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Abstract
Beginning with a critical inquiry into the reasons why the field of the political is
traditionally elaborated in the archic nexus between government and state sovereignty,
this study examines the possibilities of elaborating an alternative theory of the political in
the intersections between Michel Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchist political
theory. Taking Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality as an
alternative paradigm from which to reread the history of the political, the aim of this
study is to demonstrate that the hallmark of Foucault’s work emerges in the ways in
which his analytic of power strategically shifts the site of politics away from its
traditional locus in the exercise of government to the question of resistance. Under what
I will elaborate in terms of the primacy of resistance, I argue that Foucault’s studies of
power and governmentality reveal an anarchist hypothesis of the political in the critical
caesura between the political as archē and the political as agōn. Affirming a mutual
alliance between anarchist theory and Foucault against the orthodox foundations of
political philosophy not only exposes the conceptual principles that continue to sustain
Western political practices, but also opens up the space to pursue the implications of a
form of politics inseparable from the elaboration of permanent ethics of revolt, a distinct
way of being in the world through resistance—that is, a specific art of not being
governed. When the concepts of power and government are understood to emerge on
condition of resistance, the political conceived as archē reveals its own contingency, and
the question of politics is redirected from a constituent theory of an oikonomia to a
destituent theory of resistance, a critical ethos of becoming ungovernable, not as a
revolutionary overthrow of power, but as an art of not being governed. Rather than
reducing Foucault to anarchism, however, it is my contention that the intersection
between them emerges in the critical attempts to locate a form of politics which, in
refusing to reconstitute itself as power, could never assume the form of an archē.
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Introduction
Anarchism, Foucault, and the Question of Government
The State is the external constitution of the social power…This external constitution of
the collective power, to which the Greeks gave the name the archē, sovereignty,
authority, government, rests then on this hypothesis: that a people, that the collective
which we all call society, cannot govern itself…it must be represented by one or more
individuals, who, by any title whatever, are regarded as custodians of the will of the
people, and its agents…According to this hypothesis…is the explanation of the
constitution of the State in all its varieties and form.1
--Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.
It seems to me, in fact, that with the current economic crisis and the great oppositions
and conflicts that are developing…one can see a developing crisis of government…This
set of procedures, techniques, and methods that ensure the government of some by others
appears to me to be in crisis now…People are more and more dissatisfied with the way
in which they are governed: they have more and more problems with it and find it harder
and harder to bear. I’m talking about a phenomenon that’s expressed in forms of
resistance, and at times rebellion, over questions of everyday life as well as great
decisions…We are perhaps at the beginning of a great crisis of reevaluation of the
problem of government.2
I would like to suggest another way to go further toward a new economy of power
relations… one that implies more relations between theory and practice…It consists in
taking forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point.3
--Michel Foucault
According to the French anarchist philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the history of
political philosophy and practice finds its locution in a single hypothesis which, in
presupposing what the Greeks referred to as archē, culminates in the paradigms of
government and state sovereignty. For Proudhon, then, “[t]he form in which the earliest
men thought of order within society was the patriarchal or hierarchical form, which is to
say, in essence, authority and, in operation, government.”4 Presupposing the primacy of

1

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “Resistance to the Revolution,” in Property is Theft: A Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
Anthology (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2011), 482.
2
Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed.
James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 295-296.
3
Michel Foucault, “Subject and Power,” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. James D.
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 329; 336.
4
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “The Authority Principle,” in No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism,
ed. Daniel Guerin (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005), 81.
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government as the principal way in which order might be conceived within society is
what Proudhon refers to as the “authority principle,” or, “the governmental prejudice.”5
It is this principle of the archē, which as Proudhon correctly suggests both presupposes
and privileges “government as the “sin qua non condition for order” in society—that has
been absolutely foundational in the historical trajectory of Western political theory.6
Since its origins in Greek political thought, the terms of the political and the very
possibility of politics have been haunted by this paradigm which, following Proudhon,
might be termed the crisis of the political, or that which assumes the primacy of archic
government as the transcendental condition of possibility and material reality of politics.
For Proudhon, within the history of political philosophy the “two notions—
government and order—therefore, allegedly, have a cause and effect relationship with
one another: government being the cause and order its effect.”7 Working within the
paradigm of government, traditional conceptions of politics are, as anarchists often argue,
reducible to theories pertaining to the exercise of power, thus neglecting the potential
manifestation of alternative conceptions of both political theory and politics. Like the
anarchist Lucy Parsons once maintained, “government in its last analysis is this power
reduced to science.”8 It is in this regard that Mikhail Bakunin argues that the very term
“politics,” as traditionally understood in political theory, is taken to refer to a certain
simultaneity between authoritative power and government. Exploitation and government,
Bakunin contends, “are the two indivisible terms of all that goes by the name of politics,”
wherein the former represents “the pre-requisite as well as the object of all government,
which, in turn, guarantees and legalizes the power to exploit.”9 For Bakunin, then, the
indivisible nexus between the emergence of “politics” and the problem of government
forms the primary conceptual impasse of political theory from its classical incarnation to
its present form. Yet, according to Proudhon, the originary nexus between politics and
government is itself subject to a fundamental hypothesis that has sutured the domain of

5

Ibid, 81.
Ibid, 87.
7
Ibid, 87.
8
Lucy Parsons, “The Principles of Anarchism,” in Lucy Parsons: Freedom, Equality, Solidarity, ed. Gale
Ahrens (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company, 2003), 29.
9
Mikhail Bakunin, “God and the State,” in No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism, ed. Daniel
Guerin. (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005), 151-152.
6
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the political to the manifestation of government as such. Proudhon writes: the “external
constitution of the collective power, to which the Greeks gave the name archē,
sovereignty, authority, government rests on this hypothesis: that a people, that the
collective being we call society cannot govern itself” (original emphasis).10 In Western
political thought, the history of the concept of politics not only begins with the practice of
government as its own transcendental condition of possibility, but also with an originary
nexus that legislates a specific continuity between archē and politeia. Between the
domain of the political and the paradigm of government lies the originary principle of the
archē, and it is this principle that has hitherto fundamentally structured the dominant
narrative of political theory and practice in the West.
With the paradigm of the archē acting as the theoretical and practical framework
from which a critical conception of the political might begin, the very rationale that posits
a fundamental nexus between the domain of the political and the manifestation of
government has never been called into question, and political thought from its classical
form through its present incarnation begins with the concept of government as its
fundamental presupposition. As Proudhon’s dissent demonstrates, within the historical
trajectory beginning with the seminal works of Plato and Aristotle, and stretching to
modern political theorists such as Hobbes and Schmitt, the general terms of political
theory arise by presupposing a synthesis between politics and the exercise of government
which, in turn, is subject to the principle of an archē. It is this principle of the archē that
at once designates the condition of possibility and teleological limit for thinking through
what lies at the essence of the political. In classical political theory, beginning with the
primacy of the archē has had the effect of both naturalizing the paradigm of government
as the fundamental essence of politics, while simultaneously demonstrating that what
causes the political to emerge as such is analogous to, and made possible by, power
exercised as government. It is precisely this conceptual model of the political that, until
recently, has remained unchallenged by the majority of philosophers, and has further
prevented political theorists from conceptualizing an alternative theoretical and practical
framework for the field of the political that could never assume the form of an archē as its
privileged domain.
10

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “Resistance to Revolution,” 482.
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With such preliminary problematics in mind, this study takes as its critical turning
point the inquiry into the reasons why the terms of the political in the West have assumed
the form of government as the condition of possibility for a theoretical and material
conceptualization of politics. Contributing to what has recently been referred to as the
“anarchist turn”11 in politics and political theory, as well as to the development of what I
take to be an integral, yet historically neglected and critically undervalued concept found
in the French philosopher Michel Foucault’s collected works, the aim of this study is to
think through the philosophical and political problems underlying the historical terrain
that reduces and structures politics to the spacing and act of government in light of what I
posit as a key intersection between the resurgence of anarchist thought and practice and
the key concept of resistance found in Foucault’s political thought and writings.
Appropriating the concept of resistance as developed in anarchist political theory, as well
as its further elaboration in Foucault’s thought, in terms of the critical locus from which
to reread the history of the political against the primacy of government, it is my
contention that what must be at stake in contemporary debates about political theory
hinges on a unique relationship between Foucault’s philosophy of resistance and
anarchism that creates a fundamental rupture in the political logic of an archē, or the
specific rationale that presupposes the question of government as the implicit starting
point for a critical conceptualization of the political as such. Taking seriously the
potential of postanarchist philosopher Saul Newman’s claim that the goal of political
theory is to “affirm anarchism’s place as the very horizon of radical politics” (original
emphasis),12 this project pursues the implications of the emerging body of anarchist
praxis and scholarship along a trajectory following a core tenet of anarchist theory found
in Foucault’s thought—what will be elaborated throughout this project as the primacy of
resistance. Recognizing that resistance is primary with respect to power not only reveals
an alternative critical methodology that shifts the site of politics away from its traditional
archic locus in the exercise of power, but in doing so further illuminates the possibility of
developing an anarchist theory of politics in its irreducibility to the principle of an archē.

11

Simon Critchley, introduction to The Anarchist Turn, eds. Jacob Blumenfeld, Chiara Bottici and Simon
Critchley (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 2.
12
Saul Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 2.
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In contemporary political theory, the logic of the primacy of resistance has most
recently been broached by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their text Multitudes:
War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. 13 Inspired by a reading of the preface to the
first volume of Capital in which Marx claims that labor both materially and politically
precedes capitalist development, Hardt and Negri argue that such a theory corresponds
with a critical methodology that begins with the question of resistance. Insofar as labor
can be understood as holding a position of primary with respect to the development of
capitalist domination, Hardt and Negri’s point is to uphold that the “same is true of
resistance” (original emphasis) since the former concept is traditionally appropriated as
the substance that makes possible the dissolution of capital in the materiality of class
struggle.14 Such a tradition of inverting the relation between capitalist development and
labor toward the latter’s capacity for resistance has a trajectory that stretches back toward
the Italian movements of Operaismo in the 1960’s and later Autonomia in the later
1970’s, both of which Negri played a role as a key theorist. In these movements, Negri
alongside Mario Tronti, Sergio Bologna, and others build upon Marx’s claim that capital
reacts to the active struggles of the working class, in order to suggest that class struggle is
materially prior to socially developed capital. In other words, since work is the dynamic
13

See: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitudes: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York:
Penguin, 2005), 64-69. Despite the direct correlations with Foucault, with their use of the term “the
primacy of resistance” Hardt and Negri instead turn to Marx and derive the concept from a critical theory
of labor. Indeed, as a concept inspired by a Marxist theory of labor, Hardt and Negri’s use of the term
suggests that labor is the primary force in capitalist society in which the former’s capacity for resistance
always precedes the latter’s strategies of domination. The concept of the primacy of resistance, however,
is not a key term developed throughout this text, and is instead invoked as a theoretical bridge toward
developing a theory of resistance realized in what they refer to as the “democracy of the multitude” (67).
It is in the context of this democratic multitude, and its universal struggle against “our permanent present
war,” that Hardt and Negri suggest that “the primacy of resistance allows us to see history from below
and illuminates the alternatives that are possible today” (64). Nevertheless, while Hardt and Negri’s
attempt at a critical methodology that begins with the question of resistance is, in many ways, particularly
keen, since they frame their understanding of the primacy of resistance in the dynamic between capital
and labor, it is more adequately the question of labor rather than resistance that is given the status of
primacy. Indeed, Hardt and Negri’s work is less a theory of resistance than a theory of what they refer to
as “immaterial labor” in which the production of immaterial products such as knowledge and ideas might
come to be understood as a particular site of resistance (65). Emerging in the intersections between
Foucault, anarchism, and political theory the notion of the primacy of resistance articulated in this study
will be first distinguished from the universal characteristics Hardt and Negri prescribe for a politics of
global revolt. Furthermore, rather than invoking the concept of resistance as a way rethink the question
of labor in contemporary capitalist society, it is my contention that the question of resistance requires a
serious inquiry of its own right.
14
Ibid, 64.
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force of capitalist society, what is at stake for these theorists is that the concept of labor
contains a certain capacity for resistance that always precedes capitalist domination.15
Such a conception of labor’s inherent capacity to resist the strategies of capital ultimately
invokes an alternative critical methodology that begins with the question of resistance
rather than domination, and as such invites an affinity with an important aspect of
Foucault’s thought—that is, that resistance is primary with power.16
Although the logic of the primacy of resistance has briefly been discussed by
Hardt and Negri in terms of a Marxist theory of labor and the coming politics of a global
democracy, and while Mark Coté has established a specific continuity between the
Autonomists and Foucault’s theory of power in terms of reversing the traditional polarity
between capitalist domination and class struggle, it is nevertheless a mistake to reduce the
question of resistance to a theory of labor, especially in the context of Foucault’s project.
Rather than invoking the primacy of resistance as a concept that amends the traditional
polarity between capitalist strategies of domination and labor, it is my contention that
such a rationale as it arises from Foucault is best expressed in the context of anarchism
15

For example, see: Mario Tronti, “Lenin in England,” Marxists.org, accessed November 4, 2016,
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/it/tronti.html. Originally published in
January, 1964 in the first issue of Classe Operaia, in this text Tronti outlines the possibility of a critical
Marxist methodology that inverts the traditional relation between capital and labor in such a way that
class struggle becomes the operative force in the dynamic between the two. In a passage key to the
theoretical development of Operaismo and Autonomia, Tronti maintains that traditional Marxists have:
“worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first and workers second. This is a mistake. And
now we have to turn the problem on its head, reverse the polarity, and start again from the beginning:
and the beginning is the class struggle of the working class.” Tronti’s work has been of key interest to
Hardt and Negri’s work (see note 14 above) and Mark Coté (see note 16 below) and has influenced a
restructuring of the dynamic between capitalist domination and class struggle.
16
The similarities between the Autonomist’s reversal of traditional Marxist methodology and Foucault’s
analytic of power have not gone unnoticed. Indeed, in a particularly keen dissertation titled The Italian
Foucault: Communication, Networks, and the Dispositif (PhD diss., Simon Fraser University, 2007), Mark
Coté has outlined the ways in which Foucault’s reconceptualization of power directly influenced several
critical Italian theorists, including Tronti and Negri, to fundamentally rethink the history of capitalism in
such a way that gives priority to the question of resistance. As Coté suggests, the Autonomist “reversal of
Marxist orthodoxy was in profound affinity with Foucault’s reconceptualization of power” in terms of how
both valorize the question of resistance over strategies of domination within their respective critical
methodologies (222). It is in the relay between the Autonomists and Foucault’s analytic of power that
Coté speaks of an “Italian Foucault” in which the key characteristic that defines such an intersection arises
with the idea that “resistance comes first.” (74) While Coté’s work is particularly astute in highlighting
the importance of the question of resistance in Foucault’s work, his claim that Foucault’s analytic of
power expands Marxist critique as developed by the Autonomists tends to overemphasize the question of
labor not only as the privileged site of labor, but also the central locus through which the question of
resistance can be posed as such.
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instead of Marxism. Staging an intersection between anarchism and Foucault’s theory of
resistance against the orthodox history of political theory not only seeks to expose the
ontological and political principles that continue to sustain Western political practices
but, more importantly, attempts to open a space for political praxis beyond the horizon of
state-based politics. Situating Foucault’s theory of resistance in the context of anarchism
is not, however, a simple ideological preference, but rather, as we will see, that which
arises from a close reading of Foucault’s texts, lectures, and interviews from various
periods of his work. Thus, instead of reducing anarchist thought to Foucault’s
philosophy, or Foucault to contemporary approaches to anarchism, this project reveals
that Foucault’s political philosophy and anarchist theory intersect by locating the
question of resistance as the key concept through which the field of the political can be
rethought as a permanent domain of agonistic struggle irreducible to, and in confrontation
with, the state and power exercised as government.
In an interview from 1978, Foucault, like anarchist theorists before him, begins to
situate his thought in relation to the “developing crisis of government,” and further
establishes the trajectory of his work “at the beginning of a great crisis of reevaluation of
the problem of government.”17 It is well known that during his lectures at the Collége de
France, particularly in 1977 and 1978, Foucault begins to shift his emphasis from an
analytics of power to an analytics of the forms of rationality intrinsic to Western practices
of government, or what he refers to as “governmentality.”18 With the turn toward the
study of the history of governmentality Foucault indicates three primary shifts in the
focus of his work at this time. First, rather than focusing on specialized practices of
power and their deployment within specific institutional locations, as he did in Madness
and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, and to a certain extent in Discipline and Punish,

17

Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” 296.
The lecture titled “Governmentality” was initially published in the Italian journal, Aut-Aut, and then
reproduced twice, once in the journal, Actes, and again in the French collection Dits et Ecrits. The first
English version, translated from the Italian by Rosi Braidotti, republished and revised by Colin Gordon in
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). The most recent version, included in Security, Territory,
Population, is a revised version taken from a live recording as well as the original manuscripts from the
lecture given at the Collège de France. Given that the majority of critical works on Foucault tend to cite
from the first English translation, all further citations are from the edition published in in Power. Essential
Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 202-222.
18
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Foucault shifts his focus toward the analysis of specific complex forms of political
rationality and techniques of power exercised as a government over an entire population,
or what he theorizes as “biopolitics.”19 Second, Foucault analyzes government in terms
of an ensemble of practices operating through specific forms of political rationality
inherently different from the forms of logic intrinsic to political sovereignty and
disciplinary power.20 Indeed, following the lectures collected as Security, Territory,
Population, many of the proceeding series of lectures given at the Collége de France are
set to analyze the specific forms of rationality intrinsic to power exercised as government.
Lastly, Foucault traces how the emergence of what he refers to as “pastoral power”
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries begins to combine with the logic of the state
and “gradually becomes governmentalized.”21 In this regard, although traditional
political theory often presupposes the state as the constituent component required for the
emergence of the political, Foucault maintains to the contrary that the state can only be
understood in terms of its essential relation to the question of government.
Yet, while the turn toward “governmentality” marks a critical turning point in
Foucault’s thought, his work is not limited to the study and analysis of power exercised
as government. Instead, this analysis of government directly corresponds with, for
Foucault, a genealogical analytic of the counter-historical movements of resistance
against governmentality. Indeed, the turn toward the study of government, especially as
developed throughout several of his core writings, lectures, and interviews contains an
often over looked conceptual hinge, a key turning point in Foucault’s thought, that
fundamentally links the study of government to a critical theory of resistance. Thus, in a
crucial passage from a lecture given in 1978 titled “What is Critique?” Foucault proposes
a fundamental nexus between the history of government and the counter-historical
movements of resistance as the domain proper to the political. Foucault writes:

19

Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” 218.
Ibid, 220. Here, Foucault describes the how the process of governmentalization occurring during the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries took place at the intersection between a “whole series of specific
governmental apparatuses” and the “development of a whole complex of knowledges” 220.
21
Ibid, 220. Foucault’s point here is to draw an important connection between the problematic of
government and the traditional conceptualization of the state in political theory. Rather than
understanding the state in terms of sovereign power and juridical law, Foucault argues that the “state can
only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality” 221.
20
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[t]his governmentalization, which seems to me to be rather characteristic of these
societies in Western Europe in the 16th century, cannot apparently be dissociated
from the question “how not to be governed”…And if we accord this movement of
governmentalization of both society and individuals the historic dimension and
breadth which I believe it has had, it seems that…as both partner and adversary to
the arts of governing, as an act of defiance…as a way of limiting these arts of
governing…there would have been something born…both a political and moral
attitude, a way of thinking…which I would very simply call the art of not being
governed.22
Here, Foucault points toward the way in which the historical question of government is
simultaneously posed with the counter-historical problematic of revolt against these
forms of governmentality. More fundamentally, however, it is my contention throughout
this study that the way in which Foucault outlines a specific correspondence between
power and resistance—that is between power exercised as government and the art of not
being governed—reveals a radical new perspective from which to read the history of the
political anarchically. This is why in the turn toward the study of governmentality
Foucault continuously reiterates that the very questions of power and government
necessarily coincide with another political question, a “phenomenon” which Foucault
states is historically “expressed in forms of resistance.”23 According to Foucault, it is
through a critical theory of politics as resistance, and not of government alone, that one
can begin to suggest an alternative “way to go further toward a new economy of power
relations.”24 Yet, in the search for an new analytic of power, it is not simply the analysis
of government that designates Foucault’s principal concern at this period; instead, rather,
Foucault clarifies that it is the concept of “resistance” which forms the primary
“philosophical problem of our days.”25 At its core, this study affirms the concept of
resistance as the principal problematic explored by Foucault throughout the entirety of his
work, while simultaneously suggesting that it is through Foucault’s theory of resistance

22

Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?,” in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth.
(New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), 44-45.
23
Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” 296.
24
Michel Foucault, “Subject and Power,” 329.
25
Ibid, 336.
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that the question of anarchism can be reopened within contemporary debates in political
theory.
While the concept of resistance forms the critical axiom from which a new theory
of the political might arise, an elaboration and study of the role of resistance, I claim,
simultaneously acts as the theoretical and conceptual framework from which Foucault’s
political thought can be fully understood. Rather than presupposing the primacy of
government and the manifestation of political power as the implicit starting point for a
theory of the political, Foucault argues to the contrary that the very possibility of a new
political economy of power relations “consists in taking the forms of resistance against
different forms of power as a starting point.”26 By beginning with the concept and
practice of resistance as the very basis from which a new economy of power relations
might arise, Foucault fundamentally reverses the orthodox logic of standard political
theory, and radically denies the monopolization of the political by the paradigm of
government. Yet, taking the concept of resistance as a beginning point from which to
understand the history of politics, necessarily requires an alternative analytic framework
from which to reread the history of the political as such. This means, however, that
resistance is not only primary with respect to the history of the political, politics and
relations of power, but also in terms of Foucault’s methodology. In order to understand
the very nature of politics one must begin, as Foucault suggests, by situating resistance in
a relation of primacy with the history of governmentality. Between the crisis of
government and the coinciding philosophical problem of resistance lies the great arc of
Foucault’s thought.
Furthermore, it is my contention in this study that between the paradigm of
government and the corresponding critical theory of resistance, Foucault ultimately
reveals a unique nexus through which his thought can be situated within the context of
anarchist political theory. Although critics have and continue to argue that Foucault’s
development of what might be considered a political theory of resistance is practically
“impossible and even conceptually incoherent,”27 staging an intersection between
26
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anarchism and his thought through a rethinking of the idea of resistance invites a
reconsideration of the political possibilities offered by Foucault’s work, as well as a
radically new way from which to read the history of the political that transcends the
paradigm of government. In this regard, central to my argument in the chapters that
follow is that Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from the first volume of The History of
Sexuality—which reads “[w]here there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather
consequently, this position is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power”—
incorporates a radical political and ethical claim regarding the essence of politics which,
in turn, forms an interesting affinity with anarchism that remains to be fully explored.28
As I will argue throughout this project, what places Foucault’s work in line with the
history of anarchist thought is the way in which he situates resistance as the beingpolitical of politics; rather than presupposing the paradigm of government as the principle
of intelligibility of politics, Foucault argues to the contrary that the history of government
is contemporaneously parallel with the counter-historical movements of resistance—that
is, resistance is primary with the history of government, and as such acts as an alternative
grid from which to reread the terms of the political. I therefore assert that the resurgence
of anarchist thought and practice gives Foucault’s political project a renewed sense of
urgency, and further makes possible a redefinition of historical struggle irreducible to the
history of governmentality.
Contrary to the practice of assimilating the political to the techniques of power,
what is at stake for Foucault is that resistance must be understood and situated in a
relation of primacy with respect to power. Under what I will elaborate throughout this
project as the primacy of resistance, I argue that the political turns upon that which
animates the counter-history of governmentality—that is, the question of resistance, or
what Foucault refers to in 1978 as “the art of not being governed.”29 If Foucault’s fifth
thesis can be understood, as one theorist suggests, in terms of the “locus classicus for
assessing the possibility of a critical stance in his thought” (original emphasis),30 it is my
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contention that his work intervenes in the history of political philosophy precisely by
attempting to redefine the terms of the political not from the point of view of political
power, but from the possibility of the counter-histories of resistance that run parallel, yet
heterogeneous, to the historical possibility of power as such. In other words, Foucault
reframes and redefines the field of the political from the point of view of resistance, and
it is in this way that the general arc of his thought can be situated in relation to the history
of anarchism. Staging an intersection between anarchism and Foucault’s theory of
resistance, I argue that a redefinition of the terms of the political beyond the principle of
archic power is made possible through animating the practices that continuously ward off
all acts of governance. This is to say that, if there is a potential for a form of politics and
corresponding critical theory of the political beyond its culmination in the dual paradigms
of power exercised as government and the logic of the state, it is to be found in the taking
place of revolt, or the art of not be governed—a unique political rationality expressed in
the intersection between the logic of the primacy of resistance and a corresponding forms
of politics that animates the condition of possibility for life without government.
Throughout several of his works, Foucault gestures towards a fundamental
rupture with the history of political thought which, not only acts as the beginning point
for a new political philosophy against the history of political power, but also the general
trajectory that forms an interesting link between Foucault’s project and the history of
anarchism with regard to the question of resistance. Rather than exclusively focusing on
the question of governmentality as the primary site of political and philosophical
problems, Foucault argues to the contrary that what is needed vitally “is a political
philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty.”31 If, as Foucault was
often apt to say, that we still need to “cut off the king’s head” in political theory, I
maintain that this regicide of political philosophy intersects with anarchist thought
precisely by attempting to redefine the terms of the political not from the point of view of
political power, but from the perspective of a counter-history of resistance parallel, yet
heterogeneous, to the historical possibility of political power.32 As Foucault importantly
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reminds us, what must be at stake in political thought is not simply the analytics of power
and the study of governmentality, but that “which allows us to constitute a historical
knowledge of struggles, and to make use of this knowledge in contemporary tactics.”33
To be sure, Foucault’s genealogical—or as we will see, “anarchaeological”—method is
itself a testament of the primacy of resistance.34 Rather than beginning with the question
of power, Foucault instead begins anarchically—that is, with a “meticulous rediscovery
of struggles, and the raw memory of fights”—a “memory” of a form of politics expressed
as resistance which, as Foucault reminds his audience, has traditionally been “confined to
the margins” of theoretical and political thought.35 (C-SMD 8).
In his emphasis on historical struggle, Foucault’s work is set to both revive and
actualize the counter-history of sovereign power and biopolitical governmentality, and in
this way marks not only an important turn in contemporary theory but, also, and even
more fundamentally, a critical renewal of one of the central tenets of anarchist theory and
practice—that is, a form of politics expressed as resistance to governmentality. Thus, in
staging an intersection between anarchist thought and Foucault, what is at stake in this
study is that this critical alliance can be made by reintroducing the concept of resistance
as the vital and permanent component that reveals the field of the political in its agonistic
specificity. Contrary to the practice of assimilating the political to the operability of
power, what Foucault refers to as the political turns on that which animates the counterhistory of political power—that is, a politics as resistance, a certain “art of not being
governed.” Yet, and consequently, this means for Foucault that resistance is primary not
only with power, but with the terms of the political as well. In other words, a critical
theory of the political necessitates, per Foucault, a theory of resistance as its elemental
component. In this way, it is my contention that to understand the possibility Foucault
posits of a political theory irreducible to sovereignty, the question of resistance—what I
will elaborate throughout this project as the primacy of resistance in relation to the
paradigm of government—must not be subordinated to the study of the history of political
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sovereignty or to the study of the biopolitical governmentality. Instead, the primacy of
resistance responds to the crisis of governmentality in a way that is itself fundamental;
Foucault’s historical ontologies of power, politics, and governmentality derive their
incredible force from the affirmation of a counter-historical ontology of resistance that is
heterogeneous to, yet cotemporaneous with, the history of political power. It is only
through a critical investigation of the primacy of resistance inscribed within the history of
government as its “irreducible opposite” that will allow us to “escape,” as Foucault
writes, “from the system of Law-Sovereign which has captivated political thought for
such a long time.”36
In outlining the intersections between the return of anarchist philosophy and
Foucault’s study of resistance, this study asserts the primacy of resistance across two
main points of intersection. First by thinking through the philosophical and political
problems underlying the historical terrain that reduces and structures politics to the
spacing an act of government, it is my contention that what must be at stake in outlining
the growing relationship between contemporary radical thought and anarchist philosophy
hinges on elevating the study of anarchism to a more fundamental level in order to
cultivate the emergence of a new theory of the political in its irreducibility to the political
as archē. Affirming anarchist theory against the foundations of political philosophy not
only seeks to expose the ontological and political principles that continue to sustain
Western political practices, but also opens the space to pursue, in the chapters that follow,
the implications of the emerging body of anarchist praxis and scholarship along a
trajectory following a core tenet of anarchist theory found in Foucault’s thought: an
agonistic theory of politics as resistance. Paving the critical framework from which to
understand the general implications of the turn toward anarchism, I additionally contend
that Foucault’s problematic of resistance provides a more consistent framework from
which to rethink the terms of the political consequent upon the turn toward anarchism.
Instead of reducing current debates in radical political theory to anarchism, this study
reveals that Foucault intersects with anarchist theory by asserting the concept of
resistance as the theoretical and practical framework from which this alternative theory of
the political might take place. As such, this study aims to redefine anarchism and
36
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Foucault’s philosophy in relation to the fundamental politico-philosophical problem of
resistance, while simultaneously posing the primacy of resistance as the vital component
from which to rethink the domain of the political in its agonistic and anarchic specificity.
An attempt to trace the logic of the primacy of resistance within Foucault’s
philosophical and political works and its relation to anarchist political theory will be
elaborated in the chapters that follow. While working within the tradition of political
theory, my study of Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchist political theory further
traverses three inter-disciplinary axioms: Foucault studies, anarchist studies, and the more
recent field of resistance studies. Within of these distinct fields of study, several critical
insights regarding the significance of resistance to Foucault’s political project have been
made; and, yet, a thorough study of both Foucault’s theory of resistance and its relation to
anarchist political has only scarcely been broached. In affirming the place of resistance
in Foucault’s thought, my own approach seeks to avoid the tendency to reduce Foucault’s
concept of resistance to the analytics of power; instead, I argue, that the notion of
resistance—especially as developed by Foucault—warrants a study in its own right.
Furthermore, in staging an intersection between Foucault and anarchism my intention is
not, however, to demonstrate that Foucault’s productive theory of power somehow
amends the shortcomings of classical anarchist thought, as has been claimed by certain
anarchist theorists.37 Instead, my intention is to demonstrate to the contrary that rather
than overturning a flawed conception of anarchist resistance, Foucault’s theory instead
compliments the anarchist conception of resistance and emphasizes its key importance
within the history of political theory. In this regard, it is necessary to briefly outline
certain critical positions from which my own study of the intersections between
anarchism and Foucault’s theory of resistance proceeds.

Foucault and the Political
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First at stake in my analysis of Foucault’s study of resistance is a rereading of the
relationship between his work and political theory. While Foucault is often celebrated for
making key contributions to the study of politics through his retheorization of power
relations, as one critic nevertheless suggests, “Foucault did not characterize himself as a
political theorist or philosopher and wrote no text intended to sum up his political
thought.”38 Even so, while Foucault refused to self-identify as a political philosopher, it
is well documented that, from the late 1960s until his untimely death in 1984, his work
increasingly took a more political turn. In regard to this political turn, Foucault’s
biographers often point out how his work began to engage more directly with political
questions after witnessing a student revolt in Tunisia during 1966,39 which in Foucault’s
own account “was a true political experience.”40 Others have identified Foucault’s
political turn in the events following the revolts in France during May of 1968.41 Indeed,
throughout these years, Foucault’s project develops as an archaeological and genealogical
analysis of the forms of political rationality coupled with an analytic of power that
ultimately culminates in the study of the “history of governmentality.”42 Taking this
genealogy of governmentality as the central critical axis from which to develop an
alternative analytic of power, Foucault’s project, and the critical gesture that arises out of
it, ought to be understood and situated in relation to the larger history of political
philosophy. My argument, however, is not simply that Foucault ought to be incorporated
within the history of political thought as a central rather than marginal figure, but instead
that it is through the logic of resistance continuously developed throughout his work
whereby Foucault carves out the most trenchant interventions within the history of
political theory.
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Despite the importance Foucault continuously attaches to the political nature of
his work, the question of politics remains one of the more highly contested topics within
his oeuvre. While several theorists have analyzed Foucault’s work in relation to the
question of politics and the political, full studies of his relation to political theory are
lacking in comparison to the amount of work dedicated to other aspects of his thought.
As a recent critic argues, then, regardless “of the political importance of Foucault’s
thought, and perhaps to some extent because of its radicalness, the study of politics is an
area in which Foucault was until recently relatively neglected by comparison with other
social sciences and literary humanities.”43 Traditionally, theorists tend to argue that
Foucault intervenes in the history of political thought by developing a radically new
analytic of power, and scholars often tend to focus on the question of power while
bracketing the corresponding concept of resistance.44 It is often the case that Foucault’s
readers therefore tend to credit his thought for “welcoming the concept of power into the
contemporary philosophical landscape,” while neglecting to notice how this analytic of
power fundamentally turns upon the question of resistance, without which it would lose
its specificity.45
Despite the copious amount of secondary literature on Foucault, there is a
surprisingly minute amount of work done in regard to the concept of resistance as
continuously developed throughout his thought. Until recently, works engaging with
Foucault’s political theory often include short sections dedicated to a conceptual pairing
between “power and resistance.”46 Yet, although Foucault consistently argues for the
importance of a theory of resistance, critics and scholars rarely attempt to engage with the
notion of resistance as a concept that warrants a full study of its own, nor have they
noticed the way in which resistance functions in Foucault as the principle of intelligibility
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from which to reread the history of the political and the question of power.47 Thus, while
theorists such as Chloë Taylor highlight how “Foucault is perhaps best known as a
theorist of power,” the concept of resistance is often disregarded or bracketed as an afterthought to the analytics of power.48 In this regard, Brent Pickett observes that while there
have been attempts to engage with the question of resistance in Foucault’s thought,
“[m]ost discussions of resistance are merely codicils to lengthy examinations of
power.”49 Standard introductions to Foucault’s thought attest to this idea, and generally
include extended discussions on how the notion of power designates one of the key
concepts elaborated throughout his work. Thus, in Clare O’Farrell’s introduction to
Foucault we read that his “name is linked most famously with the notion of power.”50
Similarly, Sara Mills suggests that it is Foucault’s “analysis of power that has most
profoundly influenced political thinking.”51 Although both O’ Farrell’s and Mills’
introductions both include a short sections titled “Power and Resistance,” these pieces
nevertheless tend to focus more directly on Foucault’s notion of power.
Furthermore, while Foucault’s understanding of politics is most commonly
reduced to his theory of power, there have been relatively few full studies written on
Foucault’s relation to political theory. John Rajchman’s Michel Foucault: The Freedom
of Philosophy,52 Jon Simons’ Foucault and the Political,53 and Mark G. E. Kelly’s texts
The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault54 and Foucault and Politics: A Critical
Introduction55 are notable in this regard. These texts have made important contributions
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to the study of Foucault’s relationship to political theory, and have also significantly
expanded the focus on the question of resistance in his thought. What is particularly
significant in these studies is how each of them highlight certain concepts by which
Foucault attempts to rethink the limits of political theory. Rajchman, for example, has
pinpointed the concept of “freedom” as the theoretical and practical thread that links
Foucault’s thought to the history of political theory, and has usefully tied the concept of
freedom to the elaboration of a Foucauldian “politics of revolt.”56 Affirming the question
of revolt as a vital part of Foucault’s critical lexicon, Rajchman’s goal is to demonstrate
that Foucault’s political thought develops a “post-revolutionary politics,” whereby
Foucault turns toward the analysis of historically specific instances of resistance instead
of revolution.57 While Rajchman significantly emphasizes the importance of revolt in
Foucault’s thought and provides an extensive outline of how this approach to politics
differs from other major philosophical schools on the left, his text strangely never
mentions the notion of resistance, thus neglecting a critical concept from which to
understand the questions of freedom and revolt in Foucault’s work. In a similar reading,
Simons argues that the political theory offered by Foucault ought to be understood in
relation to the question of revolt, and ultimately that Foucault’s work is elaborated in
terms of an “ethic of permanent resistance.”58 Yet, while Simons clearly highlights the
significance of resistance in Foucault’s thought, he also argues that “resistance is
drastically undertheorized in his work,” and thus that “he does not make these arguments
clearly.”59 For Simons, then, Foucault’s failure to fully develop the concept of resistance
undermines its potential and efficacy. “Without theorizing resistance,” Simons argues,
“Foucault’s own formulations about what makes resistance possible are opaque and
allude to some sort of underlying, indomitable of agonal subjectivity that always resists
power.”60 Despite Simons’ criticisms, my own approach resists the idea that the idea of
resistance is an undertheorized concept in Foucault. As I will demonstrate the concept of
resistance is one of the more consistent themes in all of Foucault’s work. Furthermore,
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while I affirm alongside Simons that Foucault’s thought ultimately turns upon elaborating
an ethos of permanent revolt, I nevertheless contend that this critical ethos does not rely
on a hidden form of essentialism underlying the very possibility of resistance, but is
instead what arises as the very activity of politics.
In general, however, traditional studies of Foucault’s relationship to politics are
often oriented towards his work in the 1970s in which a critical shift occurred in his
thought and was directed toward the analytics of power and the study of
governmentality.61 This critical shift in Foucault’s thought leads Kelly to maintain that
“all of Foucault’s work has to do with power.”62 In particular, three concepts from
Foucault’s work during this time—“disciplinary power,” “biopower,” and
“governmentality” have been of particular interest to scholars.63 With these concepts,
there can be no doubt that Foucault has increasingly influenced the study of politics, but
his influence within the history of political theory has primarily been analyzed in relation
to the study of a new analytics of power at the expense of neglecting how the study of
power for Foucault itself turns upon the question of resistance as its key theoretical and
methodological focal point. It is therefore my contention throughout this study that any
critical consideration of Foucault’s political theory cannot be achieved without regard to
the concept of resistance. Indeed, as Foucault maintains in an interview, the analytic of
power is itself made possible through the question of resistance:
[since the] mechanics of power in themselves were never analyzed…this task
could only begin after 1968, that is to say, on the basis of daily struggles at grass-

61

See: Mark G. E. Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 31. Here Kelly reconstructs Foucault’s
theory of power “across a ten-year period in which his thought changed considerably, into a single,
coherent account of power,” 31.
62
Ibid, 31.
63
For example, see: Michel Foucault: Key Concepts, ed. Diana Taylor (Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited,
2011). This text breaks Foucault’s thought into three primary conceptual categories—power, freedom,
and subjectivity. The sections on power include extended focuses on “disciplinary power,” “biopower,”
and “power/knowledge” yet rarely engage with the concept of resistance. Also see: A Companion to
Foucault, eds. Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’leary and Jana Sawicki (Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell,
2013.) This text has a full section dedicated to the conceptual pairing of “power and governmentality”
(299-400). With the exception of Jon Simons’s “Power, Resistance, and Freedom (301-319), the rest of
the essays are devoted to extended discussions on the concept of power in Foucault’s thought.

21

roots level, among those whose fight was located in the fine meshes of the web of
power. This was where the concrete nature of power became visible.64
While Foucault’s readers tend to focus directly on his conception of power, they neglect
to realize that such an analytic of power is only made possible in Foucault through an
analytic of resistance. To be sure, it is through the study of resistance that reveals the
visibility of power as such. This is indeed the key point Foucault continuously reiterates
throughout several of his texts, lectures, and interviews. Thus, power is not something
that can be analyzed in itself—that is, “power is not a substance”—but rather, as Foucault
importantly suggests, that which is contingent upon the permanent potentiality of
resistance amongst the dynamic to which power refers.65 Indeed, Foucault’s own
methodology begins with analyzing points of resistance in order to determine the
specificity of power, and not the other way around. As Foucault therefore writes in “The
Subject and Power,” the development of an analytic of power necessarily “consists in
using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations.”66
Because resistance is what reveals the specificity of power, Foucault argues that “[r]ather
than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of
analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies.”67 It is this analytic of
power, which fundamentally turns upon the question of resistance, that Foucault’s
thought can be seen as adding a key contribution to the history if political thought. Yet as
I will argue, in order to understand the breadth of Foucault’s thought, the concept of
resistance must be situated in a position of primacy with respect to power and politics. It
is in regard to the logic of the primacy of resistance that Foucault designates an
alternative principle of intelligibility from which the history of the political and politics
can be reread both agonistically and anarchically.
More recently, Kelly’s works The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault and
Foucault and Politics have both helped to elevate the concept of resistance to a more
fundamental position in Foucault’s political thought. As Kelly’s work makes clear, it is
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impossible to fully understand Foucault’s analytics of power without the concept of
resistance. Accordingly, the concept of resistance “is so essential to Foucault’s
conception of power,” Kelly writes, “that it requires a dedicated explanation.”68 Despite
its strengths in regard to reintroducing to importance of resistance to Foucault’s political
theory, Kelly’s work nevertheless suffers from rejecting, a priori, the affinity between
Foucault’s critical conceptualization of resistance and anarchist political theory.
Although Kelly upholds that Foucault was an “anarchist…inasmuch as he urges us to
fight against existing power structures,” he further concludes that Foucault is “neither
anarchist nor socialist in so far as he does not have an a priori commitment to abolishing
the state or capitalism, nor an alternative vision of how society might operate.”69 Thus,
“while Foucault clearly had certain anarchist tendencies,” Kelly maintains that Foucault
“does not endorse a ‘fundamental anarchism’ that is opposed to government.”70 By
positing a unique relation between anarchist theory and Foucault through the concept of
resistance, my argument is not to suggest the ways in which Foucault could be read as
endorsing a “fundamental anarchism” against the history of government. As has already
been noted, Foucault often refused to align his thought with political ideologies. Instead,
rather, as I will argue in the chapters to follow, Foucault and anarchist political theory
intersect by asserting the primacy of resistance as the key concept for rethinking the
history of the political in such a way that it cannot simply be reduced to problem of
governmentality. Such a critical perspective, however, neither implies for anarchists nor
for Foucault a fundamental essence as the fulcrum for resistance, but rather an alternative
perspective from which to rethink the terms of the political anarchically and
agonistically.
Further at stake in the reconsideration of Foucault’s relation to political theory is a
rethinking of the question of resistance as it develops in relation to the larger scope of his
oeuvre. Critical developments in radical political theory and anarchist studies, as well as
the posthumous publications of Foucault’s lectures given at the Collège de France from
1971-1984, allow for a rereading of the ways in which the concept of resistance is
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expanded and developed throughout his career. Rather than taking the analytic of power
as the key focal point from which to understand Foucault’s thought, I argue that the
concept of resistance broaches new and interesting ways from which to draw critical
connections between the differing periods of Foucault’s work. In this way, rethinking
Foucault’s study of resistance in relation to the turn toward anarchism additionally
requires, I argue, a reevaluation of the concept of resistance as it develops in relation to
what Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow refer to as the four stages of Foucault’s
thought—particularly in relation to transition from what is typically characterised as his
genealogical analysis of power relations to his studies of ethics and subjection. Indeed, at
the end of their famous study of Foucault, Dreyfus and Rabinow pose the question of
resistance as one of the possible focal points for Foucault studies.71 In this regard, certain
theorists have recently invoked the concept of resistance as a new critical arc from which
to draw connecting threads between Foucault’s different works and conceptual themes.
Johanna Oksala has traced—albeit rather briefly—the concept of “resistance” across
three thematic points connecting the seemingly disparate periods of Foucault’s thought,
and argues that his later works ought to be “read as a deliberate attempt to elaborate on
his rudimentary account of resistance in The History of Sexuality and to answer the
criticisms against” his use of resistance.72 Similarly, Brent Pickett divides “Foucault’s
writings into three periods defined by Foucault’s different understandings of
resistance.”73 Kevin Thompson maintains that Foucault offers two distinct models for
resistance—a “tactical reversal” and “aesthetics of existence”—throughout his work.74
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Such preliminary work has broached new ways from which to elevate the concept of
resistance to a more fundamental position in Foucault’s critical lexicon, and yet no full
studies of the concept of resistance in Foucault’s thought have been produced.

Foucault and Resistance
A reevaluation of the place of resistance in Foucault’s thought and its relation to anarchist
political theory furthermore entails an engagement with what has recently come to be
known as “resistance studies.”75 Historically, “resistance” has remained a relatively
under researched field in philosophy, political theory, and the social sciences. With the
advent of resistance studies, however, more serious attention has been directed toward
elevating the concept of resistance to a more fundamental level that warrants its own
studies and methodologies. Within this nascent field of study, scholars have invoked the
concept of resistance as a key component within several different disciplines. James
Scott, whose work has come to be paradigmatic in the field of resistance studies, argues
that resistance acts as a sort of “hidden transcript,” that reveals an “infrapolitics” at the
cusp of political power.76 David Couzens-Hoy has usefully highlighted the concept of
resistance as a key term for continental theorists including Foucault.77 Louise Amoore78
and Barry Gills79 have both situated resistance as consequent effect of globalization and
invoke the concept of resistance as a key component of global studies; Stephen
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Duncombe80 has addressed the problem of resistance in relation to cultural studies; Benita
Parry81 has theorized resistance in relation to postcolonial studies; Catherine Eschle82 has
made a critical link between resistance, the anti-globalization movement and the field of
International Relations; while Mona Lilja and Stellen Vinthagen83 have contributed to a
heightened interest in the study of resistance by formally establishing the field of
“resistance studies.” With such elevated interest in the study of resistance, Hollander and
Einwohner maintain that “we are now experiencing a flood of research and theory which
purports to the issue of resistance.”84
While within resistance studies there exists a plurality of definitions and concepts
employed with regard to the concept of resistance, what holds resistance studies together
is, as Vinthagen maintains, the idea that “resistance needs analytically speaking to be”
understood as a completely “different phenomenon from power.”85 That the concept of
resistance ought to be understood as fundamentally different in kind from power has
immense consequences for political theory and philosophy, consequences that will be
unpacked with a critical reading of Foucault’s work and its relation to anarchist theory.
To be sure, the advent of resistance studies opens new possibilities for understanding the
significance of resistance in Foucault’s thought. Yet, while the study of resistance is
reappearing as a concept of particular interest throughout several differing disciplines, the
contributions made by Foucault to the field of resistance studies have been widely
ignored. Although the increased attention paid to the importance of the concept of
resistance would appear to warrant further study into the question of resistance as
developed throughout Foucault’s career, scholars involved in resistance studies have
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remained strangely mute on Foucault, and have further sought to discount his critical
conception of resistance as self-refuting in terms of his analytics of power. As Vinthagen
maintains: “while Foucault made a paradigmatic turn in our understanding [of]
power/resistance he is not very helpful in understanding power/resistance.”86 As his
choice italicization suggests Vinthagen, like critics before him, emphasizes that Foucault
only focuses on the analytics of power while neglecting a full study the question of
resistance. Thus for Vinthagen, Foucault studies power “with resistance always in
brackets, and he did it from the view of power.”87 In this respect, my own study proposes
a contrary reading regarding the place of resistance in Foucault’s thought; rather than
theorizing resistance from the perspective of power, it is my contention that Foucault’s
analytic of power fundamentally depends on elaborating a theory of resistance as the key
component that reveals the specificity of power relations and the political as such. As a
whole, the discipline of resistance studies tends to focus on primarily sociological studies
and problems, while neglecting the relation of resistance to political theory, and as such
have overlooked an important aspect of Foucault’s work. As I will argue, however,
Foucault’s assertion that resistance is primacy with power fundamentally offers a new
way to reread the history of politics from the perspective of resistance, thus contributing
to the discipline of resistance studies in several ways that should not be overlooked.
Additionally, while there have been several significant contributions pertaining to
the concept of resistance in Foucault, the literature on the subject is nevertheless lacking
in comparison to the focus dedicated to his analytics of power. In this way, although
Brent Pickett correctly maintains that “it is impossible to comprehend Michel Foucault’s
politics without fully understanding his concept of resistance,” scholars and critics of
Foucault historically tend to disagree on the consistency, efficacy, and practical nature of
the political possibilities afforded by his work regarding the question of resistance. 88 It is
for this reason that Oksala maintains that “resistance is one of the most contested and
divisive concepts in Foucault’s thought.”89 The concept of resistance is divisive in
Foucault because it holds the key to understanding his analytic of power. Yet, it
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contested for the way in which several scholars argue that Foucault lacks a clear theory of
resistance. In this regard, Kelly notes that although the concept of “resistance entered
Foucault’s technical vocabulary somewhat after power,” he further suggests that
“Foucault’s reconception of power requires a reexamination of resistance.”90 As such,
the concept of resistance often appears secondary in relation to Foucault’s study of power
and governmentality. To be sure, scholars have never agreed on the consistency of
resistance in Foucault’s thought. There have nevertheless been attempts to trace the
concept of resistance through a variety of other connecting concepts spread throughout
Foucault’s different works in order to locate a more consistent pattern pertaining to the
question of resistance in Foucault’s thought. While some theorists have looked for
precursors to the concept of resistance in Foucault’s thought in terms of “the outside,”91
and the concept of “freedom,”92 others like Judith Butler have argued that the concept of
resistance in Foucault’s thought is later replaced with the ethics of “virtue.”93
Furthermore, Arnold Davidson maintains that resistance is further revised in Foucault’s
late work as an ethos of “counter-conduct.”94 While each of these studies has advanced
the study of resistance in Foucault by tracing its growth alongside other key concepts, it
is my contention that the concept of resistance in Foucault requires a full study of its own
in order to fully understand how several other themes in Foucault find their respective
bases in a theory of resistance.
Regardless of these attempts to affirm the significance of resistance in Foucault,
the concept is perhaps the most contested term in all of his critical lexicon, and scholars
rarely agree on how to conceive of the question of resistance in Foucault. Customarily,
Foucault’s critics often interpret the question of resistance in one of three manners. First,
it is argued that Foucault’s conception of power—especially as depicted in Discipline and
Punish and the History of Sexuality—presents a ubiquitous and all-encompassing theory
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of power that paralyzes rather than promotes resistance. In this regard Duccio Trombardi
writes “[t]here is no escaping the impression that Foucault, far from providing a new
stimulus to demands for liberation, limits himself to describing a mechanism of pure
imprisonment.”95 Moreover, critics such as Habermas96 and Thomas McCarthy97 have
suggested that Foucault’s concept of resistance is fundamentally self-refuting in terms of
his analysis of power. While acknowledging that Foucault often directs his attention to
the question of resistance, Nancy Fraser98 and Hartstock99 have argued that Foucault
comes close to affirming the absolute necessity of resistance without either prescribing
what such forms of resistance might look like, or a specific normative criterion from
which the activity of resistance might be justified. For Fraser, a Foucauldian conception
of resistance therefore fails on two accounts. Foucault’s theory of resistance first fails
insofar as he does not specify who is resisting and what is to be resisted, and again since
he refuses to introduce certain normative criteria whereby one might be able to explain
“why domination ought to be resisted.”100 Still others argue that “Foucauldian radicalism
fails, in effect, to hypothesize another possible response beyond the pure and simple
“refusal of politics.”101 As we will see, Foucault’s theory of resistance, on the contrary,
is not developed in terms of a pure negation, but also in terms of ethical struggle toward
new forms of ungovernable subjectivities animated in practices of resistance. In this
respect, it is my contention that these approaches either come short of recognizing the
way in which the development of a concept of resistance undermines the history of
governmentality in crucial ways which help to redefine the scope of the political as a
genuine anarchic possibility, or how the continuity between Foucault’s political and
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ethical periods reveals a productive tension between resistance, politics, and ethics key to
understanding the entirety of his works. Despite these claims from Foucault’s critics
regarding the seemingly impossible task of developing a coherent political theory of
resistance, the question of resistance, I argue, is not only central to understanding the
breadth of Foucault’s thought, but vital to the possibility of rethinking the domain of the
political against the paradigm of governmentality.

Foucault and Anarchism
Finally, affirming the relation between Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchist
political theory requires and engagement with the more recent turn toward “anarchist
studies” in continental thought. 102 With the turn toward “anarchist studies,” significant
contributions have been made across a wide-range of disciplines including political
philosophy, anthropology, political science, economics, history, sociology, and
anthropology. Commenting on this growth of anarchist ideas, Randall Amster suggests
that “in recent years, anarchism has enjoyed a resurgence among activists and academics
alike.”103 The rebirth of anarchist theory has not gone unnoticed within in studies of
political theory. With the development of “anarchist studies” breaking new ground from
which to critically engage with the history of politics, Simon Critchley has argued for an
“anarchist turn in politics and our thinking of the political.”104 Similarly, Saul Newman’s
work affirms anarchism “as the very horizon of radical politics,” and has made significant
contributions to rethinking the history of political theory through anarchist
perspectives.105 While critical turns toward anarchism have helped to break new ways
from which to reread the history of political theory, the turn toward anarchism has
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additionally opened up new critical territory from which to understand Foucault’s critical
theory of resistance.
While Foucault by no means self-identified as an anarchist, he does often invoke
examples from historical anarchist movements in support of his ideas.106 The
methodological approach to unmasking the genealogy of historical struggle does indeed
suggest a retheorization of the practices of resistance which, as Foucault claims, derive
their collective force from an “anarchist thematic.107” Towards the end of his career,
Foucault even suggests that “what should of course be studied” is “European and
American anarchism.”108 Foucault, unfortunately, completed no such study.
Nevertheless, in recent scholarship the collected works of Foucault are coming to play an
increasingly pivotal role in the retheorization of the political consequent upon the
resurgent turn toward anarchism within the contemporary political landscape. Over the
past two decades, to be sure, Foucault’s thought has been increasingly mobilized by
anarchist philosophers in a variety of important ways. The intersections between
Foucault’s works and anarchism have been most clearly elucidated in the thought arising
out of the works associated with what has been called, following Todd May, Saul
Newman, and Lewis Call respectively, “poststructural anarchism,”109 “postanarchism,”110

106

See for example: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan
(New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 291-292. Here, Foucault draws direct connections between anarchism
and the political problem of delinquency, which he takes as the basis for the elaboration of political
indiscipline in contrast to the analytics of disciplinary power. Additionally, in “The Subject and Power,”
while attempting to rethink the domain of the political from the point of view of an ongoing struggle with
power, Foucault makes the claim that the examples of historical struggle he takes as the basis for
developing the idea of resistance are “anarchistic struggles” (330). Similarly, in the first lecture from
Society Must Be Defended, Foucault claims that elaboration of the political problem of struggle develops
in relation to “an anarchistic thematic” (5). Additionally, in Society Must Be Defended, Foucault utilizes
and invokes the historical movements of the Levellers and Diggers—two movements which have often
been connected to anarchism—as examples historical struggle (58, 102, 107, 108-109).
107
Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 5.
108
Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth. Lectures at the Collége de France 1984, trans. Graham Burchell
(New York: Picador,2011), 185.
109
See: Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press,
1994); “Is Post-Structuralist Theory Anarchist?” In New Perspectives on Anarchism, eds. Nathan Jun and
Shane Wahl (New York: Lexington Books, 2010), 25-39, and “Anarchism from Foucault to Rancière.”
Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An Introductory Anthology of Anarchy in the Academy. Ed. Randall
Amster. London: Routledge, 2009. (11-17).
110
See: Saul Newman The Politics of Postanarchism. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), and
From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power (New York: Lexington Books,
2001.)

31

and “postmodern anarchism.”111 May’s work is particularly ground-breaking in this
regard, and his text The Political Philosophy of Post-Structural Anarchism provides a
clear outline of how Foucault can be read within an anarchist context. In this respect,
May argues that Foucault’s works in general “offer a compelling anarchist vision that at
once emerges from and continues the anarchist tradition.”112 With a basis in May’s work,
Newman further contends that an engagement with the relation between Foucault and
anarchism will “enable us to further engage the possibility of resistance to power.”113 In
his analysis of Foucault’s relation to the history of anarchism, Jimmy Klausen argues that
“Foucault’s anarchism in fact extends, or at least can be read as extending, to a new
theorization of anarchistic practice.”114 Such preliminary advancements, especially in
May and Newman’s work, help to uncover new possibilities for exploring the still
nascent relationship between Foucault’s work and anarchism, and as such mark a critical
turning point from which my own study proceeds.115 Yet May and Newman both
underestimate the importance of resistance in Foucault’s thought, and tend to argue
instead that it is his analytic of power, and not his theory of resistance, that allows for a
connection between anarchism and Foucault to be made. As I will argue in a later
chapter, postanarchist approaches to Foucault often fail in affirming the potential of
resistance in Foucault’s work, mistakenly focusing instead on the ways which his theory
of power helps to overcome the certain limits in ‘classical’ anarchist thought, in order to
“theorize the possibility of resistance without essentialist guarantees.”116
With the notable exception of postanarchism, traditional scholars of Foucault, as I
will demonstrate throughout this project, either deny any possible link between anarchism
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and Foucault, or attempt to reduce Foucault’s thought to a politically weak, or generic
anarchism. To be sure, Foucault’s indebted refusal to either engage in political polemics
or to outline a program for political emancipation has led to a wide-range of criticism and
confusion regarding the practicality of his political theory.117 In an interview from 1984
following the question “[w]here do you stand?” (original emphasis), Foucault’s response
highlights his refusal to identify with a particular political party or school of thought.
Foucault responds:
I think I have in fact been situated in most squares on the political checkerboard,
one after another and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious
or disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the
service of Gaullism, new liberal and so on…None of these descriptions is
important by itself; taken together, on the other hand, they mean something. And
I must admit that I rather like what they mean.118
Refusing to take a firm political position, has led Foucault to be criticized for invoking a
“skeptical apolitical stance,” culminating in a form of “radicalism pushed to the extreme
of nihilism.119 An early critic of Foucault’s political theory, Michael Walzer, has
summarized Foucault’s political thought in terms of an “infantile leftism,”120 wherein
Foucault displays a commitment to “anarchism/nihilism.”121 Similarly, in an interview
from 1983, Foucault is referred to as “an anarchistic heir of Nietzsche.”122 Furthermore,
often frustrated at the lack of a strict philosophical system linking together the seemingly
disparate periods characterizing Foucault’s thought, scholars often comment that
Foucault’s “fondness for remaining elusive and unclassifiable” undermines his attempts
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to rethink the limits of political philosophy.123 Indeed, Foucault often reiterates the claim
that neither the task of philosophy, nor the goal of political thought is to prescribe (as in
Lenin’s terms) ‘what is to be done.’ The refusal to outline or prescribe a normative
political theory has led some critics to dismiss Foucault’s work as “self-indulgent radical
chic,”124 while Habermas famously refers to Foucault as a “young conservative”125 whose
thought lacks a practical theory of emancipation.
The position of Habermas is further shared by Walzer who criticizes the political
possibilities offered in Foucault’s work. While Walzer highlights the importance of
resistance in Foucault’s thought by suggesting that Foucault’s political theory is a “tool
kit not for revolution but for local resistance,” he radically denies the effectivity of the
question of resistance in Foucault’s thought, and takes it as a simple refusal of politics.126
For Walzer, it is through the state and not movements of revolt, as Foucault argues, that
make resistance possible: “it is the state that holds open or radically shuts down the
possibility of local resistance.”127 According to Walzer, insofar as Foucault radically
denies the state as an effective model for political change, the concept of resistance in
Foucault’s thought is the “catastrophic weakness of his political theory.”128 Despite his
intentions, however, Walzer points toward the way in which Foucault’s concept of
resistance aligns him with anarchist thought. With the concept of resistance acting as the
key component of Foucault’s political thought, Walzer claims that it is “for this reason
Foucault’s politics are commonly called anarchist, and anarchism certainly had its
moments in his thought.”129
While in the chapters that follow, I will engage more thoroughly in the criticisms
launched against the question of resistance in Foucault’s thought, as well as his
approaches to the questions of politics and anarchism, this study offers a rather
unorthodox reading of these criticisms and affirms the possibilities of what his harsher
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critics tend to deny. Whereas critics of Foucault tend to deny the possibility of an
emancipatory political theory in Foucault’s thought, often pejoratively reducing his work
to a call for a benign anarchism, I affirm Foucault’s relationship to anarchist political
theory, and further assert that it is with the framework afforded by anarchism that
Foucault’s contributions to political theory can be brought to light with respect to the
question of resistance. An attempt to trace the relation between Foucault and anarchism
can be better elaborated, I argue, in the ways in which he rethinks an alternative theory of
historical struggle which, not only reveals the counter-history of governmentality through
the logic of the primacy of resistance, but also that which, in doing so, fundamentally
denies the monopolization of the political by the state and the paradigm of government.
As I will argue, it is through the question of resistance—indeed the primacy of
resistance—that Foucault’s work intersects with anarchist theory most forcibly.
Foucault’s work internally turns upon and develops an affinity with anarchism through
his concept of resistance, while anarchism is what marks the critical threshold from
which to locate the political possibilities offered in Foucault’s theory of resistance.

Towards a Theory of the Primacy of Resistance
The above discussion was set in order to create a preliminary critical framework from
which to orient and situate Foucault’s theory of resistance within the history of anarchist
political theory in a way that still needs to be explored today. As I will demonstrate
throughout this project, with the technical vocabulary of resistance, Foucault’s project
works toward reversing the general tenets of political theory. Posing the problem of
resistance against the history of governmentality not only seeks to expose the ontological
and political principles that continue to sustain Western political practices and thought,
but, more importantly, attempts to open a space for political praxis in which the very
notion of struggle with governmentality becomes the central, operative force of politics.
Until the more recent publications of Foucault’s lecture series during his tenure at the
Collège de France, the complexities of his engagement with the questions of resistance to
the history of governmentality have remained subordinate to the study of the two
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interrelated poles comprising the general turn toward the biopolitical.130 In Foucault’s
work, however, it is this very persistence of power that pushes him toward rethinking the
conditions, origins and principles of legitimacy of political power, but also the possibility
of a radical politics of resistance parallel, yet heterogeneous, to the history of the
governmental. Although the concept of resistance enters Foucault’s critical lexicon later
than the concept of power, it nonetheless forms the framework from which he begins to
think through the problem of politics; resistance as I will argue is not an isolated concept
in Foucault’s thought, and its presence stretches through to his last works. Rather than
crediting Foucault with developing a philosophical concept of power, Foucault might
therefore be better known as a philosopher of resistance. As a theorist of resistance, it is
my contention that what is crucial about Foucault’s work is how he reintroduces the
concept of resistance into the field of politics and political philosophy in such a way that
a critical caesura between the political as archē and the political as agōn is revealed.
Indeed, under the logic of the primacy of resistance, it is my contention that Foucault’s
political theory ultimately unmasks the field of the political in its anarchic and agonistic
specificity. Rather than tracing the emergence of the category of the political to the
advent of government and state sovereignty, the permanent potentiality of resistance
amongst the dynamic in which politics refers and consists reopens the field of the
political as an agonistic dynamic of struggle between power exercised as government and
the counter-historical movements of resistance. As agōn, the primacy of resistance not
only designates a permanent component of politics but, more fundamentally, the
condition of possibility from which power relations are transformed into a relation of
struggle.
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Through Foucault we can begin to point toward the ways in which the
engagement with the history of political power reveals not simply the set of practices of
resistance that turn against it, but that the fundamental fact of revolt reveals the
possibility of a life emancipated from the paradigm of government —indeed, of other
possibilities “turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it.”131 While
Foucault explicitly situates his work in relation to the complexities of governmentality as
the site for political and philosophical problems, what is crucial is that he simultaneously
unmasks and posits the possibility of a non-sovereign politics of resistance. This history
of revolt, which reveals the counter-history of archic governmentality, is precisely the
point in which Foucault attempts to carve out a new terrain for political theory. Although
it is often overlooked in his work, or simply dismissed as the affirmation of a “quasianarchism,”132 Foucault’s engagement with the history of governmentality is set to
demonstrate the potential to slip into its opposite, what he calls in one work a “tactical
reversal” and in another the “counter-power” of the primacy of resistance.133 That is,
Foucault reopens the site of the political as fundamentally cognisant of the very
possibility of anarchism, of being-without-government through what Kropotkin refers to
as the “spirit of revolt.”134 If as Foucault suggests in “What is Critique?” that the history
of politics has been fundamentally bound to the political question of how to govern, the
counter-histories revived throughout his work are guided by a question that is not only
irreducible to the history of the former, but perhaps even the principle question posed by
anarchism. Foucault writes that the “perpetual question” that needs to be asked in
relation to the history of political philosophy, and one that his work is set to revive, takes
the form of asking “how not to be governed.”135 Indeed, according to Foucault born
alongside the history of sovereign power and the art of governing is the counter-history of
what he pointedly refers to as the “art of not being governed.”136 It is this “art of not
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being governed” that Foucault both takes as the key referent from which a new political
theory beyond the paradigm of government might be thought, as well as the ethical basis
for a form of politics conceived as resistance to power exercised as government.
Thus, what is of absolute importance, yet highly under-theorized in Foucault
studies is, however, that alongside the analytics of power and the study of
governmentality, Foucault begins to develop a theory of historical struggle and resistance
against the techniques of governmentality. The question regarding “how not to be
governed” is, for Foucault, the ethical framework from which a new form of political
thought might begin; politics as such must be reframed in terms of “the art of not being
governed.” When Foucault famously argues for a regicide in political theory, it is my
contention that he is specifically concerned with addressing the possibilities of resistance
that counter the forms of power exercised as government. In Security, Territory,
Population, Foucault highlights this theme as a central component to his work. Against
the history of governmentality, Foucault writes:
There must be a moment, when breaking all the bonds of obedience, the
population will really have the right, not in juridical terms, but in terms of
essential and fundamental rights, to break any bonds of obedience it has with the
state and, rising up against it, to say: My law…must replace the rules of
obedience. Consequently, there is an eschatology that will take the form of the
absolute right to revolt, to insurrection, and to breaking all the bonds of
obedience: the right to revolution itself.137
It is through the concept of resistance and the “right to revolt” that Foucault saw the
greatest potential to challenge, and perhaps even negate, his theory of governmentality.
To be sure, Foucault intervenes in the history of political philosophy by attempting to
think politics against the reduction to the first principle of archic governmental power.
Indeed, it is in Foucault that the question of resistance reappears as a key term thus far
neglected in political philosophy.
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Furthermore, with the concept of resistance acting as the theoretical framework
from which to rethink the notion of politics, a critical conceptualization of resistance
additionally acts as the point from which to rethink the history of the political and
political theory. For Foucault, then, resistance forms the point of “extreme brightness” in
political theory because it means that “we ought to have the courage to begin anew.”138
Understood in this way, resistance means:
We have to abandon every dogmatic principle and question one by one the
validity of all the principles that have been the source of oppression. From the
point of view of political thought, we are, so to speak, at point zero. We have to
construct another political thought, another political imagination, and teach anew
the vision of a future.139
Here, Foucault importantly points toward the way in which the very possibility of an
alternative theory of the political requires an engagement with the question of resistance.
Yet, this alternative theory of the political is simultaneously posed with a
reconceptualization of what constitutes the essence of politics. In the manuscripts to the
lectures compiled as Security, Territory, Population, Foucault points toward what it
might mean to construct another form of political thought through the question of
resistance. Foucault writes: “politics is nothing more and nothing less than that which is
born with resistance to governmentality, the first revolt, the first confrontation.”140 As
Foucault indicates here, “politics” is analogous to the emergence of resistance and revolt.
In this way, although resistance for Foucault is directly immerged within relations of
power, politics nonetheless refers to a permanent sphere of agonism “born with resistance
to governmentality.” In its most basic sense, then, a Foucauldian theory of politics
designates the space of “resistance to governmentality.” In other words politics,
according to Foucault, emerges as a paradigm of revolt. If politics, for Foucault, is that
which is born with resistance to governmentality, then it is my contention that the logic of
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the primacy of resistance directly informs an entirely different analytic framework from
which to rethink the history of the political.
Although work on Foucault’s approach to a theory of resistance is at times both
skeptical and evasive, what Foucault outlines in his fifth thesis on power in The History
of Sexuality is key to understanding the way in which he hopes to re-evaluate the terms of
the political beyond the paradigm of government. Indeed, this thesis is the decisive
moment in Foucault’s thought that provides the possibility for a critical stance against the
history of governmentality. That resistance is present in a position of non-exteriority to
power, means that resistance is part of the relation of power itself—that is, resistance is
“inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite,” and as such is always primary with
power.141 As Foucault clarifies in a later interview, resistance is fundamental to a
retheorization of the political because:
It means that we always have possibilities, there are always possibilities of
changing the system…You see, if there was no resistance, there would be no
power relations. Because it would simply be a matter of obedience…So
resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the force of the process;
power relations are obliged to change with resistance. So I think that resistance is
the key word, in this dynamic…To say no is the minimum form of resistance.
But, of course, at times that is very important. You have to say no as a decisive
form of resistance (original emphasis).142
As the “key word” in the dynamic between power and resistance, it is clear that Foucault
begins to associate politics with the two-fold operative character of resistance. First, the
potential space of resistance inherent to relations of power means that wherever there is
the possibility of power there is also, and consequently, the space where “we always have
possibilities”—that is, potential for resistance. In this way, “resistance comes first”—that
is, resistance is primary with power. Additionally, this primacy of resistance is the
condition of possibility for “changing the system,” the act of opening up the spacing of
the political in order to transform it. Finally, Foucault additionally points toward

141

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 116.
Michel Foucault, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential
Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 167-168.
142

40

something fundamental regarding the logic of power itself. The condition of possibility
of power is neither the state nor the paradigm of government; instead, rather, the
condition of possibility of power is itself resistance, without which “there would be no
power relations.” With the primacy of resistance Foucault fundamentally reverses the
very principles of traditional political theory. By understanding resistance as being
primary with power, what I refer to as the primacy of resistance is set to overcome the
allegations from certain critics of Foucault that he presents a picture of power that stifles
rather than develops resistance.143 The fact that resistance is present wherever there is
power does not mean that power is inescapable; rather, the primacy of resistance means
precisely that power is itself relational with its own adversarial force, and cannot be
conceived beyond this relation. As Deleuze reminds us in his study of Foucault, what is
crucial is that “the final word on power is that resistance comes first” (original
emphasis).144 It is not therefore power that is inescapable, but resistance; in its position
of primacy, resistance is the condition of possibility of both power and politics—that is,
resistance is what allows for the category of the political to emerge as such. It is this
potentiality inherent to power that ultimately allows for a preliminary reinterpretation of
Foucault’s fifth thesis as follows: if the potentiality for resistance is inherent wherever
there is power—that is, inasmuch as the history of governmentality is simultaneously the
expression of its own counter-history—and politics is that which becomes manifest
through “resistance to governmentality,” then resistance can be seen as the anarchist
invariant of political power and the history of governmentality.
Through the technical vocabulary of resistance, Foucault fundamentally reinvents
an alternative way to reread and revaluate the history of politics and political theory.
Although Foucault is still criticized for undermining the potential for a grounded political
position throughout his work, as early as 1968 Foucault begins to describe the arc of his
work in terms of developing a theory of resistance, distinct from both orthodox political
philosophy and other forms of politics. Setting up his work in contradistinction from
other prevalent forms of politics at the time, Foucault writes:
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A progressive politics is a politics which recognizes the historical and specified
conditions of a practice, whereas other politics recognize only ideal
necessities…A progressive politics is a politics which defines, within a practice,
possibilities for transformation and the play of dependencies between those
transformations, whereas other politics rely upon the uniform abstraction of
change.145
Rather than understanding politics as the prescription of “ideal” strategies and “uniform
abstractions” Foucault, as early as 1968, begins to describe a form of politics that begins
with and takes into account the potential for radical transformation as its constituent
component. Although the language of a “progressive” politics now appears dated
(Foucault himself abandoned the notion of progression), it is clear that rather than
developing an apolitical stance, Foucault instead is committed to the development of an
alternative theory of the political that grounds the question of politics within the space of
transformation—a concept he later develops as the phenomenon of resistance. In this
way, if resistance allows for a fundamental rethinking of the “principles” which have
hitherto structured the terms of the political, it is my contention that in order to
understand the possibility of affirming anarchism as the horizon of contemporary radical
thought, the question of resistance, must not be subordinated to the study of the history of
the archipolitical. Instead, the primacy of resistance responds to the crisis of
governmentality in a way that is itself fundamental; Foucault’s historical ontologies of
power derive their incredible force from the affirmation of a counter-historical ontology
of resistance that is heterogeneous, yet parallel, to the history of the governmental. Yet,
and consequently, in its relation of primacy to the domain of the political, resistance is
not only a vital component of politics and the political, but that which makes visible the
political as such.
Thinking against Foucault’s critics, then, the primacy of resistance as articulated
throughout this project can be seen, I argue, as forming the locus from which not only a
new theory of politics might begin, but the very principle of intelligibility from which to
rethink the domain of the political. By beginning to rethink politics through the question
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of resistance and radical transformation, Foucault calls for a radical reanalysis of
precisely what constitutes the political and the politics of resistance. As Paul Patton
notes, with Foucault’s intervention “one can no longer accept the conquest of power as
the aim of political struggle; it is rather a question of the transformation of economy of
power itself.”146 Recent developments in anarchist studies demonstrate a strong affinity
between Foucault’s work and the history of anarchism. Yet, at the same time, anarchist
theorists who engage with Foucault have remained strangely mute with regard to the
question of resistance. By elevating the concept of resistance as a vital philosophical
problem and key concept in Foucault’s lexicon, what is at stake in the attempt at
rethinking the political consequent upon the turn toward anarchism today is that the
primacy of resistance both designates the condition required to begin to think politics
against and beyond the paradigm of government, as well as the historical force for
creating new possibilities in life without government, an art of not being governed.

Chapter Outline
Chapter one, “On The Crisis of the Political: Government, Sovereignty, and the Paradigm
of the Archē,” takes as its critical turning point the inquiry into the reasons why the terms
of the political used by political theorists presuppose an archic nexus between the
paradigms of government and state sovereignty as the condition of possibility for
theoretical and material conceptualization of politics. As way to establish the historical
and philosophical context from which my own study proceeds this chapter traces two
dominant political paradigms through Aristotle and Schmitt which, when taken together,
provide a general narrative regarding the ways in which the field of the political in the
West is historically elaborated in terms of a form of politics as archē—that is, the
principle that locates the question of politics at the intersection between power exercised
as government and the logic of state sovereignty. As I will demonstrate, it is precisely
this conceptual model for the domain of the political that, until recently, has remained
unchallenged by political theorists and philosophers, and as such has prevented us from
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conceptualizing an alternative theoretical and practical framework for a theory of the
political that neither assumes government or the state as the privileged site of the
political. Taking the unique nexus between the principle of the archē and the paradigms
of government and state sovereignty as the conceptual horizon from which to situate the
turn toward anarchism in political theory, I then place anarchist theory in conversation
with two recent trends in contemporary theory—postanarchism and what Critchley refers
to as the “meta-political moment.”147 Contrary to the history of political theory which
locates the field of the political between government and state sovereignty my argument
is that, in their respective responses to the crisis of the political, postanarchism and
metapolitical theory both attempt to rethink the possibility of politics and the political
against the logic of the archē, and yet because of this require not only a rethinking of
anarchism as the basis from which a new thought of politics might emerge, but also an
anarchist hypothesis of the political that takes resistance as its principal domain. Such
developments in contemporary political theory not only open up unexplored possibilities
for the continued retheorization of anarchism, but also, as I will argue in the chapters to
follow, the critical framework to orient and situate Foucault’s theory of resistance that
begs to be explored today.
Responding to the archic paradigm that synthesizes the terms of the political with
government and state sovereignty, chapter two, “Anarchy and Anarchism: Rethinking the
Political at the Horizon of the State and Government,” argues for a return to the study of
anarchism in order to reveal a theory of the political in its irreducibility to the logic of the
archē. Following what postanarchist philosopher Saul Newman refers to as the
“anarchist invariant,” or, the “recurring desire for life without government that haunts the
political imagination,” I examine the relevance of anarchism to contemporary political
theory across two primary axes—rethinking the political against the paradigms of
government and state sovereignty, and a corresponding theory of politics as resistance
that animates this alternative conception of the political as such.148 Here, my intention is
to first reintroduce anarchism as itself a distinct form of political philosophy that
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fundamentally turns upon an alternative hypothesis of the domain of the political in its
irreducibility to the political as archē, and second to demonstrate how the concept of
resistance animates and forms the central component from which this new conception of
both politics and the political can become discernible. Together these two ideas—that is,
the political situated at the horizon of the state and the exercise of government, as well as
the elaboration of an alternative paradigm for politics as resistance—form the locus of
what I hold not only to be the essential task for political theory, but also the vital
characteristics from which anarchism informs the context of Foucault’s political thought.
In this regard the focus of this chapter is to both reintroduce anarchism in terms of its
fundamental gesture toward developing an anarchist hypothesis of the political, an
alternative theory of politics in which the question of resistance reveals the political in its
anarchic and agonistic specificity.
Chapter three, “An Anarchist Hypothesis of the Political: Foucault, Critique and
the Art of Not Being Governed,” introduces the concept of resistance as the key term that
gives meaning to Foucault’s critical inquires into the problematics of power, politics, and
governmentality, and further seeks to situate Foucault’s thought as such within context of
anarchism. Taking Foucault’s philosophy as exemplary of the attempt to affirm an
anarchic politics situated at the horizon of the state and government, in this chapter I
argue that the notion of “critique,” as developed between two key lectures Foucault gave
in 1978 and 1984 under the respective titles “What is Critique?” and “What is
Enlightenment?” corresponds with a different conceptualization of the terms of the
political which, in turn, redefines the spacing of the political as the history wherein power
always coincides with the fundamental truth of its own resistance. In this regard, it is my
contention in this chapter that with the concept of “critique” Foucault not only
emphasizes how the notion of resistance designates the key term central to his
philosophy, but also how it designates the principle from which the political, in its
agonistic specificity, can be interpreted anarchically. Taking the concept of “critique” as
the hidden critical locus from which to locate the problem of resistance in Foucault’s
thought, it is my contention that his work increasingly reveals what I refer to as the
anarchist hypothesis of the political—in which the term ‘politics’ refers to an ongoing and
permanent dimension of agonism between the exercise of government and the counter-
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historical movements of resistance animated as an “art of not being governed.” Rather
than beginning with the question of power (which, of course, can never be neglected in a
study of Foucault) the overall goal of this chapter is two-fold: to first demonstrate how
the notion of “critique” functions in Foucault as the critical concept that locates the
trajectory of his works with the context of a theory of resistance, and further that
Foucault’s theory of resistance rethinks the question of politics in a manner that invokes a
reconsideration of the connection between his work and the history of anarchism.
Chapter four, “The Primacy of Resistance,” designates the key focal point around
which my study of the intersection between Foucault and anarchism is based. Utilizing
the theoretical space of the anarchist hypothesis of the political as outlined in the previous
chapter, this chapter discusses Foucault’s important contribution to the often neglected
questions pertaining to the relationship between politics, power and resistance. Taking
the permanent interplay between power and resistance as both the constituent material
and principle of intelligibility of the power and politics, I argue that Foucault’s analytic
of power in The History of Sexuality posits what I refer to as the primacy of resistance, in
which the question of politics is reinvigorated and made possible only insofar as
resistance is to be understood as a vital, permanent characteristic of power. Central to my
argument, here, is that Foucault’s fifth thesis incorporates a radical claim which reverses
the essential being-political of politics, and thus has significant implications for the
continual development of anarchist thought. Rather than reducing the sphere of the
political to the historical operability of governmentality, through the logic of the primacy
of resistance Foucault reverses the archic principle that has hitherto structured Western
political thought, ultimately revealing a new way from which to reread the history of the
political from the point of view of resistance rather than government. Taking seriously
the notion that an alternative theory of the political—indeed an anarchist hypothesis of
the political—can be made in regard to the question of resistance, what is at stake in this
chapter is that such a theory ultimately first finds its basis in Foucault’s fifth thesis on
power.
Chapter five, “From Archē to Agōn,” seeks to establish a theoretical continuity
between the primacy of resistance as broached in The History of Sexuality and the lecture
series given under the provocative title Society Must Be Defended in which the
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power/resistance dynamic is directly reinvigorated by Foucault as the basic framework
from which to read the question of politics and the history of the political. As its primary
focal point, this chapter will focus on Foucault’s genealogical analysis of the war model
of politics, in which resistance is not only primary in relation to the domain of the
political, but that which acts as the principle of intelligibility from which the political as
such can be read. More specifically, while the previous chapter is set to reveal and
explicate how Foucault’s fifth thesis posits the primacy of resistance as the condition of
possibility and principle of intelligibility for a new economy of power relations, this
chapter traces how Foucault invokes this same thesis as the basis from which to rethink
the history of the political as a domain of an agōn in which the power/resistance dynamic
is recast in terms of interpreting politics as a continuation of war. In this regard, it is my
contention that insofar as a vital connection between the analytic of power from The
History of Sexuality and the analytic of the political as extensively theorized in Society
Must Be Defended can be made in terms of the primacy of resistance, that this theoretical
nexus is itself made possible in Foucault’s strategic inversion of Carl Von Clausewitz’s
proposition regarding the ways in which war designates the continuation of politics by
other means. By tracing the ways in which Foucault’s fifth thesis is redeveloped in
Society Must Be Defended, it is my argument in this chapter that Foucault’s assertion
regarding how resistance is primary and absolutely co-extensive with the field of power
is indicative of an alternative hypothesis from which to interpret the political as agōn
rather than archē. The central claim here is that just as resistance is primary with power
for Foucault, the agonistic model of the political asserts that resistance is also primary
with the history of politics.
In the final chapter, “The First Revolt: Politics as an Ethics of Resistance to
Government,” I outline a specific correspondence between Foucault’s theory of
resistance and the turn toward the study ethics at the end of his career. While the three
previous chapters are set to situate Foucault’s work in relation to the history of political
philosophy and anarchist thought, it is my contention in this final chapter that this
anarchist hypothesis of the political which takes the primacy of resistance as its
constituent component, also turns upon an ethics of revolt that animates and makes
possible Foucault’s agonistic analytic of power and politics as such. Following Arnold
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Davidson’s idea that Foucault’s notions of conduct and “counter conduct” as developed
in Security, Territory, Population, contain a key “conceptual hinge” linking together the
political and ethical axes of his thought, I argue that Foucault adds an explicitly ethical
component to the logic of the primacy of resistance.149 With the notion of counterconduct acting as the conceptual hinge between the political and ethical periods of
Foucault’s thought, resistance can be seen I argue not simply in terms of an absolute
refusal of government, but rather as that which in its struggle with government, affirms
another possibility in life. In light of the way in which a continuity between the political
and ethical axes of Foucault’s thought can be drawn through the concept of resistance, it
is at once my contention in this chapter that there is an explicitly political dimension of
Foucault’s theory of ethics that itself turns upon the question of resistance, as well as how
this turn toward the study of ethics reveals an important way in which the relation
between politics and resistance can be rethought in terms of a critically resistant ethos,
not as a prescriptive set of moral codes and normative rules, but ethos defined as a mode
of resistance to the exercise of power as government. More specifically, it is my claim
that Foucault’s ethical turn ought to be understood as an attempt to locate a continuity
between a form of ethics that animates his theory of resistance, and a form of politics as
resistance resistance—that is, an distinct ethos, or art of not being governed.
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Chapter 1
1
On The Crisis of the Political: Government, Sovereignty, and
the Paradigm of the Archē
Since its origins in Greece, politics has carried within itself a metaphysics of order. It
begins from the premise that people must be governed, either democratically by
themselves or hierarchically by others…If we have a politics to advance, it is the one that
begins from the opposite hypothesis…There is an open battle between, on the one hand,
this fear…that we can only live on condition of being governed, and on the other hand,
an inhabited politics that dismisses the question of government altogether.150
--The Invisible Committee
Perhaps there is a different way of thinking about the political principle—one that is
detached from state philosophy and works against it in the name of an entirely different
kind of political community. This is where the autonomy of the political translates into
the politics of autonomy–a politics and an understanding of the political community
which is outside of, and autonomous from, the state.151
--Saul Newman
In the historical narrative that has continuously helped shape the structure and practice of
Western politics, political theorists from classical antiquity to our own contemporary
situation have consistently taken the dual paradigm of the exercise of power in the form
of government and the coinciding problematic of sovereignty as the twin a priori
presuppositions from which a critical conceptualization of politics and political
philosophy might begin. To be sure, since Plato’s political treatise The Republic—a text
often considered by many theorists to be the foundational work on Western political
philosophy152—political theory has been haunted by the originary nexus that locates
politics and the terms of the political in the intersections between the exercise of
government and the state. Indeed, within the historical and theoretical trajectory that
stretches through the foundational texts such as Plato’s The Republic and Aristotle’s
Politics, to Thomas Hobbes’s political treatise the Leviathan, and later Carl Schmitt’s
controversial work On the Concept of the Political, the history of political philosophy
traditionally begins by presupposing an a priori nexus between the field of the political
150

The Invisible Committee, “Spread Anarchy, Live Communism,” in The Anarchist Turn, eds. Jacob
Blumenfeld, Chiara Bottici, and Simon Critchley (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 230-231.
151
Saul Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism, 99.
152
See: John Ferrari, “Introduction” to Plato, The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), xi.

49

and the paradigms of state sovereign power and the techniques of government.
Underlying this theoretical nexus and historical continuity between the exercise of
government and the paradigm of sovereignty lies what can be termed the crisis of the
political, in which the history of politics and the political is reduced to the primacy and
first principle of what the Greeks referred to as archē, the paradigmatic nexus that binds
the question of politics and the political to the logic of government exercised within the
domain of state sovereignty.
As a distinct history pertaining to the way in which the question of politics
radically coincides with and is indistinguishable from the art of governing, the French
insurrectionary collective, The Invisible Committee, thus indicates how western political
philosophy, since its incarnation in Greece, presupposes a certain “metaphysics of
order”—that is, the very question of “politics” begins with a fundamental “premise that
people must be governed, either democratically by themselves or hierarchically by
others.” As Robert Paul Wolff further notes in his text, In Defense of Anarchism, the
orthodox notion of “politics” as such has traditionally been understood and elaborated
within the unique paradigm of state sovereign power, wherein the term “politics” is taken
to refer to the “exercise of the power of the state.”153 Consequently, insofar as the
question of politics has been traditionally elaborated in terms of the exercises of
government and sovereign power, the history of “political philosophy” is therefore
analogous, as Wolff writes, to the “philosophy of the state.”154 Standard definitions of
political theory, political science, and the term “politics” reflect this reduction of the
history of the political to the dual a priori presuppositions of government and state
sovereign power as the criteria proper to a critical inquiry into the question of politics.155
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In its traditional and orthodox use, the most common definition of the term “politics,” is
initially derived from Aristotle and refers to “the science and art of government,” or “the
science dealing with the form, organization and administration of a state or a part of one,
and with the regulation of its relations with other states.”156 In this regard, it is my
contention that the history of political theory and politics can at once be read as a history
in support of the philosophy of the state, as well as in support of a distinct form of
politics manifest in the continuation of the art of governing. More specifically, it is my
argument in this chapter that the history of political theory can be interpreted as a
historical elaboration pertaining to how politics at once emerges from Aristotle as a
unique paradigm of government, a certain art of governing realized in terms of what is
referred to in Greek as oikonomia, as well as how political theory presupposes a certain
continuity between sovereign power and the concept of the political in such a way that
the emergence of the field of the political (as proposed by Hobbes and later Schmitt)
coincides with and is indistinguishable from the state.157 While the dual paradigms of
government and state sovereignty are traditionally accepted by political theorists as the
key terms pertaining to the essence of politics, the originary archic nexus that locates the
question of politics at the intersection of government and sovereignty is itself rarely
called into question.
Taking the anarchist turn in contemporary political theory as a key referent from
which to rethink the basic tenets and theoretical principles that have hitherto sustained
political theory, this chapter takes as its pivotal turning point a critical inquiry into the
reasons why the domain of the political in the West has assumed the dual form of
government and sovereignty as the condition of possibility for a theoretical and material
conceptualization of politics. Indeed, under what I hold to be the key paradigm inherent
to the history of political philosophy, the exercise of government and the theory of
sovereignty traditionally retain a certain originary position of primacy in regard to the
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founding terms that allow for the political to emerge. By position of primacy, we might
highlight what the French anarchist philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon refers to as the
founding tripartite condition of possibility of politics in the West—that is, the elemental
relation between “sovereignty, authority, [and] government”—which marks the historical
condition of possibility of politics and the emergence of the political as such.158 What
Proudhon points toward here in terms of the conceptual triptych that has historically
conditioned the ways in which we theorize and practice politics allows us to glimpse the
political in its most paradigmatic form. In Proudhon’s interpretation, the terms of the
political can be conceived as the history in which politics takes place in the field whose
extremes are “government” and “sovereignty,” between them “authority,” archē in Greek.
As we will see, what is at stake in the relation between government and sovereignty is the
constitution of an originary nexus through which politics coincides with, and is
indistinguishable from, the paradigm and first principle of an archē. Indeed, as the key
concept through which the history of politics is expressed in the duality between
government and sovereignty, the term archē designates the domain in which the political
is revealed in its most authoritative form. It is precisely this logic of the archē that this
study of Foucault and anarchism calls into question.
As both form of power and administration of order, as both exercise of
government and state sovereignty, it is my assertion in this chapter that the original nexus
that binds the question of politics to the history of the archē both presupposes government
and sovereignty as the substance and material manifestation of politics and the political.
Insofar as a critical conceptualization of the political as archē begins with the hypothesis
that one must be governed, then the material substance and activity of politics is itself
reduced to the exercise of government as a form of political power. Understood in this
way, politics not only rests upon a “metaphysics of order” that presupposes the necessity
of government as its own precondition, but also what The Invisible Committee refers to
in terms of “government as a specific form of power” (original emphasis).159 Indeed, as I
will argue below it is in Aristotle’s seminal text, Politics, in which the origins and
foundations of politics can be shown to be directly tied to the expression and exercise of
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government as a specific form of power—that is, as an oikonomia. At the same time, in
the transition from the political theory of classical antiquity to modern political
philosophy, the question of politics is more directly elaborated as a paradigm of
sovereignty in addition to the exercise of government. While the field of politics
designates the exercise of power in the form of government, in the tradition that stretches
from modern political theorists such as Hobbes to that of Schmitt, what is at stake for
these theorists is that politics as such refers to that which is situated and takes place
within the domain of the state. Consequently, however, what is ultimately revealed in
both Hobbes’s and Schmitt’s respective models of the political is a certain equivalency
between the exercise of government and the theory of sovereignty in terms of the
historical agent, or motor of politics and the political as such. While the history of
politics as government has a much older tradition than that of modern theories of
sovereignty, it is nevertheless my contention that the two can be understood as forming a
single paradigm whereby the logic of the archē designates the nexus through which
politics is expressed and historically manifest in the field between the exercise of power
as government and state sovereignty.
Even though the discourses of government and sovereignty continue to
fundamentally shape the ways in which political theory is both conceived and practiced,
recent developments in radical political theory, particularly the return of anarchist
political theory, are beginning to rethink the possibilities of a political philosophy that
can neither be reduced to the critical framework of government, nor that of sovereignty.
With the crisis of the political marking the pivotal point from which to understand the
critical intervention posed by the resurgence of anarchism today, it is my contention that
the anarchist turn itself turns upon exploring and elucidating an alternative critical theory
of the political that is fundamentally irreducible to the archic paradigm of government
and sovereignty. In this regard, we might point, as does The Invisible Committee, toward
the ways in which the contemporary political landscape is coming to be marked by an
“open battle” between theorists working within the orthodox framework of government
and those who begin by dismissing the “question of government altogether.” It is in
relation to the latter position, that The Invisible Committee proposes a critical “exit from
the framework of government” as the central—and even vital—task for contemporary
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political theory.160 If the history of political philosophy traditionally begins by
presupposing an archic nexus in which politics is expressed in the field between
government and sovereignty what is called for, and perhaps even required in the return to
anarchism is, as The Invisible Committee suggests, a radically new framework from
which to rethink the condition of possibility of politics and the political—that is, what is
required is a critical theory of the political “that begins from an opposite hypothesis.”
Similarly, as Newman further maintains in the epigraph above, if political theory is to
free itself from the dual paradigms of government and the state then what is further
essential is an alternative framework for “thinking about the political principle” that
creates a critical caesura between the Schmittian paradigm of the “autonomy of the
political” and an anarchist “politics of autonomy.”161
Responding to the ways in which anarchist political theory sets itself the task of
rethinking the conditions, origins, and principles of legitimacy of sovereign state power,
while simultaneously positing the possibility of a politics not conditioned by the history
of government, the first two sections of this chapter trace two dominant paradigms of
politics through Aristotle and Schmitt, in which the form of the political in the West can
be revealed as a nexus between the primacy of government and sovereign power. Indeed,
it is my contention that the Aristotelian and Schmittian theories of the political ought not
be understood as representing two separate models, but instead that the intersections
between the two represent a single paradigm of the archē in which the political designates
the nexus through which politics assumes the form of an oikonomia exercised within the
domain of state sovereignty. Taking the history of the political (via Aristotle and
Schmitt) as the critical axiom upon which to situate and understand the anarchist turn in
political theory, I then trace the return to anarchism across two points of intersection as
framed in the continuity between the search for politics beyond the exercise of
government and a rethinking of the domain of the political situated at the horizon of state
sovereign power. Here I place anarchist theory in dialogue with two recent critical turns
in contemporary thought—postanarchism and what Critchley refers to as the “meta-
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political moment” 162 around which the central tenets of anarchism are being mobilized in
such thinkers as Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Simon Critchley, Saul Newman, and
Todd May in order to argue that the central concerns of their respective political theories
can be characterized as the continuity between the search for a politics beyond the
exercise of government and subsequently an alternative methodological and critical
framework for rethinking the history of the political. Contrary to the history of political
theory which assumes the primacy of government as the paradigmatic form of the
political my argument is that, in their respective responses to the crisis of the political,
both postanarchist and meta-political theory attempt to rethink the possibility of politics
and the political against the logic of an archē. Yet, because these critical turns intervene
in the history of political thought by attempting to rethink the political at the horizon of
the state and the exercise of power as government, the interventions made by
postanarchism and metapolitics require not only a rethinking of anarchism as the basis
from which a new thought of the politics might emerge, but also an anarchist hypothesis
of the political that takes resistance, rather than the exercise of government as its
principal domain.
Indeed, against the background of the Aristotelian and Schmittian models of the
political, what is ultimately at stake in this chapter is to demonstrate the ways in which a
critical turn toward anarchism not only relies upon a fundamental rethinking of the
political and politics, but also that this alternative theory of the political is itself made
possible by a critical inquiry into the problematic of resistance, a key term from which
the question of politics can be rethought. Such developments in contemporary political
theory not only transcend the orthodox paradigms of political theory while opening
unexplored possibilities for the continued retheorization of anarchism, but also the critical
framework to orient and situate my critical inquiry into Foucault’s theory of resistance
that begs to be explored in relation to the turn toward anarchist theory today. With this in
mind, the aim of this chapter is to form the critical, theoretical, and historical context
from which my own study precedes. First, by thinking through the philosophical and
political problems underlying the historical terrain that reduces and structures politics to
the topology and practice of government, it is my contention that what must be at stake in
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outlining the growing relationship between contemporary radial thought and anarchism
hinges on elevating an anarchist theory of the political to a more fundamental level in
order to cultivate the emergence of a new political logic which forms a fundamental rift
with the historical continuity of the logic of the archē. Affirming anarchist theory against
the foundations of political philosophy not only seeks to expose the ontological and
political principles that continue to sustain Western political practices, but also opens the
space to pursue, in the chapters that follow, the implications of the emerging body of
anarchist praxis and scholarship along a trajectory following a core tenet of anarchist
theory found in Foucault’s thought: an anarchic politics of agonistic resistance. Instead
of reducing current debates in radical political theory to anarchism, this chapter reveals
how critical turns in radical political theory such as metapolitics and postanarchism
intersect with an anarchist hypothesis of the political by forging the space for the political
outside of the nexus that locates politics between government and the state, and further
that this anarchist turn culminates in the need for rethinking through the theory of
resistance proposed throughout the works of Foucault.

1.1 The Aristotelian Paradigm of the Archē: Politics as an
Exercise of Government
Politics…is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in the state…since
politics…legislates what we are to do and what we are to abstain from…the state seems
at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve…it is
finer and more godlike to attain for it a nation or for city-states…it is political science.163
--Aristotle

With the exception of Plato, there is perhaps no figure within the history of political
philosophy other than Aristotle who occupies such a paramount and influential place in
the history of political thought. Although the wider scope of Aristotle’s thought can by
no means be limited to the question of politics, for many political theorists his “greatness
lies in his reputation as the father of political science.”164 As a founding figure within the
history of political theory, Aristotle’s work on the question of politics, particularly in the
163
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two texts The Politics and Nichomachean Ethics, has not only established the theoretical
framework and conceptual terminology for a critical inquiry into politics and the history
of the political, but also the groundwork for how politics has historically been conceived
and practiced. As one Aristotelian theorist notes, since “Aristotle occupies a paramount
place in the history of political ideas, not only for the range and robustness of his theories
of society and the state, but also for the relevance of his theories” to contemporary
political thought, any serious study pertaining to politics and the political necessarily
requires (at least to a certain extent) an engagement with the works of Aristotle.165 To be
sure, while Aristotle’s work in political theory antedates contemporary political thought
by over two-thousand years, his thought continues to exert large amounts of influence on
contemporary theories of the political as characterized by his philosophical reflection on
certain fundamental issues embedded in contemporary debates. “Despite the profound
divide separating classical and modern theories of government,” as another commentator
writes, “contemporary thinkers have, with surprising frequency, turned to the political
teaching of Aristotle in order to assess both the possibilities and limitations for politics in
liberal societies.”166 Moreover, while there is a continued and renewed effort to place
Aristotle’s political theory in dialogue with contemporary political discourse, this had led
some theorists to claim that the persistent reappearance of Aristotle in contemporary
debates about politics subsequently reveals the “persistence of political philosophy
itself.”167 If there is a certain persistence of Aristotle within contemporary studies of the
political that coincides with the perseverance of political theory, this is made possible not
in the way that Aristotle is continuously renewed in contemporary contexts, but rather in
the way that the paradigm of government continues to fundamentally shape the various
ways in which we discuss, theorize and practice politics.
For Aristotle, politics (politikê in Greek) is short for the science of the political
and composes one of the three main categories of the Aristotelian sciences. Politics, like
ethics, economics, and rhetoric composes the basis of what Aristotle refers to as the
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practical sciences (as distinct from the theoretical and productive sciences), and is clearly
divided into questions pertaining at once to government, statesmanship and legislation.168
While Aristotle’s work in Politics can be read as a disinterested inquiry into the nature
and substance of politics, the text can also be understood more correctly as a work
organized with the general aim of instructing those in power. Thus, as one commentator
affirms, “Aristotle’s main purpose in in the Politics is not to give an academically
dispassionate account of political phenomena but to provide a handbook or guide for the
intending statesman; ‘political science’ (politikê) is also a ‘statesmanship’.”169 In this
regard, Aristotle’s Politics can be read alongside other works directed as advice to those
in power such as Plato’s Republic before him and later Machiavelli’s The Prince. Yet,
although the Politics of Aristotle can indeed be read as an instructional guide suggesting
the proper methods of governing for those who already are or might eventually be in
power, it is necessary to briefly return to Aristotelian political theory in order to reveal
how the emergence of the category of the political and the manifestation of politics is
founded upon and sutured to the paradigm of government, a specific form of power in
which the term ‘politics’ comes to signify the techniques of government exercised within
a sovereign state. While, it is incontestable that Aristotle’s founding works on political
theory have and continue to shape the ways in which we think and practice politics, a
return to Aristotle is required not in terms of how his political works might be invoked as
way to critically interrogate the possibilities afforded in contemporary liberal
democracies but, more fundamentally, as a way to interrogate the ways in which the
condition of possibility of politics and the emergence of the political assume the
paradigmatic form of an oikonomia. Indeed, it is by returning to Aristotle that the
concept and practice government—that is, of oikonomia—can ultimately be revealed as
the implicit starting point for a critical inquiry into the nature of politics and the political.
In order to understand how Aristotle forms an originary nexus between the
emergence of politics, the state, and the exercise of government as the constituent
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components of the political, it is first necessary to turn toward a seminal passage from
Nichomachean Ethics, in which “politics” is defined as a distinct tripartite relationship
between government, legislation and the state. “Politics,” Aristotle writes:
is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in the state…since
politics…legislates what we are to do and what we are to abstain from…the state
seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to
preserve…it is finer and more godlike to attain for it a nation or for city-states…it
is political science.170
From the first sentence it is clear that the question of “politics” and the disciplinary field
of “political science,” according to Aristotle, ought to be studied within the framework of
a state—that is, the very question of politics is framed within the horizon of the state. As
anarchist philosopher Nathan Jun notes, since Aristotle understands the state as the basis
and limit of the political, his work is “politicocentric; it is always concerned with, and to
a certain degree presupposes the state under some description or other.”171 In its most
preliminary form, the terms of the political, then, in Aristotle’s thought are rendered
indiscernible from its basis within the state in such a way that the state coincides with the
emergence of the political. Additionally, however, while Aristotle directly situates the
practice and study of politics within the domain of a state, his definition also outlines a
specific synthesis between the activity of politics and the exercise of government, and
further that this movement or exercise of politics becomes manifest within the art of
governing, or the legislation of another’s conduct and activity. As Jun further observes,
insofar as Aristotle presupposes a synthesis between the art of governing and the very
activity of politics, then the manifestation of politics within the domain of the state is
itself always a normative discourse legislating the activity and conduct of others; “it is
concerned with how human social relations ought to be organized” (original emphasis).172
Politics in the Aristotelian sense, therefore refers to the practices of government which
legislate the actions and potential actions of others—that is, politics as defined by
Aristotle designates the exercise of government as a specific form of power, in which the
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aim and activity of politics is to govern the field of one’s conduct in order to achieve a
specific end. Taken together, what is at stake in this early—indeed paradigmatic—
definition of politics is a specific synthesis between politics as an exercise of government
and the domain of the state—that is, politics as a distinct art of governing which legislates
“what we are to do and what we are to abstain from” is framed by Aristotle within the
horizon of the state. To be sure, it is with this definition that we have the earliest
rendition of what designates the crisis of the political, or the archic nexus that establishes
a certain continuity between the exercise of government, sovereignty and the state.
It is with these two basic premises—that is, that the domain proper to the sphere
of politics is that of the state, and further that the exercise of politics is analogous to the
exercise of government within the horizon of the state—through which Aristotle outlines
the theoretical nexus between the domain of the political and what can be termed primacy
of government. By the primacy of government, I mean to point toward the way in which
the terms of the political, particularly in the works of Aristotle, have at once been
historically reduced to the paradigm of government as the very exercise of politics, as
well as the condition of possibility of the political as such. Indeed, as initially utilized by
early political theorists like Plato and Aristotle the word political is repeatedly rendered
inter-convertible with the theoretical conceptualization and material manifestation of
government. Often translated as “form of government” and “constitution” from the
Greek politeia, the word “political” designates for the ancient philosophers both a system
of government and its practice.173 Classical definitions of the political as politeia have
had the effect of strategically locating the essence of the political within the paradigm of
government, while subsequently naturalizing the exercise of government as the
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conceptual framework, or limit point, for thinking through the possibility of politics and
the political. As Jun maintains in reference to Aristotle:
the very word political means having to do with forms of government…Like the
axioms of Euclid’s geometry, government has been an implicit starting point,
always assumed and never justified—the transcendental condition of possibility
for thinking, writing, and talking about human social organization.174
At once meaning and referring to the sphere that has to do with forms of government, as
well as its exercise as the legislation of the conduct of others, the terms of the political
and the very possibility of politics since Aristotle have been haunted by this paradigm
which assumes the primacy of government as the transcendental possibility and material
reality of the political as such.
Through Aristotle, we have seen how the notion of “politics” refers to a distinct
art of governing exercised within the domain of a state, and thus that the terms of the
political as politeia are reducible to the primacy of government in terms of both the
transcendental condition of possibility and material realization of the field of the political
as such. Framing the terms of the political as a unique synthesis between the exercise of
government and the state both valorizes the exercise of governing as the theoretical limit
point for conceiving the political, and in doing so naturalizes the state as the horizon for
the political as such. Yet, in order to fully understand how the term “politics” comes to
designate the art of governing exercised within the domain of a state, what needs to be
further investigated is the specific rationale Aristotle invokes as the basis from which his
theory of the political emerges—that is, what is further required is a critical inquiry into
the specific rationality that allows for the political to emerge as a synthesis between the
exercise of government and the state. Indeed, while the horizon of the state and the
exercise of government together form the nexus proper to the domain of the political, the
primary goal of the Politics is not, however, to arbitrarily assign a fundamental relation
between the exercise of government and the state but, more specifically, to outline a
certain continuity between politics and a particular view of human nature whereby the
latter directly informs the former and makes it possible. As Aristotle maintains in the
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Physics, of all the things that exist “some exist by nature, some from other causes.”175
Similarly, in the Politics, what Aristotle takes as his model of the political—that is the
synthesis between the exercise of government and the domain of the state—can be
understood as a critical elucidation of the natural condition of politics; politics according
to Aristotle is that which proceeds from nature. Several theorists have engaged with the
concept of “political naturalism” in Aristotle and have outlined how one of the primary
goals of the Politics “is to derive political values from facts about human nature.”176 In
this regard, Aristotle’s work in the Politics can be understood as ultimately resting upon
three fundamental presuppositions from which a certain correspondence between his
view of human nature and his theory of politics can be drawn: first, human beings are, by
nature, “political animals;”177 second, the state exists in nature and is thus prior to the
individual; and finally politics, as the art of governing, exists in nature and finds its basis
in the management of the household (oikos). There is therefore a certain political
naturalism that makes possible Aristotle’s conceptualization of politics in which the
terms of the political, the state and the exercise of government are all understood to have
their respective foundations within certain practices inherent in nature; politics according
to Aristotle is, in fact, a natural condition of human existence. While Aristotle’s claim
regarding how human beings are political by nature has informed several critical inquiries
into Aristotle’s conception of the political, it is the latter two presuppositions that
ultimately reveal the history of the political in its most paradigmatic form.
It is in regard to the Aristotelian conception of political naturalism in which we
can fully understand how the terms of the political and the history of politics begin to
coincide with the primacy of government, the state, and sovereign authority as the origins
from which the practice of politics is derived. In other words, it is Aristotle’s
understanding of human nature that forms the foundation of his theory of politics—that
is, Aristotle’s theory of politics is inextricably linked to his understanding of human
nature, and it this particular understanding of nature through which we can trace the way
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in which the terms of the political begin to coincide with the exercise of government and
the state. Aristotle begins his argument in the Politics by tracing how politics is in fact an
inherent condition of human nature rather than an arbitrary convention, and outlines how
the question of the political—in which politics designates the exercise of government
within a state—therefore first finds its basis in the pre-existent models of the household
and village. 178 Since Aristotelian political theory considers the state the final cause, or
teleological end of human political association, then “the state” is to be taken according
to Aristotle as itself “a creation of nature.”179 Yet, while the household (oikos) forms the
basic foundation from which the political emerges, throughout the Politics Aristotle
presupposes the primacy and naturalization of the state as that which is prior to yet, at the
same time, the natural end point of political organization. Thus, while Aristotle indeed
maintains that the domain proper to the sphere of politics is the state, what underlies
Book 1 of the Politics is a secondary thesis which attempts to ground this understanding
of politics not simply within a specific conception of human nature, but rather in the
state. Although the state finds its basis within and is modeled after the management of
households, an organic unit which would logically appear prior to the formation of a
state, Aristotle nevertheless maintains that “the state is by nature clearly prior to the
family and the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part.”180 Aristotle’s
argument here is that the state can be understood as attaining an existence prior to its
constituent components in a similar way to how humans and animals are prior to the
respective organs that constitute the whole of their bodies as such. However, by
understanding the state as a type of social organism in which the whole precedes its
constituent components, Aristotle neglects to notice, as one theorist suggests, that
“human beings obviously can exist apart from the polis”—that is, by assuming that the
state exists prior to its constituent components Aristotle fails to explain how or why all
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humans necessarily tend toward the development of a state.181 At the same time,
however, although Aristotle understands the state as an organic whole that exists prior to
its constituent components, what he additionally fails to adequately explain is how or
why the state as such is to be taken as the singular form through which the political can
be expressed. If the state is not only the natural end for thinking through the concept of
the political, but also that which is at once prior to its constituent components, then the
Aristotelian theory of the political contains, even if only in terms of a potentiality, the
primacy of the state as the very condition of possibility for a critical theory of the
political as such. Although logically inconsistent, in terms of that which pertains to both
the origin and end of politics, the presupposition of the state acts as the theoretical and
conceptual framework required for by Aristotle to think through the very possibility of
the political.
In addition to the way in which Aristotle presupposes the primacy of the state as
the ultimate horizon of the political, what is further at stake in the Politics is that the state
as such is to be understood as the authoritative expression to which all human beings
collectively strive toward to attain what the Greeks referred to as eudemonia. Indeed, at
the beginning of Politics Aristotle takes great care to demonstrate a certain continuity
between the highest good (eudemonia) in which all humankind naturally strives toward
and the state as the ultimate political end in which this condition of virtue can be
achieved. Insofar as “man is by nature a political animal,” then the state is defined not
only as the ultimate horizon in which a critical conception of the political might take
place, but also as the teleological end in which a community aimed at the highest good
might be achieved.182 Thus, in the opening canonical passage from Politics, we read that
“if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the
highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims a good in a greater degree than any
other, and at the greatest good.”183 As Barker further notes, “[w]hat makes the State
natural” in Aristotle’s view “is the fact that, however it came into existence, it is as it
stands the satisfaction of an immanent impulse in human nature towards moral
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perfection—an immanent—impulse that derives men upwards, through various forms of
society, into the final political form.”184 In Aristotelian political theory, then, the state is
understood as natural when it is taken as the institution toward which the whole of nature
strives.185 In other words, the state is justified in Aristotle insofar as it designates the
horizon through which humankind might be able to achieve moral perfection—that is,
because human beings have an immanent impulse toward moral perfection, the state
forms the limit point in which this condition of being can be achieved through the
exercise of politics.
Yet, while it has been acknowledged that Aristotle is well-known for his
argument pertaining to how the state forms the ultimate horizon through which the
condition of eudemonia can be achieved, it is precisely the claim that “politics is natural
to man and that man’s happiness is dependent upon being a citizen of a well-run polis or
city-state” that needs to be investigated, according to political theorists Peri Roberts and
Peter Sutch.186 Indeed, while Aristotle frames his argument pertaining to the
naturalization of the state in terms of a perpetual striving toward human happiness and
virtue through the model of the state, and justifies its existence primarily on this basis,
what is ultimately overlooked or uncritically accepted by Aristotelian theorists is how
Aristotle’s justification of the state simultaneously naturalizes all of the features Aristotle
understands as evolving into the state, such as the master/slave relation, private property,
and patriarchal family relations. If the state is understood by Aristotle as natural, this
means as one commentator correctly suggests, that “[a]ll the features of its life—slavery,
private property, the family—are equally justified, and also natural, when, or in so far as,
they serve that sovereign end.”187 Consequently, insofar as there is a specific continuity
that can be drawn between Aristotle’s view of human nature and his theory of politics,
what is ultimately at stake is that Aristotle presupposes from the outset the ways in which
the “political relations of ruling and being ruled are among the things that develop
naturally.”188 Precisely because Aristotle naturalizes the state as the conceptual
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framework and horizon for thinking through the possibility of the political, the state
(including the models of slavery, private property, and patriarchy) is not to be understood
in Aristotelian political theory as an arbitrary form of political power, but is instead the
logical consequence of human nature. To be sure, by presupposing the state as the basis
and horizon of the political, Aristotle simultaneously reproduces the effects of slavery,
property relations, and patriarchal rule as the basis that makes the state possible, and
justifies their continuation as a consequence of human nature. In its reduction to the
primacy of the state, the critical threshold of the domain of the political was never itself
called into question, and the naturalization of the state since Aristotle has traditionally
formed both the original structure and critical limit regarding the ways in which the
political has and continues to be theorized and practiced.
While the naturalization of the state, and the view of human nature that sustains it,
together form a large part of Aristotle’s argument in the Politics, it is ultimately the
critical inquiry into the paradigm and exercise of government that makes possible
Aristotle’s conception of politics and the political. What is further at stake for Aristotle
in the classical definition of the political and politics is, then, a specific continuity
between the form of government and the form of organization of the polis—where the
active element defining the sphere of politics refers to the specific “arrangement of the
inhabitants of a state” in order to achieve a specific end.189 Neither simply government
nor the social fabric of the polis, the question of politics specifically refers to the ways in
which a polis is governed which, for Aristotle, begins with and takes as its model the
“management of the household (oikonomia).”190 Within the history of political theory,
Aristotle’s Politics not only analyzes the fundamental relationship between the household
(oikos) and the state, but more specifically how the model of the household and its
relationship to the state is made possible through the unique paradigm of government—
that is, the concept of oikonomia is at once the foundation from which Aristotle theorizes
the condition of possibility of politics, as well as the nexus that makes possible the
specific continuity between the domain of the political and the domain of the state. From
the Greek words oikos (household) and nomos (law), the concept of oikonomia refers to
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specific form of power as government, and the term’s most common translation as the
“management of a household” retains this notion of power exercised as government.191
Like the model of the state, Aristotle similarly maintains that the household exists
in nature, and attempts to delineate a theory of politics per its foundation in the oikos.
Consequently, however, the way in which Aristotle takes the administration of the
household as the model for politics historically tends to naturalize the paradigm of
government as the essence of politics, in a similar manner to the way in which the state is
naturalized as the horizon of the political. Thus, insofar as “the governmental idea arises
out of family practice and domestic experience,” as Proudhon laments, then “there was
no objection voiced, government appearing as natural to society as the subordination that
obtains between the father and his children.”192 In its paradigmatic form, it is this
naturalization of the problematic of government, of an oikonomia, that acts as the locus
from which to determine how the domain of the political assumes the form of a
government in terms of both its structure and activity. In this way, because the political
is rendered analogous to the form politics takes as an exercise of government, we can also
read the very basis of Aristotle’s theory of politics as simultaneously naturalizing
political subjection as a necessary component of politics. Indeed, according to Aristotle
the fact that “some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but
expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for
rule.”193 One is reminded here of Plato’s famous “Foundation Myth” in Book 4 of The
Republic in which Socrates recounts the origin of political rule, wherein some are born
qualified to govern and others to be governed.194 In this way, the essence of politics is
not simply the exercise of governing others. Instead, rather, it is the fundamental
distinction between those who govern and are governed that makes possible the theory of
politics in Aristotle—that is, as a specific form of power exercised as government, what
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makes a theory of politics possible as such is the distinction between those who govern
and those who are governed.
By beginning with the oikos as the model from which politics assumes the form
of government, classical political philosophy at once has had the effect of naturalizing the
paradigm of government as the fundamental essence of politics, while simultaneously
demonstrating that what causes the political to attain its form as such is analogous to the
key distinction between those who govern and those who are to be governed. At the
same time, however, the concept and model of the oikos is, according to Aristotle, at
once the foundation from which politics assumes the form of government, as well as the
basis from which this model of politics as government coincides with the domain of the
state. Thus, insofar as the state in Aristotelian theory is understood as a conglomerate
“made up of households” we find in the Politics that “before speaking of the state we
must,” Aristotle claims, “speak of the management of households.”195 While we have
already seen that the state is prior to its constituent parts (oikos), what is revealed in this
passage is not an inconsistency inherent to Aristotle’s political theory. Instead, what is
revealed is that we must return to the model of oikos in order to fundamentally
understand not only how the exercise of politics is manifest as a paradigm of government,
but how this model of politics is what makes possible the continuity between the exercise
of government and the state as the key terms of the political. Thus, while the concept of
oikonomia refers to the management or government of a household, this same notion also
designates the ways in which politics as such is exercised within the domain of the state.
Etymologically, then, the term oikonomia at once signifies “the management of a family,
but also more generally the administration, the government of a state.”196 What Aristotle
refers to in terms of oikonomia therefore designates a specific elision of borders between
the oikos and the polis, the home and the state, through which the politics of the oikos is
governmentalized within the domain of the state, and exercised as a form of political
power. Two ideas are of key importance here: oikonomia at once designates the
paradigm in which politics is exercised as a form of government and, yet, at the same
time it is this paradigm of government that Aristotle invokes as the nexus that links the
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political to the model of the state—that is, oikonomia not only forms principle of
intelligibility from which the question of politics is analogous to the exercise of
government, but also the paradigm through which the state becomes the fundamental
presupposition through which politics as government is exercised.
With the concept of oikonomia we can see how the foundations of political theory
begin with an indissoluble nexus between the terms of the political, the exercise of
government and the state. At the cusp of this nexus, the concept of oikonomia forms the
grid from which to understand the history of the political and the exercise of politics in its
most paradigmatic form. In several recent texts, the philosopher Giorgio Agamben has
taken Aristotle’s concept of an “oikonomia” as the hidden key to understanding the
history of political theory and practice. In Agamben’s thought, Aristotelian political
theory forms the critical axis from which the history of political philosophy can be
revealed in its most paradigmatic form, or the locus from which to determine the “reason
why power in the West has assumed the form of oikonomia, that is, a government of
men” (original emphasis).197 Here, Agamben maintains a specific continuity between the
exercise of government and the exercise of political power—that is, Agamben suggests
that political power ever since Aristotle has assumed the form of an oikonomia, a
decisive paradigm in which the history of politics and the political power of a state is
exercised in the form of government. In other words, oikonomia designates the distinct
ways in which politics and political power have become governmentalized as their
original condition of possibility. Taking the paradigm of the oikonomia as the basic
framework for defining the political within the paradigm of government, politics,
therefore, in the Aristotelian sense directly refers to the practice of governing others, a
practice which has its basis in and is derived from specific models of domination,
hierarchy, and submission. It is in this regard that Agamben maintains that the concept
and practice of “oikonomia may constitute a privileged laboratory for the working and
articulation—both internal and external—of the governmental machine” (original
emphasis).198 Taking the concept of oikonomia as the key term around which Aristotle’s
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theory of politics is based, it is my contention that the Politics ought to be read as the
definitive text within the history of political theory in which the terms of the political are
fundamentally rendered synonymous with power exercised in the form of government
within the domain of a state. Although certain theorists have taken the concept of
oikonomia as the key term around which the Politics is based, while extensively tracing
the ways in which the model of the household serves as the theoretical and material
foundation from which Aristotle is able to conceive of politics, it is my contention that it
is with the concept of oikonomia that we can begin to fully understand how the domain of
the political radically coincides with the horizon of the state and becomes
governmentalized through the logic and first principle of the archē.
Arising out of Aristotelian political thought, the origins of political philosophy
begin by presupposing the concept and practices of government exercised within the
domain of a state as the foundational principle from which the emergence of the political
is made possible. What is perhaps equally important, however, is the synthesis Aristotle
posits between the political as a form of government and the fundamental principle
known to the Greeks as the archē. Perhaps the most pivotal word in the history of
political thought, the question of the archē is at once the most foundational and the least
challenged. Archē, and its plural form archai, has a wide and sometimes contradictory
spectrum of meanings in early Greek culture which have led the word to be mobilized for
both cosmogony and political theory. Meaning at once “beginning,” “origin,” or “first
cause,” and later “sovereignty,” “dominion,” and “authority,” the term archē suggests
both the first principle from which something proceeds and the basic foundation for
authoritarian governance. Yet, in his analysis of the key concepts used by Aristotle in the
Politics, Barker maintains a specific synthesis between the alternate meanings of the
concept and further reveals a distinct way in which the term archē comes to designate the
paradigmatic nexus that ultimately motivates Aristotle’s understanding of the political.199
As Barker writes, the “word [archē] originally signifies ‘beginning’ or ‘initiative’; and we
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may imagine that the reason it was extended, by an easy transference, to mean authority
or rule was that the Greeks regarded those in authority as beginning, or starting, or
initiating a course of political action.”200 It is in this way that the term archē can be
understood as designating the key paradigm from which to read the question of politics in
Aristotle. As we can see here while the term archē originally refers to “beginning” or
first principle, the concept can be extended within the context of politics in order to
designate the authority or rule of a government. Yet, what is ultimately at stake is that
the term more correctly signifies the ways in which the Greeks regarded individuals in
positions of authority—governors, rulers, or statesmen (archon)—as “initiating a course
of political action.” In other words, archē designates the course through which politics
emerges as a form of government—that is, archē for the Greeks at once refers to the
principle that animates, or brings into being politics, as well as that which initiates the
activity of politics as a distinct exercise of government. Indeed, within the history of
political theory, the concept of an archē ought to be understood as the paradigmatic form
through which politics and the domain of the political in the West proceeds as the
exercise of government within the domain of the state.
Taking the concept of an archē as the paradigmatic frame of reference from which
to understand Aristotelian politics in terms of the exercise of government, it is possible to
demonstrate how Aristotelian political theory at once presupposes a synthesis between
the primacy of government and the exercise of politics, as well as a synthesis between
state and the domain of the political. Between the terms of the political and the exercise
of politics as government is the paradigmatic nexus of archē, the radical origin from
which the category of the political emerges and is manifest as a tripartite condition of
government, sovereignty authority and the state. Perhaps the clearest example of an early
definition of the political that begins not simply with the notion of government as its
implicit beginning point, but rather in the archic nexus that binds the question of politics
to the exercise of government within the domain of a state, can be found in the Politics
when Aristotle defines the essence of the political as a unique synthesis between forms of
government (politeia) and the first principle of authority (archē). Thus, in Book 3 from
the Politics, where Aristotle seeks to define the state, and hence the domain of the
200
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political by its reference to differing typologies of political power, he also sets forth the
claim that has in every way been seminal to the historical development of Western
political thought. Aristotle writes: “[t]he words constitution and government (politeia)
have the same meaning which is the supreme authority (archē) in states.”201 Here, we see
that the terms of the political are reducible to the paradigm of government—that is, the
domain of the political and the exercise of government are defined by Aristotle in such a
way that the two terms collapse into one another. At the same time, however, insofar as a
zone of indistinguishability is established between the terms of the political and the
paradigm of government, what is ultimately at stake in Aristotle’s definition is that this
zone of indistinction reveals the logic of an archē as the hidden locus through which the
political is reducible not only to the exercise of government, but the exercise of
government as a specific form of power manifest in the sovereign authority of states.
Insofar as the terms of the political are reducible to the manifestation and exercise of
government, then what defines the essence of the political is, according to Aristotle, the
way in which “government is everywhere sovereign in the state.”202 What is therefore
key to Aristotelian political theory is that the point of departure for a critical theory of the
political presupposes an originary nexus between the domain of the political, the exercise
of government, and state sovereignty in such a way that the term archē comes to
designate the condition of possibility for the emergence of the political as such. In other
words, what gives the political its form as an oikonomia, and makes possible its
continuation as such, is the first principle of an archē, the sovereign authority that binds
the terms of the political to the question of government exercised within the domain of a
state. Archē as such designates the threshold through which the domain of the political
coincides with the topology of the state sovereign power and is governmentalized.
At this juncture, it is necessary to note three characteristics of orthodox classical
political theory, which form what I hold to be the key paradigm of the political that has
hitherto been seminal in the historical elaboration of Western political philosophy, and
which composes my point of departure in analyzing the intervention anarchism makes in
the history of Western politics as such. First, the paradigm of government acts as the
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theoretical limit point or horizon for a critical conceptualization of the political; in
Aristotelian political theory, the originary synthesis between politeia and oikonomia acts
as both the conceptual framework and the transcendental condition of possibility for the
terms of the political as such. Within the history of political theory, this is why Proudhon
maintains that there exists a specific link between the primacy of government and the
domain of the political. “Government,” Proudhon writes, is to political philosophers “the
necessary and immutable a priori, the principle of principles, the eternal archeus”
(original emphasis).203 Presupposing a primary synthesis between the terms of the
political and the paradigm of government causes the domain of the political to have a
form analogous to the form of government that makes the political possible as such. The
political is not only subject to the archē as its dominion, but the archē as oikonomia is
additionally itself the subject of politics. Political philosophy and modern theories of
sovereignty arise and are derived from this dual paradigm of the archē.
Secondly, with the paradigm of government acting as the conceptual framework
for a theory of the political, what lies at the essence of politics, and makes its activity
possible, are the techniques of government exercised as a specific form of power
(oikonomia) that legislates the actions and conducts of others. What is additionally at
stake in the Aristotelian paradigm is, then, the first principle of an archē that grounds the
essence of politics within the exercise of government and which, in turn, naturalizes
political subjection, domination, and hierarchy as the essence of politics as such. As the
exercise of oikonomia, politics designates a fundamental distinction between those who
govern and those who are governed, whereby the exercise of government acts as the force
that gives the political its form as such. As that which defines the structure and form of
the political assumes, the question of government, as Jun maintains, should be understood
not simply a political force, but also as an “ontological force, preceding and constituting
the polis and not the other way around.”204 Finally, under the paradigm of government,
orthodox political theory reduces the concept of the political to the primacy of the archē,
in terms of both cosmological origin and teleological end, as both sovereign origin and
sovereign authority, and finally as the nexus in which the political coincides with the
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state and becomes governmentalized. Indeed, anarchist philosopher John Clark has
importantly pointed toward the way in which the concept of archē as “origin denotes its
claim to primacy and priority, in the senses of both metaphysical ultimacy and historical
precedence.”205 What is therefore key to the Aristotelian paradigm is not that the domain
of the political contains, even if only terms of a potentiality, the primacy of archic
government as the very condition of possibility for a critical theory of the political as
such, but more specifically how the first principle of the archē is the key concept through
which the domain of the political and the history of politics assume the form of an
oikonomia.

1.2 The Schmittian Paradigm: Sovereignty as a Political
Paradigm of Government
The Concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political…State and politics
cannot be exterminated. 206
--Carl Schmitt

As discussed in the previous section, the Aristotelian paradigm of the political begins
with an original presupposition, an originary archē that locates the political in the nexus
between the exercise of government and the state—that is, politics in Aristotelian
political theory assumes the form of an oikonomia not only in terms of the exercise of
politics as archē, but also in terms of the condition of possibility of the political as such.
In this way, we might read the basic subject of Aristotle’s Politics as a work that
establishes an essential continuity between the paradigm of oikonomia and the
manifestation of politics, in which the terms of the political come to designate the
exercise of government within the domain of a state. While Aristotle poses a formidable
nexus between politics exercised as government and state sovereignty in terms of the
indistinguishable relation between politeia (form and exercise of government) and archē
(supreme authority within a state), it is necessary to turn to Carl Schmitt’s text The
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Concept of the Political in order to understand how the essential continuity between the
logic of the archē and the terms of the political is reinvigorated as a paradigm of
sovereignty. As we will see, by asserting an indivisible link between the state, politics
and sovereign authority, Schmitt’s central thesis regarding the “autonomy of the
political” renews the Aristotelian paradigm in which the political (politeia) is understood
as the supreme authority (archē) within a state. Thus, while the Politics of Aristotle
reveals the way in which a critical conception of politics in the West assumes the form of
an oikonomia, or government of men, it is necessary to return to Schmitt’s work in order
to fully understand how the field of the political is reduced to and radically coincides
with state sovereign power. Indeed, by turning to Schmitt it is my contention that the
paradigm of the archē, which in Aristotle establishes a formidable link between politics,
government, and the state, reappears as a specific continuity between the terms of the
political and state sovereign power in which the state becomes endowed with a monopoly
on politics.
Over the past few decades there has been, as one theorist notes, “a veritable
explosion of Anglo-American interest in the works of Weimar constitutional and political
theorist, Carl Schmitt.”207 Although a contentious figure in the history of political
thought primarily due to his membership in the Nazi party, as well as his direct juridical
support of Hitler’s policies,208 Schmitt’s work on political theory, like Aristotle, has
nevertheless continuously contributed to and helped shape our understanding of modern
politics and the condition of the political. Thus, in a recent work, political philosopher,
Montserrat Herrero, writes that “[w]hen dealing with political theory today, reference to
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Schmitt is also required.”209 At the very least, Schmitt’s work has been useful for
scholars and political theorists insofar as his work has provided serious studies examining
the fundamental relation between the state, politics, and sovereignty as the key terms of
the political. In regard to his key contributions to our understanding of modern politics,
Chantel Mouffe claims that “Schmitt is one of the great political and legal theorists of
this century,” a claim she continues that is “now widely recognized” by theorists on the
right and left sides of the political spectrum.210 Although, Schmitt’s theory of the
political has recently been subject to severe criticism,211 his work still represents one of
the more substantial attempts within the history of political theory to offer a critical
conception of what can be understood as the constituent components composing the
domain of the political, and continues to influence contemporary political theorists such
as Mouffe.212 Indeed, in contemporary scholarship Mouffe’s project, perhaps more than
any other, advocates for a return to Schmitt’s work in order to contest what she refers to
as the “anti-political vision which refuses to acknowledge the antagonistic dimension
constitutive of the political.”213 Despite Schmitt’s serious critique of liberalism against
which his theory of the political is based, Mouffe proposes to “think with Schmitt against
Schmitt” in order to reveal a “new understanding of liberal democratic politics instead of
following Schmitt in rejecting it.”214 While Mouffe invokes Schmitt as the theoretical
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framework from which to rethink the question of politics within a contemporary
democratic framework, her use of Schmitt can be juxtaposed against the ongoing work of
Giorgio Agamben whose project takes Schmitt’s theory of the political as the critical
turning point from which to critique the ways in which the question of sovereign power
increasingly appears as the “dominant paradigm of government in contemporary
politics.”215 Indeed, alongside Agamben it is my contention that Schmitt’s theory of the
political offers key insight into the ways in which the history of the political coincides
with the state in such a way that the very condition of possibility of politics appears as the
meaning of state sovereign authority and a paradigm of government.
As Schmitt argues at the beginning of his text, despite its continual use throughout
the history of political philosophy, what is lacking within political theory is a simple
“clear definition of the political.”216 Reflecting upon this general problematic, Schmitt’s
text formulates a crucial distinction between “politics” and the “political,” and the
decision to title his analysis The Concept of the Political clearly reflects these intentions.
As found in the epigraph above, what is ultimately at stake for Schmitt in The Concept of
the Political is to retrospectively outline a theory of the political that not only attests to
the permanence of the state as the key component that coincides with the emergence of
the political, but also to the permanence of the state’s monopolization of politics. Thus,
in Schmitt we find that the intrinsic relationship between the “state and politics cannot be
exterminated”—that is, Schmitt posits an essential and permanent continuity between the
state and politics in such a way that the term “politics” coincides with and is monopolized
within the domain of the state.217 At the same time, however, Schmitt additionally
maintains that the “concept of the state,” which has a permanent relationship with the
field of politics, necessarily “presupposes the concept of the political.”218 In this context,
Schmitt’s aim in this text is to trace the history of the basic principles which have allowed
for the domain of the political to emerge as an a priori relation between state and politics,
a relation that ultimately gives the field of the political its defining characteristic as a
paradigm of sovereignty. Against this background, Schmitt’s text is significant in the
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history of political theory in that it serves as one of the first full studies inquiring into
what he refers to as the essence or “nature of the political,”219 and as such attempts to
delineate the categories by which a clear definition of the political might be traced. Thus,
as Schmitt claims towards the beginning of his text “a definition of the political can be
obtained only by discovering and defining the specific political categories.”220
In its most preliminary form, the category that is specifically political for Schmitt
is the state, and it is this conception of the political that takes the state as its principal
domain that Schmitt maintains is in danger of being forgotten. Schmitt, like Aristotle
before him, therefore presupposes the state as the defining characteristic and condition of
possibility of the political as such. In contrast, however, to the way in which Max Weber
defines the state as that which has a monopolization on legitimate violence,221 what
Schmitt takes as the principle component essential to the domain of the political is the
sovereign state’s monopolization on what can be considered “politics.” In offering a
preliminary outline of the specific categories constitutive of the political Schmitt takes, as
the critical turning point for his analysis regarding the distinct nature of the political,
specific concern with the ways in which certain social forces arising in the nineteenth
century began to challenge the state’s monopolization of politics. Indeed, it is within the
context of the perceived dissolution of the political proper that motivates the general
force of Schmitt’s work. Under what are referred to as “neutralizations and
depoliticizations,”222 Schmitt argues that the key features of nineteenth century
liberalism, or what he calls elsewhere “political romanticism” (i.e. the religious, cultural,
economic, legal and scientific phenomena), all correspond with the antithesis of what is
taken to be proper to the domain of the political.223 Indeed, Schmitt concisely
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summarizes the loss of a clear conceptualization of the political in the following manner:
“[w]hat had been up to that point affairs of the state become thereby social matters, and,
vice-versa.”224 What Schmitt is particularly concerned with, then, is that the historical
entrance of liberal democracy into modern politics has had the effect of obscuring what
he holds to be the substantive conceptualization of the political—that is the fundamental
relation between state and politics that defines the domain of the political as such.
In contrast to the depoliticizations of the nineteenth century, what Schmitt claims
is required in order to avoid losing sight of the characteristics proper to the political, are
the specific set of criteria that distinguish the independence—or what is referred to as the
“autonomy of the political”—from other domains.225 Proceeding from the assumption
that independent domains of human social activity have their own criteria establishing
their respective positions of autonomy,226 Schmitt resists providing an “exhaustive
definition” of the political, instead opting for a definition in the sense of a “criterion of
the political and of what it consists.”227 Insofar as the political is to be critically
distinguished and taken as independent from other areas of social activity such as the
realms of ethics and morality, what Schmitt refers to as the “autonomy of the political”
simply means that “the political must therefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions, to
which all action with a specifically political meaning can be traced.”228 If as Schmitt
suggests that the criterion for a theory of morality is based off of the antithesis between
good and evil, the theory of ethics off of the antithesis between right and wrong and so
forth, then the critical question Schmitt invokes as the pivotal point from which his
inquiry into the nature of the political is to inquire into the possible criterion required to
understand the autonomy of the political. According to Schmitt, the answer to this
question can be found in terms of how a “specific political distinction to which political
actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy,” whereby this

224

Ibid, 22.
Ibid, 27.
226
Ibid, 26. Here, Schmitt claims that the criteria required to distinguish between independent domains
of human activity can be delineated by and reduced to “final distinctions,” or dialectic oppositions. In this
way, the criterion for a theory of morality is based off of the ultimate distinction between good and evil;
in ethics right and wrong, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, etc.
227
Ibid, 26.
228
Ibid, 26.
225

79

antithesis “denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an
association or dissociation.”229 Here, Schmitt demonstrates that what distinguishes the
domain of the political from other fields is to be found in the antithesis between forms of
“association or dissociation,” whereby the nature of the political as such is defined by the
“degree of intensity” between friend/enemy. It is this fundamental antithesis between
friend and enemy manifest in the intensity between forms of association and dissociation,
that Schmitt affirms as the antagonistic dimension constituting the domain proper to the
political.
In Schmitt’s conception, the antithesis that renders discernible the defining
characteristic of the political is concerned with forms of association and dissociation—
that is, the formation of a collective we opposed to a collective they. Precisely because
the criterion for distinguishing the political takes as its basis the existential distinction
between friend and enemy, Schmitt necessarily locates a permanent dimension of
antagonism inherent to the substance of the political. In other words, insofar as the
political is itself made possible, according to Schmitt, by the degrees of intensity between
friend and enemy, what is ultimately at stake is that the field of the political therefore
culminates in a realm of permanent conflict and antagonism. For Schmitt, then, given
that the criteria for distinguishing the political is based only upon the friend/enemy
antithesis, the material, or “substance of the political is contained in the context of
concrete antagonism” between forms of association and dissociation.230 It is with these
two criteria—that is, the friend/enemy antithesis and the levels of antagonism between
them—that Schmitt attempts to distinguish the categories specific to the political as such.
Thus, in what appears as the most decisive statement regarding the nature of the political
according to Schmitt, we read that “the political is the most intense and extreme
antagonism, and every concrete antagonism, becomes the more political the closer it
approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping.”231 So, in
Schmitt’s conception, the existential distinction between friend and enemy, which thus
culminates in the permanent antagonism between differing forms of associations and
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dissociations, is what distinguishes the domain of the political from other domains;
antagonism, according to Schmitt, is what reveals the nature of the political as a space
distinguished by the permanence of both power and conflict. It is in regard to this
dimension of antagonism through which Mouffe maintains that a distinction between the
political and politics can be drawn in a way that reflects the basis of Schmitt’s theory.
Thus, in Mouffe’s work, “the political” refers to the “dimension of
antagonism…constitutive of human societies,” while “politics” designates the “set of
practices and institutions through which order is created, organizing human coexistence
in the context of conflictuality provided by the political.”232 Here, while Mouffe
maintains (via Schmitt) that the “political” is constituted by the permanent “dimension of
antagonism” inherent within “human societies,” what she refers to as “politics”
nevertheless designates the techniques and practices of government “through which order
is created” within the domain of the state.233
What is often taken for granted by theorists such as Mouffe, who read Schmitt’s
work as an authoritative discussion of the nature of the political, is that this concept of the
political is inherently reducible to the theories of the state previously articulated in the
works of earlier political theorists such as Hobbes. In this regard, immediately following
the definition of the political as a concrete antithesis between the friend/enemy distinction
is a third criteria which is not only absolutely crucial for understanding the very basis of
Schmitt’s concept of the political, but categorically decisive in highlighting the way in
which Schmitt’s theory radically reduces the field of the political to the question of
sovereign power exercised within the domain of the state. Regarding, therefore, the third
criteria required for an understanding of the domain of the political, Schmitt writes with
absolute finality: “[i]n its entirety the state as an organized political entity decides for
itself the friend-enemy distinction.”234 It is with this third and final criteria that Schmitt
posits a specific continuity between the state and the terms of the political, wherein the
state acts as the foundation for the domain of the political. In this way, the very
criteria—i.e. the friend-enemy antithesis and the antagonistic interplay between them—
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required for Schmitt’s model of the political are radically framed within the horizon of
the state: “antithesis and antagonism” Schmitt writes “remain here within the state’s
domain.”235 In other words, at stake in Schmitt’s theory is a specific continuity between
the political, the state, and ultimately sovereign power. Schmitt’s conceptualization of
the political here invokes the question of sovereignty as elucidated in his later work,
Political Theology. In this text, sovereignty—which according to Schmitt is identical to
domain of the political—is defined as the absolute power to make decisions based upon
the state of exception.236 In this way, the political is according to Schmitt linked to the
principle of state sovereignty as both its principal domain and condition of possibility—
that is, the political according to Schmitt designates the field through which the
friend/enemy distinction and the corresponding dimension of antagonism inherent in this
antithesis coincide with the sovereign power of the state. Indeed, were this sovereign
“entity to disappear, even if only potentially,” Schmitt argues, “then the political itself
would disappear.”237 Schmitt thus forms an indivisible link between the state, politics,
and sovereign power as that which is proper to the domain of the political. With this final
turning point, then, Schmitt makes clear that the criterion of the political is not simply
based upon the ongoing antagonism between differing friend-enemy groupings; instead,
rather, the domain appropriate to the political is according to Schmitt the domain of the
state—indeed, the sovereign state’s monopolization of the politics of antagonism as such.
Insofar as the domain of the political cannot exist outside of a state framework,
and as such, is meaningless without absolute sovereign power, Schmitt’s central thesis
regarding the nature of the political invokes the Aristotelian paradigm in which the
political contains, even if only terms of a potentiality, the primacy of the state as the very
condition of possibility for a critical theory of the political as such. Whereas in Aristotle,
the logic of a oikonomia formed the basis from which to understand the nature of politics,
in Schmitt it is the state and sovereign power that define what is proper to the structure of
the political. This is why in the opening thesis of The Concept of the Political, Schmitt,
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like Aristotle before him, posits a decisive link between the state and the political: “the
concept of the state,” Schmitt writes, “presupposes the concept of the political.”238
Beginning his investigation into the nature of the political with the assertion that the
political precedes the state, it would appear that Schmitt wants to provide the basis for the
appearance and continuation of the state. This is to say, that insofar as the political is
taken to be primary with the state, then the concept of the political is invoked by Schmitt
in order to provide the legitimate foundation for the sovereign state. On the contrary,
however, the way in which Schmitt formulates a primary link between the state,
sovereign power, and politics demonstrates that an analysis of the political as such can
only take place by presupposing a sovereign state. In other words, what is primary within
this relation is neither the political nor the criteria which distinguish the domain of the
political from other domains, but the state itself, which according to Schmitt takes its
model from the modern European sovereign state as it emerges in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.
From both the tone of the treatise as well as the thematic focus on the forms of
“depoliticizations” that effectively weaken the strength of the sovereign state, Schmitt
clearly laments the loss of what he holds to be the primary relation between the sovereign
state and the political. To be sure, Schmitt invokes the concept of political in order to
provide a theoretical framework for returning to the model that renders the political
indiscernible from the state and sovereign power as initially inaugurated by Machiavelli,
Bodin, and Hobbes. Thus, in the preface to the original German edition of The Concept
of the Political, Schmitt concisely summarizes the basic stakes of his treatise. “The
decisive question” regarding the concept of the political, Schmitt argues
concerns the relationship of…state and politics…A doctrine which began to take
shape in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a doctrine inaugurated by
Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, and Thomas Hobbes, endowed the state with an
important monopoly: the European state became the sole subject of politics. Both
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state and politics were linked just as indivisible as polis and politics in Aristotle
(original emphasis).239
While Schmitt locates the genesis of the concept of the political in the sixteenth and
seventeenth century theorists of sovereignty, his allusion to Aristotle demonstrates a
much larger historical trajectory. As noted earlier, the terms of the political, since
Aristotle presupposed an a priori nexus between the state as the domain of the political
and politics as the exercise of government. Yet, Schmitt points toward the ways in which
the Aristotelian paradigm culminates in political philosophies of sovereignty whereby the
state’s monopolization of politics finds its ultimate expression in the concept of sovereign
power. What is at stake in Schmitt’s analysis of the political is not so much the criterion
invoked to distinguish the political as such, but the critical foundation for understanding
what the basis of the state is as a political entity. In Schmitt’s model, insofar as the very
criteria that distinguish the political from other domains (i.e. the permanent antagonism
between the existential friend-enemy distinction) takes place within the state’s domain in
terms of the primary sovereign decision, then the basis of the political is rendered
analogous with the basis of the state. The political, in the Schmittian model, is therefore
reduced to sovereign authority and the primacy of the state, whereby it is the prerogative
of the sovereign to define the content of the political.
It is in this way that we can fully understand the thesis which opens The Concept
of the Political. If the concept of the political precedes the concept of the state, this is
only made possible because Schmitt’s model of the political, like Aristotle’s before him,
presupposes the primacy of the state as that which is prior, yet at the same time made
possible by the basis of the political itself. Schmitt is thus not concerned with the origin
of the state as a political entity, nor its legitimacy; the origin of the state and the
coinciding legitimacy of sovereign power are both given variables in his model of the
political. Schmitt’s principal concern therefore lies in providing the conceptual
foundation for the nexus that links together state, sovereignty, and politics, and thus
makes possible the state’s monopolization of politics in terms of both the antithesis
between friend and enemy and the fundamental antagonism between them. For Schmitt,
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then, “the political entity is by its very nature the decisive entity, regardless of the sources
from which it derives…If it exists, it is the supreme, that is, in the decisive case, the
authoritative entity.”240 Here, Schmitt posits an immediate and primary synthesis
between the domain of the political and the sovereign state (decisive entity), which
insofar as it exists, begins with the “authoritative entity,” or the primacy of the archē that
makes possible the originary nexus between the domain of the political and the state. In
Schmitt’s model, the archē is the principle that, in establishing a specific continuity
between the domain of the political and the sovereign state, renders them indiscernible.
In working through and outlining both the Aristotelian and Schmittian models of
the political, my key point of departure has been to demonstrate the ways in which the
history of the political, from classical to modern political thought, assumes the dual
paradigm of the exercise of government and the domain of sovereignty not only as its
condition of possibility, but material manifestation as well. Indeed, between Aristotle
and Schmitt lies the general crisis of the political in which the synthesis between the
political and archē coincides with and makes possible politics as the paradigm of
governing and the political as the paradigm of sovereignty, both of which are to exercised
within the domain of the state. Although the Aristotelian and Schmittian models of the
political appear as antinomical, these two models are not incompatible with one another,
but are instead theoretically and functionally related as the two dominant paradigms
which compose the general of history of the political as archē. Beginning with
Aristotle’s seminal text, we have seen how the Politics begins with a unique synthesis
between politeia and archē, in which the domain of the political is analogous to a form of
government exercised in terms of the supreme authority of a state. Aristotle therefore
formulates a binding nexus between politics as oikonomia and sovereignty in such a way
that the synthesis between the terms of the political and the paradigm of government
causes the political to assume a form analogous to the state. The paradigm of
government and the synthesis between politeia and archē both act as the theoretical limit
point or horizon for a critical conceptualization of the political; indeed, within the history
of political philosophy, the state and the consequent problematic of government have
been taken as the privileged sites of politics. In a similar manner, Schmitt’s model of the
240
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political poses an indivisible link between the state, politics and sovereign power which,
like Aristotle’s model, paradigmatically renders the domain of the political analogous to
sovereign power. Schmitt’s central thesis regarding the autonomy of the political invokes
the Aristotelian paradigm in that the domain of the political contains, even if only in
terms of a potentiality, the primacy of the state as the very condition of possibility for a
critical theory of the political as such. Rather than focusing on the question of
government as the key characteristic of politics, however, Schmitt reopens the domain of
the political as a field of antagonism made possible in the sovereign friend/enemy
antithesis. Yet, because, Schmitt’s model presupposes the state’s monopolization of
politics as such, the field of antagonism is itself reducible to the paradigm of sovereignty.
As long as the paradigm of government and the primacy of the state together constitute
the fundamental horizon of the domain of the political, the very question of politics is
inherently reducible to a theory of power, and the archic nexus that connects the terms of
the political to the techniques of government and sovereign power exercised within
domain of the state has traditionally been left unchallenged by the majority of political
philosophers.

1.3 Critical Turns Toward Anarchism: Postanarchism and MetaPolitics
[N]otwithstanding…the seemingly insurmountable nature of the powers we confront, we
are nevertheless witness to the emergence of a new paradigm of radical political thought
and action…if we turn our gaze away from the empty spectacle of sovereign politics, we
can glimpse an alternative and dissenting world of political life and action that can only
be described as anarchistic. 241
--Saul Newman

Against the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms, which have in every way been
seminal in the historical development of Western political philosophy, one of the core
problems contemporary radical theory is coming to grapple with is how to build a new
political theory beyond the nexus that reduces the political to an originary archic nexus
between government and state sovereignty. It is in this way that Agamben importantly

241

Saul Newman. Postanarchism. (London, Polity Press, 2016), vii.

86

seeks to establish a new task and basis for political theory in such a way that it cannot
reproduce the paradigms of government and sovereignty. Thus, in “Notes on Politics”
Agamben maintains that if it is possible to rethink the history of political theory against
its origins and current limitations, then the domain of the political “cannot still take a
state-form, given that the state is nothing other than the presupposition and the
representation of the being-hidden of the historical archē” (original emphasis).242
Arguing instead that what is at stake in contemporary political thought is to rethink the
political outside of the logic of the archē, Agamben writes that political theory “must
open the field to a nonstatal and nonjuridical politics and human life—a politics and a
life that are yet to be entirely thought” (original emphasis).243 Indeed, opening the field
of political theory to a “nonstatal” form of politics that cannot be reduced to the historical
paradigm of the archē is, perhaps, the fundamental task for contemporary critical theory,
consequent upon the turn toward anarchism. As we will see, critical turns in
contemporary political theory such as postanarchism and metapolitics necessary confront
the central tenets of orthodox political theory, and as such invoke and gesture toward a
fundamental rethinking of anarchism as the critical basis for a radically new conception
of the domain of the political.
Taking seriously the anarchist turn as a crucial intervention in both the history of
critical philosophical thought and as a key referent for current debates in radical
continental political philosophy, the following section situates the return of anarchism in
relation to what I have referred to as the general crisis of the political in order to
demonstrate that what the above critical positions demand and even require is an
anarchist hypothesis of the political. Although the political theory of anarchism
traditionally attempts to dislocate politics and political theory from the dual paradigms of
government and sovereignty it has nevertheless failed to be accepted in the history of
political philosophy as a legitimate political theory. As anarchist historian Peter Marshall
notes at the end of his history of anarchist thought and practice, anarchism “cannot be
called a ‘political’ theory in the accepted sense since it does not concern itself with the
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state.”244 Given the way in which anarchism marks an unbridgeable gap with the
political discourses of the state, what might be seen as the political theory of anarchism
falls outside of and underpins the traditional categories and ideas that sustain orthodox
political theory. Although Marshall is dismissive of considering anarchism a political
theory, arguing instead that “it places the moral and economic before the political,” he
nevertheless points to something fundamental in regards to the rupture anarchist theory
forms with political philosophy.245 “If anything,” Marshall dismissively comments,
anarchism “wishes to go beyond politics in the traditional sense of the art or science of
government.”246 What Marshall attributes here as a minor characteristic of anarchist
thought, not only points toward the core crisis of political philosophy, but is at the same
time precisely what aligns anarchism with the task assigned by contemporary theorists to
rethink the political at the horizon of the dual exercise of government and sovereignty.
Anarchism neither subordinates the political to the moral, nor the economic; instead,
anarchism contributes to the discourse of political philosophy by rethinking the very idea
of politics against and beyond its culmination in the exercise of government. As such,
anarchism begins, and is marked by, the potential of rethinking the political without the
first principle of government, thus responding to the fundamental paradigm which lies at
the heart of traditional political theory.
At this juncture, it is necessary to point toward certain critical positions in which
anarchism is coming to change the general framework from which both politics and
political philosophy are being conceived and practiced. First, consequent upon the
resurgence of anarchist theory and practice, there is not only a growing interest in
revisiting anarchist texts amongst philosophers, but also a way (re)reading the history of
philosophy and political theory anarchically, and to further point out how certain
theorists invoke and rely upon concepts and ideas inherent to the political theory of
anarchism without necessarily acknowledging them as such. As Jun notes, the turn
toward anarchism involves a new methodology of “reading anarchically”—or the
“hermeneutic practice of discovering anarchist attitudes, ideas, and thoughts in literature,
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philosophy, and other venues.”247 This hermeneutic practice of reading “anarchically”
has significantly helped with the development of a critical anarchist methodology with
which to reread the history of philosophy and political theory from an entirely different
perspective that transcends the limitations of orthodox thought. Over the past two
decades, a great deal of research has been accomplished which both demonstrates
previously unexplored affinities between anarchist theory and certain philosophers or
schools of thought, while simultaneously helping to forge a new methodological
framework required for rethinking the limitations of traditional philosophical and
political theory.
In contemporary scholarship further critical work has been done with certain key
figures in the history of philosophy such as Nietzsche,248 Bataille,249 Levinas,250
Rancière,251 Spinoza, and Sartre252 amongst others. What is at stake in these approaches
is the attempt to develop “a way of thinking about anarchism as a philosophical or
theoretical trope which recurs transhistorically.”253 If anarchism can be understood, at
least in part, as a transhistorical and philosophical trope, then it would be a mistake to
limit the history of anarchist thought and the historical anarchist movements of the late
nineteenth century. By developing anarchist framework or critical methodology from
which to reread the history of philosophy, recent turns toward anarchism have helped to
afford new possibilities for beginning to broach the development of an anarchist theory of
the political. The postanarchists in particular have been seminal in developing this
critical method, and have shown how philosophers such as Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari,
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Lyotard, Baudrillard and Derrida amongst others often invoke anarchist ideas and
concepts, and as such that one can reread their works through the development of a
critical anarchist framework. Although there is no general consensus amongst the
thinkers who make the postanarchist canon of thought, the general claim posited by
postanarchists is not that the above philosophers are nominally “anarchist.” Instead, the
general intervention of postanarchism is at once to demonstrate how certain aspects of
poststructuralism and other schools of philosophy help to rethink the limits of ‘classical’
anarchist thought, thus contributing to a retheorization of anarchism, or postanarchism,
while simultaneously invoking anarchist theory as the critical framework from which to
rethink the history of political philosophy. As Todd May argues in The Political
Philosophy of Post-Structural Anarchism, the essential goal in theorizing the possibility
of a political theory of poststructural anarchism is to “sketch the framework for an
alternative political philosophy…not only in the vision it provides, but also in the style of
intervention it advocates.”254
Another critical position suggests that the questions posed by anarchism are
coming to bear upon the work of contemporary philosophers, in such a way that as David
Graeber demonstrates “even those who do not consider themselves anarchists feel that
they have to define themselves in relation to it, and draw on its ideas.”255 Faced with the
limitations of more orthodox political theories, as well as the dominance of Marxist
thought within the continental left, a new critical and methodological framework for
thinking through the question of politics is developing which, although often
unacknowledged, gestures toward a more distinctly anarchist approach to political theory
and philosophy in general. One of the more recent critical trends that appears to invoke
an unacknowledged anarchist basis from which to reconceive the notion of politics has
been developed under what the French philosophers Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou
refer to as “meta-politics,” or what Simon Critchley later terms “anarchic metapolitics.”256 In the attempt to liberate political philosophy from its foundation within the
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dual paradigms of government and sovereignty the central thesis arising out of the
metapolitical tradition is as Critchley claims that “politics should be conceived at a
distance from the state.”257 What is at stake, then, in the attempt to rethink politics
outside of the state is to recreate the space for a critical conception of politics which
cannot be reduced to the paradigm of government. The principal problem, then, of
contemporary radical politics, as posited within the metapolitical tradition, is how to
reconceive certain conditions in which the very notion of “politics” can be situated
outside and at the limit of the state. Arising out of the critical positions of postanarchism
and metapolitics is a radical call to forge a new space for politics situated at the horizon
of paradigm of government, and therefore to additionally ask how we can redefine the
domain and terms of the political as cognizant of this turn toward anarchism.
In other words, if we can speak of a resurgence of anarchism this is because in its
first instance contemporary political positions such as postanarchism and metapolitics
explicitly situate themselves in relation to the task of developing an alternative hypothesis
of the political outside and against the dual paradigms of government and sovereignty.
The relevance of anarchism for contemporary debates in radical political theory lies in
this gesture toward redefining politics as that which is situated against and beyond the
state, and in turn allows the field of the political to transcend its historical limitations,
while providing it with a more consistent framework. Reflected in such figures from the
contemporary continental left as Alain Badiou, Simon Critchley, Jacques Rancière, Todd
May, and Saul Newman is a new critical methodology that sets itself the task of
undermining, displacing, and unmasking the primacy of archic power in order to rethink
both politics and the terms of the political against and beyond the history of
governmentality. At stake below is not simply that the central tenets of anarchism are
reappearing in contemporary critical thought, but that the problems posed by anarchist
philosophers anticipate current debates in critical theory, which in turn contribute to the
ongoing retheorization of an anarchic politics situated at a fundamental rethinking of both
the domain of the political and the essence of politics against the logic of the archē. In
other words, I contend that a rethinking of the problem of the political and of political
philosophy today not only requires a rethinking of the questions and interventions posed
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by anarchism, but also an alternative critical methodology for reading the history of
political theory anarchically.
While the postanarchist and metapolitical traditions continue to open unexplored
possibilities in the affinity between philosophy, political theory, and anarchism, I want to
point toward the way in which these critical positions ought to be situated in response to a
growing crisis of the political. The importance, then, regarding this trajectory being
carved out between the return of anarchism and the philosophical left is a critical
rethinking of the fundamental premises and assumptions that allow us to rethink the
rationale of the first principle the archē, in which politics is grounded within the
techniques of government exercised within the domain of the state. Yet, what is
ultimately at stake within these critical traditions is not simply that their respective
interventions begin to offer a preliminary framework for an anarchist hypothesis of the
political, but that this rethinking of the political itself turns upon and is made possible by
a critical inquiry into the question of resistance to the exercise of government. As I will
argue in the penultimate section, what these critical positions gesture towards, and even
require, is the possible development of an anarchist theory of the political which turns
upon the question of resistance located in the intersection between anarchism and
Foucault’s theory of power, politics and governmentality.

1.4

Postanarchism

Postanarchism is not a specific form of politics; it offers no formulas or prescriptions for
change. It does not have the sovereign ambition of supplanting anarchism with a newer
name. On the contrary, postanarchism is a celebration and revisitation of this most
heretical form of (anti)politics. Indeed, so far from anarchism being surpassed, the
radical struggles for autonomy appearing today on the global terrain indicate that, on
the contrary, the anarchist moment has finally arrived.258
--Saul Newman
Over the past decade, postanarchism has exerted a significant amount of importance in
academic circles, and has considerably helped in the resurgence of anarchist political
theory. In its most basic sense, postanarchism “demonstrates a desire to blend the most
promising aspects of traditional anarchist theory with the developments in post258
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structuralist and post-modern thought.”259 While postanarchism has been critiqued for
offering a reductive and selective reading of classical anarchist thought,260 as well as the
claim that classical anarchism “founds its politics on a flawed conception of power,”261 it
has nevertheless tremendously helped to reinvigorate interest in the study of anarchism as
a distinct discipline. Saul Newman’s texts, particularly From Bakunin to Lacan: Antiauthoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power, The Politics of Postanarchism, and
Postanarchism, have been decisive in highlighting the ways in which anarchism is both
coming to influence contemporary political theory, while at the same time gesturing
towards a new critical understanding of the domain of the political. By identifying the
appearance of anarchist themes and ideas throughout both the history of political thought
and contemporary political thinkers, Newman concludes that anarchism “might be seen
as the hidden referent for radical political thought today.”262 For Newman, the
reappearance of anarchist themes and ideas is understood as the coming framework from
which to rethink the limitations of political philosophy and practice as a whole, and is
thus the “eternal aspiration,” “horizon,” or “forgotten link” in which radical theory
appears to culminate.263 If we can begin to speak of an anarchist turn in practice and
philosophy, then what is at stake for Newman is that contemporary political philosophy
and practice turn on what he refers to as the “anarchist invariant,” or, the “recurring
desire for life without government that haunts the political imagination.”264 As a hidden,
or forgotten “invariant,” what is thus of key importance in the connections currently
being sketched between contemporary politico-philosophical movements and the
resurgence of anarchism is that the principle tenet of anarchist theory—that the domain of
the political and field of politics is irreducible to the paradigm of sovereignty and the
exercise of government—once again appears at the forefront of contemporary theory.
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With the political possibilities offered by anarchism acting as a “hidden referent”
for radical theory, one of the recent tasks of contemporary scholarship has been to draw
points of convergence between contemporary political theory and anarchist thought in
order to lay the groundwork for rethinking the political at the limit of the paradigm of
government. Like Kropotkin once suggested, what must be elevated to a more
fundamental level is the demonstration of the “logical connection between modern
philosophy…and anarchism.”265 Indeed, drawing connections between contemporary
political thinkers and anarchist thought is one of Newman’s strengths as a theorist, and is
what ultimately allows him to conclude that anarchist thought is reappearing today as the
ultimate horizon for contemporary political thought. In the Politics of Postanarchism,
Newman invokes contemporary political theorists such as Alain Badiou, Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri, Jacques Rancière, and Giorgio Agamben in order to highlight not
only the anarchist tendencies of these thinkers, but that certain works in contemporary
political theory gesture toward and require an alternative hypothesis of the political that
cannot simply be reduced to the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms. At stake in
Newman’s work is therefore not simply outlining the connections between anarchist
thought and contemporary philosophical positions in such a way that helps supplement
the critical limitations of traditional political theory; instead, rather, what is at stake for
Newman is that contemporary radical political theory appears to require an investigation
into anarchist political theory as the critical framework required for rethinking the
political at the horizon of the state and the exercise of government.
With reference to the above theorists, Newman highlights three points of
intervention in which a unacknowledged call for a return to anarchism can be staked out
across contemporary philosophical debates: “a politics no longer confined to the
parameters of the state, party and class.”266 Highlighting the ways in which the domain
of the political must be rethought outside of the state, without the notion of vanguard
party politics, and a break with the idea that class relations are the determining factor in
political struggles, Newman’s work makes significant advances toward the preliminary
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development of an alternative theory of the political that overcomes the limitations found
in the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms. In the Politics of Postanarchism, Newman
takes Schmitt’s definition of the political as the critical axiom upon which to demonstrate
how anarchist political theory posits an alternative understanding of the political that is
fundamentally opposed to what I have outlined in terms of the paradigm of government
that has helped to structure Western political through and practice. In this way,
Newman’s work significantly takes as its basis the argument regarding how
(post)anarchism “provides us with a new conception of the autonomy of the political,
which transcends both the Schmittian and liberal paradigms.”267 Against Schmitt’s
insistence that the appropriate domain of the political is identical with the state, Newman
fundamentally reverses this logic, arguing instead that:
The state is actually the order of depoliticization: it is the structure of power that
polices politics, regulating, controlling, and repressing the insurgent dimension
that is proper to the political; it is a forgetting of the conflict and antagonism at
the base of its own foundations.268
In reversing the Schmittian paradigm, Newman’s point is to demonstrate that the domain
appropriate to the political is not, in fact the state, but rather the “autonomous spaces
defined in opposition to” the state.269 In its fundamental opposition to the state,
anarchism begins, according to Newman, with the assertion that the “political” can be
redefined as the “constitution of a space of autonomy which takes its distance from the
state, and thus calls into question the very principle of state sovereignty.”270 Understood
as such anarchism defines a rupture with the historical rationale that traditionally grounds
the terms of the political within the space and practice of government, and in this way
forges a permanent, unsurpassable gap between the art of governing and its counterhistory. In its irreducibility to the political topology of the state and governance, the
significance of the postanarchist turn arises with an alternative conception of the political
which, in its autonomy from the state, transcends the logic of an oikonomia.
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Newman is correct in suggesting that the return of anarchism today provides an
alternative conceptualization of the domain of the political that cannot simply be reduced
to the logic of an oikonomia. Such an approach necessary comes into confrontation with
the central tenets of orthodox political philosophy, and to a certain extent calls for a
fundamental overturning of the history of political theory. What is at stake in the attempt
to free the political from the nexus that binds it to an originary archic power, is that
anarchism at once “conceive[s] of a space for politics outside and against the state,” as
well as a coinciding form of political praxis “through which the principle of state
sovereignty is radically questioned and disrupted.”271 What is equally important,
however, is the way in which Newman argues that this alternative conception of the
political needs to be supplemented with a reconceptualization of politics generated by
movements of resistance situated outside of the framework of state power. As Newman
contends, the tendency to rethink the political at the horizon of the state is, in fact, a
tendency that is “being borne out in many radical movements and forms of resistance
today.”272 For Newman then, what is required for a radical reconceptualization of the
political that cannot be reduced to the paradigm of government is a theory of politics that
takes resistance as the basis from which a new theory of the political becomes manifest.
Indeed, as Newman importantly claims, it is these “movements of resistance” that make
possible and “open up new political spaces, characterized by ‘anarchist’ forms of
organization, which are outside of the ontological order of state sovereignty.”273
According to Newman, then, insofar as postanarchism can be seen as reappearing
as the “eternal horizon” of political theory, and as such requires an alternative theory of
the political that transcends the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms, what is further at
stake is that this reconceptualization of the terms of the political itself turns upon the
question of resistance. To be sure, the strength of Newman’s contributions to both the
development of postanarchist theory and the history of political theory more generally
arise in the attempt to rethink the basis of the political in the general context of a theory
of resistance. Against the Aristotelian and Schmittian models of the political, then,
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Newman radically redefines the domain of the “political” as the “constitutive space
between society and the state,” and further that “it is in this space that the current
struggles against global capitalism and state authoritarianism must be situated” (original
emphasis).274 In Newman’s conceptualization of the political what is ultimately
presupposed is a radical dissolution of the originary nexus between the paradigm of
sovereignty and the exercise of government; yet, this rupture with the logic and discourse
of the archē is not a given variable for Newman, it is instead what is brought about and
made possible through a critical conceptualization of resistance. In this way, by
resituating the space of the political in the interstitial space “between society and the
state,” what is ultimately at stake for Newman is that this reconception of the political
includes two distinct ideas that turn on the question of resistance. First, Newman
maintains that such a conception of the political designates how “politics must signify a
disruption or break with the idea of an established order.”275 Second, Newman maintains
that a retheorization of the political is set to emphasize how the “tasks of radical politics
are not reducible to the overthrowing of state power.”276 In the first instance, Newman
posits that resistance marks the condition from which the question of politics cannot be
simply reduced to the exercise of government and state sovereignty, while in the second,
the concept of resistance is invoked in relation to the history of radical political theory—
that is, resistance marks the condition by which the history of struggle cannot be reduced
to a revolutionary struggle over the power of the state. At stake in both these instances is
that a critical theory of the political consequent upon the turn toward anarchism is made
possible on condition of a vital retheorization of resistance.
Indeed, the question of resistance has been at the forefront of postanarchist
political theory since its inception. In Todd May’s book, The Politics of Poststructural
Anarchism, resistance at once forms general framework for his critical inquiry into the
limitations of orthodox political theory, as well as the critical locus from which he
attempts to rethink the limits of classical anarchist thought. Under what are referred to as
the “twin assumptions,” or dual “a priori that haunts anarchist thought,” May argues that
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the classical anarchist “view of power as suppressive” and “their humanist naturalism”
incites “the search for a transcendental or quasi-transcendental ground from which to
recover a pure, untainted source of resistance” (original emphasis).277 This point is
shared by political theorist Derry Novak who, two decades prior to May, argues that
“anarchism misjudged the nature of social forces, particularly the nature and potentialities
of political power,” a misjudgement from which anarchism “inevitably declined.”278
Rather than assuming that the ‘classical’ anarchist view of power led to its demise, May’s
point, however, is more critically to demonstrate that poststructural philosophy,
particularly Foucault and Deleuze’s insistence that power is not merely repressive, but
productive, reveals a new critical framework from which to overcome the limits of
classical anarchist thought, and thus a point of departure from which to rethink the
possibility of anarchist resistance. For May, insofar as power is understood as productive
rather than repressive in the Foucauldian sense, then it is the specificity of forms of
power according to May that give “rise not only to that which must be resisted, but also,
and more insidiously, to the forms of resistance itself often takes.”279 As May further
concludes, “the liberation from specific forms of power must take into account of the
kind of resistance that is being engaged in, on pain of repeating that which one is trying
to escape.”280 In other words, the poststructural conceptualization of power is what
allows for a reconceptualization of anarchist resistance that begins with, and arises out of,
a specific analysis of power as its basis rather than pure, “untainted” point of departure.
Like May, in From Bakunin to Lacan: Antiauthoritarianism and the Dislocation
of Power Newman takes the paradox of the uncontaminated place of resistance as the
turning point from which to rethink the limits of classical anarchism consequent upon a
poststructuralist conceptualization of power. According to Newman classical anarchist
political theory is faced with a “theoretical impasse” which presupposes, through
essentialist and universal premises, a pure place of resistance outside, rather than within
power: “if there is no uncontaminated point of departure from which power can be
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criticized or condemned, if there is no essential limit to the power one is resisting, then
surely there can be no resistance against it.”281 It is this conceptual aporia—based upon
the general problematic of a theory of resistance—that composes the basis, according to
Newman, for the development of postanarchist reconceptualization of politics. For
Newman, then, it is “by using the poststructuralist critique” of power that “one can
theorize the possibility of political resistance without essentialist guarantees: a politics of
postanarchism” (original emphasis).282 For both May and Newman, the central task of
rethinking the political at the horizon of the state takes as its critical turning point the
question of resistance; to be sure, resistance is the key concept by which a new theory of
the political is made possible. Postanarchism not only highlights how resistance is a
central concept inherent to anarchist political theory, but also the significance of this
concept for rethinking the political in its irreducibility to the logic of the archē.
The postanarchist turn in political theory has not gone unchallenged (especially
amongst anarchists), and several theorists have criticized the postanarchist understanding
of classical anarchist thought, as well as the central thesis regarding how a
poststructuralist intervention into anarchist thought allows for a retheorization of a nonessentialist anarchist philosophy. Alan Antliff challenges May’s “claim that ‘classical’
anarchism—and by extension, contemporary anarchism—founds its politics on a flawed
conception of power and its relationship to society.”283 Against this idea Antliff argues
that “classical anarchism does have a positive theory of power,” while simultaneously
offering an “alternative ground for theorizing the social conditions of freedom” in a nonessentialist manner.284 Similarly, Nathan Jun, has challenged the central thesis of
postanarchism regarding the way in which “postmodernist political philosophy represents
an altogether new form of anarchism,” and argues to the contrary that “classical
anarchism is arguably the first political postmodernism.”285 Another criticism against
postanarchist can be further maintained in relation to the question of resistance as
developed in anarchist political theory. Despite the ways in which May and Newman
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centralize the discourse of resistance to the project of postanarchism, it is my contention
that while they both correctly point to the concept of resistance as a vital component of
anarchist political theory, it is nevertheless a critical mistake to reduce the question of
resistance in anarchist theory to an essential, or humanist ground that acts as the
transcendental source of revolt. Despite their intentions, both May and Newman locate
the place of resistance within the limits of power, and as such tend to presuppose the
primacy of political power as the framework from which a critical conceptualization of
resistance might take place. Regardless of its critical shortcomings, what is crucial about
the postanarchist turn in contemporary radical theory is that the possibility of rethinking
the political at the horizon of the state requires a more fundamental engagement with the
concept of resistance. As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, the relation
between anarchist political theory and resistance is not developed through a fundamental
reliance on a benign human essence; instead, the question of resistance posed in anarchist
theory at once redesignates politics as the struggle with the exercise of government, as
well as the pivotal point from which an alternative hypothesis of the political can be
found.

1.5

Metapolitics

As far as archē is concerned, as with everything else, the conventional logic has it that
there is a particular disposition to act that is exercised upon an equally determinate
inferiority…for there to be politics, there must be a rupture in this logic…Politics is a
specific rupture in the logic of archē. 286
--Jacques Rancière
In many important respects the meta-political turn, like postanarchism, represents a
crucial turning point in the history of political theory consequent upon the resurgence of
anarchist political theory. Beginning with the argument that a failure to transcend the
nexus linking politics to the state is one of the more pressing issues political theory must
come to grapple with, metapolitical theory calls for a fundamental overturning of the
history of political theory. In this regard, at the beginning of his influential text,
Metapolitics, Badiou confrontationally suggests that “one of the core demands of
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contemporary thought is to have done with political philosophy.”287 For Badiou, the
formidable problem of political philosophy, or what he refers to as the “great enigma of
the century,” is to think through the ways in which politics ultimately gives “rise to
bureaucratic submission and the cult of the state.”288 Political philosophy has failed,
according to Badiou, to transcend the relation that binds the political to the state. To be
done with political philosophy means, then, that we must begin to rethink politics in such
a way that “it is impossible for it to be governed by the state,” which for Badiou and
others requires a theory of “meta-politics,” or the critical conception of the space for
politics outside and against the state.289 To be sure, consequent upon the resurgence of
anarchism, one of the central tasks for contemporary radical theory is to search for an
alternative space for politics outside of the framework which traditionally locates the
state as the condition of possibility for the emergence of the political. At its core, metapolitics attempts to transcend the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms by
reconceptualising politics in such a way that it cannot be reduced to either sovereignty or
the exercise of government.
Perhaps the first to contribute to the development of the metapolitical moment in
continental thought is the French philosopher Jacques Rancière, whose work often
parallels anarchist theory, and has become increasingly integral for rethinking the history
of political theory anarchically.290 Rancière’s principal text in political theory,
Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, and the coinciding supplementary essay “Ten
Theses on Politics,” both provide a new conception of politics that significantly aids in
the possibility of critically dislocating the state’s monopolization on politics within the art
of governing and sovereign law. In Disagreement, Rancière asserts a fundamental
distinction between what he refers to as “archipolitics” and “metapolitics” in order to
fundamentally rethink the basis upon which political theory traditionally presupposes the
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paradigm of government as the condition of possibility of politics.291 It is with this
distinction that Rancière provides a preliminary passageway toward rethinking the
political anarchically. The paradigm of classical politics—which I have suggested begins
with an originary nexus between politeia and archē—is according to Rancière the
fundamental myth, or originary “lie that invents some kind of social nature in order to
provide the community with an archē” (original emphasis).292 Insofar as traditional
political theory presupposes an originary link between the very notion of politics and the
paradigm of government, Rancière proposes to rename this history under the heading of
“archipolitics,” or the political “project of a community based on the complete realization
of the archē of community.”293 What Rancière nominates under the heading of
“archipolitics” is useful in identifying a paradigm of political theory in which the very
condition of possibility of politics always becomes manifest within the logic of an archē,
and as such presupposes an originary link in which the domain of the political assumes
the form of government. It is in this way that the orthodox history of political philosophy
has, according to Rancière, been none other than the history of the archipolitical.
By pointing out that the historical terms of the political are conditioned by the
crisis of the archē, thus culminating in the problematic of archipolitical government, what
is at stake for Rancière is to demonstrate the ways in which the traditional
conceptualization of politics has effectively been reduced to theories and relations of
power. Because politics in its traditional conceptualization arises out of the
presupposition of an archē as its principal domain, and therefore culminates in the logic
of government, the very history of archipolitics becomes manifest in what Rancière
renames in terms of the logic of the police. Archipolitics as such is, according to
Rancière, “just as much a form of archipolicing that grants ways of being and ways of
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doing.”294 In this regard, Rancière describes the relation between archipolitics and the
logic of the police in the following manner:
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and
consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution
of places and roles, and the system for legitimizing this distribution. I propose to
give this system of distribution and legitimization another name. I propose to call
it the police (original emphasis).295
By “the police,” a term invoked with reference to Foucault’s studies of the biopolitical
and governmental policing of populations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
Rancière means to describe the ways in which the paradigm of government forms the
framework for the domain of the political.296 What Rancière identifies here as the logic
of the police directly invokes Aristotle’s oikonomia, or the way in which the domain of
the political traditionally assumes the primacy of government as its condition of
possibility. Politics takes on the logic of the police for Rancière because it is an ordering
“of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of
saying”297—in short, politics as archipolitics is for Rancière none other than the exercise
of power as the art of governing. “To put it simply,” Rancière concludes, “the politeia of
the philosophers is the exact identity of politics and the police” (original emphasis).298
Insofar as political philosophy attempts locate the possibility of politics within the
paradigm of government then, as Rancière suggests, it “is condemned to have to reidentify politics and police.”299 Archipolitics as such points toward the core crisis of
political philosophy that renders politics indistinguishable from the exercise of
government. Indeed, according to Rancière the specific continuity established between
politics and power exercised as government ultimately amounts to a radical “reduction of
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the political to the state” in the sense of both the Aristotelian and Schmittian
paradigms.300
Yet, what is at stake for Rancière is that the very gesture that grounds the political
within the realization of an archē “cancel[s] out politics through the gesture that founds
it.”301 Indeed, if the political cannot be reduced to the single foundation of an
archipolitics, then what is crucial is the way in which Rancière both reserves and reopens
a space for politics outside of its culmination in the logic of an originary archē. Unlike
the postanarchist critique of locating a pure space for politics outside of the state, the
‘outside’ that forms the substance of politics is not, for Rancière, made possible by an
essential foundation, but an entirely different logic that dislocates the state’s
monopolization on politics. The key critical aspect of metapolitical theory thus begins
with and turns upon the idea that politics is irreducible to the exercise of power, and as
such must be understood on its own terms. At the same time, however, this means that
what is required for Rancière is an entirely different logic for politics, a specific rationale
antinomical to the art of governing.
Taking Rancière’s first thesis on politics from his seminal essay, “Ten Theses on
Politics,” as a beginning focal point from which to understand this key distinction, we can
directly point toward the ways in which an alternative conceptual and methodological
approach to the question of the politics is developing that directly challenges and
undermines the traditional categories that sustain orthodox political theories. In the
opening component of his first thesis on politics, Rancière writes with absolute certainty
that “[p]olitics is not the exercise of power.”302 This is a bold claim, and one that is
clearly directed at the history of traditional political theory as outlined in the first sections
of this chapter. If the activity composing politics, as Rancière posits here, cannot be
reduced to the exercise of power then what is at stake in this thesis is foremost the claim
seeking to overturn the core tenets of political theory from Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and
Schmitt. In its irreducibility to the exercise of government, traditional political theory
has, both conceptually and practically, remained none other than a philosophy of power
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and the coinciding theoretical investigation into the origins and legitimacy of power as
such. For Rancière, then, rendering “politics with the exercise of, and struggle to
possess, power is to do away with politics.”303 Contrary to Schmitt’s insistence that the
appropriate domain of the politics is the state, from Rancière’s perspective the state is
more correctly the site of depoliticization—that is, it is the locus of sovereign power that
polices the domain of politics as the exercise of government. In this way, if the history of
political philosophy could more correctly be referred to, as Rancière argues here, in terms
of a historical theory of power, then what might still be considered political philosophy
necessarily requires an entirely different framework for a critical understanding of the
very possibility of politics. Indeed, in the second component of his first thesis on politics,
we read that “[p]olitics ought to be defined on its own terms.”304 Defining the notion of
politics on terms that are irreducible to the politics of the state opens up new possibilities
for developing alternative approaches to political theory distinct from theories of
sovereign power, and therefore outside the history of archipolitics.
Insofar as the possession of and struggle toward power is to be understood as
analytically different in kind than the proper domain of politics, what is therefore
required for political theory is a conceptual framework which begins with a fundamental
redefinition of what “politics’ in its non-statist form consists of as such. In Rancière’s
thought, the proper character of what is to be considered the essence of politics cannot, as
we have seen, be reduced to the exercise of power. Indeed, politics as distinct from
archipolitics, is that which escapes in the Schmittian sense those with the sovereign
power to define what is proper to the domain of politics, as well as its manifestation in
the exercise of power as government. Instead, rather, turning to Rancière’s seventh thesis
on politics we find that the essence of politics lies in its opposition to the paradigm of
government and logic of policing: “politics,” Rancière writes, “is specifically opposed to
the police.”305 In its irreducibility to the exercise of power, politics is that which disturbs
power in order to bring about what Rancière refers to as the “impossibility of the
archē.”306 In its irreducibility to the struggle for and possession of power, what is proper
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to the domain of politics is the space of autonomy that lies in opposition to the state;
politics is that which confronts the logic and manifestation of the archē. Distinct from
archipolitics, Rancière therefore “propose[s] to reserve the term politics for an extremely
determined activity antagonistic to policing” (original italics).307 In this conception, the
appropriate domain of politics is neither the state, nor the fundamental field of
antagonism between the friend/enemy distinction as posited in Schmitt’s model, but the
sphere of agonism defined in opposition to the state and the logic of the police exercised
as government. As that which actively opposes the police, Rancière’s
reconceptualization of “politics” retains the sense of antagonism as found in Schmitt’s
model. Yet, precisely because this antagonism is directed against the state the critical
conceptualization of politics found in Rancière’s thought is defined by and begins with a
framework that is more consistently aligned not only with anarchism, but with an
anarchist conception of politics as resistance. With this alternative framework in place,
the turn toward metapolitical theory can be understood as an attempt to liberate political
philosophy from its foundation within the space of government and sovereign law in
order to create an alternative space for a politics in which the techniques of
governmentality are both questioned and disrupted.
Arising out of Rancière’s political thought is a need for a fundamental rethinking
of new forms of politics that can be situated outside of the terrain that reduces the
political to the archipolitical. This is to say, a reconceptualization of alternative
possibilities for the political which can neither be reduced nor assimilated to the
archipolitical, requires a different political topology which, in its radical dislocation from
the archipolitical, attempts to open the space for political practice beyond the horizon of
state-based politics. It is in this context, that Rancière posits the possibility of a transition
from archipolitics to metapolitics. For Rancière, metapolitics defines a radical space
which, although outside of, comes into conflict with the archipolitical through the
manifestation of “dissensus.”308 The key concept of dissensus in Rancière’s thought
resists the reduction of the political to the archipolitical; dissensus points toward the
essence of politics because it designates a radical sphere of praxis in which the primary
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locus of politics arises in the insurgent form of agonism against archipolitical policing.
Rancière’s conceptualization of politics as the realm of ongoing conflict and agonism
radically reverses Schmitt’s central claim regarding how the political is marked by the
sphere of antagonism exercised within the state. What can be understood as politics for
Rancière, however, is neither the object nor objective of the state, but a distinct form of
praxis that disrupts and resists the archipolitical. Thus, Rancière’s third thesis on politics
reads: “politics is a specific rupture in the logic of the archē.”309 Working within an
alternative framework for understanding the domain of the political that resists the logic
of archipolitics, Rancière locates a real political and philosophical possibility; as the
activity by which politics defines a rupture with the “logic of the archē,” the praxis and
substance of politics is not only interpreted anarchically, but anarchic by definition.
Contrary, then, to the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms, in Rancière’s
understanding politics is what becomes manifest in direct opposition to the state, and
therefore reverses the very principle of state sovereignty. Whereas in Aristotle and
Schmitt, politics directly refers to and takes place within the domain of the primacy of
government, for Rancière, the domain proper to the sphere of politics might better be
characterized—although he does use this language—by resistance to the archipolitical.
Against the rationale of the first principle of an ontological and authoritarian force that
grounds politics in the problem of government and legitimates this act as the terms of the
political, what is crucial regarding Rancière’s work, is how he importantly helps to
reformulate the question of politics from the perspective of resistance rather than the
paradigm of government. It is by further elaborating this conceptual nexus between the
locus of politics and the praxis of resistance that we can begin to rethink the history of
politics in terms of carving out a distinct “rupture with the logic of the archē” in a more
consistent manner.
There are clear parallels that can be drawn between the metapolitical moment and
the political theory of anarchism, especially in terms of rethinking politics from a
different critical logic than the logic of the archē. Anarchist political theory traditionally
begins by providing a different way for thinking about the terms of the political—one that
both defines a rupture with the logic of the archipolitical and situates politics outside and
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against the state. Indeed, it is this search for a place for politics situated at the horizon of
the state that incites the search for a ground from which the politics of resistance might be
found. Thus, if as Badiou and Critchley suggest that the goal of contemporary political
thought is to rethink politics meta-politically—that is, as a form of politics that “puts the
state at a distance”310—anarchism can be seen as providing a more consistent framework
from which to situate and understand the implications of the meta-political moment.
Critchley is thus correct to assert both that this “meta-political moment is anarchic”
(original emphasis), and again, like Rancière, that “politics is the manifestation of
dissensus, the cultivation of an anarchic multiplicity that calls into question the authority
and legitimacy of the state.”311 Crucially, however, Critchley’s reconceptualization of a
theory of politics that “puts the state at a distance” places, as its conceptual and practical
framework, the question of resistance as the very basis from which a new theory of
politics might begin.312 It is in this regard that Critchley importantly maintains that this
politics as “[r]esistance is about the articulation of a distance, the creation of space or
spaces of distance from the state.”313
The strength of Critchley’s work arises in the way in which he locates the concept
of resistance as the central concept that composes the retheorization of politics as
proposed by Rancière. At the same time, Critchley’s conceptualization of an anarchic
politics of resistance that, in its very activity, creates spaces outside of the state,
additionally makes possible the search for a non-essentialist “outside” to power as
theorized by the postanarchists. The creation of spaces outside the state are what
Critchley refers to as “interstitial distance[s].”314 As Critchley argues in a separate work,
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“these interstices are not given or existent,” but made by the very activity of politics.315
If the creation of the distance from the state is what is produced by politics, then
Critchley’s understanding of politics affirms the postanarchist search for a nonessentialist outside to power that can act as the ‘ground’ for resistance. Yet, at the same
time this “outside” is not an essential place of resistance that comes from the outside, but
is instead, somewhat paradoxically, forged from within the state. In this way, “the
activity of politics” is, according to Critchley, “working within the state against the
state…the forging of a common front, imagining and enacting a new social bond that
opens a space of resistance and opposition to government.”316 The distinction Critchley
makes is crucial. If the active component of politics finds its locus and logical expression
in the concept of resistance instead of the state or the art of governing, Critchley’s
understanding of politics demonstrates that resistance is what forges the outside of the
state by its very activity as such. Such as approach does not posit a pure outside to
power, but instead demonstrates that a radical exteriority is made possible by resistance.
In the chapters that follow it is my contention that the theoretical nexus in which the
question of politics is inextricably linked to the question of resistance must be rigorously
thought through to its fullest extent.

1.6

Conclusion: Toward a Critical Theory of Anarchism

This chapter addressed and took as its critical turning point the ways in which the domain
of the political in the West often assumes a form of government as its historic condition
of possibility. The paradigm of government, and the synthesis between politeia and archē
acts as the theoretical limit point or horizon for a critical conceptualization of the
political. Indeed, within the history of political philosophy, the state and the consequent
problematic of government have been taken as the privileged site of the political. Taking
the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms as historical examples of this I have shown
that the terms of the political begin with a unique synthesis between politeia and archē, in
which the domain of the political is analogous to the exercise of government within a
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sovereign state. Presupposing a primary synthesis between the terms of the political and
the paradigm of government causes the domain of the political to have a form analogous
to the form of government that makes the political possible as such. As long as primacy
of the state and paradigm of government constitute the fundamental horizon of the
domain of the political, the very problem of the political has been reduced to the
paradigm of government, and the archic structure that connects the domain of the
political to the domain of the state has traditionally been taken for granted, and
unfortunately unchallenged by the majority of political philosophers.
Taking the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms as the critical turning point
from which to locate the return of anarchist political theory, I then situated the resurgence
of anarchist political theory through the postanarchist and meta-political turns in
contemporary theory in order to demonstrate that contemporary political theory appears
to demand an alternative hypothesis of the political located at the horizon of the state. At
the same time, however, while critical turns such as postanarchism and metapolitics help
to contribute to the resurgence of anarchist political theory by asserting the autonomy of
the political from the state and redefining politics in terms of a radical struggle with the
state, what is further required is the unique question of resistance that has always been
posed by the logic of anarchism. What is crucial in the turn toward anarchism is
therefore not only the formation of politics beyond the framework of the state, but a form
of politics that is centred on, and arises out of a critical inquiry into the general
problematic of resistance. It is nevertheless my contention that the tradition of anarchist
theory has always affirmed the critical moves made in postanarchist and metapolitical
theory, and therefore that what is required is itself a return to the study of anarchism in
which the question of resistance can be shown in its specificity.
As I will maintain in the following chapter, the key intervention made by
anarchist political theory in its most basic form, ought to be understood against the
background of the crisis of the political. Rather than reducing anarchism philosophically
as a simple rejection of the state counter-posed with a utopic view of a desirable future,
or to a radical “rejection of politics,”317 anarchist political theory begins by positing an
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entirely different theory of the political that begins with a critical exiting from the
paradigm of government. One of the ways, then, in which to understand the recent turn
toward anarchism is, as Dimitri Roussopoulos argues, that a rethinking of anarchist
political theory affords “new horizons…for a transformative political philosophy that
promotes” innovative political possibilities “without a centralizing authority, that is a
state…without a fixation on a nation state.”318 In light of this possibility, the following
chapter addresses the way in which a rethinking of anarchism affords us a way of
thinking through alternative political possibilities by presupposing a radical dissolution
with the nexus that confines the political to the paradigm of government. In doing so, the
overall goal is to demonstrate the ways in which anarchist philosophy posits an
alternative hypothesis of the political which, as we will see, itself turns upon the question
of resistance to the exercise of government rather than the archic nexus between
government and sovereignty as a way to rethink the possibility of a non-statist politics.
Anarchism intervenes in the history of political philosophy by rethinking the fundamental
categories that ground the political within the paradigm of government, while at the same
time resituating the concept and practice of resistance as the vital condition that makes
possible an alternative theory of the political.
With the paradigm of government acting as the critical turning point from which
to understand the turn toward anarchism as such, the following chapter is therefore
devoted to further exploring the implications of developing an alternative hypothesis of
the political through an engagement with anarchist political theory. More specifically, in
the next chapter I revisit anarchism in order to make a case for a reading of the history of
anarchist thought as turning upon a vital distinction between the exercise of government
and the politics of resistance, in which a critical theory of resistance comes to designate
the specificity of the political as such. Although anarchism is often reduced to, as
political theorist A.J. Simmons suggests, a single “central claim [that] unites all forms of
anarchist political philosophy”—that is, the claim that “all existing states are
illegitimate,”319 I maintain that reducing anarchism to the claim that there can be no
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legitimate states is itself historically inaccurate and fails to take into consideration several
other characteristics distinct to anarchist theory. While the anarchist critique of the state
does indeed mark a central point of contention within the tradition of anarchist thought, it
is my contention that the locus of anarchist critique is, more fundamentally, directed at
the nexus that binds the domain of the political to the dual paradigms of the exercise of
government and sovereign power as outlined in this chapter. Furthermore, by reducing
anarchism to an abstract critique of the state, traditional political philosophers often
neglect and fail to take into account the ways in which anarchist political theory
fundamentally turns upon an alternative theory of “politics,” whereby the term itself
designates for anarchists, not solely the exercise of government, but the countermovements of resistance against the deployment of government as such. By rethinking
anarchism in terms of elaborating an alternative hypothesis of the political through a
critical theory of resistance, my general intentions are twofold: to first define, or perhaps
redefine, anarchism qua the unique concept of resistance, while simultaneously invoking
the concept of resistance the principle from which to read the history of the political.
Such a critical conception of anarchism designates the critical framework from which to
situate Foucault’s theory of resistance amongst this tradition in the chapters that follow.
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Chapter 2
2
Anarchy and Anarchism: Rethinking the Political at the
Horizon of the State and the Exercise of Government
Government is stationary…Governments always stand for the “established order of
things.” Hence, we use the word anarchy, the negative of government, and will retain it
when the political state has merged into the social commonwealth.320
--Lucy Parsons
Anarchism is the method by which to achieve anarchy through freedom and without
government, that is without authoritarian organisms which, by using force, even, possibly
for good ends, impose their will on others.321
--Errico Malatesta
Anarchism can be described first and foremost as a visceral revolt. The anarchist is
above all…in revolt.322
--Daniel Guérin
By way of establishing the general problematic and theoretical framework from which
my own study proceeds, the previous chapter outlined and addressed the ways in which
the domain of the political traditionally presupposes the paradigms of government and
sovereignty as the transcendental and material condition of possibility of politics as such.
Tracing this nexus between the exercise of government and the theory of sovereignty as
the fundamental conceptual impasse posed within the history of political theory, the goal
of the previous chapter was two-fold. To first demonstrate—through a reading of
Aristotle and Schmitt—two dominant paradigms within the history of political
philosophy in which the historical condition of possibility of the political is conditioned
by the principle of an archē that forms the nexus between politics exercised as oikonomia
and state sovereign power. Furthermore, while outlining the preliminary intersections
between the return of anarchism and the critical positions of both postanarchist and
metapolitical theory, the second aim of the previous chapter was to demonstrate that there
is a strong current in contemporary thought to fundamentally rethink the philosophical
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and political problems underlying the historical terrain that reduces and structures the
terms of the political to the techniques of government exercised within the domain of the
state. Rather than working within the historical framework that reduces the question of
politics to the exercise of government and the domain of the political to the advent of
state sovereign power, contemporary critical positions such as postanarchism and
metapolitics demand the invention of new political topologies outside this very nexus,
and thus fundamentally gesture toward the preliminary development of what can be
referred to as an anarchist hypothesis of the political, an alternative theory of the political
that begins anarchically, and reopens the space of the political as a topology of agonistic
struggle instead of a sovereign art of government.
What is ultimately at stake in staging a decisive juxtaposition between the
orthodox tradition of political philosophy and the critical interventions posed by
postanarchism and metapolitical theory is how these latter two positions adopt the basic
tenets of anarchism as the key referent from which the history of the political can be
rethought, thus carving out a distinct space for the revitalization of anarchist political
theory in contemporary scholarship. We have seen that the central claim arising out of
both postanarchism and the metapolitical theory is that the domain of the political is
irreducible to the exercise of government, or what Rancière aptly refers to as the
“archipolitical.”323 Because the politics is irreducible to the logic of the archē, the
political as such for Rancière begins anarchically. Furthermore, within the postanarchist
tradition we have seen how Newman reverses Schmitt’s paradigm pertaining to the
continuity between the domain of the political and state sovereignty. Contrary to
Schmitt’s argument regarding how state sovereignty forms the substance proper to the
domain of the political, Newman instead maintains that the state is itself an “order of
depoliticization”—that is, state sovereignty is the “structure of power that polices
politics, regulating, controlling, and repressing the insurgent dimension that is proper to
the political; it is a forgetting of the conflict and antagonism at the base of its own
foundations.”324 The critical question, then, central to postanarchist and metapolitical
theory revolves around how to create a rupture with the political logic grounded in the
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archic nexus between state sovereignty and the exercise of power as government. In turn,
this requires an alternative hypothesis for the political that at once reveals what Newman
refers to as the agonistic “insurgent dimension proper to the political,” and what Rancière
refers to as the form of “politics” that carves out a “specific rupture in the logic of the
archē” (original emphasis).325 By situating the question of politics and the political at the
horizon of the state and the exercise of government, postanarchist and metapolitical
theory both affirm what can be preliminarily referred to as the anarchic terms of the
political, in which what is ultimately presupposed is not the primacy of the first principle
of government, but a critical caesura between the political as archē and the “insurgent
dimension” of the political manifest in terms of a distinct rupture with the logic,
discourses, practices of politics as archē.
In both postanarchist and metapolitical theory, however, the preliminary
development of this alternative hypothesis of the political requires, and is paired with, the
task of locating as Newman, Badiou, and Critchley all claim a radical new space for
forms of “politics situated at a distance from the state,”326 or reserving the terms
“politics,” as does Rancière, to designate an “extremely determined activity antagonistic
to policing.”327 Thus, while there is a strong current amongst the above theorists to
rethink the terms of the political as an insurrectionary rupture with the logic of the archē,
what is at stake is how these theorists reintroduce the concept of historical struggle—that
is, of resistance—as the very condition from which the basic tenets of political theory can
be retheorized. Rather than presupposing, as does Aristotle, that politics designates the
techniques of government exercised within the domain of the state, we see here that
politics can, in fact, be rethought at once as that which is located “at a distance from the
state,” as well as the field of agonistic struggle “antagonistic to policing”—that is, as
resistance to the techniques of government exercised as a specific form of power. As that
which is located and takes place outside of the logic of the archē, a critical theory of
“politics” for these theorists is fundamentally revitalized, elaborated, and posed in regard
to a critical inquiry into the question of resistance as the very locus that makes possible
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an alternative space for politics located at a “distance from the state.” Crucially, then,
while the continuation of anarchist thought reappears with particular force in terms of
developing an alternative hypothesis of the political, what is ultimately at stake in this
retheorization is the reappearance of the critical question of resistance, a new paradigm
from which the basic tenets of political theory can be rethought. Indeed, as I will argue
throughout this chapter, the concept of resistance is not only the central (and perhaps
even vital) component that has always remained at the very heart of anarchist political
theory since its incarnation, but the key concept by which the political and the question of
politics is reopened as a fundamental agonistic space of struggle—that is, it is through the
unique question of resistance that anarchist political theory is able to posit an altogether
different theory of the political.
In this way, while metapolitical theory appears to invoke anarchist thought as the
basic turning point from which to rethink the logic and structure of the political, and
although postanarchism invokes poststructural political philosophy as a way to overcome
the alleged limits of “classical anarchism,” it is my assertion that the political theory of
anarchism both affirms and prefigures the major critical moves established and
articulated in these schools of thought. 328 In other words, anarchist political theory, I
maintain, has historically set the terms of debate that make possible the metapolitical and
postanarchist interventions. In this regard, these critical positions ought to be understood
as designating a historical continuation of the vital attempt initially posed by anarchist
theorists to rethink the field of the political and the subsequent question of politics on
condition of the unique place of the permanence of resistance amongst the field to which
politics refers and consists. Since its origins, anarchist political theory has presupposed a
radical dissolution with the statist imagery of orthodox political philosophy, and in this
way prefigures the political possibilities offered through the more recent critical trends of
postanarchism and metapolitics. Thus, if the intersections between contemporary
political theory and anarchist thought can be maintained, as Saul Newman suggests, in
terms of a permanent (albeit at times hidden) “invariant”329 of political theory in which
the history of government is simultaneously haunted by the possibility of life without
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government, it is my contention in this chapter not only that the resurgence of anarchism
requires the development of a radically alternative hypothesis of the political, but more
fundamentally that this critical task itself requires a return to the study of the question of
resistance as posed in anarchist theory.
With this critical framework in mind, what is ultimately at stake in this chapter is
two-fold: to first reintroduce anarchism as itself a distinct form of political philosophy
that fundamentally turns upon an alternative hypothesis the political irreducible to the
logic of the archē, and second to demonstrate how the concept of resistance animates and
forms the central component from which this new conception of both politics and the
political can become discernible. Together these two ideas—that is, the political situated
at the horizon of the state and the exercise of government, as well as the elaboration of
alternative paradigm for politics as resistance—form the locus of what I hold to be the
essential task for political theory. In this regard, the focus of this chapter is to both
reintroduce anarchism as a more consistent theoretical framework from which to rethink
the political anarchically, as well as how this theory of the political turns upon an
agonistic theory of resistance as the key component that reveals the political as such.
Whereas the political concept of “anarchy,” as well as a politics of resistance have both
been traditionally excluded and discounted within the history of political theory, the
overarching goal of this chapter is to reintroduce the political theory of anarchism as that
which asserts an alternative hypothesis of the political through a critical theory of
resistance. To do so, the concept of “anarchy” will be elaborated in three distinct yet
interrelated manners that might act as the preliminary framework from which to rethink
the political on condition of resistance: as a philosophical principle that affirms an
alternative starting point for a critical theory of the political; as a historico-political
principle in which the history of the political is retheorized as a permanent domain of
agonistic struggle; and as a paradigm of politics as resistance. In this regard, this chapter
aims to define, or perhaps even redefine anarchism, at once as a critical political theory
that attempts to identify within the history of politics an alternative set of criteria from
which the domain of the political cannot be reduced to a priori paradigm of government,
as well as how anarchist thought turns upon and is critically coupled with the affirmation
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of a unique theory of resistance as the vital principle from which to read the history of the
political in radically new ways.

2.1 Drawing the Line Once Again: Anarchism and Marxism on
the Concept of Struggle
[T]he situation in politics can be defined as a breakdown of the state and its entire
failure…the collapse of states will become more than a question of time, and the most
peaceful of philosophers will see in the distance the dawning light by which the great
revolution manifests itself. 330
--Peter Kropotkin

The novelty of the coming politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest
or control of the State, but a struggle between the state and the non-State (humanity), an
insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization.331
--Giorgio Agamben

In the trajectory that stretches from the anarchist Peter Kropotkin who, over a century
ago, defined the “situation in politics” as a “breakdown of states,” to contemporary
philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s claim pertaining to the ways in which “novelty of the
coming politics” can be defined in terms of an “insurmountable disjunction,” or
fundamental “struggle between the State and non-State,” we can underline the ways in
which anarchism reappears as the horizon from which politics and the political might be
rethought as a paradigm of historical “struggle,” or what I will elaborate hereafter as a
distinct form of politics as resistance. With this problematic in mind, it is my contention
that what must be at stake in outlining the growing relationship between contemporary
radical thought and anarchism hinges on elevating an anarchist theory of the political to a
more fundamental level in order to cultivate the emergence of a alternative political logic
in which the “insurmountable disjunction” between a conception of the political as archē
and an alternative theory of the political redefined in terms of an agonistic struggle
“between the State and Non-state.” At stake, then, in what Agamben refers to as the
330
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“novelty of the coming politics” is a return to rethinking the questions of the political and
politics within the paradigm of historical struggle. This turn toward a more anarchist
approach to a theory of the political, as well as the retheorization of politics as resistance
has not been without its various critics. More specifically, a large portion of the
criticisms directed at the return of anarchism are most commonly set forth by
contemporary Marxist theorists. This is, of course, nothing new. Ever since the dispute
between the Marxist-communists and the anarchists that led to a divisive split in the fifth
congress of the International Workingmen’s Association in 1872 over questions
pertaining to the revolutionary use of in Bakunin’s words, “a state, a government, [and] a
universal dictatorship”332 in order to achieve one’s political goals, a firm line pertaining
to their respective theories of historical struggle has been drawn between the two most
radical traditions in the history of political philosophy. Indeed, what Agamben alludes to
as the novel forms of politics to come fundamentally appears to echo the historical divide
pertaining to how the concept of struggle has been conceptualized in the revolutionary
traditions of both anarchism and Marxism. As a struggle neither for the “conquest or
control of the state,” but that which is situated between the “state and non-state,"
Agamben appears to reference the fundamental debate between anarchism and Marxism
over the critical use of how the concept of struggle is to be conceived and practiced.
What is at stake in the divide between anarchist and Marxist thought is not, therefore, a
set of fundamental ideological differences, but a contestation over the paradigm of
historical struggle and its use within the field of politics—that is, the fundamental break
between anarchism and Marxism arises in regard to their respective conceptions
pertaining to a historical theory of struggle, or resistance. While the confrontation
between anarchism and Marxism has been well documented by historians, the dispute
between Marx and Bakunin is useful in pinpointing a fundamental confrontation between
two dominant theories of historical struggle within the revolutionary tradition. 333 Indeed,
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it is by tracing the preliminary distinctions between these two theories of struggle that an
anarchist hypothesis of the political can be shown to be simultaneously paired with
historical theory of resistance that ultimately motivates this conception of the political as
such.
Following his expulsion, alongside James Guillaume and other anarchists, from
the First International, the Russian insurrectionary anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, argued
that an unbridgeable gulf had been forged between the authoritarian communisms
inspired by Marxist doctrine and the anti-authoritarian tendency of anarchism. This
pivotal schism between Marxism and anarchism not only helped to define a new direction
for nineteenth and early twentieth century radical thought, but also brought to the
forefront of the modern political imagination an alternative critical social philosophy
which, at its very core, questions the fundamentally authoritarian premises of Western
political thought and practice. Accordingly Bakunin clarifies that between these two
nascent tendencies in radical thought, there is a “very palpable difference…a yawning
gulf.”334 Marxists, Bakunin concludes, are “governmentals and we are anarchists.”335 In
regard to the question of historical struggle, Bakunin reveals that Marxism is to be
distinguished from anarchism since its theory of resistance remains, in fact, bound to the
fundamental presuppositions of modern Western political thought insofar as it
understands the state as the transcendental and material condition of possibility for
overcoming capitalism. Despite their attempts at a revolutionary theory of class struggle
as the principle component of history as such, Bakunin maintains that Marxists
nevertheless “worship the power of the state,” thus reinvigorating the logic of the archē
endemic within the entire tradition of political philosophy. 336 As Bakunin’s dissention
demonstrates, although orthodox Marxism attempts a critical conceptualization of the
politics of struggle, this theory of struggle fundamentally relies on the very condition it
opposes. Marxist-communists, Bakunin laments, can therefore “acknowledge no other
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emancipation than the one they expect from their so-called people’s State.”337 The
implications of Bakunin’s critique of Marxism are far-reaching; insofar as Marxism
traditionally presupposes the use of the state as a means toward a proletariat revolution,
the notion of class struggle as a dominant theory of resistance is revealed by Bakunin as
itself a statist project. Bakunin is clear, however, that an anarchist theory of resistance is
that which can only take place “independently of any government tutelage.”338 It is
within the fundamental thesis that a politics of struggle must take place independent of
the framework of government that forms the basis of the anti-authoritarian ethics that
distinguishes anarchism from other political traditions. At the heart of this fundamental
chasm between Marxism and anarchism lies a basic distinction that has at once become
central to the elaboration of the anti-authoritarian ethics distinct to anarchist thought, and
the resurgence of anarchism consequent upon what May refers as the “failure of
Marxism.”339 The advent of anarchism, as a distinct political theory, is not simply based
off of an a priori rejection of authoritarian modes of political organization, but more
fundamentally that this rejection is coupled with and informs the notion that both politics
as well as critical theory of historical resistance must be conceived independent of the
principle of government, and further that the paradigm of struggle as such cannot take
place either within the framework of a state or as a struggle for control of the state.
Today, in both theory and practice, the vital distinction between the anarchist and
Marxist conceptualizations of historical struggle is once again reappearing.340 To be sure,
contemporary Marxist-communist philosophers such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek
are in many ways at the locus of this debate. Although metapolitical theory can be seen
as sharing and advancing a certain affinity with anarchism—particularly in its central
assertion regarding the autonomy of the political from the state as well as gesturing
toward an alternative theory of politics as struggle—it is precisely around the questions
337
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pertaining to both anarchism and the politics of resistance that Badiou and others have
problematized in relation to recent developments in radical political philosophy. Given,
as Badiou states in Metapolitics, that the central question—or “great enigma of the
century”—in which contemporary political philosophy must grapple takes the forms of
asking “why does the subsumption of politics…ultimately give rise to bureaucratic
submission and the cult of the State?,” it is easy to locate an anarchist dimension of
Badiou’s political thought, particularly in regard to the way in which he attempts to
rethink political theory against the “cult of the state.”341 Yet, whereas Newman argues
that Badiou’s thought draws “upon a certain kind of anarchism without acknowledging
it,”342 Badiou nevertheless maintains that his theory of a “politics without a party” ought
not be reduced to the critical framework of anarchism.343 Thus, in The Communist
Hypothesis Badiou writes:
We know today that all emancipatory politics must put an end to the model of the
party, or of multiple parties, in order to affirm a politics ‘without a party’ and yet
at the same time without lapsing into the figure of anarchism which has never
been anything else than the vain critique, or the double, or the shadow, of the
communist parties, just as the black flag is only the double or shadow of the red
flag.344
Here, Badiou clearly valorizes communism as the political theory from which to frame
the general intervention set forth by metapolitics, while also reducing anarchism to a
mere “shadow” of communist thought. Responding to this claim, anarchist theorist
Gabriel Kuhn argues that Badiou’s “characterization of anarchism is simply false,” and
once again reinvigorates the “anti-anarchist prejudice” initially arising out of the clash
between the anarchists and Marxists over how the historical concept of struggle is to be
conceived.345 In context, Badiou’s critique of anarchism arises out of a series of
341
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conferences and texts, which as he claims, are established to put the word
“communism…back into circulation” consequent upon the failures of both Marxist
critique and historical communist practice. 346 Yet, although Badiou aspires to reinvent
the idea of communism in response to the historical failures of the Marxist left, his
argument regarding the way in which “we have to take up the challenge of thinking
politics outside of its subjection to the state and outside of the framework of parties”
makes it clear that the reappearance of the communist hypothesis appears as such in its
adaptation to certain tenets that have always been central to anarchist political theory. 347
Despite Badiou’s obstinate reliance on the authoritarian models of political
emancipation, it is my contention that the critical questions metapolitical theory poses in
relation to a theory of historical struggle might better find its theoretical elaboration
within the anarchist tradition, rather than in Marxism. Historically, anarchists have
remained sympathetic to several of the basic tenets of communism, and have often sought
to rethink communism through the framework of anarchist thought.348 At the same time,
however, anarchists have traditionally contested not only the means by which Marxistcommunist thought and practice attempts to prescribe and implement a revolutionary
program to overcome the class relations within the history of capitalism, but also what
can—by way of contrast to Schmittian concept of the state’s monopolization of the
political and politics—be referred to as the Marxist monopolization of a theory of the
politics of struggle. To be sure, ever since the Manifesto of the Communist Party was
published in 1848, Marx and Engels’s opening thesis pertaining to how the “history of all

346

Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, 36. Between the 13th and 15th of March, 2009 a conference
took place in London under the title of “The Idea of Communism.” Other participants, or what Badiou
refers to as the “great names of the true philosophy of our times” (The Communist Hypothesis, 36)
included: Slavoj Žižek, Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, and Terry Eagleton among others. Also see: The
Communist Idea, eds. Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek (New York: Verso, 2010).
347
Alain Badiou, Polemics, trans. Steve Corcoran (New York: Verso, 2006), 270.
348
See: Peter Kropotkin, “Anarchist Communism: Its Basic Principles,” in Anarchism: A Collection of
Revolutionary Writings,” ed. Roger N Baldwin (New York: Dover Publications, 2002), 44-78. This text
offers one of the clearest statements regarding the case for free anarcho-communism. Here Kropotkin
claims that, as anarchists, “[w]e are communists” (61). Yet for Kropotkin, insofar as anarchism might be
connected with communism, it can only do so by beginning with a fundamental basis of antiauthoritarianism. Thus, Kropotkin writes: “[o]ur communism is not that of the authoritarian school: it is
anarchist communism, communism without government, free communism” (61). The distinction
Kropotkin makes here is essential to the elaboration of new schematics of politicization that do not
relapse into previous political models.

123

hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” has not only been understood
by scholars as the defining statement on the history of struggle, but also the very critical
framework from which the very concept of struggle is to be elaborated. 349 Thus, while
Badiou maintains that the “black flag” of anarchism is none other than the “shadow of the
red flag” of communism, it is perhaps better stated that anarchism has been
overshadowed, if not historically than at least within the academy, by the dominance of
the Marxist paradigm of class struggle. Yet, as anarchist theorist Cindy Milstein
importantly notes, “it’s not that anarchists didn’t take this history seriously,” but more
fundamentally that anarchists have always maintained that “there were other histories”—
that is, “other struggles” that cannot be reduced to the form of class struggle.350 Indeed, it
is these “other histories” and “other struggles” that Milstein argues is “something that
anarchism would continue to fill out over the decades.”351 Thus, while anarchists have
indeed both participated in the history of class struggles and taken the history of this
struggle as such quite seriously, anarchist political theory has traditionally maintained
that by reducing the history of struggle to the universal logic of class struggle turns upon
a thoroughly limited theory of resistance. It is therefore my contention that the very
question of historical struggle must be rethought, not in a way that discounts the material
reality of class politics and coinciding the struggles around them, but in a much more
expansive and theoretically intricate manner.
Insofar as Marxist theory cannot itself account for the varying forms of historical
resistance without radically reducing these struggles to the paradigm of class, one of the
goals of this chapter is to make a case for a return to anarchism in order to fundamentally
account for an anarchist theory of the political animated not in terms of the paradigm of
class struggle, but in terms of a form of politics redefined as a form of resistance to the
exercise of government. As anarchist theorist Gabriel Kuhn importantly suggests, rather
than working within the paradigm of class struggle, perhaps contemporary theory ought
to begin by asking an different “strategic question”—that is, whether “anarchism would
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not be a more promising name than the name communism.”352 Phrased in terms of a
“strategic question,” what is at stake here is not a simple valorization of anarchism over
communism. At the same time, however, if one of the central goals of contemporary
radical political philosophy is to invent new modes of politicization without relapsing
into the previous models of political analysis and criticism, then what is required is a
retheorization of the political that does not invoke the framework provided by previous
models of politicization. To be sure, this is why Critchley borrows from Badiou’s work
in order to help develop a more “anarchic” dimension to critical field of meta-politics.353
Although Marxist-communism asserts that “class struggle” is the principle motor of
history as such, the very tradition of Marxism often relies on the same models of the
political traditionally utilized in order to provide the basis for the problematic of
authoritarian government. In this way, what I intend to demonstrate in this chapter is that
there are several key advantages in developing and elaborating an anarchist hypothesis of
the political which underpins contemporary radical philosophy, and yet, at the same time
turns upon the question of resistance instead of “class struggle” as the basis from which
such a theory of the political might begin.
An additional critique arising out of current discussions in radical thought thus
revolves more directly around the questions, both philosophical and political, pertaining
to the elaboration of a theory of politics as resistance. In this regard, critical theorist
Benjamin Noys maintains that Badiou’s critique of anarchism can further be read in
terms of an extended critique of the problem of resistance as developed in both anarchist
theory and poststructural political philosophy. Despite its similarities with anarchism,
Badiou’s political thought, according to Noys, maintains a “general skepticism towards
what he regards as the anarchist faith in the ‘pure’ movement of resistance.”354 The
problem Badiou finds with the development of an unadulterated movement of resistance,
arises not so much against the question of resistance as a general political praxis, but
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rather, as Noys suggests, in the tendency to posit a “simple-minded opposition between
power and resistance,” which reduces politics to a form of weak dialectics for Badiou.355
Badiou’s critique of resistance (launched here at Foucault as much as it is at the
anarchists), is directed against a “constrained sense of the possibilities of politics that
remains in a dualism of resistance versus power.”356 As Noys further argues, the
“monolithic conception” of the power/resistance dialectic “prevents a properly political
assessment of the complex arrangements of political power and the means by which
capitalist state power might not only be resisted but overthrown.”357
Perhaps nowhere is the contestation over the question of resistance as a paradigm
of struggle more apparent than in the debate between, on the one hand Simon Critchley
who defends an anti-authoritarian anarchist position, and on the other Slavoj Žižek whose
obstinate defense of authoritarian communism has become a mainstay in certain
contemporary philosophical circles. 358 Directed against what is vaguely referred to as
the “postmodern left,” Žižek critiques the philosophers who “call for a new politics of
resistance…by withdrawing from [the state’s] terrain and creating new spaces outside its
control.”359 Thus for Žižek, the meta-political question regarding the “politics of
resistance is nothing but the moralizing supplement to a Third Way Left.”360 As to be
expected, Žižek (like Schmitt before him) maintains a static conception of the political as
a strict dichotomy between the state power and no power at all; rather than “resisting
state power,” Žižek contends that one should “ruthlessly” acquire and use “state
apparatuses” to promote one’s political “goals.”361 As Critchley points out, the debate
between his own work and Žižek again reinvigorates “the conflict between
authoritarianism and anarchism that is focused historically in the polemics between
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“Marx and Bakunin, or between Lenin and anarchism.”362 To be sure, since orthodox
Marxism which, to a certain extent, logically culminates in Žižek’s position, calls for a
radical use of the state as the political means to achieve revolution, then we might think
of the tradition of Marxism is itself the continuation of the “archipolitical” by other
means. Suggesting that it is precisely the question of resistance and not that of the state
that needs further elaboration, Critchley refuses the simplicity of the Žižek’s political
binary, and argues instead that “genuine politics is about the movement between these
poles.”363 What is crucial, for Critchley, is that the “movement” of the political is
“neither given nor existent but created through political articulation.”364 Rather than
amounting to a fundamental “surrender” as Žižek would have it, Critchley maintains that
resistance is what arises in the “movement” of politics—that is, resistance becomes
manifest and is created through “political articulation,” not as its essence, but as the very
movement of politics.
With this key distinction between the Marxist and anarchist approaches to the
question of posing politics in terms of historical struggle in mind, the remainder of this
chapter seeks to reintroduce and affirm anarchist political theory as the theoretical
framework from which to rethink the political at the horizon of government and state
sovereignty, while at the same time demonstrating that such turns in political theory
require an engagement with the question of resistance as the key concept from which a
retheorization of the political and a politics of struggle becomes possible. To do so, I first
reintroduce several common attributes that designate anarchism not simply as radical
critique of state and capital, but more fundamentally as a dynamic political philosophy
which transcends the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms of the political, as well as the
Marxist paradigm of class struggle. As we will see, what is ultimately at stake in
reintroducing “anarchy” as a seminal concept within the history of political theory is how
this critical conception designates the pivotal point from which an alternative hypothesis
of the political can be made, not as an archic nexus between the exercise of government
and sovereign power, but in terms of a permanent field of struggle and conflict between
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movements of governmentalization and movements of resistance. Thus, while I contend
that anarchy marks the possibility of rethinking the political at the horizon of the state, I
further maintain with this concept we can begin to point toward a way to fundamentally
reread the history of the political through the concept of resistance. In other words, with
the concept of anarchy marking the vital manner by which the field of the political is
shown to designate a dynamic field of struggle between the exercise of power as
government and the counter-force of resistance, what is ultimately at stake is to
demonstrate how anarchist political theory redesignates the political as the historical field
of agonistic struggle. Contrary, however, to both Schmitt’s theory in which the dynamic
field of antagonism made possible in the friend/enemy antithesis is itself contained and
radically reduced to the sphere of sovereign power, and the Marxist paradigm in which
the concept of antagonism is reduced to the sphere of class struggle, anarchist theory
reveals the historical domain of the political as neither a struggle between sovereign
states, nor between opposing classes, but in terms of an permanent agonistic struggle
between the exercise of the government and the counter-movements of resistance.

2.2

Defining Anarchism

Given the way in which anarchism has often been misrepresented in both the popular
imagination and the academy, it is an almost compulsory task for writers on the subject to
begin by attempting to define exactly what anarchism is,365 or in other cases what it is
not.366 Since its origins, anarchism has been fraught with several internal contradictions
365
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and points of divergence that have continuously forged the need for endless texts
clarifying its unorthodox positions. Both within and outside the movement, anarchism
has historically and culturally been defined in numerous and sometimes contradicting
ways. Unlike most traditions in political theory, anarchism does not therefore lend itself
easily to simple classification. As historian David Goodway suggests, one of the central
problems one comes to face when discussing anarchist thought, then, is that “it is
notoriously difficult to delineate anarchism.”367 Since anarchism is a neither a uniform
theoretical doctrine nor a political program, the complexities of anarchist thought and
practice appear to resist classification. According to one of the foremost historians of
anarchism, George Woodcock, “simplicity” is therefore “the first thing to guard against”
when writing about anarchism.368 As John Clark more pointedly reiterates two decades
later, “any definition which attempts to define the term [anarchism] by a single idea”
ultimately misunderstands the complexities of anarchism, and thus “fails abysmally to do
justice” to the inherently varied phenomena to which anarchism refers.369
Although there remains a debate amongst scholars regarding the precise origins of
anarchist thought and political praxis, there are three general ways of theorizing
anarchism historically: as a trans-historical and trans-cultural open-ended set of ideas and
practices; as a political theory developing out of the Enlightenment; and as an actuallyexisting revolutionary movement beginning in nineteenth century Europe. As both transhistorical and trans-cultural idea, historians tend to argue that the roots of anarchism
“reach deep in the ancient civilizations of the East” and further that the “cynics of the
third century came even closer to anarchism.”370 As a political theory, others suggest that
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the first clear statement of anarchist principles can be found in William Godwin’s
seminal text An Inquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793),371 and is therefore a
phenomena born from the Enlightenment.372 Others, however, have found hints of the
beginning of anarchist thought two centuries earlier than Godwin in Étienne De La
Boétie’s vitally important text the Discourse on Voluntary Servitude (1574).373 Focusing
more exclusively on anarchism as a revolutionary tradition based in class struggle, others
further claim that “[a]narchism did not rise as a primordial rebel state of mind as far back
as Lao Tzu in Ancient China or Zeno in ancient Greece,” but rather grew out of the
“seedbed of organized trade unions…in opposition to classical Marxism’s imposition of
socialism-from-above.”374 To be sure, the trouble in pinpointing the origins of anarchism
demonstrate that the positions of anarchist thought and practice might be better
characterized in terms of a tradition, rather than ideology, which historically develops
from a broad repertoire of anarchistic ideas and practices. Insofar as the history of
anarchism refers to a “complex and subtle philosophy embracing many different currents
of thought and strategy,” then we might understand “anarchism” as does historian Peter
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Marshall further notes “like a river with many currents and eddies, constantly changing
and being refreshed by new surges but always moving towards the wide ocean of
freedom.”375 Less figuratively, we might add as the celebrated anarchist historian Rudolf
Rocker long ago recognized that anarchism does not develop as a determinate theory or
doctrine—that is, anarchism is not “a fixed, self-enclosed social system, but a definite
trend,” or permanent strand in history, “which, in contrast with the intellectual
guardianship of all clerical and governmental institutions, strives for the free unhindered
unfolding of all the individual and social forces in life.”376
While there is a certain difficulty in locating the specific origins of anarchist
thought and practice, anarchist theorists are faced with another difficulty insofar as no
canon of work is, or can be, exhaustive of anarchist thinking—that is, neither a single
individual, nor a group of thinkers, can claim priority over determining the limits and
scope of anarchism. Indeed, recent developments in anarchist studies suggest that an
insulated reading of the classical canon of nineteenth century anarchist thought is
infinitely problematic and fails to recognize the expansive development of a varied range
of tendencies in anarchist thought and practice over the past century. Despite, however,
several attempts to think though this common problem, the contemporary anarchist
milieu still faces a similar difficulty. Since anarchism has increasingly come to represent
a large and diverse range of tendencies and ideas while directly intersecting with several
other disciplines of thought and movements of resistance such as feminism,377 anti-racist
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struggles,378 anti-colonial,379 queer struggles,380 ecological struggles,381 amongst others
no unitary definition, it seems, is possible. Indeed, precisely because anarchism at once
develops as a transhistorical idea, a socio-political philosophy, and a historico-political
movement, all of which intersect with several other movements of struggle, critical
consensus suggests a near impossibility in defining anarchism in either an overly
simplistic or singular manner.382
Despite that anarchism’s typically variegated developments and interventions
render it incoherent as a political philosophy, several theorists have nevertheless made
rigorous attempts to define certain key characteristics of historical anarchist thought and
common practices throughout specific, theoretical, cultural, and philosophical contexts,
while outlining several key characteristics common to anarchism as a distinct political
theory. According to Uri Gordon, what is first required is itself a basic framework for
understanding not necessarily the “content” of anarchist political theory, but a general
outline regarding certain commonalities that might compose a preliminary understanding
of anarchism. Accordingly, Gordon proposes three distinct, yet interrelated, ways from
which a critical understanding of anarchism might begin. Anarchism is first a “social
movement, composed of dense networks of individuals, affinity groups and collectives
which communicate and coordinate intensively, sometimes across the globe.”383 Second,
“anarchism is a name for the intricate political culture which animates these networks
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and infuses them with content”384 Finally, anarchism is a “collection of ideas’ (emphasis
in original).385 John Clark, however, maintains that in order to link these seemingly
disparate bodies of historical movements and schools of thought, a more comprehensive
definition is required that takes into consideration both the historical and philosophical
dimensions of anarchism, while simultaneously allowing for the continual evolution and
trajectory of ideas and practices through its past and contemporary incarnations. In an
attempt to develop a clear statement of the tradition of anarchist political theory, Clark
proposes a four-point definition which not only tries to capture the diversity of the
historical and philosophical character of anarchism, but in doing so opens up a
preliminary way of defining anarchism as a unique form of political theory. “For a
political theory to be called anarchist it must contain,” according to Clark, the following:
1) a view of an ideal, non-coercive, non-authoritarian society; 2) a criticism of
existing society and its institutions based on this anti-authoritarian ideal; 3) a view
of human nature that justifies the hope for significant progress toward the ideal;
and 4) a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of non-coercive,
non-authoritarian, and decentralist alternatives.386
Although somewhat burdensome, Clark’s definition provides an adequate summary of
the differing components that can be seen as outlining the basis for anarchism as a
distinct form of political theory. Without, perhaps, the third thesis (which has been the
subject of much contention in anarchist thought)387 regarding a distinct perspective of
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“human nature that justifies” and motivates anarchist struggle, recent definitions of
anarchism as a political theory, albeit with minor variations, affirm this basic outline.
Thus in his work on anarchism and political philosophy, Nathan Jun simplifies Clarks
definition and maintains that the political theory of anarchism can be understood as: “a
universal condemnation of and opposition to all forms of closed, coercive authority
(political, economical, social, etc.), coupled with [a] universal affirmation of an
promotion of freedom and equality in all spheres of human existence” (original
emphasis).388 From these definitions it is clear that anarchism is neither simply reducible
to a political critique of the state nor an economic critique of capitalism. Instead the
critical impetus of anarchist thought is directed more specifically as a critique and rupture
with the logic of the archē, a distinct logic manifest in the varying forms of political,
economic, social, forms of authority, hierarchy, and domination.
At the same time, however, what is implied yet glossed over in these definitions is
that anarchist political theory as such turns upon entirely different theory of the political
that is critically paired with a shared emphasis on the politics of resistance from which
anarchist political theory as such becomes manifest. In this way, we might add, as
Gordon does, that anarchist political theory further includes both a “shared repertoire of
political action based on direct action,” and the “shared political language that
emphasizes resistance to capitalism, the state, patriarchy and more generally to hierarchy
and domination” (my emphasis).389 Two ideas are of key importance here. First, Gordon
maintains that anarchist political theory turns upon a form of political praxis “based on
direct action,” and further that this distinct form of praxis is itself animated by a
collective political discourse of “resistance.” Yet, while Gordon importantly emphasizes
not simply the relation between anarchist political theory and the paradigm of resistance,
but the way in which resistance animates anarchist political theory as such, this claim can
be further amended in order to arrive at what I hold to be vital crux of anarchism. While
it is true that a collective emphasis on resistance is what animates both the politics and
political theory of anarchism, this need not be directed against the often monolithically
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abstract notions of state, capitalism, etc., but more specifically in opposition to the
exercise of power as government often personified and manifest in state sovereignty,
capitalism, as well as in the varying techniques of domination, hierarchy, and oppression.
Between then, on the one hand what Jun refers to as the anarchist critique of the
manifestation of authoritarian political, economic, and social relations, counter-posed
with the affirmation of freedom against the exercise of power as government, and on the
other Gordon’s emphasis on the political praxis of direct action there is a certain
simultaneity and reflexivity that locates the political theory of anarchism within the
paradigm of resistance. Despite the fundamental difficulty in defining anarchism, I want
to briefly turn to a key definition of anarchism from Kropotkin’s early writings in order
to reveal how we might understand anarchism as pertaining to an alternative theory that
at once takes the non-acceptability of power and the politics of resistance as its starting
point. “The anarchist,” Kropotkin writes, “denies not only existing laws, but all
established power, all authority; yet the essence remains the same; the anarchist rebels—
and this is where he begins—against power, authority, under whatever form it may
appear.”390 As Kropotkin first suggests here, anarchism begins with a unique position
that takes the non-acceptability of all power and authority as its starting point—that is,
anarchism according to Kropotkin presupposes a fundamental rupture with the logic of
the archē. At the same time, however, this means for Kropotkin that anarchism “begins”
or takes as its “essence” resistance against power and authority as the starting point from
which the logic of the archē can become potentially ruptured. In other words, the
anarchist critique and opposition to the exercise of power as government, as manifest in
varying political, economic, and social forms, is itself animated and coupled with the
politics of resistance; at the same time, the paradigm of resistance—within which the
praxis of anarchism is located—is that which is made possible and finds its consistency
within the critique of the political as the exercise of government. It is my contention that
this understanding of anarchism forms the basis from which an alternative historical
theory of the political can be posed in relation to the unique question of resistance that
animates anarchism as such.
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2.3

Anarchy as Philosophical Principle

Anarchy is the word which comes from the Greek, and signifies, strictly speaking, without
government: the state of a people without any constituted authority, that is, without
government. 391
--Errico Malatesta

In the history of political philosophy, the concept of anarchy, like the political theory of
anarchism, is perhaps one the most misunderstood and undervalued concepts in political
theory. From its inception, the term anarchy has primarily been invoked by philosophers
and political theorists in a pejorative sense, denoting both disorder and chaos, and as such
the negation of political order; to be sure, the concept of anarchy has historically come to
signify the converse anterior to what is typically understood as constituting politics.392 If
the history of politics and political philosophy has, as I have pointed towards, taken the
concept of the archē as the implicit starting point from which a critical conceptualization
of politics begins, then by its very definition the term anarchy is irreducible to the
political as archē—that is, it is the philosophical and political concept by which we can
begin to rethink the political at the horizon of the state and the exercise of government.
Despite, however, the ways in which anarchy, and consequently by extension, the
political philosophy of anarchism has and continues to remain marginal, the very concept
of anarchy in both its philosophical and political senses is in every way seminal to the
history of political philosophy, and is what ultimately renders the paradigm of struggle as
resistance more acute.
Etymologically, the word “anarchy” comes from the Greek word αναϱχια
(anarchia in Latin) where the prefix αν designates ‘without’ and αϱχια, translated as
archē, which means at once “beginning,” “origin,” or “first principle,” and later as
391
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“sovereignty,” “supreme authority,” and “government.”393 Rather than assuming the
primacy of an archē, anarchy in its philosophical sense designates an entirely different
theoretical plane from which a new critical conceptualization of the political might begin
that does not assume the state and government as its constituent components. As a
philosophical concept, anarchy is the idea which, in the absence of the principle of
authority, designates a critical position of exteriority from which to question the
foundations of political thought. Unlike in the history of political thought, where politics
is derived from and determined by the first principle of archē, anarchy in contrast
designates a critical unfounding, or radical disordering, of these authoritative
foundations—that is, it destabilizes the presence and dominance of an archē. It is within
this context that Proudhon delineates what might be considered the earliest attempt at
ascribing to anarchism one of its key philosophical characteristics in relation to the
problem of the political. “The meaning ordinarily attached to the word anarchy,”
Proudhon writes in his seminal 1840 text What is Property?: An Inquiry into the
Principle of Right and of Government, “is absence of principle, absence of rule;
consequently it has been regarded as synonymous with disorder.”394 Yet Proudhon is
clear that it is not anarchism that expresses disorder, but rather “our accustomed habit of
taking man for our rule, and his will for law” which forms the “height of disorder and the
expression of chaos.”395 Reversing the accusations launched at anarchists back toward
the heart of government, Proudhon famously suggests that just “as man seeks justice in
equality, so society seeks order in anarchy.”396 We have seen how the paradigm of
government has traditionally retained a sense of primacy in relation to political questions
pertaining to how best to conceive of “order” in society. Yet, rather than attempting to
think through the question of political “order” within the framework of an archē,
Proudhon instead posits the concept of anarchy as an alternative beginning point—that is,
Proudhon paradoxically suggests that we might also rethink the notion of “order” within
the topology of anarchy.
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What is at stake for Proudhon is that the concept of anarchy might form the basis
for a new principle from which to radically rethink both the terms of the political and
very concept of politics as it has been understood in both society and philosophy. Given
that the subtitle of Proudhon’s text suggests that it is the very “principle” of government
that forms the point of departure for his argument, anarchy—which, for Proudhon might
be rewritten as an-archy to emphasis the prefix ‘without’—comes to suggest the way of
thinking through alternative political potentialities without assuming a formidable link
between the political and the first principle of the archē. In its most basic form, the
concept of anarchy, which Proudhon also defines in the same work as “the absence of a
master, of a sovereign” reveals an alternative principle from which to reconceptualise the
history of the political and politics without the first principle of the archē.397 Yet, if we
understand the history of the concept of the archē as the principle that has at once
conditioned our understanding of politics and ordered the field of the political
accordingly we might, following Kropotkin, more critically suggest that the very question
of “order” within political theory means to “speak of order as it is conceived in our
present society.”398 Thus, according to Kropotkin if we “take a look at this order which
anarchy seeks to destroy,” then the term anarchy can be better understood as referring to
the “negation of order” (original emphasis)—indeed, the negation and struggle with the
order of the archē.399 In this way, while Kropotkin maintains that “order is servitude,”
the concept of anarchy might therefore be taken in its most basic form as a radical
disordering of the present order as archē. 400 As that which creates a distinct rupture in
the logic and order of the archē, Kropotkin maintains that a critical conception of anarchy
thus finds its locus in the concept and practice of “disorder” rather than order. Yet rather
than simply designating a condition of chaos, the concept of “disorder” and its relation to
the term anarchy can be understood in the following way according to Kropotkin:
“disorder”
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[i]s the uprising of the people against this ignoble order…It is the revolt of
thought on the eve of the revolution…Disorder is the abolition of ancient
slaveries, it is the uprising of the communes…Disorder is the insurrection…an
incessant struggle…Disorder is the blossoming of the most beautiful passions and
the greatest of devotions, it is the epic of supreme human love.401
In attempting to attain a preliminary definition of the concept of anarchy, two ideas in
Kropotkin’s definition are of key importance here. First, the relation between the
concepts of “anarchy’” and “disorder” refers to a radical rupture (in the sense provided by
Rancière) with the logic and order of the archē. As that which takes a rupture with the
logic of the archē as its starting point, anarchy as such designates an alternative basis
from which to rethink the concept of the political. At the same time, however, because
anarchy begins with a radical disordering of the logic of the archē, the term also comes to
designate a specific mode of political praxis, a process where politics seeks to create a
fundamental rupture with the present order as archē. As a politics of disorder, anarchy
thus refers to the politics of “uprising”, of “revolt, of “insurrection,” and of “incessant
struggle.” As the form of politics, then, that animates a rupture with the logic and order
of the archē, anarchy begins with and takes as its basis a theory of resistance that
animates the concept of anarchy as such. It is in this way that we might come to
understand the concept of anarchy as itself a philosophical principle, or alternative basis
from which the question of politics and the political can begin to be rethought.
Emphasizing that the philosophical and political character of anarchism ought to
be defined in relation to the foundational onto-political problem of the archē, nineteenth
century American anarchist Benjamin Tucker (in a manner that prefigures Rancière’s
work) argues that anarchism is distinguished philosophically by its rupture with the logic
of the archē. “Anarchy” Tucker claims:
[d]oes not mean simply opposed to the archos, or political leader. It means
opposed to archē. Now, archē, in the first instance, means beginning, origin.
From this it comes to mean a first principle, an element; then first place, supreme
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power, sovereignty, dominion, command, authority; and finally a sovereignty, an
empire, a realm, a magistracy, a governmental office (original emphasis).402
In its most fundamental sense, “anarchy” as Tucker maintains here designates an
opposition to archē. Paying careful attention to the etymological development of the term
archē, Tucker identifies two ways of understanding anarchy in relation to the crisis of the
political outlined in the previous chapter. Whereas in the pre-political sense “anarchy,”
as Tucker suggests, first comes to mean “without guiding principle,” when extended into
the political sphere it takes on an additional meaning as “without dominion” or “without
authority.”403 Anarchism, as understood here by Tucker, cannot be reduced
philosophically to a radical rejection of the state, but instead as a rejection, or opposition
to, archē as both the “beginning” and “origin” of the political space which eventually
becomes articulated as a “supreme power,” and as such develops as “sovereignty,”
“authority,” and government. In other words, anarchy is opposed not just to the political
as politeia, but the way in which politics affords primacy to the concept of archē as the
terms of the political expressed in the continuity between sovereignty and the exercise of
government. What is at stake for Tucker in affirming the concept of anarchy in
opposition to the archē, is a critical conceptualization of anarchy as an alternative
“fundamental principle in the science of political and social life.”404
In essence, the idea of anarchy as a “principle” appears at two levels in Tucker’s
work. First, anarchy refers to that which precedes and eludes all archē; anarchy is prior
to all guiding principles. Yet, at the same time, the notion of anarchy in the philosophical
sense does not exclude the elaboration of a political conceptualization of anarchy.
Indeed, we might understand anarchy as the principle which negates the totality of the
archipolitical. While it appears contradictory to assert that which eludes the origin of
principle as a principle itself, what Tucker ultimately points toward here are the ways in
which the concept of anarchy formulates an alternative logic of the political which is
continuously in conflict with the history of the archipolitical. Along this line of thought,
in a crucial footnote to Otherwise than Being, Emanuel Levinas sets forth a definition of
402

Benjamin Tucker, Individual Liberty: Selected Writings (New York: The Revisionist Press, 1972), 33,
original italics.
403
Ibid, 33.
404
Ibid, 42.

140

“anarchy” that helps to further elaborate what Tucker means by establishing anarchy as a
“principle.” “Anarchy” Levinas writes:
cannot, under pain of contradiction, be set up as a principle (in the sense that
anarchists understand it). Anarchy, unlike archē, cannot be sovereign. It can
only disturb, albeit in a radical way, the State, prompting isolated moments of
negation without any affirmation. The State, then, cannot set itself up as a
whole.405
Anarchy, according to Levinas, cannot be understood as a political principle in the sense
that it resists totality. Yet, as Levinas maintains here anarchy is that which radically
disturbs the totality of the state. Although anarchy cannot be established as a “principle,”
this same concept forms the critical topology which proves that the archipolitical can
never establish itself as a whole. In Levinas’s thought, then, anarchy, is what resists the
state’s claim to totality, and in this way forges a permanent, unsurpassable gap between
two warring conceptions of the political—the sovereign archē and the figure of the
anarchē which disturbs the terms of the political in a radical way. Yet, as Miguel
Abensour observes in his analysis of the anarchist implications of Levinas, the fact that
anarchy is rendered apolitical by Levinas does not mean that it has no relevance for
political theory. Instead we find that the space carved out by “anarchy disturbs politics to
the point where we can speak of the disturbance of politics…to separate an-archy from
sovereignty, to separate it from a principle does not mean that anarchy dos not affect
politics or leaves it unchanged” (original emphasis).406
Rather than designating something apolitical, the principle of anarchy defines a
point of rupture with the historical rationale that traditionally grounds the political within
the space and practice of government—anarchy is what disturbs and disorders the
political as a continuation of the logic of the archē. Although Levinas emphasizes that
the concept anarchy can only disturb the state “without any affirmation,” anarchists have
nevertheless consistently refused to reduce the notion of anarchy to a mere negation of

405

Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pennsylvania:
Duquesne University Press, 1998), 194, n.3.
406
Miguel Abensour, “An-anarchy Between Metapolitics and Politics,” in The Anarchist Turn eds. Jacob
Blumenfeld, Chiara Bottici, and Simon Critchley (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 94.

141

order. Thus, while Kropotkin suggests that “originally, anarchy was presented as a
simple negation,” he also maintains the following key distinction:
“No State,” or “No Authority,” in spite of its negative formulation, had a deeply
affirmative meaning when spoken by [anarchists]. It was both a philosophical
and practical principle which signified that the whole of life of human societies,
everything, from daily individual relationships between people to broader
relationships between races across oceans, could and should be reformulated
sooner or later, according to the principles of Anarchy.407
For Kropotkin, then, the radical “negation of all forms of authority,” which forms the
basic logic behind the anarchist critique of society is paired with, according to Kropotkin,
an “affirmation—the conception of a free society, without authority.”408 It is because the
anarchist negation of the state is coupled with the affirmation of alternative political
possibilities in life outside of the paradigm of government that Kropotkin maintains that
“anarchy was understood by its founders as a great philosophical idea,” or “a general
philosophical principle.”409
It is by taking the political and philosophical principle of anarchy in opposition to
the first principle of an archē that we can begin to rethink the political at the horizon of
the state. While in the previous chapter we saw how the term archē not only refers to that
which designates the way in which the political assumes the form of the techniques of
government exercised within the domain of the state, but also the first principle that
brings forth politics as such, anarchy, in contrast, at once reveals an alternative beginning
point for a critical conception of the political, as well as an alternative principle which is
brought into being as a form of resistance to the exercise of government. Thus, insofar as
the concept of anarchy designates the vital manner by which the political can be
fundamentally rethought, the word itself has further significant political meanings.
Indeed, the word anarchy also refers to an onto-political position of praxis—that is, a
condition of being without government. As Marshall notes, the concept of anarchy
therefore additionally refers to “the condition of being without ruler,” whereby, in the
407
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political sense, anarchy “comes to describe a condition of people living without any
constituted authority or government.”410 Jun shares Marshall’s position and maintains
that anarchy “can be roughly translated as the state of being without a ruler.”411
According to Marshall, then, “anarchy is usually defined as a society without
government, and anarchism as the social philosophy aimed at its realization.”412 In its
most preliminary sense, we can point toward two ways from which to begin to
understand anarchy as a philosophical principle: the principle of anarchy at once signifies
a radical position of critique and a position of praxis, a state of being without
government.
In his entry on anarchism for the eleventh edition of The Encyclopedia Britannica
(1905), Kropotkin further expands upon this notion of anarchy. Anarchism, which
Kropotkin acknowledges as the first political theory “contrary to authority”—is defined
as the “principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without
government.”413 In its philosophical connotation, anarchy designates a critical theory of
the political “contrary to authority,” as well as a critical conceptualization regarding the
possibility of political life without government animated by the principle of anarchy.
Affirming the concept of anarchy as a “principle” contrary to the first principle which
provides the political with an archē—that is, as an alternative political principle
“conceived without government,” anarchism constructs a different set of relations for the
terms of the political which seeks, at its core, to overcome the limitations of the
archipolitical. Indeed, as Kropotkin claims anarchist political theory maintains that the
“ideal of the omnipotent and beneficent state is merely a copy from the past,” to which
anarchists “opposed it with a new ideal—an-archy: that is the total abolition of the
state…by means of the free federation of popular forces.”414 By opposing the concept of
anarchy to the concept of archē we might, following Kropotkin’s logic, adopt the
concept as itself the critical framework which provides the space for a theory of the
political outside and against the history of the archipolitical. Anarchy is the philosophical
410
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and political concept—indeed principle—from which the history of the political can be
rethought in such a manner that does not leave the nexus between the exercise of
government and sovereignty intact; instead anarchy at once designates that which resists
the state’s claim to totality, as well as a unique form of political praxis that continuously
ruptures the logic and practices of the archē.

2.4 Anarchy as an Historical Principle of Intelligibility of the
Political
As a philosophical principle, directed not just simply as a critique of the state, but more
fundamentally a critique against the first principle of an archē that reduces the political to
the continuity between state sovereignty and the exercise of government, the concept of
anarchy, then, must be thought against its typical use in political theory. Rather than
invoking the term anarchy as the condition of chaos overcome by the advent of the state,
we ought to understand the concept as a philosophical principle and coinciding form of
praxis that disorders the continuation of the logic an order of the archē. Understood as
such, the concept of anarchy as described above can also be taken to designate a unique
way to reread the history of the political itself, even within the history of archipolitical
thought. In this regard, although Hobbes might be understood within the history of
political theory as one of anarchism’s foremost adversaries, it is by turning to his seminal
political treatise the Leviathan that we might locate a key example within the history of
political theory from which the concept of anarchy can at once be understood as an
alternative principle of intelligibility from which to read the history of the political from
the perspective of resistance. Indeed, in the Leviathan the concept of anarchy cannot
only be shown as the implicit starting point for the main argument of the text, but also a
seminal (albeit historically neglected) concept within the history of political theory that
ultimately turns upon an alternative theory of the political that is to be overcome, or
superseded, in Hobbes’s writings by the advent of sovereign power. While it has been
noted that what Hobbes refers to as the continuity between the “state of nature” and the
condition of “anarchy” is one of the more significant elements of which his political
thought is based, it is my contention that that the importance of Hobbes’s use of the
concept of the “state of nature” lies in its fundamental gesture toward a critical
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conception of the political as anarchy. 415 In other words, despite his intentions, what
Hobbes ultimately reveals as the condition of “anarchy” in the Leviathan is not a violent
“state of nature” eradicated with the advent of sovereign power, but instead a vision of a
politics as anarchy inspired by a completely different understanding of the political.
As is well known and often cited, Hobbes invokes the figure of “anarchy” in the
Leviathan at once as the condition prior to the establishment of sovereign power,416 as
well as the justification for the social contract that forms the artificial body of the
sovereign state.417 Although there has been some serious debate amongst theorists of the
Leviathan regarding whether Hobbes intended his concept of the “state of nature” to be
understood as a “kind of thought-experiment,” or a historically “practical possibility,”418
it is my contention that the notion can be interpreted in terms of an agonistic conception
of political conflict opposed to the theory of sovereignty.419 Against, then, the more
orthodox readings of Hobbes, in which the “state of nature” is posed in terms of the
condition that needs to be “averted only by the existence of an ordered society governed
by a coercive sovereign,” the Leviathan can instead be interpreted as masking an
alternative principle of intelligibility from which to reread the history of the political
agonistically. 420 More specifically, although Hobbes maintains that the terms of the
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political are marked by the way in which the state and sovereign power arise through the
eradication of the condition of “anarchy”—a condition manifest in what Hobbes refers to
as “civil war”—it is my contention that the Leviathan nevertheless reveals a preliminary
manner from which the history of the political can be reread from the perspective of
anarchy. 421 Indeed, rather than premising the birth of politics upon the eradication of the
condition of anarchy, what Hobbes reveals in the Leviathan is history of the political in
its agonistic specificity—that is, a permanent struggle between the state and non-state in
which the concept of “anarchy” is not only primary with regard to the politics of state
sovereignty, but that which is manifest and animated through a unique paradigm of
political resistance, or “civil war.” In this regard, it is necessary to briefly turn to some of
the central components of the Leviathan in order to demonstrate how the theory of
sovereignty, which Hobbes premises on the eradication of the condition of anarchy,
effectively masks an alternative conception of the political that takes the condition of
anarchy as its starting point, and further that this conception offers key insight on how to
reread the question of politics against the historical paradigm of the archē.
It has been noted that Hobbes’s concept of the “state of nature” has become an
inescapable point of reference for political thought, and further that this concept has
subsequently “had a profound impact on our understanding of human nature [and]
anarchy.”422 In its most common understanding, commentators on the Leviathan have
maintained that the “state of nature” in Hobbes’s usage means that the “condition in
which man is placed by mere nature is one of conflict and insecurity—a war of every
man against every man.”423 While there remains some critical contention in regarding the
state of nature as “state of continual and overt violence,”424 it is clear that Hobbes is
referring to a direct state of conflict.425 Yet it is in regard to this perpetual state of
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conflict that Hobbes forms the contextual background from which political order can be
derived—that is, the state of nature designates the condition in which human beings
conduct themselves in a situation without the existence of sovereignty, thus forming the
background upon which the need for sovereign government becomes justified according
to Hobbes.426 In this regard we might take the notion of the “state of nature” as the
concept from which the notion of state sovereignty can be contrasted. Thus, as Evrigenis
acknowledges, the “stark contrast between the misery that accompanies anarchy and the
peace that comes through government, seems enough to explain the appeal of the image
of the state of nature” in Hobbes.427 In other words, it is the state of conflict Hobbes
represents through the concept of the state of nature that is ultimately contrasted with the
theory of sovereign power in the Leviathan. Yet, this might mean, as Evrigenis argues,
that the Leviathan nevertheless represents a “powerful and succinct account of a
condition sufficiently undesirable to cause one to reconsider one’s plan for rebellion.”428
Because Hobbes understands the “state of nature” in terms of a condition of conflict that
ought to be overcome with the politics of the state, it is my contention that the “state of
nature” designates, not humankind in its natural condition, but rather a form of politics
manifest in terms of an agonistic praxis of struggle—indeed a politics of rebellion and
resistance—and further that Hobbes’s argument in favor of overcoming this condition
can be interpreted as an attempt to mask this agonistic conception of the political as
anarchy with a theory of sovereignty.
Indeed, at the beginning of chapter thirty-one of Leviathan, Hobbes establishes a
specific nexus between the “state of nature,” “anarchy,” and the “condition of war,” and
further maintains that these conditions are to be eradicated from the field of the political
with the advent of sovereignty. In a passage that is in every way seminal to the history of
political theory, Hobbes therefore writes that the “the condition of mere Nature, that is to
say, of absolute Liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are Sovereigns, nor Subjects, is
Anarchy, and the condition of War.”429 Here, Hobbes draws an explicit connection
between the pre-sovereign condition of “nature” and “anarchy,” represented here as a
426
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“condition of war”—that is “nature,” according to Hobbes, is analogous to both the
condition of anarchy and the praxis of civil war. To be sure, the eradication of this
condition of anarchy through sovereign power and the advent of the commonwealth
designates the premise against which the question of sovereign power is posed and, as
such, is what Hobbes posits as the ultimate telos of the political. “The final Cause, End,
or Design of men,” Hobbes therefore contends, is “of getting themselves out from that
miserable condition of war.”430 What is required by Hobbes in order to overcome this
“miserable condition of war” is not simply the advent of a central sovereign power, but
more fundamentally a collective contract or “covenant” wherein all mutually agree to
forfeit what might be understood through Hobbes as a pre-juridical right to autonomy: “I
authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of
men, on this condition,” Hobbes writes, “that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize
all of his actions in a like manner.”431 What is ultimately at stake for Hobbes is therefore
not simply to demonstrate that the condition of sovereignty is preferable to the nonpolitical conditions of “state of nature,” “absolute liberty,” and “anarchy,” but that the
advent of sovereignty turns upon overcoming and eradicating a pre-juridical “right”
toward self-governance manifest in the condition of civil war.432
While this passage is itself in every way seminal to the history of political
thought, Hobbes’s use of the term “anarchy” is traditionally reduced to two simplified
ideas. First anarchy is often taken by Hobbes as the concept that describes the absence of
political society, or a state of nature famously defined as the “war of every man against
every man.”433 Here in its most reductive sense, the concept of anarchy denotes for
Hobbes the mere absence of sovereign power, and as such is rendered synonymous with a
natural condition of “liberty” prior to the advent of sovereignty and the politics of the
state. Additionally, however, precisely because the condition of “anarchy” describes the
absence of sovereignty and a permanent condition of war, the concept paradoxically
“signifies want of government.”434 Two ideas are of key importance here. First, the
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concept of “anarchy” in Hobbes forms the historical condition ultimately leading to the
contract that constitutes sovereign power. In other words, this means that “anarchy” is
what is presupposed by Hobbes in order to justify the collective need for sovereignty;
sovereignty is therefore secondary to the condition of anarchy. In this way, the concept
of anarchy in Hobbes’s thought describes a condition prior to the politics of the state and
as such, on the other, the justification for the need of a state—that is, in both cases the
reality of the condition of anarchy is what forms the beginning point of Hobbes’s theory.
Yet, because the concept and condition of anarchy is what is presupposed by Hobbes in
order to justify the need of government, as well as the manifestation of state and
sovereign power, it is my contention that the condition of anarchy can be understood as
an alternative principle from which to read the history of the political in a radically new
manner. Given the ways in which Hobbes argues that the state and sovereign power is
founded upon and arises out the attempt to overcome the state of anarchy, by his own
logic Hobbes both demonstrates that anarchy, as a condition prior to the state, designates
the implicit starting point for modern political philosophy as such. What is at stake, then,
is not that the condition of anarchy in Hobbes designates a radical outside to the state and
sovereign power, but rather that its presence fundamentally denies the state’s claim
toward primacy and dominance within the history of politics and political theory.
While the intended goal of Hobbes’s text is to demonstrate the institution of
sovereignty through the mutual transferral of the collective right to self-governance and
autonomy, the very premise of this argument at once presupposes and demonstrates the
possibility of an alternative theory of the political as expressed through the condition of
anarchy—not as an essence transcendent to sovereign power—but that which is manifest
and made possible in what Hobbes refers to as “civil war.” Yet, insofar as Hobbes
understands anarchy as a condition of war prior and parallel to the politics of the state, we
might further understand the condition of anarchy as designating a form of politics—
indeed a form of political praxis—that is irreducible to, and arises in conflict with the
history of the state. To be sure, it is this distinct sphere of praxis that, according to
Hobbes’s own logic, is at once prior to the manifestation of sovereignty, as well as the
condition by which the advent of sovereignty is itself historically said to overcome and
eradicate. Indeed, Hobbes offers a brief glimpse of this dissenting form of politics when,
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in Chapter 29 of the Leviathan, he discusses the varying causes that lead to the
dissolution of sovereign power and commonwealth. Herein Hobbes writes that “the
Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power,” the historical movements of rebellion
referred to as “pretenders [of] Politicall (sic) Prudence,” are “animated by False
Doctrines.”435 Here Hobbes reveals the ultimate polemic of his argument; what Hobbes
attempts to eradicate with the advent of sovereign power is not a human condition
wherein all war against all, but instead another form of politics that resists the absolute
power of the sovereign, a politics of civil war. Following Agamben, we might therefore
redefine Hobbes’s “state of nature” as a “mythological projection into the past of civil
war.”436 In this way, whereas Hobbes draws an explicit connection between anarchy and
the condition of civil war and traces the way in which the birth of sovereignty is said to
eradicate anarchy from the field of the political, his theory of the advent of sovereignty
also reveals, according to Agamben, how the political can therefore be read in reference
to the political past of civil war. While we have already seen how the concept of anarchy
can be understood as designating an alternative principle from which the political might
be fundamentally rethought, here we can additionally see how the concept of anarchy in
the Leviathan is revealed as pertaining to an alternative conception of politics as civil
war.
In Tiqqun’s understanding of Hobbes the history of the political is attested to by
the state’s struggle with the condition of anarchy, noticeable not as an essential
exteriority, but politically in terms of civil war against the state. The history of the
domain of the political is not then simply the history of the state’s monopolization on
politics, but more fundamentally, the history of, on the one hand, the politics of the state
which seek to eradicate anarchy from the field of the political, and the politics of civil
war which seek to undermine the state on the other. Thus, “the point of view of civil
war,” Tiqqun maintains, “is the point of view of the political.”437 For Tiqqun, then, the
point of view of the political is not simply the historical elaboration of the paradigm of
government and the primacy of the state. Instead, rather, it is the concept of civil war that
435
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forms the critical locus from which to read the domain of the political within the
condition of anarchy.
In their unorthodox reading of Hobbes, Tiqqun at once reveals a radically new
perspective from which to read the history of the political, as well as an alternative
perspective of the political in which the critical question of resistance is rendered more
acute. In highlighting how the concept of “civil war” acts as the historical principle from
which we can reread the history of the political, Tiqqun therefore radically denies the
Schmittian paradigm of sovereignty, while retaining (albeit in a radically different
manner) a fundamental theory of agonism as the key component of the political as such.
Tiqqun therefore accepts Hobbes’s thesis regarding the “state of nature” while
fundamentally reversing its principle position; the state of nature as a condition of
anarchy is not simply a violent war of all against all, but an irreconcilable struggle
between on the one hand, the paradigm of sovereignty and the state’s attempted
monopolization of the field of the political, and on the other the condition of anarchy or
civil war manifest in the struggle against the state form. Despite their unorthodox
reading of Hobbes, Tiqqun is not alone, and variations of this reading can be found
amongst various anarchist theorists, as well as other critical theorists and philosophers
such as Pierre Clastres,438 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,439 and Michel Foucault.440
Thus in their critical inquiry into the anarchist anthropologist Pierre Clastres’
ethnographic work into non-state societies and the coinciding historical problematic of
war, Deleuze and Guattari argue, in a manner that invokes the basic premises of Hobbes
that “the state was against war, so war is against the state, and makes it impossible.”441
Like Tiqqun, Deleuze and Guattari understand the history of the state as the simultaneous
history of its own impossibility—that is, the struggle between the politics of the state,
which attempt to put an end to civil war, and the struggle against the state, which finds its
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historical elaboration in the concept of civil war. However, Deleuze and Guattari
additionally argue that the concept of civil war describes a radical position of praxis in
contrast to the politics of the state: Deleuze and Guattari write: “it should not be
concluded that war is a state of nature, but rather that it is the mode of a social state that
wards off and prevents the state.”442 In this sense, civil war is not simply a state of nature
prior to the state’s existence, but also a specific mode of praxis in which the politics
arising out of the condition of anarchy, develop as strategic tactics of resistance against
the state. For Tiqqun and Deleuze, and Guattari, the concept of anarchy, which is
historically expressed in terms of civil war, is the very grid from which we can read the
history of the political. At the same time, however, this alternative framework for
understanding the domain of the political, which in its essence asserts that anarchy is
primary with the state, additionally locates a fundamental dimension of agonism with the
concept of civil war that lies at the heart of the domain of the political. To put it
differently, anarchy—as opposed to the first principle of government—gives us an
alternative way to conceive of the domain of the political situated at the horizon of the
state, a conceptualization that locates a fundamental agonism between the state and
anarchy as the substance of the political, and finds its expression in the concept of civil
war. Such a theory of the political is not, however, set to exclude or deny the existence
of the state, but more fundamentally to describe the irreconcilable conflict between the
political as archē and the political as anarchy.
While anarchists have traditionally refused Hobbes’s description of the “state of
nature,” they have nevertheless affirmed an alternative, critical understanding of the
concept of anarchy, and have often sought to elaborate a theory of the political that
begins with this alternate conception. Pointing toward the way in which anarchists have
traditionally attempted to distinguish a critical concept of anarchy from Hobbes’s usage,
Newman maintains that whereas sovereign “law bases its claim to our obedience on its
supposed ability to put a stop to the violent anarchy of the state of nature, anarchists
refuse this artifice of social contract theory, affirming instead a different vision of
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anarchy.”443 Yet, for Newman this affirmation of a theory of anarchy in Hobbes invokes
a philosophical aporia in which the historical concept of anarchy is inherently intertwined
with the historical logic of the state and the advent of sovereignty. Newman therefore
criticizes that “the anarchy that forms the ontological basis of social contract theory, and
that the law and sovereignty are supposed to eliminate, provides for anarchists the
ontological foundation for the possibility of life beyond the law.”444 At stake in
Newman’s critique is the way in which the concept of anarchy as discussed by Hobbes in
the Leviathan, has been misinterpreted by certain anarchists as indicating a transcendental
position of pure exteriority outside of the state. Understood in this sense, “anarchy” as
Newman maintains simply designates the transcendental condition of possibility from
which anarchists might be able to justify the potentiality for life without government.
Yet, Newman neglects to notice how the concept of anarchy, even as used by Hobbes in
the Leviathan, does not simply refer to a “state of nature” prior to the advent of the state
and the discourse of sovereignty, but more specifically toward an alternative conception
of politics as resistance, a form of politics against which Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty
is set to eradicate from the field of the political. Thus, by critiquing the idea of anarchy
as pure place of exteriority, Newman neglects the way in which this “place” of anarchy is
not an essential condition, either transcendent or prior to state sovereignty, but that which
becomes manifest in the exercise of resistance against the formation of the state and the
exercise of government. If we assume, as has been suggested by one commentator, that
“at the center of Hobbes’s political theory lies the concept of the state of nature,”445 then
we might further suggest that the condition of anarchy is not only that what is
presupposed by Hobbes through the concept of the “state of nature,” but also that which
reveals an agonistic theory of the political that is effectively masked by the theory of
sovereignty.
Furthermore, while we have seen how the condition of anarchy as manifest in the
praxis of civil war points toward and alternative principle from which the political can be
understood anarchically, anarchists have often invoked the notion of civil war as the basis
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from which politics as such can be understood agonistically. In this regard, certain
anarchists have located a specific dimension of agonism at the heart of political relations,
and have, despite their differences, often invoked the concept of civil war to designate a
fundamental struggle with sovereign power and the exercise of government. Anarchist
journalist, Anselme Bellegarrigue, links the idea of civil war to the notion of government,
and centralizes the idea of agonism as the inherent consequence of government. “Who
says antagonism, says civil war,” writes Bellegarrigue, “from which it follows that who
says government, says civil war.”446 Reversing the logic of Hobbes, anarchist historian
and theorist, Rudolph Rocker argues that the paradigm of government inherently leads to
“a constant war of each against all.”447 At the same time, Rocker centralizes the war
against relations of power as the basis of anarchist politics: “anarchists represent the
viewpoint that the war against capitalism must at the same time be a war against all
institutions of political power.”448 Indeed, according to Rocker, the anarchist’s war
against the state is what opens up the possibility for life without government: “[n]ew
worlds are not born in the vacuum of abstract ideas, but in…ceaseless struggle…constant
warfare against the already-existing.”449 Anarchist Emile Armand highlights how this
dimension of agonism is what unifies anarchist theory. Armand writes:
As the word “anarchy” etymologically signifies the negation of governmental
authority, the absence of government, it follows that one indissoluble bond unites
the anarchists. This is antagonism to all situations regulated by imposition,
constraint, violence, governmental oppression, whether these are a product of all,
a group, or of one person.450
Furthermore, Voltairine de Cleyre maintains that while “[a]narchism seeks to arouse
consciousness of oppression,” the agonism that lies at the heart of political relations
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refers to the “sense of the necessity for unceasing warfare against capitalism and the
state.”451
In each of the above examples, it is clear that anarchism conceives of politics
agonistically—that is as a permanent and irreconcilable struggle between the techniques
of government exercised within the state and critical conception of politics as resistance,
a “constant warfare against the already-existing.” Additionally, while Kropotkin believes
that the very basic tenets of political theory might be rethought according to the
principles of anarchy, he additionally demonstrates that this philosophical principle turns
upon an alternative conceptualization of political praxis that places resistance as the
central component of anarchist politics. According to Kropotkin, the principle of anarchy
is distinct, politically and philosophically, because it “is a principle of the daily
struggle…a principle distorted by statist science…vital and active, always forging new
progress in spite of and in opposition to all oppressors.”452 As a principle of struggle
which, as we for will see for anarchist theorists, finds its consistency in the concept of
resistance, anarchist political theory situates politics outside and in opposition to the state,
and in this way prefigures the core idea of meta-political theory. Furthermore, by
defining anarchism in relation to the principle of struggle, Kropotkin additionally
centralizes resistance as the key component from which to rethink the domain of the
political against the primacy of the state. The antagonism inherent to the political theory
of anarchism is, according to Kropotkin, not represented by a “struggle against rulers, as
was once the case, nor is it simply a struggle against an employer, a judge, or a police
officer.”453 Instead what lies at the heart of anarchist theory is according to Kropotkin:
The struggle between two principles that, from time immemorial, have been at
war with one another within society: the principle of liberty, and the principle of
coercion. These two principles are once more engaged in a monumental struggle
which must, of necessity, result in the triumph of the libertarian principle.454
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As the ongoing struggle between the “principle of coercion” which is historically
elaborated through framework of government and “the principle of liberty,” resistance is
not only the defining character of anarchist political theory, but also the critical grid from
which we can understand the domain of the political. Despite the postanarchist claim that
“classical” anarchism presupposes a radical outside to the state in order to justify
resistance against power, the concept of anarchy as opposed to archē does not presuppose
a pure, uncontaminated place for resistance. Instead, rather, as we find in Kropotkin’s
analysis above, a critical conception of anarchy at once designates the means by which
certain historical popular forces resist the state, as well as the historical principle of
intelligibility from which to read the history of the political as such.
What is crucial is that the resurgence of anarchist philosophy ought to be
understood as an attempt to rethink the history of the political—that is, anarchism
constructs a different set of relations of the political whereby politics can be situated
outside of the state, and as such reinvigorates the philosophical focus on the counterhistory to the paradigm of government. Thus, in a more recent work, Tiqqun amplifies
Kropotkin’s logic and elevates the analysis of the counter-history of the paradigm of
government as the central task for political theory. According to Tiqqun: “[w]e have,
then, the official history of the modern State, namely the grand juridico-formal narrative
of sovereignty: centralization, unification, rationalization. And also there is a counterhistory, which is the history of its impossibility.”455 “You have to look into this other
history,” Tiqqun concludes, in order to begin to rethink the political at the horizon of the
state.456 Thus, for Tiqqun:
There is an official history of the state in which the State seems to be the one and
only actor, in which the advances of the state monopolization on the political are
so many battles chalked up against an enemy who is invisible, imaginary, and
precisely without history. And then there is a counter history written from the
perspective of civil war…This counter history reveals a political monopoly that is
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constantly threatened by the recomposition of autonomous worlds, of non-state
collectivities (original emphasis).457
Like Kropotkin, Tiqqun understands the history of the political in terms of a permanent
struggle between the state and “non-state collectivities”—that is, a struggle between
history of the state and the parallel, yet heterogeneous, counter-historical impossibility of
the state manifest through the logic of civil war. Following Tiqqun it is my contention
that an analysis of this counter-history to the state reveals the specificity of the political in
a radically new way that is irreducible to the logic of the archē. Furthermore, insofar as
this counter-history of the state is historically manifest as a politics of civil war, it also
my contention in what follows that the politics of resistance might become the new basis
from which the political can be conceived within the topology of anarchy.

2.6

Anarchy as a Historical Paradigm of Resistance

Let us always remember that the oppression of governments has no other limit than the
resistance offered to it.458
--Errico Malatesta

Compared with the amount of texts and space afforded to the political theorists working
within the paradigms of government and state sovereignty, the history of works focusing
on the counter-history of government as manifest through resistance have been quite
scarce. Nevertheless, as outlined in the previous section, there have been a few notable
readings of the history of the political in which the basic theses of Hobbes can be
reversed in order to demonstrate a counter-history of the political as told through the
perspective of anarchy and the paradigm of civil war. While Deleuze and Guattari’s
concept of the “war machine” is invoked to account for (via Clastres) the presence of
“counter-State societies,” or the historical movements “directed against the State-form,
actual or virtual,”459 Tiqqun reverses the basic premises of Hobbes in order to
demonstrate how the history of the political is itself the history of “civil war” attested to
457
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by a permanent agonistic struggle with the modern state. It is my assertion, however, that
what is ultimately at stake in these alternative readings, is that this counter-history of the
political turns upon a certain continuity between an elaboration of the political from the
perspective of anarchy and a corresponding politics that assumes the praxis of resistance
in its most paradigmatic form, not only in terms of the principle from which to read the
political, but as a historical paradigm of struggle, a form of politics as resistance. We
have already seen how anarchism ultimately turns upon a different historical conception
of struggle opposed to the Marxist notion of “class struggle,” and further that this notion
is supported as an alternative manner from which to read the history of the political as the
history of resistance manifest in the paradigm of civil war. It is now important to look at
a more in depth exploration of the relationship anarchism poses between the history of
the political and a critical conceptualization of a form of politics as resistance. To do so,
it is necessary to turn to a reading of several of Kropotkin’s works in which he traces the
history of the political as expressed through an permanent agonistic struggle between the
principle of government and the counter-historical movements of resistance. Through
Kropotkin, anarchism is defined as the paradigmatic expression of these forms of
resistance. Yet, as I will ultimately suggest, Kropotkin’s reading of history as the
historical struggle between the exercise of government and the counter-historical
movements of resistance coincides with a theory of civil war and is animated by it.
Aside from being one of Russia’s leading revolutionaries during the late 19th
century, as both philosopher and geographer Kropotkin is one of the more
philosophically systematic and profound thinkers involved in the early development of
anarchist political theory. Indeed, as the historian Peter Marshall claims, Kropotkin gave
anarchism “a philosophical respectability at a time when it was increasingly being
associated in the popular press with mindless terrorism.”460 It is in this way that George
Woodcock maintains that Kropotkin was one of the “great figures of the anarchist
tradition, the equal of Godwin, Proudhon, and Bakunin.”461 It is often noted that
Kropotkin is perhaps best known for his work Mutual Aid, in which he attempts to
provide a scientific ground for anarchist philosophy by arguing that the political theory of
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anarchism finds its ultimate expression and is further developed through an analysis of
the existing tendencies in both nature and society. 462 Like Godwin and Proudhon before
him, Kropotkin bases the development of anarchism in Mutual Aid upon a particular view
of nature and an analysis of certain existing tendencies within human societies. For
Kropotkin, then:
Anarchism represents more than a mere mode of action and a mere conception of
a free society; that it is part of a philosophy, natural and social, which must be
developed in a quite different way from the metaphysical or dialectical methods
which have been employed in the sciences dealing with men.463
Here we can see how Kropotkin sought to prove that anarchist theory finds its
confirmation in an analysis of the existing tendencies within both nature and society.
While Kropotkin’s view that anarchism is firmly based in a naïve view of human nature
is often critiqued for grounding anarchism within an essentialist framework,464 Marshall
points to how what Kropotkin refers to in terms of the natural basis that underpins
anarchist thought, more correctly “demonstrate[s] that anarchism represents existing
tendencies in society.”465 In other words, what gives anarchism its basis for Kropotkin is
not a reliance on a benign understanding of human nature, but rather an analysis of
certain tendencies within history that represent a struggle toward achieving a condition of
anarchy. It is therefore my argument that what is generally posited as a form of
essentialism inherent to Kropotkin’s thought is not to be found in a benign humanism, but
is historically expressed in movements of resistance. More specifically by providing an
alternative grid from which to understand the history of the political as the ongoing
struggle between the state and the counter-historical movements of resistance, it is my
contention that Kropotkin’s value as a philosopher arises through the way in which he
attempts to rethink anarchism in a way that coincides with an interpretation of history as
a movement animated by the politics of resistance.
Like many anarchist theorists, Kropotkin formulates a general critique of the state
and the exercise of government as the critical axiom from which to locate the basic tenets
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of anarchist political theory. In analyzing the origin and basis of the state Kropotkin
stresses that the governmental principle has remained the dominant starting point for
critical conceptualization of the political in the history of political theory. In several
works, particularly The State: Its Historic Role and Modern Science and Anarchism,
Kropotkin provides a significant analysis of the origins of the state as a historically
specific, albeit contingent, form of political organization which evolves to ensure the
monopolization of the political within the framework of government. Nonetheless,
despite the ways in which the critique of the state is often taken for theorists and
historians as the very basis from which anarchist political theory stems, and hence the
basis from which an anarchist conception of society might arise, Kropotkin argues to the
contrary that the critique of state composes only one part of the principal tenets of
anarchist theory. As Kropotkin writes in Modern Science and Anarchism:
When we look into the origin of the anarchist conception of society, we see that it
has a double origin: the criticism, on the one side, of the hierarchical
organizations and the authoritarian conceptions of society; and on the other side,
the analysis of the tendencies that are seen in the progressive movements of
mankind, both in the past, and still more so at the present time.466
Despite the way in which anarchism is often reduced to a radical critique of the state,
what is significant about Kropotkin’s conceptualization regarding the “origins” of
anarchism, is that the critique of the state is paired with the “analysis of the tendencies”
in society—tendencies which, for Kropotkin, develop as movements of historical
resistance to the principle of governance. As he writes elsewhere, the anarchist
“conception” of society is fundamentally different than the statist framework because it is
not “constructed on the a priori method;” instead anarchism is derived “from an analysis
of tendencies that are at work already…reinforcing the no-government tendency”
(original emphasis).467 Indeed, while anarchist historians and theorists tend to emphasize
Mutual Aid as Kropotkin’s contribution to anarchism insofar as it attempts to provide a
scientific basis supporting his theory of anarchism, it is my contention that the
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importance of Kropotkin resides more specifically in the way that he rethinks the political
on condition of a theory of resistance, a permanent and ongoing struggle in which the
tendency toward non-governance is historically manifest as a form of politics as
resistance against the techniques of government and the logic of the state. 468
In The State: Its Historic Role, the “double origin” Kropotkin locates at the
beginnings of anarchist thought is further elaborated as an alternative theory of the
political corresponding with a historical theory of resistance that animates an agonistic
conception of the political. According to Kropotkin, a radical critique of the state “not
only includes the existence of a power situated above society, but also…a whole
mechanism of legislation and policing [which] has to be developed in order to subject
some classes to the domination of others.”469 Here, on the side of critique, Kropotkin
directly locates the state within the paradigm of government: the concept of the state is
invoked in order to describe the existence of a sovereign power and mechanisms of
“legislation and policing,” which assumes the form of a government, and hence the
“domination of others,” as its principal domain. Regardless of the importance and
attention he often attaches to the state, Kropotkin’s focus, as he often reiterates
throughout several of his works, is not so much to develop a critique of the state—radical
critiques of the state for Kropotkin have existed since its inception. Rather than taking
the state and the paradigm of government as the ultimate horizon for the domain of the
political, this is why in The State: Its Historical Role Kropotkin first defines the state not
only to trace the way in which the political assumes the form of a state, but in order to
demonstrate that the history of the state—indeed its historic role—reveals a political
monopoly that is constantly threatened by another historical tendency toward nongovernance. As we will see, by tracing the origins of the state, Kropotkin uncovers
something fundamental regarding the logic of the development and manifestation of
sovereign power, which dislocates the state’s claim to a monopolization on the political.
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In addition to tracing the way in which the domain of the political is shaped by the
paradigm of government, which in the 16th century assumed the form of the modern state,
Kropotkin maintains that the historic role of the state as such:
developed in the history of human societies to prevent the direct association of
men to shackle the development of local and individual initiative, to crush
existing liberties, to prevent their new blossoming—all this in order to subject the
masses to the will of minorities.470
Like Hobbes, Kropotkin presupposes a radical outside to the state, not a state of nature,
but as alternative political possibilities that are crushed by the appearance of the state. As
Kropotkin maintains, the state is therefore an entity which “in its very essence” appears
as the “greatest hindrance to the birth of a society based upon equality and liberty, as well
as the historic means designed to prevent this blossoming.”471 The historical
development of the state is born, according to Kropotkin, in order to eradicate the
existence of alternative forms of political associations and to further prevent new forms
from arising; in short, the state, is according to Kropotkin, “an obstacle to the social
revolution.”472 Precisely because the state develops in such a manner that crushes
alternative forms of political and social association which, as Kropotkin claims, are
always “existing,” as well as to prevent the possibility of future non-state forms of
association, what is at stake is to demonstrate the logic of how the state obtained and
retained its monopolization of the political in the Schmittian sense. Yet, this
monopolization of the political, which Kropotkin claims is the very role of the state,
reveals the history of the political is the history of the of the state’s ongoing struggle with
its own outside; the appearance of the state simultaneously reveals the appearance of nonstate political realities and possibilities. In other words, Kropotkin traces not just the
primacy of government through its historical incarnation in the modern state, but also that
this history is paired and arises with its own counter-history—a counter-history which, as
we will see, becomes manifest in history through resistance. Rather than beginning with
what Kropotkin refers to as “an almost childish argument,” or the implicit assumption
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that the “state exists and represents a powerful ready-made organization,”473 the history
of the political is better understood according to Kropotkin in terms of the expression that
“throughout the history of our civilization, two traditions, two opposing tendencies have
confronted each other…the authoritarian and the libertarian.”474 To be sure, by
conceiving of the domain of the political as a permanent struggle between the principle of
government and the principle of anarchy, Kropotkin radically inscribes the concept of
resistance into the very basis of his understanding of the history of politics.
Although the state and the paradigm of government have remained the dominant
philosophical model for social and political organization this history, according to
Kropotkin, is simultaneously the history of another tendency that arises in opposition to
the “dominating, governing tendency that found its expression in the Church, the State,
and Authoritarian Socialism.”475 In this regard, Kropotkin claims that within the “history
of human society there has always been found in it two currents of thought and action—
two different tendencies.”476 It is by paying close attention to these two differing
tendencies that we can begin to distinguish a new critical framework from which to
rethink the political at the horizon of the state. For Kropotkin, then, the history of
political is at once the expression of an “authoritarian tendency, represented by [those]
who maintained that society must be organized by a central authority, and that this
authority must make laws and be obeyed,” and “in opposition to this authoritarian current
[a] popular current, which worked at organizing society…on a basis of equality, without
authority,” which as Kropotkin claims “is represented now by the Anarchists.”477
Kropotkin thus locates a new way from which to read the history of the political through
the vital, agonistic struggle between these two principles. If the history of the political is,
according to Kropotkin the struggle between these two currents, then Kropotkin radically
denies the state’s claim to primacy, and gives us a new grid from which to reread the
history of the political as a history of struggle and civil war.
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Although Kropotkin’s pamphlet Modern Science and Anarchism can be credited,
like his text Mutual Aid, with a critical attempt to give anarchist philosophy a scientific
foundation, much of the pamphlet instead traces the history of the political through an
analysis of the tendency toward governance and the tendency toward non-governance; as
such the text is better read as a fundamental statement on the history of the political. In
this text, Kropotkin argues that the political cannot be reduced to the politics of the state
because “side by side with this authoritarian current, another current asserted
itself…[and] rose against the principle of governance, against the supporters of the
state.”478 Rather than taking government as an implicit starting point for a critical theory
of politics, the domain of the political is, according to Kropotkin, better expressed in
terms of an ongoing and permanent dimension of agonism between the “principle of
governance” and the “anarchist principle,” which arises historically against and outside of
the state. For Kropotkin, then, the history of the political is neither identical with the
exercise of the power of the state, nor analogous to the terms of economic class struggle;
instead, rather “it is the struggle between two great principles that, from time
immemorial, have been at war with one another within society.”479 Albeit in a much
different manner Kropotkin, like Hobbes before him, locates the concept of war as the
very grid that makes the political appear as such. By positing that the history of the
political as an ongoing struggle between the history of governmentality and the anarchist
tendency toward non-governance, Kropotkin’s goal is not to reduce the history of politics
to a weak dialectic between the principle of governance and anarchy; instead, rather,
what is at stake for Kropotkin is to demonstrate that the historical manifestation of
government, which has traditionally been privileged as the dominant model for human
social relations, is simultaneously parallel with its own heterogeneous counter-history of
resistance. To be sure, Kropotkin’s value as a political theorist arises from his endeavor
to demonstrate that paired with history of the state, regardless of its dominance, is
simultaneously the history of a dynamic expression of an alternative tendency in
opposition to the paradigm of government.
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Taking these two tendencies as the critical axiom on which to read the history of
politics, Kropotkin expands upon the logic of Marx and Engel’s thesis that human history
develops in terms of class struggle, and asserts the history of politics is better expressed
in terms of a permanent struggle between the principle of government manifest in the
state and the movements of resistance against this very principle. Kropotkin’s counterthesis posed against the traditional understanding of class struggle reads as follows:
“From the earliest times these two currents were found struggling against each other.
They continue to do so, and the history of mankind is the history of their struggles.”480
Here Kropotkin not only offers an alternative critical framework from which to read the
history of politics, he locates a fundamental theory of agonism at the heart of the history
of the political. Unlike Schmitt, however, who locates the substance of the political in
the antagonism between friend and enemy, or the Marxist antagonism between classes, in
Kropotkin’s thought the substance of the political is located in fundamental and
permanent antagonism between the principle of governance and the anarchist principle; it
is this agonistic struggle between the principle of government and the expression of
resistance that makes the political visible as such according to Kropotkin.
The distinction Kropotkin proposes between anarchist and governmental
conceptions of the political—between the state and non-state—is therefore vital not only
to the anarchist critique of the archipolitical, but also to understanding the way in which a
new philosophy of politics arise from the interpretation of the permanent conflict between
these two conceptions of the political. If the politics of the state are made manifest
through the elaboration of government, “anarchism” Kropotkin writes “owes its origins”
To the constructive, creative energy activity of the people, by which all
institutions of communal life were developed in the past, and to a protest—a
revolt against the external force which had thrust itself upon these institutions.481
By understanding history as the continual struggle between anarchy and government,
Kropotkin argues that anarchism can be seen as developing alongside (albeit in conflict
with) the history of archipolitical. Two ideas are of immediate importance here. First,
anarchism is according to Kropotkin always in existence in the very histories of
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individual and popular movements of resistance. Precisely because anarchism
historically originates in movements of resistance, Kropotkin’s point is to demonstrate
how an anarchist theory of politics does not arise by means of an essentialist universal
worldview, nor that it is tied to a few major thinkers or texts, but that the complexities of
anarchist theory are born in many different currents, thoughts, and strategies which
assume the form of resistance to the principle of governance. Similar to the way in which
anarchist historian Rudolph Rocker observes how “anarchism…is a definite trend in the
history of mankind…in contrast [to] governmental institutions,” Kropotkin argues that
anarchism a recognizable tendency in history, a tendency that historically develops in
opposition to the principle of governance. 482 In this way, anarchism is born and
continuously renewed throughout history in the “creative, constructive force of the
masses…in opposition to those who put their hope in governing minorities.”483
According to Kropotkin, then, the history of anarchism is therefore attested to by the
history of the “revolts of both individuals and the nations against the representatives of
force.”484 It is these movements of revolt that Kropotkin claims “were imbued with the
anarchist spirit,”485 and several of Kropotkin’s works are set to trace the appearance of
the anarchist tendency throughout history.
Taking Kropotkin’s lead, we can point toward the ways in which the existence of
the historical movements from which anarchism originates are marked by a fundamental
revolt with the principle of governance, and not an a priori essence of human nature in
the sense critiqued by the postanarchists; anarchism owes its historical origins to the
manifestation of a form of politics as resistance. What is particularly distinctive
regarding the turn toward anarchism is therefore not only the formation of politics
beyond the framework of the state, but a form of politics that is centered on, and arises
out of, the manifestation of resistance to the archipolitical. Like the way in which
Rancière once described the necessity of a critical transition from archipolitics to
metapolitics, we can now begin to point to the transition from a metapolitics to an
anarchist politics of resistance. Kropotkin’s conceptualization of the history of politics as
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the ongoing struggle between two differing currents provides us with a preliminary
framework for a new theory regarding the domain of the political, which transcends what
I previously outlined in terms of the primacy of government. It is precisely by
understanding the conflict between the principle of governance and the figure of anarchy
which resists and revolts against the archipolitical that anarchists claim calls for a
redefinition of politics as that which exposes itself as an ongoing war between the state
and the non-state. At the same time, however, insofar as the political cannot be reduced
to the paradigm of government, what is equally important for Kropotkin is how the
historical substance which composes and makes possible the anarchist tendency that lies
“in opposition to the governing hierarchic conception and tendency.”486 If the
authoritarian current is manifest in terms of the historical appearance of the state and the
paradigm of government, what then composes the anarchist tendency is animated and
made possible, as Kropotkin importantly argues, “by the means of which the masses
resisted the encroachments of the conquerors and the power-seeking minorities” (my
emphasis).487
Resistance for Kropotkin is the substance inherent to the historical tendency
toward the principle of non-governance, and is therefore one of the central components of
anarchist theory attempts to elaborate at its very basis. Thus when Kropotkin claims that
anarchism begins with an analysis of tendencies in opposition to that state, he writes that
these tendencies are born in the tendencies that “enabled” the popular movements “to
resist the encroachments upon their life [from those] who conquered them” (my
emphasis).488 Furthermore in tracing the further history of revolt against the principle of
governance, Kropotkin maintains that the historical tendencies toward non-governance
“were all the outcome of the same resistance to the growing power of the few” (my
emphasis).489 In other words, if the authoritarian tendency is made manifest by the
historical appearance of the state and the paradigm of government, the opposing tendency
finds its ultimate expression in movements of resistance against the primacy of
government. Kropotkin’s analysis not only centralizes the concept of resistance as a key
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component of the political, but in doing so also maintains that the analysis of resistance
gives us a new way to rethink the very basis of political philosophy. It is with the
distinction between the political as archē and the political as a paradigm of resistance that
anarchist theory proposes an entirely different terrain from which to rethink the history of
the political.
The way in which Kropotkin centralizes the concept of resistance as the basis for
an anarchist philosophy of the political is not isolated to his own works. In a fascinating
passage from The Individual, Society, and the State, Benjamin Tucker amplifies
Kropotkin’s logic to suggest that the defining feature of the political lies in formulating a
key distinction between the principle of governance and anarchy, whereby the possibility
of developing a new philosophy of politics hinges upon the question of resistance. What
is of key importance, however, is that by articulating a clear distinction between two
conflicting political spheres Tucker begins to redefine both anarchism and the question of
politics in terms of a critical theory of resistance. For Tucker, the political sphere of
governance is characterised through a dual essence of aggression and invasion;
“[a]ggression, invasion, government,” Tucker claims, are “inter-convertible terms.”490
Thus for Tucker,
the essence of government is control, or the attempt to control. He who attempts
to control another is a governor, and aggressor, and invader…On the other hand,
he who resists another’s attempt to control is not an aggressor, an invader, a
governor, but simply a defender, a protector, and the nature of such resistance is
not changed whether…one declines to obey an oppressive law, or by one man by
all men, as when a subject people rises against a despot…The distinction between
invasion and resistance, between government and defense is vital. Without it
there can be no valid philosophy of politics.491
Like Kropotkin, Tucker understands the history of the political in terms of an ongoing
and irreducible struggle between the principle of government and the historical paradigm
of resistance. Yet, Tucker’s work makes another important contribution that is in every
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way essential to rethinking an anarchist theory of the political. As found in the passage
above, Tucker posits a vital distinction between “government” and “resistance” as itself
the condition of possibility for a critical philosophy of politics as such. Given, as we
have seen, that the political cannot be reduced to the history of the archipolitical, the
“vital” distinction Tucker posits between the principle of “government” and the paradigm
of “resistance” is itself what makes possible an anarchist hypothesis of the political.
Anarchism, according to Tucker, can thus be distinguished philosophically from other
political theories, not simply as the rejection of the orthodox claims made for the
legitimacy of state power, but as a historical theory of resistance to the principle of
government. Crucially, however, by redefining politics from the point of view of
resistance to the archipolitical, Tucker additionally defines anarchism in relation to the
fundamental political paradigm of resistance.
It is precisely because Kropotkin and Tucker take up the analysis of movements
of resistance that reinforce the tendency toward non-governance as the critical turning
point from which to develop the primary philosophical basis of anarchist political theory,
that he can be seen as gesturing toward a fundamentally different theory of the political—
indeed, an anarchist hypothesis of the political from which the concept of resistance is its
locus. In outlining the historical origins of the state, what is at stake for anarchists is the
analysis of the tendencies in history which become manifest in movements of resistance
against the state and the exercise of government. In this way, resistance, for anarchists,
acts as the critical axiom from which to reread the history of the political; resistance is
inscribed into the history of the political, and its permanence is attested to by the ongoing
struggle between two dominant tendencies that compose the antagonistic substance of the
political—the authoritarian principle which assumes the form of government as its
domain and culminates in the modern sovereign state, and the anti-authoritarian
anarchist principle toward non-governance. In other words, resistance is the critical
framework, or principle of intelligibility which reveals the domain of the political as a
topology of agonistic struggle. It is precisely because anarchist political theorists posit
resistance to the principle of governance as both the basis from which anarchist
philosophy begins, as well as the central component from which to reread the history of
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politics, that the political theory of anarchism fundamentally gestures toward a new
understanding of the political situated at the horizon of the state.
Taking Kropotkin’s interpretation of history of politics as the critical turning point
from which we might begin to transcend not just the Aristotelian and Schmittian
paradigms of government and state sovereignty, but also the Marxist paradigm of class
struggle, I have outlined preliminary anarchist approach to the political, in which the
concept of resistance is inextricably bound and gives meaning to the possibility
rethinking the political at the horizon of the state and the exercise of power as
government. Furthermore, as a central component within the history of anarchist
thought, resistance is not only that which makes possible a form of politics situated
outside of the state, but also that which makes possible a vital transformation in one’s life
and conditions. It is in this regard that Emma Goldman, like Kropotkin and Tucker,
seeks to further develop anarchism in relation to the elaboration of a form of politics as
resistance. Anarchism, according to Goldman, should not be understood as an ideal view
of a future stateless and classless society to come, but as the development of movements
of resistance manifest at the horizon of the state. “Anarchism,” Goldman therefore
writes,
is not a theory of the future to be realized through divine inspiration. It is a living
force in the affairs of our life, constantly creating new conditions…Anarchism
therefore stands for direct action, the open defiance of, and resistance to, all laws
and restrictions, economic, social, and moral. But defiance and resistance are
illegal. Therein lies the salvation of man.492
Here, Goldman importantly defines anarchism in relation to the critical question of
resistance. For Goldman, then, rather than defining and outlining the principles for the
possibility of an anarchist society to come, anarchism is instead first and foremost a
theory of resistance wherein the praxis revolt is the condition of possibility for a
transformation in life. As a theory of living resistance, anarchism is what opens the space
of politics beyond and against the history of governmentality. Indeed, a core problem
central to the terrain of the postanarchist and metapolitical turns is thinking through a
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redefinition of the political from the point of view of resistance rather than from the
perspective of political power. Yet, in Goldman’s definition we also find that resistance
opens a real political possibility; resistance is not only the central component from which
to rethink politics outside of the paradigm of government, but also that which makes
possible the creation of “new conditions”—that is resistance is the form of politics that
renders transformation possible. This is why in a separate work, Goldman elevates and
centralizes the concept of resistance as the ultimate horizon of anarchist politics:
“resistance to tyranny” according to Goldman “is man’s highest ideal.”493 Following
Goldman in this way, we can conclude that resistance to the exercise of government not
only forms the basis of an anarchist politics, but also an anarchist hypothesis of the
political animated by the history of resistance as such.

1.6 Conclusion: Towards an Anarchist Hypothesis of the
Political
Although the paradigm of government has retained a certain privileged sense of primacy
within the history of political theory, the goal of this chapter has been to reintroduce
anarchist political theory in terms of that which posits and turns upon a unique hypothesis
of the political from the perspective of resistance. If political theory is to escape the
paradigm of archē, which has hitherto remained the dominant critical framework and
condition of possibility for political theory as such, what was ultimately at stake was to
outline the ways in which anarchist political theory requires, and even demands, an
alternative hypothesis, or critical framework for a theory of the political that transcends
the dominance of the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms of the political. Unlike the
political theories of Aristotle and Schmitt, where politics is both derived and determined
by the first principle and logic of the archē, it is my contention that a critical
conceptualization of anarchy designates an opposing theory of the political in which
politics disorders the order, logic, and sovereign authority of the archē; anarchy
designates a radical disordering or rupture with the logic of the archē. In this regard, I
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maintained that with a critical conception of anarchy—as the principle that makes
possible the disturbance of the logic of the archē, as well as the historical principle of
intelligibility of the political as such—anarchist political theory posits a more consistent
way of rethinking the domain of the political and the question of politics as proposed in
the postanarchist and meta-political traditions. Furthermore, with reference to Tiqqun,
Kropotkin, and others I demonstrated through an unorthodox reading of the concept of
anarchy in Hobbes that history of the state is simultaneously parallel with the history of
anarchy—the counter-historical tendency toward non-governance as manifest in the
politics of civil war. Here we have seen how the permanence of civil war amongst the
domain to which the political refers and consists means that the history of the political
can be interpreted as an agonistic dimension of struggle in which resistance comes to
mark the constituent component of the political as such. We can now add that both
critical conceptions of anarchy ultimately turn upon a unique theory of resistance that
motivates and animates an anarchist conception of the political as such. Following
Tucker, we have seen how an anarchist theory of the political turns upon a vital
distinction between the exercise of government and the counter-historical movements of
resistance, and in Kropotkin how this distinction means that the term politics designates
an irreconcilable struggle, or permanent war between the techniques of government
exercised within a state and the counter-historical movements of resistance. In other
words, if the goal of radical political thought is to affirm politics against the history of the
archipolitical, the question of resistance as invoked and utilized within anarchism can be
seen, I maintain, as an effective way of engaging with this problem—that is, a
retheorization of a form of politics situated at a distance from the state, hinges upon the
question of resistance as uniquely posed within the anarchist tradition.
With the critical question of resistance designating the horizon from which to
rethink the political in radically new ways, this chapter was set to characterize the turn
toward anarchism in political theory in order to create the critical framework from which
to orient and situate Foucault’s work within the history of anarchist thought in a way that
still needs to be explored today. While Foucault is often credited for developing an
analytic of power, it is this very persistence of power that not only pushes Foucault
toward rethinking the conditions, origins and principles of legitimacy of political power,
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but also a theory of resistance that informs his analytics of power and the political as
such. As we will see, through the technical vocabulary of a critical conceptualization of
resistance, Foucault’s project works toward reversing the general tenets of political
theory in a distinct manner that is consistent with the history of anarchist political theory
as outlined throughout this chapter. Posing the problem of resistance against the history
of governmentality not only seeks to expose, for Foucault, the ontological and political
principles that continue to sustain Western political practices but, more importantly,
attempts to open a space for political praxis in which the very notion of resistance
becomes central as an operative force of politics. Although the concept of resistance
enters Foucault’s critical lexicon later than the concept of power, it nonetheless forms the
framework from which he begins to think through the general problematics of power, the
political, and the exercise of governmentality. Rather than crediting Foucault with
developing a philosophical concept of power, what is crucial about Foucault’s work is
that he introduces the concept of resistance into the field of politics and political
philosophy in radically new ways consistent with the turn toward anarchism.
As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, it is with Foucault that we can
begin to more thoroughly engage with the task of rethinking an anarchist hypothesis of
the political on condition of resistance in a more consistent manner. What is at stake in
such a line of thought is not simply the affirmation of an anarchist politics beyond the
state and the exercise of government, but the affirmation of a theory of resistance central
to formulating an alternative hypothesis of the political situated at the horizon of the state
and the exercise of government. While Foucault explicitly situates his work in relation to
the complexities of governmentality as the site for political and philosophical problems,
what is crucial in Foucault’s work is how he simultaneously reveals and posits an
alternative theory of politics in which the permanence of resistance is what designates the
specificity of the political. In reconceptualising the political as a space marked by the
permanent presence of resistance, Foucault reveals that resistance exceeds the operability
of power, thus opening it up to a horizon beyond itself. As I hope to articulate, this
conception of resistance provides a framework that allows me to further explore the
terrain between Foucault, the politics of resistance, and anarchism in the chapters that
follow. Taking Foucault’s philosophy as exemplary of the attempt to affirm a theory of
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the political which takes resistance as its constituent component, I argue in the following
chapter that this alternative view of politics and the political as elaborated by Foucault
through the unique concept of what he refers to as “critique,” corresponds with a different
conceptualization of both the terms of the political and of transformative resistance,
which, in turn, redefines the spacing of the political as the spacing where power coincides
with the fundamental truth of its own resistance, a form of resistance outlined by
Foucault as an “art of not being governed.”494
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Chapter 3
3
An Anarchist Hypothesis of the Political: Foucault, Critique
and the Art of Not Being Governed
If it is true that the set of relations of force in a given society constitutes the domain of the
political… To say that ‘everything is political’ is to affirm this ubiquity of relations of
force and their immanence in a political field; but this is to give oneself a task, which as
yet has scarcely even been outlined, of disentangling this indefinite knot…Political
Analysis and criticism have in large measure still to be invented—so too have the
strategies which will make it possible to modify the relations of force, to co-ordinate them
in such a way that such a modification is possible and can be inscribed into reality. That
is to say, the problem is not so much that of defining a political ‘position’ (which is to
choose from a pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine and bring into being new
schemas of politicization. If ‘politicization’ means falling back on ready-made choices
and institutions, then the effort of analysis involved in uncovering the relations of force
and mechanisms of power is not worthwhile. To the vast new techniques of power
correlated with multinational economies and bureaucratic States, one must oppose a
politicization which will take new forms.495
--Michel Foucault
The previous chapter sought to reintroduce anarchism as a distinct political theory that
turns upon an alternative theory of the political through the concept of resistance.
Focusing on a critical theory of anarchism, the previous chapter gestured toward taking
the concept of anarchy as the central component from which a new theory of the political
might begin, but also how this retheorization of the political turns upon the unique
question of resistance. One of the central problems, then, essential to anarchism is not
only a theory of the political situated at the horizon of the state and the paradigm of
government, but also a reconceptualization of a corresponding theory of politics in which
resistance to the archipolitical designates the central component of an anarchic
conception of the political as such. In other words, it is my contention that in anarchism
it is a theory of resistance, and not that of an oikonomia, that forms the principle from
which the history of politics can be reread as an agonistic field of struggle with power
exercised as government. What is thus at stake in this trajectory is not simply the
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affirmation of an anarchist politics outside and against the state, but the affirmation of a
critical theory of resistance essential to rethinking the political anarchically. Together,
these two ideas—that is, an anarchic conception of the political and the elaboration of a
corresponding form of politics as resistance—form the locus of what I hold to be the
essential task for political theory consequent upon the return of anarchism. If political
philosophy is to escape the paradigm of government, which has hitherto remained the
dominant critical framework and condition of possibility for political theory as such,
what is required, and even demanded, is first an anarchist hypothesis of the political in
which the unique question of resistance designates the principle of intelligibility from
which to reread the history of politics. As I will argue throughout this chapter, this is
precisely the position Foucault continuously elaborates throughout his work. In this
regard, it is my contention in this chapter that such contemporary developments in
political theory not only open unexplored possibilities for a continued retheorization of
anarchism, but also the critical framework from which to rethink and orient Foucault’s
often contested theory of resistance within this tradition.
Throughout his collected works, Foucault consistently argues that it is
inefficacious and unproductive to reduce a study of the political and the coinciding
question of politics to a theory of political power. Consequent, or turning upon, a critical
reevaluation of the problem of government, this is why in the first epigraph above
Foucault claims that political theory is therefore faced with a “task” that has “scarcely
even been outlined.” Situated amongst what was elucidated in chapter one as the core
crisis of political philosophy—that is, the synthesis between the domain of the political
and the first principle of an originary archē—Foucault importantly suggests that what
must be at stake is “disentangling this indefinite knot.” Indeed, the critical task Foucault
assigns to political theory in 1976, is precisely what is currently being elaborated in the
metapolitical and anarchist turns in political theory. Anticipating, then, several of the
debates in political theory outlined in chapter one, Foucault importantly suggests two
ways in which to “bring into being new schemas of politicization”—indeed two general
problematics—which both align his thought with anarchism, while formulating a unique,
yet unthought, critical theory of resistance that will be the focus of this chapter.
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First, “political analysis and criticism,” Foucault argues, must be reinvented: “to
the vast techniques of power…one must oppose a politicization that will take new
forms.”496 This is to say that political theory, according to Foucault, must be redesigned
in such a way that it cannot be reduced to the logic of the archē—a specific rationale of
government traditionally considered primary with respect to the domain of the political.
For Foucault, then, against the theories and practices which locate the political at the
intersection between power exercised as government and state sovereignty, what must be
at stake is the development of a new, opposing theoretical framework of the political.
Indeed, as I will argue throughout this chapter, it is this fundamental retheorization of the
political that underlies Foucault’s methodological approach to philosophy and the history
of political thought, and as such creates the critical framework from which to situate the
trajectory of his collected works within the tradition of anarchism. Additionally,
alongside this reinvention of political analysis, Foucault claims that what must be equally
rethought is the question of resistance, or the “strategies which will make it possible to
modify the relations of force,” and inscribe these transformations into reality. It is
exactly within this critical framework—this double move which at once invokes a
rethinking of the political situated at the horizon of the state, as well as the question of a
form of politics elaborated as resistance—that this chapter will demonstrate the ways in
which Foucault intervenes in the history of political theory by radically rethinking the
history of politics in such a way that resistance designates the constituent principle of the
political.
Traditionally, the history of archic political thought and practice has had the effect
of neutralizing and minimizing the character of resistance within the history of the
political.497 Foucault, however, begins from the opposite position; rather than taking
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resistance as a minor term within the history of political theory, Foucault valorizes it as
the key concept that reveals the specificity of power, politics, and the political as such.
Turning to Foucault, then, I want to suggest that a rethinking of the question of anarchism
can, in part, be accomplished through a study of how his theory of resistance reveals a
radically new perspective from which the history of the political can be interpreted
anarchically. Yet, at the same time as Foucault reformulates the terms of the political on
condition of the question of resistance, he does so not simply to argue that the political
might be rethought in terms of a reductive dialectic that takes the form of
government/resistance, but that a rethinking of the terms of the political requires a
radically different framework that affords primacy to the question of resistance. If as we
have seen, that one of the central tasks of contemporary political theory is to reconsider
the domain of the political in such a way that it cannot be reduced to the problematic of
government, then what is needed vitally is an altogether different analytic framework and
methodology for the terms of the political which not only include resistance as a key
component but, in doing so, also reframes the political from the point of view of
resistance.
It is at the cusp—indeed the precise intersection—of these two problematics that I
suggest a fundamental rereading of Foucault’s thought in order to demonstrate the ways
in which his work increasingly gestures towards new “schemas of politicization” situated
in the trajectory between the question of resistance and the history of anarchism.
Utilizing the critical space afforded by the anarchist turn in contemporary political
thought, this chapter will begin to discuss Foucault’s contributions to anarchism and the
politics of resistance, while at the same time demonstrating the ways in which it is
through the questions of anarchism and resistance that help facilitate a new reading of
Foucault’s oeuvre traditionally overlooked by scholars. More specifically, this chapter
introduces the significance of the question of resistance to Foucault’s thought by
outlining its intersection with the coinciding concept of what he refers to as “critique,” a
methodological praxis underlying his studies of philosophy and politics. In this regard, it
is my contention in this chapter that the idea of “critique” reveals a new perspective from
which the concept of resistance can be highlighted as the key term around which
Foucault’s project revolves. At the same time, however, it is this concept of “critique”
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and its relation to the question of resistance that reveals for Foucault what I refer as an
anarchist hypothesis of the political, in which the concept and practice of resistance
comes to designate the agonistic dimension specific to politics. Although the concept of
“critique” is often invoked in several of Foucault’s texts, lectures and interviews, it is
most clearly elaborated in three key texts. The concept of “critique” is first developed in
a posthumously published transcript of a lecture given at the Société de Philosophie
Française in 1978 titled “What is Critique?”. In this lecture, what Foucault takes as the
basis of “critique” is shown to originate in the counter-historical practices of resistance to
governmentality. Second, Foucault addresses the importance of “critique” in the first
lecture from The Government of Self and Others, and outlines how the idea accounts for
his own methodological approach to both political theory and philosophy.498 Finally, in
“What is Enlightenment,” first published in 1984, Foucault conceptualizes “critique” in
terms of an ethos of resistance developed in response to the political problematics of
authority and obedience.499 What is crucial is not simply the thematic overlap between
these texts, but rather how each situates the notion of “critique” in relation to Foucault’s
genealogical histories of governmentality, while further elaborating the ways in which the
concept also designates the active component from which to rethink the history of the
political from the perspective of resistance.
Several critics and scholars have offered extensive studies regarding the
significance and use of the concept of “critique” as it is developed over the course of
Foucault’s thought. The significance of the concept of “critique” in Foucault’s thought
has not gone unnoticed by his biographers, and both James Miller500 and Didier Eribon501
have dedicated thorough discussions pertaining to the concept of “critique” as it develops
throughout his collected works. Highlighting the importance of this concept, Christopher
Penfield more recently writes that “critique is the philosophical mode of reflection that
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best characterizes Foucault’s thought.”502 Since “critique” exemplifies Foucault’s
approach to philosophy, scholars and critical commentators have sought to engage with
and draw connections between the notion of “critique” and several other key concepts or
general thematics spread throughout his works. Drawing a certain correspondence
between “critique” and other critical concepts such as “subjectivity,”503 “practices of the
self,”504 and “ethics,”505 scholars of Foucault have sought to demonstrate the importance
of the concept of “critique” across the wide, diverse spectrum of his thought and work.
Furthermore, theorists as diverse as Jon Simons,506 David Ingram,507 Todd May,508 David
Couzens-Hoy,509 and Edward McGushin510 have invoked the concept of “critique” as way
to reveal how Foucault’s work should be understood within the critical and philosophical
tradition initially arising with Kant and the Enlightenment. At stake for these writers is
how the relation Foucault stages between “critique” and the critical tradition of Kant
helps to locate a certain thematic link between the differing periods of his collected
thought. Others such as McGrusin,511 Diana Taylor,512 and Thomas Lemke513 further

502

Christopher Penfield, “Critique,” in The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, eds. Leonard Lawlor and John
Nale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 87.
503
Here Hays draws a crucial connection between critique, the study of subjectivity and the potentiality
for agential transformation.
504
Diana Taylor, “Practices of the Self,” in Michel Foucault: Key Concepts, ed. Diana Taylor (Durham:
Acumen Publishing Limited, 2011), 173-186. In her analysis of the relation between “critique” and what
Foucault referred to as “technologies” or “practices of the self,” Taylor maintains that Foucault’s use of
“critique may loosen the relationship between truth and power that characterizes modern subjectivation”
(174). In Taylor’s conception, “critique,” therefore has an emancipatory function as it develops in
Foucault’s thought.
505
David Ingram, “Foucault and Habermas,” in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Cutting
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 257-262.
506
Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1995), 51. Here Simons draws a direct
connection between Foucault’s political theory and Kant’s critical project through an affinity with the
concept of “critique” in which “critique” helps to determine the limits of political power. Drawing an
explicit connection between Foucault’s political thought and Kant’s, Simons’ writes: “Foucault conceives
of political philosophy along Kantian lines, as a philosophical project to determine the proper limits of
political power.”
507
David Ingram, “Foucault and Habermas,” 266.
508
Todd May, The Philosophy of Foucault (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 22-23.
509
David Couzens-Hoy, Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Post-Critique (Cambridge: MIT
University Press, 2004), 90-92.
510
Edward McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life (Illinois: Northwestern
University Press, 2007), 275-280.
511
Ibid 278-286.
512
Diana Taylor, “Practices of the Self,” 178-180.
513
Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality and Critique (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2011).

180

argue that the concept of “critique” ought to be understood in relation and response to the
rise of governmentalization and Foucault’s studies of “governmentality.” Additionally,
focusing on the problematic of government and the coinciding emancipatory aspects of
Foucault’s genealogy of “critique,” theorists such as Johanna Oksala514 and Couzens-Hoy
have sought to draw connections between the elaboration of “critique” and the
development of a theory of emancipatory freedom in Foucault’s thought and work,
whereby the concept of “critique” comes to mark “a crucial condition of freedom.”515 In
this regard, while scholars have highlighted the importance of the concept of “critique” in
Foucault, while further tracing the ways in which the notion of “critique” helps form
connections between other critical concepts, it is my contention that the concept most
directly helps to introduce and elaborate a specific correspondence with the theory of
resistance underlying his respective studies of power, politics, and governmentality.
Taking the specific correspondence between governmentality and the concept of
“critique” as one of the key turning points in Foucault’s thought, the fundamental relation
established between “critique” and resistance has not gone unnoticed, and several
theorists have additionally outlined certain connecting point between the two terms.
Ingram, for example, writes that “critique” in Foucault “is nothing more than an
embodied exemplification of virtuous resistance.”516 Similarly, Judith Butler argues that
with the notion of “critique,” the question of resistance is retheorized by Foucault in
terms of an ethical “practice of virtue.”517 In his text The Political Philosophy of Michel
Foucault, Kelly contends that “Foucault depicts critique as a specific counter-part to the
modern art of government,” and as such that “critique” functions as a theoretical
continuation of the problem of resistance as developed in his thought.518 Furthermore,
Andrew Cutrofello’s text Discipline and Critique and David Couzens-Hoy’s Critical
Resistance are both indispensable references for working out the relation between the
general problematic of governmentality, the rise of “critique” and the turn toward the
study of resistance in Foucault’s thought and work. With the concept of “critique” acting
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as the theoretical locus from which Foucault attempts to transcend the problematic of
governmentality, Couzens-Hoy maintains that his thought turns upon the development of
a “social ontology of resistance” that is “made manifest through a genealogical
critique.”519 In this regard, Couzens-Hoy further argues that with the concept of critique
“Foucault recognizes that he has to explain the conditions for the possibility of resistance,
and he does so by building resistance into power relations from the start.”520 In outlining
a unique relationship between Kant, Foucault, and the problem of resistance, Cutrofello
further suggests that it is with the notion of critique that Foucault begins to think through
the relation between resistance and ethics, and thus maintains that Foucault’s
retheorization of Kant’s “categorical imperative could provide Foucauldian critique with
an ethical basis for a politics of resistance.”521 As we will see in a later chapter,
Foucault’s engagement with the critical tradition of Kant and the coinciding problematic
of “critique” helps to determine a specific connection between the problematic of
resistance initially sketched in The History of Sexuality and his turn toward ethics in his
final works. What is particularly insightful about these accounts is that each locates the
concept of “critique” within the context of an extended discussion of Foucault’s often
contested theory of resistance, while also suggesting how “critique” might designate a
unique basis that allows for the elusive character of Foucauldian resistance to be
attenuated. While these theorists have made significant contributions to the study of
resistance in Foucault through its relation to the concept of “critique,” the fundamental
relation Foucault establishes not only between critique and resistance, but also the
question of politics has nevertheless only been scarcely outlined. In other words, what
requires further exploration is the precise manner by which Foucault locates the question
of politics at the intersection between his concept of “critique” and his theory of
resistance.
In situating the question of politics between the notions of “critique” and
resistance, my own approach is set to demonstrate the ways in which the elaboration of
the concept of “critique” and its relation to the general problematic of resistance develops
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a fundamental affinity with anarchism, and as such ought to be situated more firmly
within an anarchist framework in order to fully appreciate its political and philosophical
importance. While the above theorists have highlighted a fundamental relation between
“critique” and resistance, several of these theorists nevertheless tend to deny a possible
relation between Foucault’s concept of critique and the history of anarchism. In this
regard, while I affirm an essential nexus between the concepts of “critique” and
resistance, I argue that with the concept of “critique” Foucault locates a theory of
resistance at the basis of his distinct understanding of politics, while simultaneously
developing a unique affinity with anarchism. More specifically, it is my contention in
this chapter that the relation Foucault stages between “critique” and resistance ultimately
reveals the basis for an anarchist hypothesis of the political in which resistance designates
the constituent component of a form of politics irreducible to the logic of the archē. In
other words, what is crucial in the relation between “critique” and resistance is an
alternative basis from which to rethink the question of politics anarchically.
In what follows, what is at stake in staging an intersection between Foucault and
anarchist political theory is first to demonstrate how with the concept of “critique” his
work increasingly builds upon and develops an alternative theory of the political that
turns upon the question of resistance. Rather than beginning with the question of power
or governmentality (neither of which can be neglected in Foucault’s thought), by turning
toward the concept of “critique” I want to suggest an alternative way of thinking through
what it might mean to “cut off the king’s head” in political theory, as Foucault was often
apt to suggest.522 As we will see, what Foucault elaborates in terms of “critique” has
serious implications for both philosophy and political theory; philosophically the concept
of “critique” begins to develop in regard to a permanent struggle against the problem of
authority, while politically the term designates a form of politics animated by movements
of resistance to governmentality. Although the 1978 lecture is often overlooked by
scholars in comparison to the 1984 lecture, between the two Foucault begins to
incorporate the concept of “critique” into his general lexicon in such a way that both
provides a rare overview of the development of his thought in relation to the question of
resistance, as well as a critical commentary regarding the development of a new critical
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framework from which the terms of the political are rethought anarchically. Indeed, with
the notion of “critique” both philosophy and politics, as Foucault importantly suggests in
the 1978 lecture, develop in relation to, and are linked by, what he refers to as the “art of
not being governed,” or a fundamental “decision not to be governed.”523 Inasmuch as
Foucault takes this “art of not being governed” as the very basis for what he refers to as
“critique,” I argue that his genealogical study of the critical attitude forms a direct
alliance with anarchist political theory that ought not to be overlooked in Foucauldian
scholarship. If the notion of “critique” in Foucault’s thought can be understood, as one
commentator suggests, in terms of a general “lens for viewing the coherence, stakes, and
trajectory of his work as whole,”524 it is my contention that between the concept of
“critique” and the coinciding form of politics expressed as an “art of not being governed”
Foucault formulates a hidden critical locus from which to redefine the terms of the
political not from the point of view of political power, but from the complexities of the
movements of resistance parallel, yet heterogeneous, to the historical manifestation of
governmentality. At the same time, as I will demonstrate throughout this chapter, the
notion of “critique” functions in Foucault’s thought as an internal methodological
framework that binds together the larger trajectory of his collected works in relation to
the question of resistance. With these two ideas in mind, this chapter argues that within
the critical and methodological approaches to the fundamental reanalysis of power and
genealogical approach to the history of politics and governmentality, Foucault begins to
develop and posit an anarchist theory of the political through the concept of “critique”
that turns upon the question of resistance instead of the paradigm of government, and as
such allows for a critical transcendence of the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms.

3.1

Anarchaeology: Foucault’s Critical Anarchist Methodology

Let us, therefore, start with an outline of an anarchistic methodology…
--Paul Feyerabend525
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Before attending to an analysis of the concept of “critique,” it is first necessary to briefly
outline a preliminary connection between anarchism and Foucault’s methodology that
will act as the turning point from which to stage a fundamental intersection between the
concept of “critique” and the politics of resistance. In terms of his methodological
approach to the study of the political, what Foucault shares with anarchism is the refusal
to presuppose the primacy of government or sovereign power as the principle from which
to either understand the question of power or to read the history of politics. This is why
Foucault famously criticizes the history of political theory insofar as it “has never had
another system of representation, of formulation, and of analysis of power than that of the
law, the system of law.”526 At stake here for Foucault is the idea that the state and
sovereign power can no longer act as the theoretical framework for a critical analysis of
power and the activity of politics. Thus, as Foucault maintains in the January fourteenth
lecture from Society Must Be Defended, “[w]e have to study power outside of the model
of Leviathan, outside the field delineated by juridical sovereignty and the institution of
the state.”527 Since the mid 1970s, many of Foucault’s major texts, interviews and
lectures are critical responses to this conceptual impasse. In studying the question of
politics and the analysis of power against its basis in the juridical form of state sovereign
power, Foucault highlights an important way to detach ourselves from the traditional
discourses that locate the question of politics within the domain of the state—that is, like
many anarchists Foucault attempts to rethink the political at the horizon of the state and
the paradigm of government, and as such reveals a form of politics that is genuinely
without an archē.
As we will see, while Foucault begins to rethink an alternative basis for political
theory irreducible to both government and sovereignty, what is particularly significant is
the specific correspondence he develops between the attempt to affirm an anarchic
politics that does not culminate in the practice of government and the historico-political
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question of resistance. In other words, the essential thrust of Foucault’s project is that the
search for a politics irreducible to governmentality cannot be divorced from the critical
question of resistance, and yet, precisely because of this, what is required by Foucault is a
new political methodology that takes resistance as its constituent component. Indeed,
insofar as the “set of force relations” as Foucault suggests “constitutes the domain of the
political” what must be fundamentally rethought is the way in which these force relations
necessarily include resistance as a central, although historically neglected, feature of
politics.528 This is why in his study of Foucault, Deleuze specifically traces how power
relations are to be necessarily paired with the concept of resistance. In Foucault, Deleuze
therefore writes:
There is no diagram (of power) that does not also include, besides the points
which it connects up, certain relatively free or unbound points, points of
creativity, change and resistance, and it is perhaps with these that we ought to
begin in order to understand the whole picture.529
At stake for Deleuze is how the notion of resistance at once acts as the precondition of
relations of power in Foucault, as well as how this analytic of power begins with a theory
of resistance as its divisive focal point. Indeed, one of the points Foucault consistently
emphasizes throughout his work is that his methodological approach to the study of
politics and the political is not simply to be understood in terms of an alternative analytic
of power, but rather as a critical theory that begins with the question of resistance as the
primary focal point from which the questions of power and politics can be rethought.530
In this regard, it is my contention that this reconceptualization of the political from the
perspective of resistance reveals a unique alliance between Foucault’s thought and
anarchist political theory. Thus, although Foucault often took pride in remaining
politically unclassifiable,531 and while he does often characterize his thought in relation to
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certain problematics located within specific philosophical and political traditions as much
as he often seeks to disqualify and overturn others, I want to suggest that Foucault’s work
not only develops an internal solidarity with anarchism through his theory of resistance,
but also that anarchism marks the critical threshold from which to locate the political
possibilities offered in his study of the politics of resistance as such.
Although Foucault often draws upon examples from anarchist movements as
historical support for his unique approach to the studies of power, politics and
governmentality, it is my contention that a preliminary outline between Foucault and the
history of anarchist thought can first be made in terms of a critical methodology that
takes a theory of resistance as the primary focal point required for a critical inquiry into
the questions of power and politics. Perhaps the most unique and direct way Foucault
formulates an affinity with anarchism in this manner arises in On the Government of the
Living when he coins the neologism “anarchaeology” rather than “archaeology” to
describe his general methodology and approach to the analytics of governmentality and
politics.532 As outlined in extensive detail in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault
uses the term “archaeology” to describe the ways in which his general research method is
characterized by the suspension of established discourses for thinking about history and
the presupposition that the typical conventions for thinking about history of ideas as such
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should also be subject to archaeological analysis.533 For Foucault, “archaeology” shifts
the critical objective of historical analysis away from what has been done in the histories
of systems of thought to the set of conditions, or “discursive formations” enabling certain
practices to emerge in history as such.534 While maintaining this critical gesture
“anarchaeology,” in contrast, differs from the former term insofar as it is a philosophical
attitude or way of being, distinguished from skepticism, that begins with “the nonnecessity of all power of whatever kind.”535 Similar to his archaeological method, then,
by beginning with the “non-necessity of power,” what Foucault refers to as
“anarchaeology” can be understood as designating a critical methodology that suspends
the established conventions for thinking about politics and the political. An
anarchaeological understanding of the history of politics as such cannot therefore begin
by presupposing a theory of power as the principle that gives the political its form.
In coining the term “anarchaeology,” Foucault draws inspiration from Paul
Feyerabend’s 1975 text Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge in
which the author argues for an epistemological or “theoretical anarchism” that acts as the
basic methodological approach to both “epistemology and the philosophy of science.”536
While Foucault’s focus is not on the problem of knowledge and epistemology, but rather
on the questions of power and politics we might, following the subtitle of Feyerabend’s
text, suggest that what Foucault develops under the term “anarchaeology” can better be
understood as forming the basic outline for an anarchist theory of politics and the
political. Yet, given that Foucault’s work in Discipline and Punish and The History of
Sexuality is generally understood by scholars as turning upon the very question and
historical analysis of “power,” his statement in 1980 regarding the “non-necessity of
power” appears at odds with the general thematic focus of several of his works. Yet, by
taking “the non-necessity of power as a principle of intelligibility” of politics, Foucault
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not only radically reframes the study of politics from a perspective that invokes
anarchism as a hidden conceptual framework, but also offers a new way to read the
problematic of resistance as the conceptual key to fully understanding what is at stake in
a critical analytic of power and politics.537 Anticipating that his audience will claim that
any political methodology beginning with a “non-necessity of power” necessarily invokes
the concept of “anarchy,” or “anarchism,” Foucault quickly responds by affirming a
possible relation between anarchism and his own methodological approach to the study of
political theory.538 Against his potential interlocutors, Foucault maintains that: “I don’t
see why the words ‘anarchy’ and ‘anarchism’ are so pejorative that the mere fact of
employing them counts as triumphant discourse.”539 In other words, rather than
immediately discounting anarchism, Foucault instead refuses to exclude a possible
connection between the political implications of his work and anarchist theory. With the
term “anarchaeology,” then, Foucault importantly refuses to reduce the questions of
“anarchy” or “anarchism” to the pejorative sense given to the terms by most theorists,
and in doing so begins to provide a rare insight into the affinity he draws between
anarchism and his own thought.
After affirming a critical conception of “anarchy” (albeit hesitantly) as the basis
of his own methodology, Foucault further elaborates what he means to suggest by
invoking the term “anarchaeology.” 540 With the method of “anarchaeology” Foucault’s
first point is to demonstrate that it is not of matter of putting “non-power” or the “nonacceptability of power” at “the end of the enterprise, but rather at the beginning of the
work, in the form of questioning all of the ways that power is in fact accepted.”541 Rather
than presupposing the primacy of the state, sovereignty, and political power as the grid
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from which to read the history of politics and political theory, Foucault argues instead for
a critical framework which begins with the “non-acceptability of power” as the “principle
of intelligibility” of a historical knowledge of politics.542 In other words,
“anarchaeology” designates a critical methodology from which the political can be
rethought anarchically. Furthermore, instead of beginning with an a priori conception of
power, Foucault instead argues that “[p]ower has no intrinsic legitimacy” and, as such,
that it cannot therefore function as the historical condition of possibility for the
emergence of the political.543 Foucault’s point here is that one cannot fully understand
the history of politics simply by assuming the primacy of power over other determining
factors. In other words, “anarchaeology” in this sense designates a strategic refusal to
presuppose a theory of power in any form other than its own fundamental contingency.
Second, Foucault maintains that “anarchaeology” does not begin with the thesis
that “all power is bad, but instead from the point that no power whatsoever is acceptable
by right and absolutely and definitely inevitable.”544 Here, Foucault’s claim is that a
historical knowledge of politics cannot begin with the a priori assumption that there must
always be something akin to an inevitable, essential and acceptable form of power from
which a historical knowledge of politics is made possible. In other words, it is not a
theory of power, according to Foucault, that designates the principle of intelligibility for
politics, but instead a position that begins from the opposite hypothesis, an opposing
theory whereby an ongoing struggle with power signifies the principle from which to
reread the history of political theory from the perspective of resistance. Finally, whereas
Foucault is often criticized for the way in which his theory of power overrides the
possibility of resistance and denies the possibility of agency,545 “anarchaeology” begins
with the idea that “[i]t is the movement of freeing oneself from power,” and not that of
subjection to power, “that should serve as the revealer in the transformations of the
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subject.”546 In this final instance, “anarchaeology” reveals a real political possibility for
Foucault; rather than a theory of politics that traces subjection to the varying practices of
power, Foucault suggests to the contrary that it is through a study of resistance, or a
critical inquiry into the “movement of freeing oneself from power,” that we should direct
our gaze in order to understand what is ultimately at stake in the questions of power and
politics. With these positions acting as the basic methodological approach to Foucault’s
study of politics and the problem of governmentality, it is clear that Foucault directly
draws a rare parallel between his own thought, methodology, and the political theory of
anarchism. Indeed, given that Foucault often refuses to affiliate his work with any
specific political positions, the way in which he aligns his thought with anarchism he
should not be overlooked by his readers. As Foucault comments in On the Government
of the Living:
You can see therefore that there is certainly some kind of relation between what is
roughly called anarchy or anarchism and the methods I employ…in other words
the position I adopt does not absolutely exclude anarchy—after all, once again,
why would anarchy be so condemnable? Maybe it is automatically condemned
only by those who assume that there must always, inevitably, essentially be
something like acceptable power. So the position I am proposing does not
exclude anarchy.547
Although we have seen how Foucault’s critics often invoke the concept of “anarchism” in
the pejorative sense to point toward what they find as certain fundamental weaknesses in
his thought, Foucault self-affirms this alliance.548 In addition to affirming anarchy as the
basic methodological framework employed in his analytics of power and politics, he also
points toward the way in which the concept of “anarchy” has been historically denounced
by political theorists. Indeed “anarchy,” as Foucault suggests above, is most commonly
condemned by those philosophers who presuppose the inevitability and acceptability of
power as the proper characteristic inherent to the field of the political. Foucault,
however, denies this presupposition and maintains that his own position cannot therefore
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exclude the possibility of anarchy inasmuch as it begins with the “non-necessity of
power.” By affirming the place of “anarchy” within his own work, Foucault significantly
begins with a critical position that offers a preliminary to transcend the Aristotelian and
Schmittian paradigms of the political, thus providing a preliminary basis of an anarchist
theory of politics. As Foucault importantly suggests, then:
The approach [of anarchaeology] consists in wondering…what of the subject and
relations of knowledge do we dispense with when we consider no power to be
founded either by right or necessity, that all power only rests on the contingency
and fragility of a history, that the social contract is a bluff…and that there is no
universal, immediate, and obvious right that can everywhere and always support
any kind of relation of power.549
Here Foucault provides a preliminary outline of an alternative way to study the history of
political theory and the coinciding problem of politics from the perspective of anarchy.
Rather than beginning with an analysis of power as the key term from which to
understand the political, Foucault argues that he wants to begin on the “opposite track”
which, in taking the non-necessity of power as the starting point of his political theory,
transcends the orthodox paradigms of political theory.550 It is this “non-necessity” of
power that acts as the beginning point from which Foucault begins to posit what I will
refer to throughout this chapter as an anarchist hypothesis of the political—a hypothesis
that at once rethinks the domain of the political at the limit of the governmentalization of
the state, and in doing so, requires a specific engagement with the question of resistance.
Although in On the Government of the Living Foucault draws clear connections
between his work and anarchist thought, given the way in which the term
“anarchaeology” makes a limited appearance in his collected thought it would
nevertheless be difficult to trace Foucault’s philosophical lineage immediately to
anarchism simply through this term alone, without directly ignoring or bracketing the
larger critical and philosophical tradition from within which he works. Thus, in order to
pinpoint and highlight what I have just outlined as a preliminary alliance between
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Foucault and anarchist thought based upon his own methodological approach to the
questions of power and politics, I argue that this critical framework invoked in 1980 as
the method of “anarchaeology” is further developed and finds its articulation between the
lectures “What is Critique?” and “What is Enlightenment?” wherein Foucault attributes
the possibility of a new theory of the political beginning with the non-necessity of power
to a reactivation of the concept of “critique.” Indeed, as we will see the concept of
“critique” bears strikingly similar qualities to the notion of “anarchaeology” and, as such,
marks an important way from which to locate Foucault’s thought within the anarchist
tradition. In outlining what I find to be a key component of Foucault’s thought, what is
crucial in regard to these two lectures is the way in which Foucault provides a rare selfreflexive analysis of the critical arc of his collected works in relation to the problematic
of resistance, while at the same time situating his thought amongst a central political and
philosophical tradition that invokes a rethinking of anarchism as the basis from which a
new theory of the political might arise. As we will see, what Foucault elaborates under
the notion of “critique” is best exemplified in a position that begins at the intersection
between the “non-acceptability of power” and the counter-historical movements of
resistance parallel to the history of governmentality.
What is at stake, therefore, in formulating a critical link between an anarchist
hypothesis of the political and Foucault’s lectures “What is Critique?” and “What is
Enlightenment?” is neither to ascribe a political identity to Foucault, nor to classify what
is often intentionally unclassifiable. Instead, rather, what is at stake arises in the way in
which what Foucault outlines in these lectures as “critique,” invokes, contributes to, and
even forms an alliance with the history of anarchist theory, while at the same time
helping to introduce and centralize the concept of resistance to the whole of his thought.
Against, then, certain critics such as Senellart551 who deny any real connection between
Foucault’s methodology and anarchism, it is my contention that such a connection is
indeed elaborated between the two lectures “What is Critique?” and “What is
Enlightenment?” Taking note of the importance of both these texts, I argue that the
framework Foucault adapts from the critical tradition of Kant and the Enlightenment
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begins to posit an anarchist hypothesis of the political that can account for the question of
resistance amongst its dynamic. Focusing, then, on the ways in which the notion of
“critique”—like the concept of “anarchaeology”—is vital to the ways in which Foucault
hopes to rethink the history of the political from a radically new perspective, the overall
goal in what follows is twofold: to first reveal the ways in which Foucault’s thought
formulates a radically new methodological approach to the study of the political that
elevates the notion of resistance as the vital component of the being-political of politics,
while at the same time demonstrating how resistance functions, for Foucault, as the
critical axis upon which his collected works turn. In this regard, rather than
superimposing a pre-existing school of thought or grafting a philosophy of anarchism
upon Foucault’s work, it is instead better to attend to the way in which he directly locates
his general trajectory within a specific critical tradition, and then to show how this critical
tradition of resistance forms the basis from which an anarchist hypothesis of the political
can be elaborated.

3.2 Essays in Refusal: Critique and the Struggle Against
Authority
Critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, “this, then, is what
needs to be done.” It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and
refuse what is. Its use should be in the processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in
refusal. It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage in programming.
It is a challenge to what is.552
After all, we are all members of the community of the governed, and thereby obliged to
show mutual solidarity…The suffering of men must never be a silent residue of
policy…The will of individuals must make a place for itself in a reality of which
governments have attempted to reserve a monopoly for themselves, that monopoly which
we need to wrest from them little by little and day by day.553
--Michel Foucault
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In the opening epigraph above, Foucault offers a preliminary definition of the concept of
“critique” and highlights its divisive characteristics. Being critical, according to
Foucault, is not a prescriptive form of philosophical thinking, but instead an instrument
of resistance, a strategic confrontation with and “challenge to what is;” being critical as
such is none other than the elaboration of “essays in refusal.” Indeed, it is my contention
that Foucault’s work as a whole should be understood as a collection of texts written
within the context of these “essays in refusal.” Yet, in order to understand the
significance of the concept of “critique” as it is developed in Foucault’s thought it is
necessary to turn toward the philosophical tradition from which his use of the term is
most extensively developed. In each of the texts where Foucault most directly engages
with the concept of “critique,” he invokes the figure of philosopher, Immanuel Kant, as
the genesis of a larger critical tradition from which Foucault self-reflexively views his
own work as participating. Indeed, although writing pseudonymously for entry on his
own work in the Dictionnaire des Philosophes, Foucault identifies and situates his work
in relation to a larger philosophical framework of “critique” as it develops out of Kant
and the critical tradition of the Enlightenment. 554 Thus, in Foucault’s entry to the second
edition of the Dictionnaire des Philosophes, he maintains the following: “[t]o the extent
that Foucault fits into the philosophical tradition, it is the critical tradition of Kant.”555
While posing Foucault’s philosophical thought in relation to Kant might appear
“ambivalent” to some, it has also been noted that “[a]side perhaps from Nietzsche, Kant
figures more prominently that any other philosopher” in Foucault’s thought.556 Although
his reading of Kant is often contested by orthodox philosophers, Kant’s importance to
Foucault cannot be underestimated, and the use of Kant as a key referent stretches the
entirety of Foucault’s career.557 As Foucault writes in a lecture delivered at Stanford
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University in 1979, the importance of Kant in relation to his thought and methodology
can be understood in two primary manners. “Since Kant,” Foucault writes:
the role of philosophy has been to prevent reason from going beyond the limits of
what is given in experience; but from the same moment—that is, from the
development of modern states and political management of society—the role of
philosophy has also been to keep watch over the excessive powers of political
rationality.558
While Dreyfus and Rabinow observe how “Foucault reinterprets Kant’s linking of the
historical moment, critical reason, and society as a challenge to develop a radically new
version of what it means to lead a philosophical life,” in the passage above Foucault also
makes it clear that his interest in Kant also appears in regard to a political register.559
Given that both Kant’s original publication and Foucault’s 1984 lecture share
similar titles, it is clear that Foucault hopes to frame and situate his own thought in
relation to the same critical tradition in which this problematic arises. 560 Indeed, as Marc
Djaballah notes, the critical tradition beginning with Kant’s essay on the enlightenment
designates Foucault’s “most direct point of reference” for the development of his own
theory of “critique.”561 Regardless of the influence Kant had on Foucault’s work as a
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philosopher, he nevertheless does not identify as a Kantian—that is, Foucault does not
view his work as a continuation of Kant’s project. Instead, rather, Foucault claims that
his work, insofar as it pertains to the tradition of philosophy, participates in the critical
tradition arising out of Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment. It is this critical tradition, and
not an orthodox reading of Kant’s texts, from which Foucault begins rethink the question
of politics through the concept of “critique.” Thus, while Dreyfus and Rabinow
demonstrate that Foucault’s relation to Kant helped to reshape the basis of his
philosophical thought, the relation of Kant to Foucault additionally helps to develop a
radically new way to engage with the history of political thought and the problematic of
governmentality. For John Ransom, then, “[w]hat Foucault gives us” through the
concept of critique “is a different way of looking at and responding to the myriad ways of
being governed that surround us—in short, a new depiction of the political world.”562 At
stake in Ransom’s reading of Foucault’s relation to Kant, however, is more specifically
how Foucault begins to rethink the notion of “critique” within the context of his own
studies of power and governmentality. For Djaballah, then, the continuity between Kant
and Foucault more correctly arises in the way that the latter politicizes the former: “[t]he
attitude defined by Kant as that of enlightenment is a theoretical formulation of the
attitude of being critical that Foucault identifies in the context of the political arts of
governing.”563 Yet, in tracing the political development of Foucault’s use of the term
“critique,” Djaballah reveals how the notion of “critique” comes to exemplify what
Foucault theorizes in terms of the politics of resistance.564 While Djaballah is correct to
locate the concept of “critique” as a potential historical source of Foucault’s theory of
resistance, it is my contention that this relation between “critique” and resistance is first
elaborated in terms of a philosophical problematization of the question of authority and,
more fundamentally, that this struggle against authority reveals an alternative foundation
in philosophy and political theory from which the structure of the political and the
question of politics is rethought by Foucault anarchically.
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In the 1984 lecture, Foucault situates his study of “critique” within the context of
the philosopher’s struggle against the condition of authority. In this regard, Foucault first
emphasizes how Kant defines the Enlightenment as the critical process by which
humanity might come to leave its state of minority.565 In other words, the essay is framed
in terms of a critical theory of emancipation; it is this potential condition of emancipation
that Foucault’s locates at the basis of the concept of “critique.” According to Foucault,
then, Kant’s understanding of the Enlightenment does not refer to a specific historical
era, but is instead conceived “in an almost entirely negative way…an exit, a way out.”566
Taking the general problematic regarding the possibility of attaining a “way out” from
one’s “state of minority,” in the 1984 lecture, Foucault outlines three distinctive
characteristics of Kant’s project which form the basis of his analysis of “critique” and its
relation to the question of authority. First, the minoritorian condition in which humanity
is maintained refers to a “certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else’s
authority;”567 second, in relation to the problem of authority, this minoritorian condition
is further characterized by the incapacity to use one’s own reasoning without the
guidance of others;568 finally, this incapacity to use one’s own reason designates the
simultaneity between an excess of authority and a lack of “courage” to use one’s own
reason without the guidance of others.569 Following these three general problematics—
which all focus around the problem of authority for Foucault—the 1984 lecture begins by
emphasizing the relation between Kant’s brief essay and the three Critiques. For
Foucault, what is crucial in outlining the connection between Kant’s minor essay and his
major works is the way in which Kant describes the Enlightenment as the moment when
humanity puts its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any form of authority.
As Foucault begins to argue here, the notion of “critique” develops as a way to rethink
the politico-philosophical problem of authority and obedience. In other words, the
concept of “critique” is initially posed by Foucault within the context of a position of
philosophical anti-authoritarianism. It is through the development of the notion of
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“critique” and the coinciding problematic of authority that Kant’s text, Foucault argues,
can be read as marking out a “discreet entrance into the history of thought of a question
that modern philosophy has not been capable of answering.”570 In other words, what is at
stake for Foucault is that the basic goal of critical philosophy is to think through the
question of authority in its specificity. If, therefore, as Foucault claims that “modern
philosophy is the philosophy that is attempting to answer the question of the
Enlightenment,” and furthermore that the “Enlightenment is the age of the critique,” then
philosophy’s relation to the concept of “critique” emerges as a fundamental confrontation
with the question of authority.571
In Foucault’s reading of Kant, the Enlightenment is therefore not understood in
terms of a historical era lasting from the mid seventeenth century until the end of the
eighteenth framed by a rationalist-humanist discourse, but an ongoing and continuous
process in which “philosophical thought” begins to critically “reflect on its own
present.”572 Indeed, this is what Foucault holds to be the crucial philosophical change
insinuated in Kant’s work. As Foucault writes in The Government of Self and Others,
with Kant’s “text a new type of question appears in the field of philosophical
reflection…the question of the present, of present reality.”573 Yet this philosophical
reflection regarding one’s own historical situation is additionally coupled with the
problem of authority for Foucault. Foucault writes: “[i]t seems to me that the question of
modernity arose with the question of what authority was to be accepted.” 574 Similar to
the method of “anarchaeology,” the concept of “critique” takes the non-acceptability of
authority as its starting point. It is precisely within the context this critical tradition—
which at once changes the focus of philosophy to a critical engagement with the
intersection between one’s own present conditions and the problematic of authority—in
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which Foucault attempts to redevelop the concept of “critique” as the basis of his own
approach to the study of philosophy. As Foucault further maintains in the 1984 lecture:
“the thread that may connect us to the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal
elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical
ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.”575
Consequently, this critical relation to one’s own present condition arises, for Foucault,
with a struggle against authority, or a new critical attitude that resists the problem of
excessive authority. By invoking drawing an explicit connection between critique and
the reactivation of a permanent critical attitude, or ethos, Foucault seeks to describe the
problematic of the Enlightenment in terms of the development of a new critical ethics
which takes as its turning point the problem of authority and obedience. Thus, in the
second section of “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault outlines three features distinctive
to the historical development of “critique,” all of which ultimately turn upon elaboration
of an anti-authoritarian ethos.
First by “critical attitude” Foucault means to suggest a specific “mode of relating
to contemporary reality,” whereby the attitude of critique constitutes a specific relation to
one’s own present conditions.576 Here “critique” is a state of philosophical reflection that
renders one’s own historical conditions visible as such. Second, this critical attitude is,
according to Foucault, “a voluntary choice made by certain people”—that is, “critique”
contrasts a position of voluntary agency against Étienne De La Boétie’s notion of
“voluntary servitude.”577 Third, the critical attitude is “a way of thinking and feeling”
about one’s own historical situation, and thus a “way of acting and behaving that at one
and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task.”578
Inasmuch as Foucault self-identifies his thought within this critical tradition, the larger
trajectory of his works must be understood in relation to the ongoing and “permanent
critique of our historical era” made possible in the reactivation of an anti-authoritarian
attitude and ethos of existence Foucault calls “critique.” Yet while Foucault seeks to
locate the trajectory of his work within the critical tradition of the Enlightenment, what is
575
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absolutely essential is that the reactivation of the critical attitude itself develops in
relation to an ongoing struggle with the problem of authority, in which the turn toward
ethical transformation must be understood on the cusp of the problematic of authority and
the governing of others. Indeed, it is against the problematic of authority that Foucault
both begins to develop his use of the notion of “critique” while at the same time utilizing
the tradition of this critical attitude as the anchoring point from which to locate the
general problematic of resistance as it develops in his thought.
With the concept of “critique,” we have seen how Foucault introduces the
problematic of the Enlightenment through Kant in order to outline what he holds to be the
key challenge and coinciding critical task for philosophy. Yet Foucault radicalizes Kant’s
thought in order to demonstrate that the key problem philosophy has been incapable of
solving are the problematics of authority and political obedience. In its critical reflection
on one’s present conditions, philosophy, for Foucault, begins in the struggle against the
general problem of authority. In other words, at the moment when philosophical thought
begins to critically reflect on its own present, the problem of authority is made visible, and
it is this fundamental struggle with the question of authority is what Foucault labels as the
basic task of philosophy. In his unorthodox reading of Kant, Foucault argues that the key
philosophical problematic developed out of the Enlightenment ought to therefore be
understood as a “modification of the pre-existing relation linking will, authority, and the
use of reason.”579 In response to Kant’s essay, then, Foucault asserts the claim that what a
philosophical engagement with the problematic of the Enlightenment offers, is a radical
reflection on our current situation—or what he refers to as a “permanent critique of our
historical era” in which the task of philosophy appears as an ongoing modification of the
present through the struggle with relations of authority.
It is within this philosophical and critical tradition involved in a permanent critique
of the present that Foucault (albeit late in his career) outlines as the basic analytic and
methodological framework for his thought that begins to align his thought with anarchism.
To be sure, although Foucault’s major works and their respective thematics might appear
as fundamentally disparate to some of his harsher critics, they can all be seen as
participating in and elaborating a perpetual critique of our historical era. Yet, at the same
579

Ibid, 35.

201

time, the thread that connects Foucault’s thought and work to the critical tradition of the
Enlightenment is not simply a retheorization of philosophy’s relationship to the present,
but the “reactivation of an attitude,” or, “philosophical ethos” that develops as a
“permanent critique” of authority.580 In other words, a critical reflection on one’s own
present, necessitates for Foucault an ongoing critique of authority and a coinciding social
ontology of critique as the condition of possibility for critical philosophy as such. By
analyzing the problem of the Enlightenment in terms of an ongoing relation to one’s
present, Foucault’s central claim is that Kant reactivates the concept of “critique”—
characterized here as both attitude and ethos—under which the very task of philosophy
changes and begins to turn upon a radical critique of authority. In its most preliminary
form, it is through the introduction of the concept of “critique” into his thought that
Foucault begins to radically rework the philosophical framework from which to understand
the structure of the political and the history of politics. If the history of philosophy, as
Foucault suggests in this lecture, has traditionally been incapable of overcoming the
problem of authority, then what he takes as the very basis of his critical thought additionally
helps to point toward an alternative philosophical position from which to understand the
domain of the political. The force relations that constitute the domain of the political
cannot simply be reduced to the questions which presuppose the necessity of authority—
of the archē—as the principle from which politics emerges. Instead, rather, Foucault
argues that there is a corresponding critical attitude that resists the manifestation of
authority, and it is the very possibility of this critical attitude of resistance that indicates a
new analytic framework for the study of the political.
For Foucault, then, the problem of the Enlightenment—which, is defined as the
key problem for philosophy—is therefore posed “in relation to a certain minority
condition in which humanity was maintained and maintained in an authoritative way.”581
The basic philosophical problem—indeed its most fundamental question—according to
Foucault, is to critique not simply the basis of authority, but its multifarious and continual
manifestation, and to challenge the subordinate position in which a “minority” is
maintained. In the first lecture from The Government of Self and Others, Foucault
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extensively focuses on the problem of “tutelage” or minoritorian condition.582 Through a
critical reflection on what Kant means by a state of tutelage, Foucault argues that the
minoritorian state is not defined as a condition in which individuals are forcibly deprived
of their “means and possibilities of autonomy.”583 Instead, rather, the minoritorian
condition is brought about through a voluntary dependence on authority. Foucault thus
writes:
If men are in this condition of tutelage, if they are subject to the direction of
others, it is not because these others have seized power, or that it has been handed
over to them in an essential, founding and instituting act…it is because men are
unable or do not wish to conduct themselves, and others have obligingly come
forward to conduct them.584
This condition of tutelage is itself a condition of governmentality—that is, the problem of
tutelage for Foucault is characterized by a “vitiated relationship between government of
self and government of others.”585 Yet what is at stake, is that the critical attitude that
develops from the Enlightenment is set to modify this problem of government; the task of
the Enlightenment is according to Foucault “precisely to redistribute the relationships
between government of self and government of others.”586 As Foucault suggests in the
1983 lecture the very position and critical function of the notion of “critique” is faced
with the task of leaving the condition of tutelage through the reactivation of a “critical
attitude” that arises historically in terms of an ongoing struggle with the problem of
authority and government. Thus, for Foucault the task inherent in the philosophy of the
Enlightenment is to exit from one’s minoritorian position through the exercise of critical
activity. As we will see in the analysis of the 1978 lecture, Foucault contributes to this
problem by inscribing the practice of resistance into the very basis of “critique”—that is,
resistance is what makes possible the critical exiting from one’s condition of tutelage.
In this regard, Judith Butler has drawn an important connection between the
discovery of the critical attitude and the question of resistance in Foucault’s thought. As
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Butler importantly remarks “resistance to authority…constitutes the hallmark of the
Enlightenment for Foucault.”587 Here Butler importantly points toward a direct
connection between what Foucault analyses through “critique” and the question of
resistance. Inasmuch as the concept of “critique” marks the critical axis from which to
understand the breadth of his work, then this concept cannot itself be separated from the
concept of resistance; “critique” is fundamentally an extended discussion of the problem
of resistance in Foucault’s thought. Since, as we have seen, that Foucault directly
situates his work within the critical tradition of the Enlightenment, what Butler points to
here is of vital importance for uncovering two preliminary ways in which we can begin to
point toward the ways in which Foucault’s thought begins to develop and turn upon an
anarchist hypothesis of the political. First, the critical tradition of the Enlightenment is
fundamentally characterized and marked, according to Foucault, by resistance to
authority; this is, according to Foucault, the founding act of critical philosophy as it
develops out of the Enlightenment itself arises as a condition of resistance. In this way,
insofar as Foucault’s work can be seen as reactivating the tradition of the Enlightenment
as the very basic framework for his thought, he additionally establishes the concept of
resistance as the central basis from which the critical tradition of the Enlightenment
might continue. Through the development of the notion of “critique,” Foucault thus
inscribes resistance into the very basic framework for his philosophical thought.
Additionally, at the same time as resistance constitutes the hallmark of Foucault’s work,
resistance to authority also establishes the way in which Foucault begins to rethink the
question of politics in a radically new way. Insofar as the Enlightenment is what is
counter-posed to, and continuously resists, the problem of authority, what Foucault
therefore outlines and centralizes to the trajectory of his work in terms of a radical and
permanent critique of ourselves begins with an anti-authoritarian ethic that radically
begins to reframe the position of philosophy and the domain of the political from the
perspective of resistance. Taken together, the above two points invoke a preliminary, yet
conceptually vital, relation between Foucault’s philosophical project and the history of
anarchism through the reactivation of the critical attitude of the Enlightenment.
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Although there is no single locus for the historical origin of anarchism, several
anarchist historians have pointed toward the way in which, as both movement and
philosophy, anarchism derives “directly from the ideas of the eighteenth century
Enlightenment.”588 While anarchism might be seen as developing, at least in part,
through a relation with the ideas of the Enlightenment, the way in which Foucault poses
the Enlightenment not as a doctrine, but as a continual anti-authoritarian critique of the
present, reinvigorates the relation between anarchism and the Enlightenment, and
likewise the relation between anarchism and Foucault in a way that anticipates current
debates in political theory, while at the same time centralizing the concept of resistance to
his project. In other words, both Foucault and anarchists take the critique of authority as
the basis from which critical philosophy begins. In this way, as anarchist philosopher
Paul McLaughlin argues in a position similar to Foucault, that anarchism ought to be
defined “in relation to the fundamental ethico-political problem of authority.”589
Crucially, for McLaughlin, “anarchists” both “take as their starting point the open
question of authority,” while alongside the “philosophes, they assert their right to raise
this question” (original emphasis).590 In asserting that anarchism takes, at its very basis, a
fundamental critique of authority, and that this very critique is what helps to form an
alliance between anarchism and the history of critical philosophy, what McLaughlin
points to here as a key component of philosophical anarchism, also uncovers a key link
between anarchism and Foucault’s general project through the notion of critique.
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With the notion of “critique” acting as the basic philosophical framework that
underpins his thought, Foucault invokes the history of anarchism not as a fundamental
foundation, but as an alternative methodology for the rethinking the perspective of
philosophy and the domain of the political from the point of view of resistance and an
open questioning of authority. Thus, as we will see in the following section, while
several theorists deny the connection between Foucault’s thought and anarchism, the way
he shapes an anti-authoritarian critique into the basis of his philosophical approach to the
question of politics invokes and continues the tradition of anarchist thought by building
its most basic tenet into the core of his work. This, then, is the first way in which we can
begin to understand the ways in which Foucault’s methodology begins to develop and
posit I refer as the anarchist hypothesis of the political. Rather than beginning, as
traditional philosophers often do, with the archē as the historical a priori or transcendental
condition of possibility for thinking through the terms of the political and the social
context of politics, Foucault suggests instead an alternative possibility beginning with
what he begins to develop under the heading of “critique.” As an instrument for those
who “fight,” “resist,” and “refuse what is,” the very task of the critical attitude takes as
its starting point an irreducible critique of authority—that is, critical philosophy, for
Foucault, is none other than the elaboration of “essays in refusal” beginning from the
position of autonomy rather than the first principle of the archē; critique, as such, is the
philosophical position that begins with a fundamental “challenge to what is.”591
With the notion of “critique” acting as the general structure for the philosophical
tradition in which Foucault participates, what I point toward here as the key connection
between Foucault and the anarchist tradition in terms of an ongoing struggle with the
problem of authority, also informs the analytic framework from which Foucault’s oeuvre
might be reread. It is in this way that postanarchist Todd May demonstrates how the
alleged elusiveness of Foucault’s thought might be attenuated if it can be tied to a “single
question” which appears and finds its elaboration around the intersection between
“critique” and the Enlightenment.592 For May, the most basic philosophical question—
the question regarding “who we are?” is the guiding thread of Foucault’s work, and is
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thus “never far from the surface of any of his works.”593 May points out that the critical
question that asks “who we are?” finds its elaboration in the celebrated lecture from 1984
when Foucault begins to explain the task of philosophy and his work in relation to what
he refers to as the “critical ontology of ourselves.”594 Indeed, in an interview from 1977
Foucault argues that “philosophy’s question…is the question as to what we ourselves
are.”595 If as May suggests, that the “critical ontology of ourselves” marks the principal
guiding thread of Foucault’s general project, then we can additionally point toward the
ways in which the notion of “critique” and its coinciding anti-authoritarian ethic traverses
Foucault’s work as well. At the same time, however, the critical reflection on who we
ourselves are necessitates, for Foucault, a coinciding political dimension of critique that
can ultimately never be divorced from the permanent critique of authority. Precisely
because the task of philosophy takes as its starting point the irreducible critique of
authority, this is why Foucault argues that “contemporary philosophy is entirely political
and historical.”596 It is in posing a critical relation between the historical question
regarding who we are and the anti-authoritarian ethic of “critique” that we can begin to
develop a stronger connecting thread between the different periods of Foucault’s thought.
Nonetheless, what is at stake for Foucault is that the philosophical dimension of critique
consequently requires a direct engagement with the study of the political, and as such,
what can be identified as the guiding thread of Foucault’s thought under analytic
framework of the “critical ontology of ourselves,” turns upon both the philosophical and
political axes of critique.
Paying close attention to the interplay between the philosophical and political
dimensions of critique, Foucault suggests in “What is Enlightenment?” that what can be
understood as “the critical ontology of ourselves” is not essential foundation, but rather
an anti-authoritarian “attitude or, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of
what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”597 Thus,
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whereas May argues that Foucault’s thought can be understood in relation to the question
pertaining to who we are, this question always turns upon, according to Foucault, another
coinciding problem regarding the possibility of becoming otherwise, or a radical
transformation in one’s own condition of subjectivity. In this way, the ethos, or “critical
attitude” Foucault seeks to reactivate through Kant and the Enlightenment turns upon
both negation and affirmation. As Foucault outlines in the 1984 lecture, the critical
ontology of ourselves implies a theory of negation culminating in the affirmation of a
possible political transformation. “Critique” first implies a “refusal” of what Foucault
refers to as the “blackmail of the Enlightenment,” wherein “one has to refuse everything
that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian manner.”598
Secondly, such an analytic framework for Foucault, “has to avoid the always facile
confusions between humanism and Enlightenment,” and thus the task is not to posit an
essential humanist foundation that gives rise to the “critical attitude,” but rather to
“imagine it [the current historical situation] otherwise than it is, and to transform it.”599
With the development of this “critical attitude” Foucault does not invoke a premodern or
essential foundation from which the critique of authority arises; instead, rather, the
critique of authority is directed at and takes place at the limits imposed on us in order to
transform them. Crucially, then, in a similar manner to the way in which resistance to
authority underpins what Foucault identifies as the task of philosophical critique, the
analysis of the authoritarian limits imposed on us is significantly paired with the
affirmative possibility of political transformation.
Thus, for Foucault, the radical critique of authority is not simply a pure move of
negation, but that which, in its negation of authority, leads to and culminates in a critical
transformation with that which maintains humanity in its minoritorian condition. Indeed,
as Foucault argues, it is not simply enough to renounce authority; instead, rather, “the
critical question has to be turned back into a positive one.”600 The point of critique is not
therefore launched as an anti-authoritarian “gesture of rejection;” the “point.” Foucault
maintains is instead “to transform the critique conducted in the necessary limitation into a
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practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.”601 To be sure, as
Foucault suggests in an interview from 1981, the notion of critique and its coinciding
ethic of anti-authoritarianism, is what makes radical transformation possible: “criticism
(and radical criticism),” Foucault writes, “is absolutely indispensable for any
transformation.”602 Situating the radical critique of authority, which as we seen for
Foucault radically reframes the basis for political thought, as “indispensable” for the very
possibility of transformation, Foucault demonstrates that the negation of authority
culminates and finds its expression in the potentiality of transforming the limit points at
which critique is directed.
Through the radicalization of a critical “attitude” and “ethos” derived from Kant,
Foucault indeed suggests that what has always remained central to his work is a
continuation of the project of the Enlightenment, in which the concept of critique
suggests a philosophical coupling between historical analysis of ourselves—that is the
analysis of the conditions of possibility of our own ontology—and the possibility to
become otherwise. Here it is easy to see that any study of Foucault which attends to the
first part of this coupling at the expense of the latter, necessarily misses what is
fundamentally at stake in the project of Foucault’s work. While May and others are thus
correct to point to the way in which the concept of “critique” might help to locate a
general trajectory in Foucault’s philosophy as the simultaneous study of “who we are”
and “who we might be,”603 this same trajectory, I claim, acts as the basis for a
preliminary outline of a new approach to the domains of philosophy and politics which,
in turn, requires a more serious engagement with the question of resistance. Indeed, on
the one hand Foucault defines the critical attitude of the Enlightenment as an attitude or
ethos situated at the horizon of the historical problematic of authority, and as such his
thought prefigures the meta-political and anarchist turns in political theory by rethinking
the task of philosophy at the limit or horizon of the state. Yet, the importance of the idea
of “critique” can only be fully understood in relation to the coinciding problematic of
resistance, a concept which is significantly reintroduced into Foucault’s work at the same
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time when he begins to situate his thought in relation to a larger critical framework of the
Enlightenment.
Faced not simply with the philosophical problem of authority, then, but with its
material manifestation as well, what initially appears as a principal problem for
philosophy is itself coupled with a political context. The Enlightenment, according to
Foucault, “now appears as a political problem.”604 By coupling a political dimension
with the philosophical framework of the Enlightenment, what is at stake for Foucault is to
demonstrate how “the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself
struggling with attitudes of countermodernity.”605 This is to say that alongside—indeed
coupled with—the history of political power and government, are the historical
movements running counter and outside of the manifestation of authority. Focusing on
the way in which Kant defines the Enlightenment in terms of a radical escape—an “exit”
or “way out”— we can now better understand the way in which Foucault suggests that
the task of philosophy which “characterizes the Enlightenment” is the development of the
critical attitude “that releases us from the status of our immaturity.”606 If as Foucault
maintains in the 1984 lecture that the key problem developed through Kant’s project
finds its critical impetus as an exiting from “man’s self-incurred tutelage,” then in a much
more radical way, Foucault raises the stakes in order to suggest that the task of
philosophy is to begin with and think through a certain “exiting” or “way out,” not only
from the problem of authority but, more specifically, from the ontological condition in
which human beings are maintained in a minoritorian manner. At the same time,
however, what is crucial in the relation between the movements of modernity and
movement of counter-modernity are, as we will see in the following section, the ways in
which Foucault begins to reread the history of politics through the question of resistance
and revolt.
It is within this political dimension of critique that we can uncover another
manner in which Foucault’s concept of critique invokes another crucial affinity with
anarchism. Insofar as anarchism can be tied (at least in part) to the history of the

604

Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 37.
Ibid, 39.
606
Ibid, 34.
605

210

Enlightenment it has always existed, as Jun recently argues, not only as a philosophical
critique of authority, but also as a movement of what Foucault refers to as the “attitudes
of countermodernity.”607 In this regard, Jun maintains that “anarchism has from the
beginning defined itself against modernity—not by stealing Romantic glances at a
premodern past, but by looking for something new, something that stands apart from,
exists outside of, or altogether moves beyond, modernity.”608 The history of anarchism
is, according to Jun, itself a movement of Foucault’s theory of “countermodernity.”
Whereas we have seen that task of the critical attitude of philosophical takes as its
starting point the irreducible critique of authority, and in this way forms an alliance with
the philosophical basis of anarchism, we can now assert a second coinciding axis along
which the critique of authority becomes manifest as the movement of politics. As such,
with the concept of “critique” Foucault invokes not only the unconditional critique of
authority that has always remained the basic tenet of the position of philosophical
anarchism, but also calls forth a rethinking of the question and practice of resistance—a
practice that has always remained a key component of anarchist theory—as the very grid
from which to rethink the history of politics. Although Foucault does not use the
language of resistance in the 1984 lecture, the 1978 lecture makes the relation between
resistance, and anarchism and “critique” more clear.
In order to demonstrate more fully the way in which the concept of “critique” in
Foucault’s thought develops and turns upon what I have preliminarily outlined as the
anarchist hypothesis of the political, in which the philosophical critique of authority
prefigures the possibility of transformation, and as such necessitates an engagement with
the domain of the political through the concept of resistance, it is necessary to now turn
to the corresponding 1978 lecture. The foundational authority that maintains humanity in
its minoritorian condition and defines the modern condition since the Enlightenment, is
alternatively developed in the 1978 lecture in relation to the larger context of Foucault’s
study of governmentality. For Foucault, the general problematic of authority that
maintains subordinate positions is itself a form of governmentalization and yet at the
same time—and even consequently according to Foucault—alongside the history of
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governmentality is the political and critical attitude that resists it. Whereas the
philosophical dimension of critique in the 1984 lecture invokes resistance to authority as
the very basis for philosophy, in the 1978 lecture, Foucault additionally asserts resistance
to governmentality as the very basis for politics and the study of the political.
If the general problematic of the Enlightenment, as Foucault suggests in the
1984 lecture, is the thinking through of our “exit” from the problem of authority in terms
of a philosophical critique, then what makes the earlier lecture “What is Critique?”
significant is the way this problematic is coupled with a historico-political dimension that
invokes the key concept of resistance in order to understand the manner in which critique
becomes realized as an “art of not being governed”—or the struggle between the rise of
governmentalization and counter-historical movements of resistance. Indeed, it is my
contention that the transformation made possible through the radical critique of authority
is best exemplified in the concept of resistance, or the critical ethos developed as a
specific “art of not being governed.” By analyzing the notion of “critique as an ongoing
withdrawal from the problem of government, in addition to the anti-authoritarian critical
attitude discussed above, we can more clearly see how Foucault builds an anarchist
hypothesis of the political into the whole of his thought.

3.3

Critique and the Art of Not Being Governed

In conclusion…might it not now be necessary to follow the other route…And if it is
necessary to ask the question about knowledge in its relation to domination, it would be,
first and foremost, from a certain decision-making will not to be governed, the decision
making will, both an individual and collective attitude which meant, as Kant said, to get
out of one’s minority.609
--Michel Foucault

Although Foucault situates his work within the critical tradition of Kant in order to
reintroduce the question of authority to philosophy, his understanding of “critique” as it
develops in the political context differs from Kant in one key aspect that cannot be
overlooked. In Kantian political theory, the state and the a priori character of law are
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presupposed as the universal terms through which the political can be articulated.610
Foucault, however, denies this artifice and suggests how the concept of “critique” reveals
an alternative foundation of politics irreducible to the state. While the concept of
“critique” in the 1984 lecture acts as the basic theoretical and methodological framework
from which Foucault begins to rethink the critical task of philosophy, this same concept
is additionally invoked in the 1978 lecture as a way to inform an alternative analytic
theory of the political opposed to and outside a theory of the state. In order to account for
this alternative understanding of “critique,” the 1978 lecture undertakes a genealogical
account of being critical in terms of a socio-political practice arising in response to the
growth of Foucault refers to as “pastoral power.”611 Rather than simply tracing the
history of the political to the emergence of governmentality, in “What is Critique?”
Foucault claims that what is required is a theory of the political opposed to the history of
government. As outlined in this lecture, it is with the concept of “critique” that Foucault
begins to rethink the possibility of an alternative theory of the political opposed to
governmentality. As we will see, this alternative approach to the study of politics begins
with, according to Foucault, a “certain decision-making will not to be governed.”612 It is
by beginning with this critical will not to be governed that Foucault begins to
fundamentally rethink the domain of the political in such a way that it cannot be reduced
or simplified to the problematic of governmentality. Given that the problematic of
governmentality is more thoroughly developed in Foucault’s lexicon than the concept of
authority, what Foucault outlines in the 1978 lecture as the permanent interplay between
governmentality and the “art of not being governed” is essential in tracing how the
concept of “critique” ultimately turns upon an anarchist hypothesis of the political as
continuously developed throughout his thought.
610
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Since the position Foucault takes in the 1978 lecture is directly related to the
problematic of government, it is necessary to briefly outline what Foucault means by
“governmentality.” Published in the same year as “What is Critique?” was a lecture that
eventually became part of the lecture series collected as Security, Territory, Population,
titled “Governmentality” in which Foucault begins to situate his work in relation to the
general “problematic of government” and at the same time introduces the concept of
“governmentality” into his critical lexicon.613 Taken together, these two lectures (“What
is Critique?” and “Governmentality” along with the lectures comprising Security,
Territory, Population) mark the entrance of the problem of government into the wider
scope of Foucault’s thought which, as we will see, is subsequently coupled with, by
necessity, the general problematic of resistance. Although the term governmentality
appears somewhat late in Foucault’s lexicon, the introduction of the general problematic
of government into Foucault’s thought marks a key conceptual intervention in his
thought, and is central to the lectures he gave at the Collège de France from 1977 until
1984 as well as the final two volumes of the History of Sexuality. Rather than attempting
to understand Foucault’s work in relation to an analytic of power, as Foucault suggests in
The Government of Self and Others, the goal is to “analyze power as a field of procedures
of government.”614 As initially defined in the lecture “Governmentality,” Foucault first
uses this term in order to restructure the analytic framework from which to understand the
problem of politics and political philosophy; that is, for Foucault the analytics of power
needs to take into account the problem of governmentality rather than sovereignty in
order to fully understand the domain of the political.615 Yet at the same time, it is
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precisely by engaging with the general problematic of governmentality that Foucault
uncovers a new framework for understanding the domain of the political that begins
anarchically—which is to say with the question of resistance rather that of power.
Understood as both analytically and practically different from the questions
pertaining to sovereignty, the term governmentality is utilized by Foucault in such a way
so as to establish a historical break in the general framework for political theory. “[T]he
art of government” Foucault writes must be “defined in a way that differentiates it from a
certain capacity of the prince.”616 For Foucault, then, within the history of political
thought, the term governmentality suggests a historical change in political rationality
from treatises regarding “advice to the prince” to treatises on the “art of government.”617
Citing an early definition of the term “government” from the French emblem book writer,
Gillaume de la Perrière’s 1555 text, Le Miroir Polique, Foucault argues that the problem
of government has “a finality of its own,” and in this respect, “it [government] can be
clearly distinguished from sovereignty.”618 As clearly differentiated from political
sovereignty, Foucault initially defines “government” as the “right manner of disposing
things so as to lead not to the form of common good, as the jurists would have said, but to
an end that is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed.”619 The turn
toward the study of government as an analytic framework for political thought begins, for
Foucault, by understanding governmentality in terms of both a rationality and series of
multiform tactics utilized to achieve a specific end—that is, the problem of government is
neither that of establishing legitimate sovereignty, nor of imposing laws, but of ordering
and managing the relations between things. Thus, the problematic concerning the crisis
of government is itself an enigma regarding (to use Foucault’s own phrasing) the order of
things.
It is within the framework of governmentality (particularly as developed in “What
is Critique?) that the philosophical questions posed by Foucault in “What is
Enlightenment?” are made more transparent in relation to the anarchist hypothesis of the
political that underpins his thought. Indeed, in “What is Critique?” Foucault importantly
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begins to discuss how the task of political philosophy is to develop a perpetual “critical
attitude” in relation to the problem of government, and in doing so provides a lens for
viewing the importance and coherence of the idea of resistance in his works as a
whole.620 In the 1978 lecture, Foucault begins by outlining the ways in which the general
thematics and questions of political theory historically change with the introduction of
government as the basic problem in which philosophers must engage. According to
Foucault, beginning in the 15th century, “there was a veritable explosion of the art of
governing men,” which begins by developing the idea “quite foreign to ancient culture—
that each individual, whatever his age or status, from the beginning to the end of his life
and in his every action, had to be governed and had to let himself be governed.”621
Indeed, if as Foucault suggests that the question “how to govern was…one of the
fundamental questions about what was happening in the 15th or 16th centuries” (original
emphasis), it is at this time that the problem of government becomes one of the crucial
anchoring points in his thought.622
Yet, at the same time, however, (and this is what makes this lecture so essential)
as the problem of government becomes a key focus for Foucault’s work, the question of
government in the 1978 lecture is paired with and develops in relation to another key
question which Foucault revitalizes and revises under the concept of the “critique.” As
Taylor points out, the concept of “critique…emerges in response and is inextricably
linked to the spread of governmentalizing techniques.”623 In this way, what Foucault
traces under the heading of “critique” must be understood directly in relation to the study
of governmentality; however, as it develops in relation to the problematic of government,
the concept of “critique” acts as a way to radically introduce the notion of resistance as
the key concept through which this notion of “critique” can be elaborated. Thus, in a key
passage, Foucault writes “[s]o, this governmentalization, which seems to me to be rather
characteristic of these societies in Western Europe in the 16th century, cannot apparently
be dissociated from the question ‘how not to be governed?’.”624 It is this political
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dimension of “critique” directed toward the question “how not to be governed,” in which
Foucault claims gives rise a specific “historical dimension” of politics traditionally
overlooked by philosophers and political theorists.625 Furthermore, it is within this
critical question—referred to here as the “perpetual question—of “how not to be
governed” that Foucault importantly suggests that “one could approximately locate
therein what we would call the critical attitude.”626 Crucially, then, the location of the
“critical attitude”—which as we have seen marks a key concept in Foucault’s thought—is
to be found and situated in the historical expressions of the “art of not being governed.”
As developed nearly six years prior to the Enlightenment lecture, what Foucault defines
here as the “critical attitude” becomes manifest and is elaborated not in terms of struggle
against authority but, more specifically, as an “adversary to the arts of governing”—that
is, “critique,” which as we have seen is the very task of philosophy for Foucault, now
finds its political context within a critical ethos elaborated in terms of an “art of not being
governed.”627 By locating the ethos of “critique” within the “art of not being governed,”
Foucault begins to radically reframe history of the political in a vastly different manner
that begins to afford primacy to the question of resistance.
In this way, if as Colin Gordon argues that the “governmental theme has a focal
point in Foucault’s later philosophy,” then at the same time, this “focal point” ought not
to be divorced from another series of questions located within the space he reserves for
the “critical attitude.”628 To be sure, any reconsideration of the political possibilities
afforded in Foucault’s thought necessarily requires not simply the consideration of the
political problem of governmentality, but also the parallel counter-history of the “the art
of not being governed.” Against, then, the context of more traditional understandings of
politics Foucault poses a counter-historical “political and moral attitude, a way of
thinking” which, as a “first definition of critique,” assumes the following “general
characterization: the art of not being governed quite so much.”629 Here, it is clear that
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Foucault affirms a direct link between “critique” and resistance, wherein the notion of
“critique” is accordingly defined as a specific art of not being governed. Similar to the
ways in which the methodology of “anarchaeology” takes as its starting point the “nonnecessity of power,” we can see here that “critique” begins with the non-necessity of
government as the explicit starting point for a critical theory of politics. Despite the
importance Foucault ascribes to the relation between “critique” and the “art of not being
governed,” critics engaging with the 1978 lecture often tend to discount the possible
connection to anarchism in Foucault’s discussion of “critique.”630 Yet, while Foucault
indeed remarks that the critical attitude does not mean that “governmentalization would
be opposed in a kind of face-off by the opposite affirmation he does provide a general
outline of what he means here by defining critique in terms of a specific “art of not being
governed.”631 The critical attitude of the art of not being governed is, as Foucault
maintains, a permanent “adversary to the arts of governing”—that is, it is characterized in
terms of “an act of defiance…a challenge…a way of limiting these arts of governing and
sizing them up, transforming them… [or] finding a way to escape from them.”632 As a
permanent “adversary” to the art of governing, what Foucault outlines under “critique”
can never be divorced from the very structure of the political; instead, rather the critical
attitude of the art of not being governed—that is, the very historicity of revolt—is a
constituent component of the domain of the political.
With this preliminary definition acting as the locus from which to understand the
political context of “critique,” Foucault additionally employs three “historical anchoring
points” as examples of what he refers to as the art of not being governed.633 Foucault
first traces the birth of the critical attitude in relation to the arts of governing that were
still grounded in the authority of the church: “not wanting to be governed was a certain
way of refusing, challenging, limiting ecclesiastical rule.”634 Second, the counter630
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practice of being governed is for Foucault a struggle against judicial and sovereign power
rather than ecclesiastical rule. Hence, “not to want to be governed like that also means
not wanting to accept these laws because they are unjust, because, by virtue of their
antiquity or the more or less threatening ascendancy given them by today’s sovereign,
they hide a fundamental legitimacy.”635 Yet precisely because the art of not being
governed is “confronted with government and the obedience it stipulates,” then the
attitude of being critical raises the question, according to Foucault, of “natural law” in
which “critique means putting forth universal and indefeasible rights to which every
government…will have to submit.”636 Finally, “to not want to be governed” is as
Foucault maintains “not accepting as true…what an authority tells you is true…but rather
accepting it only if one considers valid the reasons for doing so” (original emphasis).637
Thus, in its third anchoring point, the art of not being governed “finds its anchoring point
in the problem of certainty in its confrontation with authority.”638 It is with these three
“historical anchoring points”—the ecclesiastical, the juridical and the epistemic, or the
triadic problematic of the “sovereign, the law, [and] the authority of dogmatism”—that
Foucault elevates the art of not being governed as something of “capital importance in the
history of Western culture.”639
It is with this discussion of critique in relation to the general problematic of
governmentality in which Foucault’s thought can be seen as formulating a new critical
depth with regard to the ways in which to rethink both philosophy’s relationship to the
question of politics and the very terms of the political. The struggle between, or what
Foucault refers to, as the historical “interplay of governmentalization and critique” is
what he takes as the basic model of the domain of the political and politics insofar as it is
tied to the development of the “critical attitude.”640 Situated amongst the current task to
think through the postanarchist and metapolitical possibilities of a politics located at a
distance from the state, Foucault’s thought prefigures these critical turns with the advent
of a simple, yet nonetheless highly consequential, hypothesis that reframes the general
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task of what might be developed into a philosophy of politics. Against the history, both
political and philosophical, which sought to elaborate the question of politics in terms of
regimes of government, advice to the prince, or the problem of sovereignty—in short
against the arts of governing, which have always been the history of the archipolitical—
Foucault asks if there might not be another way to think through the problem of politics
and the domain of the political beginning with the art of not being governed. Indeed,
with the development of this concept of “critique,” Foucault unmasks a certain agonistic
logic of struggle hidden beneath the problematic governmentality which allows him to
offer a fundamental reinterpretation of the structure of the political. The historical
elaboration of the problem of government is both consequently and simultaneously the
history of its impossibility—or the perpetual manifestation of the art of not being
governed, which reveals, animates and gives presence to the perpetual “critical attitude”
that haunts the historical problematic of governmentality.
In addition to beginning to rethink the terms of the political and the question of
politics from the space of the art of not being governed, the struggle between
governmentality and critique also marks an important synthesis or critical nexus binding
together the three general problematics of Foucault’s thought to the question of
resistance. If as Foucault suggests in a 1982 essay titled “The Subject and Power” that
the goal of his work has not simply been to analyze the problem of power, but instead to
“create the history of the different modes by which, in our culture, beings are made
subjects,” then the classification of his thought into three successive periods might be
understood to correspond, as Foucault suggests here, with “three modes of objectification
that transform human beings into subjects.”641 As outlined in “The Subject and Power,”
Foucault discusses the way in which the problem of his archaeological period is to
demonstrate the way in which the subject of discourse becomes a subject as such in
relation to a problem of truth and discursive practices; the problem of his genealogical
works focuses on the problem of subjectivity and power; and his final ethical periods
focus on the problem of subjectivity, its relation to the self, and its possible
transformation. Truth, power, and the subject—with these three general thematics,
Foucault provides a useful analytic tool for drawing connections amongst the different
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periods of his thought. At the same time, however, what is crucial is that it is these three
problems which characterize the wide breadth of Foucault’s work are all rearticulated in
relation to the coinciding problematics of governmentality and critique.
Turning to a crucial passage from “What is Critique?,” Foucault suggests not only
that the problem of government helps to elaborate the questions of truth, power, and the
subject, but also that the question of critique—that is, of the “art of not being
governed”—is additionally posed in relation to these three general problematics
comprising the whole of his work. For Foucault, then:
the core of critique is basically made of the bundle of relationships that are tied to
one another…power, truth and the subject. And if governmentalization is indeed
this movement through which individuals are subjected in the reality of a social
practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well, then! I will say
that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to
question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of
truth. Well, then! critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of
reflected intractability. Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the
subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.642
The ethical relation between critique and “desubjugation of the subject” will be dealt with
in chapter six. Yet, it is essential here to point towards the ways in which Foucault
frames the trajectory of his collected works, as well as the coinciding thematic problems
associated with the differing periods of his work, not only to the movement of
governmentalization (as is often the focal point), but also the counter-movement of
“critique,” or what is interestingly referred to here as the movement of “voluntary
insubordination.” Crucially, while critics tend to focus on the ways in which Foucault’s
analytics of power tend to override the possibility of agency and transformation, here we
see that Foucault inscribes the possibility of radical agency into the heart of his work with
the concept of “critique.”643 With “critique,” acting as the continuous thread throughout
his work, Foucault importantly inscribes the art of not being governed as a key focal
point for his thought; it is through the concept of “critique” and the coinciding question
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of “how not to be governed” that one can begin to reread the general focus of Foucault’s
collected works. Furthermore, while Foucault is often criticized for understanding the
subject as socially constructed by, and thus structurally bound, to the very forms of power
he criticizes, with the notion of “critique” he provides an alternative framework from
which to understand the problem of subjectivity, in which what is at stake is not the
subject of power, but the “desubjugation of the subject” made possible through the
position of “voluntary insubordination.”644 Here, rather than focusing on the ways in
which relations of power create subjects, Foucault interestingly demonstrates that radical
transformations in subjectivity are made possible not through power, but through
resistance, or a unique form of political praxis as “voluntary insubordination.”
As we saw in the 1984 lecture, Foucault’s poses a general problematic in relation
to one’s voluntary submission to authority, and his counter-concept of “voluntary
insubordination” as invoked here revisits this idea. Foucault’s choice of words here
importantly invokes the political problem of “voluntary servitude”—first articulated by
one of the founders of modern political philosophy in France, Étienne De La Boétie. 645
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political tradition from which he might be able to locate a basis to situate the “critical attitude” of the “art
of not being governed.” Furthermore, given the way in which Foucault historically locates the
development of the critical attitude of the “art of not being governed” as arising with particular emphasis
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, La Boétie’s text can be seen as directly intervening and
participating in the tradition Foucault hopes to reinvigorate. Often overlooked by traditional political
philosophers, La Boétie’s text, Discourse on Voluntary Servitude importantly presents a central problem
for political theory that inverts the traditional manner in which the political is theorized. La Boétie’s
problematic of “voluntary servitude” cuts to the heart of and fundamentally reworks the tradition of
political theory based on either advice to political leaders or theories seeking to legitimate sovereignty.
With the notion of “voluntary servitude” La Boétie argues that the central problem of political philosophy
must be elaborated around the problematic of political obedience—that is, for La Boétie, the principal
problem that haunts political philosophy is why people willingly obey the commands of government. In
his investigations to the problematic of authoritarian governance and our voluntary submission to it, La
Boétie radically rethinks the domain of the political in such a way that it begins with the position of
disobedience. The call for mass disobedience that frames La Boétie’s text, has often been recognized as
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Written in the middle of the sixteenth century, la Boétie’s short text, Discourse of
Voluntary Servitude (1550) is often considered a seminal text in the historical
development of anarchist thought, and Foucault’s reference to this text is helpful in
further outlining the ways in which the development of the critical attitude begins to posit
an anarchist hypothesis of the political.646 La Boétie’s treatise utilizes the notion of
“voluntary servitude” in order to preliminarily rethink the domain of the political from
the opposite position to the problematic of sovereignty and archipolitical governmentality
as later elaborated in the works of traditional philosophers such as Bodin and Hobbes.
The treatise is coherently structured around a single problematic that inverts the entire
tradition of Western political theory: according to La Boétie, the principle question
political theory must engage with—a question that is still essential to contemporary
thought, and one that Foucault directly attempts to reinvigorate—is why people willingly
allow themselves to be governed.647
As a key problematic posed in the Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, La Boétie
addresses the voluntary subjective bond which ties us to that which dominates us. In
thinking through the problem of “voluntary servitude,” what is stake for La Boétie is that
political power and coinciding question of government does not simply rely on coercion
as a tactic oriented toward obedience but, more fundamentally, on our voluntary
an early example of anarchist political philosophy, and insofar as Foucault invokes this tradition in order
to situate the critical attitude of the “art of not being governed,” the reference is helpful in articulating
the way in which he builds the anarchist hypothesis into his work.
646
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Rose Books, 2007), 10-12. Indeed, given the influence La Boëtie has had on the development of anarchist
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still haunts political theory, and as such must be addressed in contemporary currents of anarchist theory.
See: Saul Newman, “Voluntary Servitude Reconsidered.” In Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies, 1.
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submission to power. In other words, our agential voluntary submission to power is, at
the same time, precisely what constitutes the basis for the continuation of political power
as such. Thus, rather than reducing the question of the political and politics to the agency
of political power, La Boétie redistributes agency to the people who allow themselves to
be governed. According to La Boétie, “[i]t is therefore the inhabitants themselves who
permit, or, rather, bring about, their own subjection, since by ceasing to submit they
would put an end to their servitude.”648 For La Boétie, then, if power depends upon our
submission to it in order to constitute itself as such, then in order to resist the
continuation of political power, what is required is the active withdrawal of our
submission to political authority. Through the development of what Foucault refers to as
“voluntary insubordination” which begins with the proposition “[r]esolve to serve no
more, and you are at once freed,”649 La Boétie radically inverts the political tradition
based upon the primacy of the archipolitical. Indeed, rather than assuming the necessity
of obedience to governments, which for theorists like Hobbes, is a necessary component
for the continuation of sovereignty, La Boétie begins from the position directly opposed
to the history of the archipolitical, starting with primacy of freedom which, as he suggests
“we are not only in possession of” but also “have urge to defend.”650 Although La
Boétie’s treatise is set to investigate what he considers to be a vital problem traditionally
ignored by political theorists, his analysis offers only a preliminary outline from which a
thought of the political might emerge in line with Foucault. Nonetheless, it is with
reference to both the idea that the questions pertaining to the domain of the political
might alternatively be rethought beginning from position of freedom and the will to
defend it that Foucault takes as the basis for a fundamental reevaluation of the political.
Through asserting the problematic of “voluntary insubordination” as a vital core
to the elaboration of the “critical attitude,” it is clear that Foucault directly attempts to
invoke and continue in the tradition initially articulated by La Boétie. Given that
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Foucault builds the notion of “voluntary insubordination” as a vital element of the notion
of critique—wherein what is insured is the space in which the problematic of
governmentality can be both questioned and undermined—into the core of his thought,
the critical problem of the “art of not being governed,” I suggest, constitutes not only the
hidden locus of his thought, but a radical reframing of the terms of the political
anarchically. To recreate a theory of the political—which, as we have seen, is the
fundamental task Foucault ascribes to the elaboration of the “critical attitude”—requires,
then, with regard to La Boétie, a different topology of the political that begins in a radical
condition of freedom on the one hand, and a voluntary agential will to resist—indeed to
withdrawal from—the manifestation of government on the other. Indeed, by turning,
once again, to the essay “The Subject and Power” we can directly see how Foucault
invokes La Boétie’s problematic in order to reframe the political from the point of view
resistance. If, for La Boétie, “voluntary servitude” marks the fundamental condition of
government, Foucault suggests to the contrary that we ought to begin with the problem of
resistance in order to avoid the condition of voluntary servitude. In this regard, Foucault
writes:
The power relationship and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot therefore be
separated. The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude (how
could we seek to be slaves?). At the very heart of the power relationship, and
constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of
freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to
speak of an agonism of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement
and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a
permanent provocation.651
In a similar manner to how the art of government can never be divorced from the critical
question pertaining to “how not to be governed,” we see here that the question of power
cannot be separated from “freedom’s refusal to submit.” This is to suggest that,
according to Foucault, the manifestation of power always meets with the potential of its
own resistance, or the refusal to willingly submit to power. Insofar as freedom is itself
the precondition for both power and government, this means for Foucault that “power is
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exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.”652 In other words, if
as Foucault maintains that power must be understood as the “government of men by other
men,” then the very problematic of government necessarily “includes an important
element: freedom.”653 Yet, consequently, insofar as freedom’s refusal to submit is itself a
precondition of government, the domain of the political cannot therefore be reduced
simply to the primacy of government; the precondition of power and the manifestation of
government is itself marked by the permanent potential of resistance within the field of
freedom. This means for Foucault that the very permanence of the political is attested to
by the ongoing struggle between relations of power and governmentality and the art of
not being governed which, insofar as it acts as the very precondition of power and
government attains a position of primacy in relation to the field of the political.
Precisely because of this, the problem of the political is, as Foucault suggests
here, not therefore simply a problem of “voluntary servitude”—which overemphasizes
the role of power at the expense of resistance. Instead, rather, what is at stake for
Foucault—indeed, what lies at the “very heart of the power relationship”—is the
problematic of resistance, or the simultaneity between the “recalcitrance of the will and
the intransigence of freedom” which, when taken together, invert La Boétie’s critique of
“voluntary servitude” to what Foucault’s theory of “voluntary insubordination.” It is
from this alternative position that Foucault begins to reframe the domain of the political
not as an “essential antagonism,” but in terms of an ongoing “agonism,” or, “permanent
provocation” which begins with, and takes as its very basis, the problematic of resistance
as the referent for reframing the substance of the political. It is this retheorization of the
political that Foucault places as one of the central tasks for political theory. Foucault
writes: “I would say that the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power
relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is
an increasingly political task—even, the political task that is inherent in all social
existence.”654
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If according to Foucault, the task in which political theorists must engage not only
revolves around the question of power, but also an analysis of the fundamental agonism
between power and resistance, then the elaboration of the “art of not being governed”—
which as he suggests in the 1978 lecture “has nothing to do with philosophy of history or
the history of philosophy,” but is instead grounded in the framework of “historicalphilosophical practice”—is one of the key problems with which philosophy must attempt
to engage.655 For Foucault, rather than a philosophical “investigation into the legitimacy
of the historical modes of knowing,” or the political investigation into the effects of
political power understood as “unique principle” and “domination,” what is at stake in the
“historical-philosophical” element of “critique” is that the question of both philosophy
and politics ought to be understood in terms of a strategic reversal, a reversal which
begins as an art of not being governed.656 In this way, Foucault suggests that in order to
adequately engage in the question of the political, “[o]ne always has to think about it [the
political] in such a way as to see how it is associated with a domain of possibility and
consequently, of reversibility, of possible reversal.”657 By rethinking the question of
politics in terms of a “domain of possibility” in which the problem of government
continuously comes into contact with its “possible reversal,” Foucault’s thought affirms
the meta-political search for a theory of the political that cannot simply be reduced to the
problem of governmentality and the state. Indeed, the historical-philosophical practice of
critique for Foucault is what makes possible and reframes the terms of the political as the
movement of resistance; critique is the political theory which turns on a critical
conception of resistance as the precondition for power relations as such. For Foucault,
what is at stake in the questions regarding both philosophy and politics is not the search
for “transcendental or semi-transcendental” conditions of possibility that give primacy to
the history of the archipolitical, but instead the critical topology in which the problems of
authority and governmentality might be reversed.658 Foucault thus writes that the
question posed for politics is:
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[n]o longer through what error, illusion, or illegitimacy has knowledge come to
induce effects of domination manifested in the modern world…but how can they
instead be reversed or released from within a concrete strategic field, this concrete
strategic field that induced them, starting with this decision not to be governed
(my emphasis).659
By reframing the basis of political philosophy in terms of a strategic “decision not to be
governed,” Foucault crucially builds what I refer to as the anarchist hypothesis of the
political into the core of his collected works, while simultaneously invoking what I will
trace in the following chapter as the primacy of resistance. What I refer to here as the
anarchist hypothesis of the political does not simply mean that Foucault argues that the
concept of the political cannot be reduced to the question of governmentality, but that in
its non-reducibility to the problem of government, the political is itself that which starts
with the critical “decision not to be governed.” In other words, the domain of the
political, for Foucault, is itself, what pivots not only on the question, but the permanent
potentiality of resistance, a perpetual agonism between governmentalization and the
counter-history of the art of not being governed which makes visible the domain of the
political as such. At the same time as Foucault locates a structure of permanent agonism
at the heart of the political, he additionally posits an alternative methodological
framework from which to reread the history of the political in such a way that places the
art of not being governed in a primary relation with the history of governmentalization.
With “What is Critique?” it is my contention that the ways in which Foucault
suggests how the questions of politics and the political might be rethought from a
position starting with a decisive will not to be governed, designates a unique political
rationality opposed to the traditional logic of the archē. Whereas, the notion of critique
outlined in “What is Enlightenment?” is utilized in order to invoke a radical task for
philosophy that, takes as its starting point, the irreducible critique of authority, in “What
is Critique?” this “critical attitude” is coupled with and turns upon a “decisive will not to
be governed.” Indeed, with the concept of critique, it is my contention that Foucault at
once invokes the concept of resistance as the critical agent that binds together his critical
inquiries in to power, politics, and governmentality, as well as the key problematic to be
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developed throughout his work. Taken together, then, the element of “critique” in
Foucault’s thought functions so as to anchor resistance not only as the central—indeed
vital—component of his studies of power and governmentality, but also to his thought as
a whole. Furthermore, with the concept of “critique,” Foucault builds an anarchist
hypothesis of the political in to the very core of his thought, not in terms of a fundamental
anarchism, but rather in terms of a critical methodology, or “anarchaeology” which, in
beginning with the non-necessity of power, refuses the traditional logic of the archē. In
addition, then, to the philosophical component of “critique,” which as I argued in the
previous section begins with a radical critique of authority, this then is the other way in
which we can now begin to posit a second element of the anarchist hypothesis that
underpins Foucault’s thought. Arising from the intersection between an irreducible
critique of authority and a decisive will not to be governed, the domain of the political
can be redefined as the field pertaining to and marked by the permanence of resistance;
as a permanent an ongoing sphere of agonism between the art of governing and the art of
not being governed, resistance composes the substance of the political, and is therefore
the condition of possibility for the political as such. This means, however, both that
resistance is primary in relation to the history of the political and is that which makes
visible the political as such.
In chapter one, I cited a passage from Benjamin Tucker’s text, Individual, Society,
and the State in which he claims that a philosophy of politics is made possible only upon
articulating a key distinction between government and resistance. A reconsideration of
this passage can now be posed in light of the intervention I think Foucault makes in
regard to this tradition. Tucker writes: “the distinction between invasion and resistance,
between government and defense is vital. Without it there can be no valid philosophy of
politics.”660 It is now clear that Foucault’s critical thought attempts to rethink the
possibility of a philosophy of politics in terms of vital distinction between government
and resistance, and as such can be understood as contributing to the anarchist tradition
invoked by Tucker. The distinction between governmentality and the critical attitude
generated around the question “how not to be governed” acts as both the framework and
referent from which a new political theory that does not culminate in the problematic of
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governmentality might emerge. Yet, while Tucker and Foucault collide in rethinking the
possibility of a philosophy of politics derived from a key distinction between
governmentality and resistance—that is, between the art of governing and the art of not
being governed—what makes Foucault’s theory particularly significant is not simply the
distinction between government and resistance, but how the question of politics can be
released from the tradition of the archē starting with a decisive will not to be governed.
In other words, Foucault redefines the political not simply in terms of a distinction
between archipolitical and the an-archipolitical, but from the perspective that affords
primacy to the question of resistance itself. In this way, Foucault does not reframe the
political in terms of static dualisms between the state and non-state, government and
anarchy, or resistance and power; instead rather, starting with the decisive will not to be
governed Foucault reveals that resistance designates the condition of possibility of power
and politics. Reframing the domain of the political from the point of view of resistance
means that the potentiality for resistance is the anarchic spacing that provides the
irreducible condition to both confront and escape the history of governmentality, and as
such acts as the key referent from which a new thought of the political might arise that
could never assume the form of an archē. Precisely because Foucault rethinks the
problem of the political through resistance, his theory also invokes and even turns upon
anarchism; resistance as the very substance of the political invokes anarchism not in
terms of a prescriptive outline for a future society to come, but a gesture that embodies
the disruption of the archē that has hitherto grounded the political and the question of
politics within the space of government.
At the same time, however, as Foucault’s thought can be seen as directly invoking
an affinity with anarchist political theory through the concept of “critique” and the
coinciding problematic of the art of not being governed, I must be careful in asserting an
immediate relationship between anarchist political theory and what Foucault develops
through the problematic of critique and resistance. Although a certain affinity between
Foucault and anarchism might now appear more transparent in regard to what I have
outlined thematically under “the art of not being governed,”—a problematic that finds its
expression and framework within the history of anarchism—critics of Foucault have
continuously denied the possibility of this very connection. Noting the bewilderedness
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and general confusion arising from the attendees of Foucault’s 1978 lecture concerning
the critical discourse of the “art of not being governed,” biographer James Miller writes
that “[t]he philosophers in his audience were struck by the strangeness of this conclusion,
particularly coming from Michel Foucault.”661 Traditionally, critics have continued to be
perplexed by Foucault’s remarks throughout this lecture, and subsequent theorists often
discount or outright deny the possibility of a relation to anarchism that underpins
Foucault’s work. In particular. certain theorists have pointed out how the “unqualified
will not to be governed” Foucault speaks of in the lecture form 1978 contradicts his
earlier work in which “there was never an anarchistic will not to governed at all.”662
Even those sympathetic to both anarchism and Foucault, such as Judith Butler, have
denied the possibility of anarchist politics arising from elaboration of the “critique” and
the “art of not being governed.” As Butler writes in her short essay on the idea of
“critique” in Foucault’s thought, through the framework of the “art of not being
governed,” Foucault “is not posing the possibility of radical anarchy, and that the
question [‘how not to be governed’] is not how to become radically ungovernable.”663
Yet as we have seen, this is not the position Foucault takes in regard to the problem of
“critique.” Instead of positing an essential foundation from which the art of not being
governed arises historically, Foucault maintains to the contrary that what is at stake is to
rethink the very structure of power relations, governmentality, and domain of the political
with regard to the primacy of resistance. Nevertheless, to make her claim, Butler turns to
the question and answer period following the lecture “What is Critique?,” where Foucault
is asked whether or not his expression—“the art of not being governed—depends either
on positing anarchism as a sort of essential “foundation” against the monolithic project of
governmentality, or whether the expression culminates in resistance as a political
practice.664 Foucault’s response is crucial in outlining precisely what he means be that art
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of not being governed and its possible relation to anarchist theory. Strikingly, Foucault’s
response reveals a fundamental similarity between critique and what he in 1980 refers to
as “anarchaeology,” whereby he refuses to exclude the possible of a critical anarchism in
his work.
Although, Foucault’s critics typically turn to his answer at the end of his 1978
lecture in order to deny the more radical nature of some of his claims, the way in which
he responds to this question helps to both unpack what he means by the “decision not to
be governed” and how his general thought does not hinge upon a fundamental anarchism,
but rather upon the question of anarchy as manifest in the history of resistance. Indeed,
whereas Butler denies both the possibility of anarchism as a critical framework for
Foucault’s thought, his response directly invokes these two positions in a way that cannot
be overlooked. Foucault’s response is as follows:
I do not think that the will not to be governed at all is something that one could
consider an originary aspiration. I think that, in fact, the will not to be governed
is always the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this
price. As for the expression of not being governed at all, I believe it is the
philosophical and theoretical paroxysm of something that would be this will not to
be relatively governed…I was not referring to something that would be a
fundamental anarchism, that would be like an originary freedom, absolutely and
wholeheartedly resistant to any governmentalization. I did not say it, but this
does not mean that I absolutely exclude it.665
Similar to the way in which Foucault argues that “anarchaeology” begins with the “nonnecessity of power” as the theoretical standpoint that allows him rethink the analytics of
power and government, here we see that the expression of the art of not being governed is
where Foucault locates the historical specificity of this non-necessity of power, or,
anarchaeological approach to the study of politics. What is at stake for Foucault in
thinking through the significance of the philosophical and political expression of “not
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being governed at all” lies not in posing a “fundamental anarchism” that invokes a
monolithic and universal “originary freedom” against the history of governmentality.
Instead rather, and this is crucial, what is at stake in the expression the “art of not being
governed” first emerges in posing the question of anarchism in terms of the relative and
historical specificity of resistance; the art of not being governed invokes an affinity with
anarchism not as a fundamental foundation, but as the expressions manifest, in all their
relative historical specificity, of the manifestations of resistance. Foucault thus inscribes
revolt into the history of politics—that is, revolt has a historicity of its own, and as such a
theory of the political must include the principle of revolt as a vital component. This is
why Foucault continuously reiterates that the political will not to be governed is “always
the will not to be governed thusly,” and yet, at the same time, this “will not to be
governed” is according to Foucault the historical condition of politics, and as such cannot
be divorced from the very structure of the political.
Insofar as the art of not being governed always arises in particular historical,
social, and political contexts, what Foucault develops through the problematic of critique
is neither the prescription of a general political theory, nor the description of a
fundamental essentialism “resistant to governmentalization,” but the preliminary
elaboration of a theory of politics in which what must be explored is the political question
of resistance. At the same time, however, as Foucault significantly points toward here,
the “expression of not being governed at all” is additionally demarcated as a
“philosophical and theoretical paroxysm” which although does not necessarily rely upon
a “fundamental anarchism,” cannot fully “exclude it” either. As we saw in Foucault’s
description of “anarchaeology,” his methodology does not fully exclude the possibility of
anarchism as a critical link in his thought and work; here, in a strikingly similar manner,
Foucault once again reiterates that his critical theory of “critique” and the ethics of “the
art of not being governed” cannot fully exclude the possibility of anarchism. Foucault’s
choice of words here helps to explain what initially appears as a fundamental
contradiction endemic to this lecture. As a philosophical paroxysm—that is, as an
uncontrollable emotion or attitude of “being critical”—the expression “not to be
governed at all” invokes anarchism not as the essence of resistance, but as the “critical
attitude” which, as we have seen, takes as its basis and starting point the decision not to
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be governed, and as such acts as the critical turning point from the political can be
interpreted anarchically through the permanence of resistance.
Rather than developing an inconsistent framework for critical thought, the
expression “not to be governed at all” has both a historical-political dimension and a
coinciding philosophical attitude. For Foucault, then, there are thus two dimensions
developed through the concept of critique which required for an anarchist theory of
politics and a radical reframing of the terms of the political. Thus, in his concluding
response to the question posed to Foucault at the end of the 1978 lecture, he writes: “[i]f
we were to explore this dimension of critique”—that is, if we are to explore the critical
question how not to be governed—“would we not then find that it is supported by
something akin to the historical practice of revolt, the non-acceptance of a real
government, on the one hand, or, on the other, the individual experience of the refusal of
governmentality.”666 Rather than a “fundamental anarchism” or essential substance from
which resistance arises, the art of not being governed is what emerges in practices of
revolt; it is this historicity of revolt and not an essential ground for resistance, that
Foucault urges us to take as the basic analytic framework for a new thought of the
political. It is at the intersection of these two axes—the critical position that begins with
a “non-acceptance of real government” and the coinciding form of politics of resistance
to governmentality—that what I have referred to as the anarchist hypothesis of the
political arises in Foucault’s thought. A politics and coinciding political theory that does
not culminate in rationality of governmentality which, as we have seen for Foucault, is
the task of philosophy, cannot be divorced from the historical and philosophical question
of resistance, and it is with this logic—the logic that the political will is a will not to be
governed—that Foucault’s thought develops and begins with an anarchist hypothesis of
the political.

3.4

Towards a Theory of the Primacy of Resistance

That the history of political thought which, traditionally reduces the questions of politics
and the terms of the political to the manifestation of the archipolitical, might be radically
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rethought through the critical framework of the “art of not being governed” is one of
Foucault’s greatest contributions to political theory. Indeed, consequent upon, the ways
in which the analytic and material framework for political theory traditionally affords
primacy to the problematic of government, the importance of Foucault’s intervention
arises in both his critical exploration of a history of politics conditioned by resistance
while at the same time redefining and locating the basis for critical philosophy from the
position of resistance. Focusing on this interplay between these two ideas, David
Couzens Hoy usefully employs the terms “critical resistance,” or the idea that “critique
without resistance is empty and resistance without critique is blind” to suggest a guiding
thread in Foucault’s thought. 667 Given that the general lacuna of Foucault’s thought is
often articulated as being motivated from a critical inquiry into the problematic of power,
we can now add that it is rather the concept of resistance that is divisive in understanding
the complexities of his thought and his analytics of power and governmentality. In other
words, if “Foucault is accepted as being a theorist of power,” then as Johanna Oksala
correctly maintains “we also have to read him as a theorist of resistance.”668 To be sure,
the interplay between critique and resistance—that is, of “critical resistance”—marks the
general thread connecting the different periods characterizing Foucault’s thought, while
at the same time demarcating a different framework in order to engage with a theory of
the political beginning with the critical position that takes resistance as the primary
domain of the political.
What is at stake in positing an anarchist hypothesis of the political at the base of
Foucault’s thought is not simply that he introduces the notion of resistance as a concept
which, although has been commonly neglected in the history of political thought, might
be repositioned as a grand reversal to the problematic of governmentality. Rather, what
is at stake is that resistance itself needs to be understood, analytically and practically, as
an altogether different phenomenon than power, and as such requires a completely
different analytic and methodological framework from which to understand the field of
the political consequent to the permanence of resistance amongst the very dynamic of
politics. It is in this way that what I have outlined as the anarchist hypothesis of the
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political—or that which begins with the idea that the historical possibility of government
can never be separated from the art of not being governed—demonstrates how Foucault’s
works and methodology turn upon the development of the concept of resistance in two
ways essential to the development of a new framework for a theory of the political
emancipated from the problem of governmentality. Politically, resistance becomes
manifest within the framework of the art of not being governed as the taking place or
“experience of the refusal of governmentality,” while, philosophically, resistance is
manifest in the critical attitude that takes the “non-acceptance of a real government” as
the theoretical standpoint from which an analytic framework for the study of the political
might begin. In both instances, what is at stake for Foucault, is that if a reanalysis of the
terms of the political in its irreducibility to the state is possible, then one must begin with
the question of resistance—that is, resistance must be articulated not only as analytically
different in kind from power, but as primary with the history of governmentality, and
therefore as the vital component of the domain of the political. If a redefinition of the
terms of the political beyond the principle of governmentality is possible—that is if an
alternative philosophy of politics is possible—it is only through the logic of the primacy
of resistance which, in its irreducibility to the history of the archipolitical, provides the
condition to both confront and escape the history governmental rationality and practice.
That is, if a critical theory of politics irreducible to the logic of the archē is possible, such
a conception begins with an analysis of the counter-historical movements of resistance
through which politics emerges as a distinct art of not being governed.
This chapter has attempted, through a rereading of Foucault’s thought in relation
to the development of the general problematic of “critique,” to reformulate a radically
alternative framework from which to understand the domain of the political. By
introducing the concept of resistance through the corresponding notion of “critique” I
have argued that Foucault formulates a unique methodological framework from which
reorient the notion of resistance as the primary component of the domain of the political.
In doing so, I have not simply sought to draw connections between Foucault and the
history of anarchist thought, but that Foucault builds an anarchist hypothesis of the
political into the core of his thought. In this regard, we have seen that rather than
reducing the sphere of the political to the historical operability of governmentality,
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Foucault reverses the archic principle that has hitherto structured Western political
thought, and as such takes the notion of resistance as the condition of possibility for the
emergence of the political in its agonistic specificity. Secondarily, I have also sought to
elevate the notion of resistance as the crucial—indeed vital—concept that binds together
the larger trajectory of Foucault’s thought, and therefore set forth the claim that resistance
might subsequently allow for a new reading of Foucault’s collected works. Utilizing the
framework provided by the intersection between “critique” and the “art of not being
governed” developed throughout this chapter in order to both outline a unique relation
between anarchism and Foucault, as well as a general framework from which the notion
resistance is understood as an internal and ineliminable aspect of political theory, the
following chapter is set to further elucidate and situate the concept of resistance as the
central problem elaborated in Foucault’s analytic of power. More specifically, in the
following chapter, it is my contention that what must be at stake in attempt to open the
space for political theory and praxis situated at the horizon of governmentality, hinges on
elaborating Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from the first volume of the History of
Sexuality as the principle of intelligibility through which the questions of power and
politics emerge as a unique paradigm of resistance.
Although Foucault does not explicitly draw the connection between his
genealogy of being critical and what I will outline in the following chapter as the primacy
of resistance, the dynamic between governmentalization and “critique” echoes the
dynamic between power and resistance first sketched in the History of Sexuality. As I
argue in the following chapter, Foucault’s thesis which posits that resistance must be
understood as primary with power, incorporates a radical claim which reverses the
essential being-political of politics. Taking the permanent interplay between
governmentality and resistance as the very substance of politics, Foucault provides an
alternative analytic grid or principle of intelligibility for a critical theory of the political
which, in locating the question of resistance as the vital component of politics, reverses
the paradigms of orthodox political theory. As such, whereas this chapter was set to
outline the ways in which Foucault creates the philosophical and political framework
from which to situate the concept of resistance as the vital principle through which the
political can be understood anarchically, the following chapter more directly addresses
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Foucault’s theory of resistance—what I will elaborate as the primacy of resistance—as
the hidden locus for political thought and politics.
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Chapter 4
4

The Primacy of Resistance

If societies persist and live, that is, if the powers that be are not “utterly absolute,” it is
because, behind all of the submissions and coercions, beyond the threats, the violence,
and the intimidations, there is the possibility of that moment when life can no longer be
bought, when the authorities can no longer do anything, and when, facing the gallows
and the machine guns, people revolt.669
In order for power relations to come into play, there must be a certain degree of freedom
on both sides…This means that in power relations there is necessarily the possibility of
resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance (of violent resistance, flight,
deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation), there would be no power
relations at all.670
--Michel Foucault
In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea of “critique” as a vital concept within
Foucault’s critical lexicon, and argued that through this concept Foucault both introduces
the notion of resistance as the key concept developed throughout his thought, as well as
the constituent component from which the field of the political can be rethought
anarchically. More specifically, it was my contention that Foucault’s anarchaeological
approach to the study of governmentality and the corresponding ethos of “critique”
reveals a preliminary framework for developing what I refer to as an anarchist hypothesis
of the political in which the history of government is simultaneously parallel with the
counter-historical movements of resistance manifest in terms of an “art of not being
governed.” Against the history of political thought which traditionally reduces both
politics and the terms of the political to the paradigm of government and the primacy of
the state, the ways in which the political might be rethought in terms of a permanent and
ongoing struggle between the art of governing and the art of not being governed is
Foucault’s greatest contributions to the history of political philosophy. With the notion
of “critique” as such designating the philosophical framework for Foucault’s critical

669

Michel Foucault, “Useless to Revolt?” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. James D.
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 449-450.
670
Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Ethics, Subjectivity,
and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997),
292.

239

inquiries into the studies of power, politics, and governmentality, the corresponding
question of resistance is what helps formulate a unique solidarity between Foucault and
anarchist theory. Indeed, consequent upon the ways in which the analytic and material
framework for political theory traditionally affords primacy to the problematic of
government, the importance of Foucault’s intervention within anarchist political theory
arises in both his critical exploration of a history of politics conditioned by resistance
while at the same time redefining and locating the basis for a critical inquiry into the
domain of the political from the perspective of resistance. Taking seriously the notion
that an alternative theory of the political—indeed an anarchist hypothesis of the
political—can be made in regard to the question of resistance, what is at stake in this
chapter is that such a theory ultimately first finds its basis in Foucault’s fifth thesis on
power as initially proposed in The History of Sexuality.
Utilizing the theoretical space of the anarchist hypothesis of the political, this
chapter discusses Foucault’s important contribution to the often neglected questions
pertaining to the relationship between politics, power, and resistance. Taking the
permanent interplay between power and resistance as the principle of intelligibility of the
power and politics, this chapter argues that Foucault’s analytic of power in The History of
Sexuality posits what I refer to as the primacy of resistance, in which the question of
politics is reinvigorated and made possible only insofar as resistance is to be understood
as a vital, permanent characteristic of power. In rereading Foucault’s analytic of power
from the perspective of resistance, the approach taken in this chapter goes against much
of the conventional literature written on the question of power in The History of
Sexuality. Standard interpretations generally read the text as pertaining to Foucault’s
ongoing “process of rethinking his analysis of modern power,”671 and further that
“Foucault’s key claim” in The History of Sexuality is that “mechanisms of power in the
West have been profoundly transformed” into what is referred to for the first time in this
text as “biopower.”672 Thus, in their influential reading of Foucault, Dreyfus and
Rabinow maintain that the “two interconnected concepts around which Foucault
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organizes his writings in the 1970s are the repressive hypothesis and bio-technico-power”
(original emphasis).673 While it is incontestable that Foucault situates his thought in The
History of Sexuality at the intersection between these theories of power, it is my
contention that standard interpretations often neglect to notice how his changing analytic
of power in this text is fundamentally framed within the context of rethinking the
question of resistance amongst this dynamic, and further how the question of resistance
ultimately changes how power can be conceived. Indeed, although the importance of the
concept of “biopower” for Foucault should not be underestimated, the attention given by
scholars to the final chapter, “The Right of Death and the Power over Life,” has
overshadowed the importance Foucault attributes to the theory of resistance underlying
his changing analytic of power at this time. As I will argue, insofar as resistance is
understood by Foucault as a constituent component of power and politics, then a critical
theory of the political can no longer rely on the paradigms of government and sovereignty
as the basic point of departure for the study of politics and power relations as such.
Rather than reducing Foucault’s work in The History of Sexuality to question of
“biopower,” the general focus of this chapter is to demonstrate, to the contrary, how
Foucault’s radical inscription of resistance into the dynamic field of power relations
ultimately changes the way in which power and politics can be conceived.
Against reducing the problem of resistance to the question of power, as is often
the case in readers of Foucault, the basic theme of this chapter is neither to simply affirm
the place of resistance in Foucault’s thought, nor to trace the use of the concept
chronologically throughout his work. Instead, the central goal of this chapter is twofold:
to demonstrate how Foucault’s analytic of power in The History of Sexuality vitally turns
upon an alternative critical theory of resistance that acts as the conceptual nexus from
which the question of power can be rethought agonistically, and to further explicate how
this theory of resistance as such directly corresponds with an alternative principle of
intelligibility for an anarchist theory of the political. After addressing the critical
reception of Foucauldian resistance from which my own reading intervenes, I first attend
to the critical and theoretical context surrounding The History of Sexuality in order to
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demonstrate how the critique of sovereignty that marks the pivotal turning point of
Foucault’s analytic of power itself turns upon reinvigorating the question of resistance
amongst this analytic. Here, I maintain that Foucault’s text is itself framed not in terms
of rethinking the general problem of power, but as a fundamental way to rethink the
question of resistance often neglected in traditional theories of power.
With this is mind, I then trace and explicate Foucault’s work regarding the critical
question of resistance as initially broached in the fifth thesis on power in The History of
Sexuality, amongst other key texts and lectures, in order to demonstrate how Foucault’s
analytic of power ultimately reveals the logic of the primacy of resistance at its base. As
I will demonstrate, Foucault’s fifth thesis at once has the strategic effect of transforming
the traditional notions of power and politics, while further offering a novel reading of the
question of resistance. Placing specific emphasis on Foucault’s fifth thesis, my intention
is to outline certain theses on resistance which might act as a preliminary framework for
beginning to transcend the Aristotelian and Schmittian theories of the political, while
further tracing how the primacy of resistance allows for a unique connection to be drawn
with anarchist political theory. With the rationale of the primacy of resistance acting as
the conceptual hinge from which to read the coinciding problematics of power and
politics, this chapter ultimately explores how Foucault in turn offers a radically new
perspective from which to begin to read the structure and form of the political as a
permanent sphere of agonistic struggle between power and resistance. As we will see, by
beginning to rethink the general problematic of power through the question of resistance,
Foucault discovers a new logic for political theory that can be described as the critical
transition from the principle of an archē in which the question of politics is reduced to the
problematic of governmentality and the logic of the state, to that of an agōn, wherein
resistance designates the constituent component through which the fields of power and
the political emerge. 674 A critical explanation of the primacy of resistance and its
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relation to the elaboration of an anarchist hypothesis of the political is therefore the
essential task of this chapter.

4.1

Critical Reception of Foucauldian Resistance

Although I am not the first to speak of the problem of resistance in Foucault’s thought,
the literature regarding the question of resistance is rather minute in comparison to the
volumes of work dedicated to the problem of power. For those critical commentators
who have engaged with the question of resistance, even the most generous of his critics
have never agreed upon the validity of the concept of resistance, nor have they outlined
its significance in relation to political theory. As one commentator points out, “any
reasonable interpretation of Foucauldian resistance will necessarily have a large amount
of indeterminacy.”675 To be sure, the question of resistance remains one of the more
misunderstood, underestimated, and contested concepts in all of Foucault’s critical
lexicon. Some of the ambiguity derives from the ways in which Foucault appears to
dedicate a stronger focus to the concept of “power” within his work, while only
occasionally engaging with the problem of resistance as an afterthought to his analytics
of power and governmentality. Thus, the most common conviction held by his critics is
that “Foucault’s conceptualization of resistance is truncated compared to his work on
power because he did not study resistance historically in as much detail as power.”676 In
his study of Foucault’s place in the history of political theory, Kelly similarly indicates
that “if Foucault’s remarks on power are schematic, his remarks on resistance are merely
suggestive.”677 To be sure, a large portion of the literature regarding Foucauldian
resistance and the subsequent theory that surrounds it have regularly continued to reduce
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the question of resistance in Foucault’s work to a theoretical flaw inconsistent with his
general analytic of power and governmentality.
While it is true (at least to a certain extent) that Foucault does not undertake a full
study of the question of resistance in the same way that he does for power, the general
problematic of resistance, however, traverses the core of Foucault’s thought. A close
reading of Foucault’s texts, lectures, and interviews throughout the 1970s and early 1980s
reveals a strong engagement with the question of resistance, as well as a rich history
regarding the ways in which these forms of resistance are expressed as an art of not being
governed. To be sure, as I will argue throughout this chapter, resistance designates the
conceptual hinge required for a full understanding of Foucault’s analytic of power. In
this way, arguments pertaining to the way in which Foucault’s theory of power truncates
his discussion of resistance, as discussed by critics such as Simons, tend to neglect a
critical dimension of Foucault’s thought.678 In light of these concerns, one of the goals of
this chapter is to demonstrate the possibility of a novel reading of the question of
resistance in Foucault’s thought. Rather than failing to account for its possibility
amongst his analytic of power, resistance, I maintain, is itself a necessary component of
Foucault’s analytics of power and governmentality without which the latter would not be
possible.
Although Foucault often emphasizes the significance of the concept and practice
of resistance as vital conceptual component to his political and ethical thought, the theory
of resistance that lies at the heart of his work is, as to be expected, one of the more
criticized and disputed areas of his thought. As feminist and Foucauldian philosopher
Johanna Oksala suggests, the concept of “resistance is one of the most contested and
divisive” concepts in Foucault’s critical thought.679 At once controversial and decisive,
the concept of resistance, it seems, appears as a theoretical impasse internal to Foucault’s
analytics of power and governmentality. On the one hand, the concept of “resistance” is
often contested on the ground that Foucault’s analytic of power is so pervasive that no
resistance to relations of power are possible, even conceptually. More generously, the
678
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concept of resistance, as Oksala argues, ought to be understood as a central component of
Foucault’s thought and is therefore decisive insofar as it is the very “key to understanding
what power is about.”680 While Foucault’s critics tend to focus on the question of power
while disregarding an genuine credit to his theory of resistance, this chapter explores and
affirms the idea that Foucault’s analytics of power can only be understood on condition
of resistance.
Given that much of the literature on Foucault’s theory of resistance often repeats
(albeit with slight variations) similar shared concerns, the most commonly emphasized
areas of concern can be placed into three common criticisms. The first, and most
frequently reiterated, criticism directed at the question of Foucauldian resistance argues
that, given the analytic of power as developed in both Discipline and Punish and The
History of Sexuality, Foucault cannot explain (either conceptually or practically) how it is
possible to engage in resistance to the very forms of power outlined in his genealogical
studies. Taking what Foucault refers to in The History of the Sexuality in terms of the
“omnipresence of power”681 as an example of his failure to account for the possibility of
resistance, critics such as Habermas682 and Thomas McCarthy683 traditionally argue that
Foucault’s conception of theory of resistance is both theoretically and practically selfrefuting. Furthermore, following in the wake of Habermas, more recent critics such as
Kevin Anderson,684 John Holloway,685 and Slavoj Žižek686 claim that Foucault’s theory
of resistance therefore lacks a critical conception of emancipation whereby a subject
might be able to escape a certain relation of power, and subsequently maintain that his
account of resistance cannot, under pain of contradiction, allow for a critical
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conceptualization of freedom. The second traditional area of criticism problematizing the
question of resistance in Foucault’s thought claims that his theory deceptively lacks a
normative framework to describe why resistance is to be preferred over submission.
Here, theorists such as Fraser,687 Hartstock,688 and Pickett689 argue that Foucault comes
close to positing the absolute necessity of resistance without regard to any normative or
ethical basis from which resistance as such might be justified, and furthermore that he
cannot provide an answer pertaining to the question of why one might choose to resist in
a given circumstance. Finally, despite Foucault’s consistent arguments against an
underlying essentialism hidden in his analytics of power and resistance, Colin Gordon
maintains that Foucault’s conception of resistance implicitly relies upon a transcendental
substance of being-resistance, or agonal subjectivity that always underlies relations of
power.690
While these areas often form the general locus from which Foucault’s theory of
resistance is found to be critically inadequate, the work engaged in outlining a critical
analysis of a Foucauldian theory of resistance has nevertheless only scarcely been
outlined. There have been, however, a few notably affirmative readings of the concept of
resistance in Foucault’s thought. Briefly exploring these alternative readings is useful in
providing the critical framework for my own affirmation of Foucauldian resistance, while
further outlining a theoretical basis from which to overcome the core concerns
traditionally invoked to disprove the possibilities afforded by a Foucauldian theory of
resistance. Perhaps the first reading that directly engages with and affirms the question
of resistance in Foucault’s thought can be found in Gilles Deleuze’s text Foucault
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originally published just a few short years after his friend and colleague’s death in 1984.
Organized around the guiding theme of Foucault’s philosophy—that is, of “thinking
otherwise”691—the strength of Deleuze’s text arises in the way that he highlights how
each of the three major themes (knowledge, power and subjectivation) in Foucault’s work
all appear to turn upon the question of resistance. In Deleuze’s reading, particularly the
second section of his study, the notion of resistance is found to be a central component of
Foucault’s triadic problematization of knowledge, power and subjectivation, and is one of
the more continuously cited concepts developed throughout the text.692 It should come as
no surprise, then, that Deleuze reads Foucault’s work as extended critical commentary
regarding the practical and conceptual problem of resistance in the history of political
theory. For Deleuze, a critical reading of Foucault’s collected works appears to turn on
the following set of critical questions:
[w]hat is our light and what is our language, that is to say, our ‘truth’ today?
What powers must we confront, and what is our capacity for resistance, today
when we can no longer be content to say that the old struggles are no longer worth
anything? And do we not perhaps above all bear witness to and even participate
in the ‘production of a new subjectivity’? Do not the changes in capitalism find
an unexpected ‘encounter’ in the slow emergence of the Self (sic) as a center of
resistance?693
In a manner that invokes the core logic of Foucault’s fifth thesis on power, Deleuze views
Foucault’s work as being critically centered upon the dual question that at once asks
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“[w]hat powers must we confront, and what is our capacity for resistance?”694 Indeed,
Deleuze’s text is notable in that it offers one of the first preliminary statements that
begins to reveal the logic of the primacy of resistance. Attested to by its permanence
within the field of force relations to which power refers, Deleuze maintains that the
following conclusion can be drawn from Foucault’s analytic of power: in its irreducibility
to the field of power, “the final word on power is that resistance comes first” (original
emphasis).695 Indeed, it is in Deleuze that the logic of the primacy of resistance is first
understood as a key focal point in Foucault’s thought, and the intention of this chapter to
further explore this gesture toward the primacy of resistance.
As a corollary to the above, Jon Simons provides a brief outline of the
fundamental dependence of power on resistance, ultimately suggesting that “power
relations do not exist when the struggle ceases, when there is no resistance to the strategy
of government from the actions of others.”696 Indeed, Simons highlights what can be
referred to as the agonistic specificity inherent to Foucault’s analytic of power; relations
of power can only be conceptualized as such in relation to the forms of struggle animated
in movements of resistance against power. To address this question of how power
depends on the permanence of resistance requires invoking the logic of the primacy of
resistance as the conceptual nexus key to Foucault’s agonistic conception of power.
More recently, in his text The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, Kelly dedicates a
rare full chapter to the question and general problematic of resistance, and offers one of
the more definitive and comprehensive readings affirming its place in Foucault’s
thought.697 What is particularly significant about Kelly’s chapter is that it is effectively

694

Ibid, 115.
Ibid, 89.
696
Jon Simons, “Power, Resistance, and Freedom,” 309.
697
See: Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 105-123. Kelly’s work in this text is significant
insofar as it offers one of the more extensive analyses of Foucault’s fifth thesis and its place amongst his
overall thought. Indeed, Kelly remarks, that although the concept of resistance is reinvigorated in relation
to different areas of emphasis in Foucault’s thought, the fifth thesis as initially proposed in The History of
Sexuality is the “definitive statement from Foucault about resistance,” and thus one that “he never
abandons” (106). While his work is useful in highlighting the importance of resistance to Foucault’s
general analytic of power, Kelly’s focus often diverges from Foucault in order to invoke the fifth thesis as
making a fundamental claim toward a theory of “vitalism” that is must more akin to Deleuze than
Foucault. Thus, Kelly writes that the “power-resistance dyad is a mutation of organic life, which is itself a
negentropic moment in the physical history of the universe: as such, the universe itself contains the germ
of resistance” (117). In this way, Kelly often neglects the development of the question of resistance in
695

248

the first full commentary dedicated to a critical exploration of Foucault’s fifth thesis from
The History of Sexuality. Taking seriously the significance of the question of resistance
Posed in The History of Sexuality, Kelly maintains that Foucault “never abandons this
conception,” and thus that it is the “definitive statement from Foucault about
resistance.”698 Kelly’s work ought therefore to be understood as offering key insight into
the ways in which the fifth thesis on power continued to influence and shape Foucault’s
thought throughout his work, as well as how the concept of resistance allows us to read
Foucault in new ways. Yet, although Kelly recognizes the vital importance of the
concept of resistance in Foucault’s theory of power, his work, like many before,
mistakenly denies that any connection can be made between this theory of resistance and
anarchism.699
The advent of postanarchist critical theory particularly the work of anarchist and
philosopher, Todd May, has significantly revitalized scholarly interest in the possibilities
afforded by Foucault’s theory of resistance, while formulating a preliminary conceptual
nexus from which to situate his work within the broader historical and philosophical
canon of anarchism. In his work, Between Genealogy and Epistemology, May dedicates
a full chapter to the question of resistance that both highlights its significance to
Foucault’s genealogical project while also demonstrating how the concept of resistance
allows one to theorize a radical conception of freedom and emancipation.700 For May,
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“the for-the-sake-of-which of genealogical critique is resistance, a resistance whose
contours and possibilities we must understand in order to finally grasp the genealogical
project” central to Foucault’s thought.701 The integrity of May’s work is further found in
the way in which he affirms Foucauldian resistance as the key concept required for
rethinking the question of politics at the cusp of the problem of sovereignty. “To
understand the nature of this resistance,” May emphasizes, “will be to recognize the
general of micropolitical intervention available to us in a world no longer governed solely
be means of sovereign power.”702 Furthermore, May’s text The Political Philosophy of
Poststructuralist Anarchism,703 as well as a few corresponding articles704 coupled within
ongoing research, have usefully invoked Foucault’s analytic of power in order to
contribute to a rethinking of the question of resistance posed in anarchist political theory.
To be sure, “anarchism” according to May “provides the outline of a framework within
which to understand poststructuralist political philosophy.”705 Contrastingly, however,
May also invokes poststructuralist theory as a critical and theoretical framework from
which to supplement what he refers to as the “twin assumptions” or twofold “a priori that
haunts anarchist thought.”706 Common to May’s analysis, as well as the postanarchist
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project in general, Foucault’s analytic of power and resistance is therefore invoked in
order to supplement the traditional anarchist “view of power as suppressive” with a
productive model of power that corresponds with a new critical conception of political
praxis irreducible to what May holds to be the orthodox anarchist a priori search for a
“pure, untainted source for resistance.”707 For May, then, Foucault’s analytic of power
can be used to supplement the fundamental question of resistance within anarchist theory
and practice.
While the postanarchists have made certain significant advances regarding the
question of resistance in Foucault’s thought, and have further provided key insight into
how we might read Foucault as a theorist of resistance, they have nevertheless only
gestured toward the logic of the primacy of resistance and its possible connections to
anarchism. Indeed, while such work has made significant advances toward the question
of resistance within studies of Foucault, a critical exploration of how the fifth thesis
fundamentally overturns the basic assumptions of traditional political theory in such a
way that the concept of resistance, and not that of an oikonomia, come to constitute the
paradigm specific to politics has never been written. Furthermore, while May’s work has
significantly uncovered a unique way to read Foucault’s theory of resistance through
anarchist political theory, I do not hold as May does that anarchism is haunted by either a
repressive view of power, or a transcendental conception of resistance exterior to power.
Instead, taking resistance as the key component of anarchist theory as outlined in chapter
two, I argue that Foucault’s theory of resistance ought not be understood as a supplement
to anarchist theory, but rather as the affirmation of an anarchist hypothesis of the
political. More specifically, it is my contention in what follows that invoking the logic of
resistance, rather than the paradigm of government, reveals for Foucault a critical caesura
between the political as archē and an anarchic conception of the political as agōn.

4.2 The Analytic of Power and the Turn toward the Study of
Resistance
Power is not a substance. Neither is it a mysterious property whose origin must be
delved into. Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals…The
707
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characteristic feature of power is that some men can more or less entirely determine
other men’s conduct—but never exhaustively or coercively…If an individual can remain
free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject him to government. There is
no power without potential refusal or revolt.708
--Michel Foucault
Like most political theorists, the question of power is one of the more ubiquitous
concepts in all of Foucault’s thought, and much of his work is organized as a critical
exploration of its general problematic. To be sure, the critical interrogation of the
concept of power stretches the trajectory from his early studies to his final works. The
question of power is first developed in The Birth of the Clinic regarding the problem of
the “medical gaze;”709 it is developed in Madness and Civilization in relation to the birth
of the asylum in his study of madness710—a study that is later resituated in a more
political context under heading of “psychiatric power;”711 it is shown, throughout several
different times in his work to exist in a position of non-exteriority with different forms of
knowledge—hence the term “knowledge-power;”712 it is a concept that is significantly
revamped in Discipline and Punish under what he outlines as “disciplinary power;”713 it
is with the problem of power that Foucault frames his three volumes on the study of the

708

Michel Foucault, “Omnes Et Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” 324.
Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. Alan Sheridan
(New York: Vintage, 1994), ix-xi. Although in The Birth of the Clinic Foucault lacks the critical language he
will later use to describe the interrelation between forms of perception, knowledge and relations of
power, the concept of the “medical gaze” as developed in this text ought to be understood as a
conceptual predecessor to his later work. Indeed, Foucault also draws explicit connections between the
gaze and the development of new forms of “political consciousness” (22-36).
710
See: Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans.
Richard Howard (New York: Vintage, 1988), 38-64; 65-84; 241-278.
711
Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power. Lectures at the Collège de France 1973-1974, trans. Graham
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1-18. In these lectures Foucault revisits several of the
earlier general themes found in The Birth of the Clinic, Madness and Civilization, and Discipline and Punish
and re-evaluates them amongst his changing analytic of power. As such, these lectures provide a
theoretical bridge between Foucault’s early work and the new analytic of power that would come to
shape his later thought.
712
See: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 27. Here, Foucault outlines what
he means by “power-knowledge relations,” and maintains that “power and knowledge directly imply one
another;” thus according to Foucault “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a
field of knowledge” (27).
713
See: Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 135-169. Here, Foucault traces and outlines the microphysics of
“disciplinary power” and differentiates its field and activity from the theory of sovereignty. Although the
function and scope of the problem of power is again problematized in his subsequent works, Foucault’s
work in Discipline and Punish prefigures Foucault’s theses on power as established in The History of
Sexuality (26-27).
709

252

history of sexuality, and is famously reconceived in the first volume with the neologism
“biopower.”714 Finally, the general problematic of power is shown by Foucault to be a
key focus in what he begins to consider as the paradigmatic nexus between “the
government of self and the government of others.”715 It is in this way that Kelly
determines that “[i]n a sense, all of Foucault’s work has to do with power.”716
While Foucault’s redefinition of power remains a pivotal point of departure in
much of his work, this same analytic can never to be separated from the critical question
of what Foucault refers to throughout several of his works as “resistance.” In this way,
Kelly’s claim can be amended in order to suggest that while it is true that all of
Foucault’s works involve a critical inquiry into the question of power, this also means
that all of his works pertain to the question and study of resistance as well. Thus, while
critics tend to read The History of Sexuality as Foucault’s most “theoretically
sophisticated understanding of…the exercise of power,” it is my contention that the way
in which Foucault recasts the study of resistance in this text is even more revolutionary
than his analytic of power alone.717 As we will see, although much of Foucault’s work is
centered on the general question of power, the very force of the analytic of power in The
History of Sexuality derives its specificity from theorizing the primacy of resistance as
the vital component that gives the study of power its analytic force. In this way, any
inquiry regarding the question of power in Foucault’s thought simultaneously requires a
critical investigation into the place and general question of resistance amongst this
dynamic. Indeed, it is in Foucault’s analytic of power that the very question of resistance
is renewed with particular critical force. At the same time, however, as Foucault
radically rethinks the analytic of power through the question of resistance, it is precisely
the power/resistance dynamic from which the questions of power and the political can be
interpreted anarchically. With this perspective in mind—that a critical inquiry into the
question of power is simultaneously posed with the question of resistance for Foucault,
and further that this dynamic offers a new perspective on the paradigm of the political
consequent upon the permanence of resistance—it is important to outline the theoretical
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context surrounding Foucault’s analytic of power in The History of Sexuality to
demonstrate how a critical theory of resistance forms the nexus upon which the critique
of sovereignty and the coinciding analytic of power depends.
Although Foucault previously engaged with the general problematic of power
prior to The History of Sexuality, it is often recognized that the publication of this text
coincides with a radically new analytic and methodological approach to the problem of
power situated at the limit of theories of sovereignty.718 While in Discipline and Punish
Foucault was already rethinking the basis of power against its locus in the juridical
foundation of sovereignty, the general problematic of power is renewed with particular
critical force in The History of Sexuality. As Foucault reminds his reader, the aim of his
project in The History of Sexuality is “to move less toward a “theory of power than an
‘analytics’ of power: that is, toward a definition of the specific domain formed by
relations of power, and toward a determination of the instruments that will make possible
its analysis.”719 It is in the context of defining the “specific domain” of power and the
accompanying analytic that Foucault’s project most directly intervenes in the history of
political theory. As Arnold Davidson contextualizes, if “Foucault’s central contribution
to political philosophy” is to be found in the “refinement of a new conception of power,”
this is because he puts into “question the two reigning conceptions of power.”720 First,
Davidson claims that on one side of the critical spectrum Foucault’s analytic of power
overturns “the juridical conception found in classical liberal theories,” while on the other
Foucault is found to attack “the Marxist conception organized around the notions of the
State apparatus, dominant class, mechanisms of conversion, and juridical
superstructure.”721 Indeed, under what he refers to as the “repressive hypothesis” of
power, one of Foucault’s central arguments in The History of Sexuality is that both
theories of sovereignty and Marxist reductionism tend to “mask” the concrete operations
of power in such a way that obscures “its own mechanisms.”722
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It is against, then, this critical background that Foucault’s analytic attempts to
break free from a “certain image of power-law, of power-sovereignty,” or the political
theories which assume the “theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty.”723 In Foucault,
any analysis “made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state,
the form of law… are given at the outset.”724 Political theories which locate the source of
power “in the primary existence of a central point” only consider what Foucault calls the
“terminal forms power takes.”725 For Foucault, then, in order to critically “analyze power
within the concrete and historical framework of its operation,” what is therefore required
is the construction “of an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a
code.”726 In other words, against both traditional and radical political theorists who
presuppose the primacy of the state, Foucault reveals an analytic of power and political
rationality situated at the horizon of the state.727 Moreover, in the search for a nonsovereign and non-juridical theory of power, Foucault additionally refuses to reduce the
study of power to the Marxist conception of its “economic functionality,” in which the
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role of power acts as a support for the continuation of relations of production and the
class relations that sustain them.728 This is why Foucault elaborates his analytic in terms
of a “non-economic analysis of power.”729 As Foucault clarifies in an interview from
1978, against the theories which take power as a repressive force maintained in the
sovereign center of juridical law, as well as the Marxist reduction of power to the
reproduction of relations of productions “power is that which must be explained.”730
With the critical explanation regarding the traditional question of power acting as
the basic point of departure for Foucault’s larger project in The History of Sexuality, this
is why the second chapter of the text is directly dedicated not only as is often cited to
outlining the alternative methodological approach to the question of power, but also, and
more importantly, to outlining a new analytic of power that can account for the question
of resistance amongst its dynamic. Under the heading of the aptly titled chapter
“Method” Foucault famously offers five theses on power set to at once rethink the
general problem of power at the limit of the logic of the state and the problem of
sovereignty, while simultaneously outlining the methodological framework for his
ongoing work on power at this time. Indeed, it is with these theses that we can begin to
understand the way in which Foucault’s analytic of power corresponds with an alternative
theory of the political consequent upon the primacy of resistance. Although Foucault
often returns to, with slight variations, the propositions initially set forth in The History of
Sexuality, all of them nominate five central components required for a preliminary
understanding of power relations. Thus, while the concept of “power” remains a
fundamental concept for Foucault, and is continuously redeveloped throughout the course
of his work, the original theses proposed in 1976 ought to be understood as his definitive
outline for a new methodological approach to the study of power. As we will see,
although Foucault’s analytic of power is developed as a critique of Marxist reductionism
and juridical theories of sovereign law, this same analytic contains a conceptual hinge in
which the analytic of power coincides with a critical theory of resistance which, in turn,
allows for the question of power to be understood in its agonistic specificity. Contrary to
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standard readings regarding the question of power in The History of Sexuality, it is my
contention that Foucault’s text must be read as making a fundamental claim regarding not
just the possibility of forms of resistance amongst power relations, but also the
preliminary elaboration of an alternative theory to account for its appearance within the
context of politics. In other words, what is novel in Foucault’s account is that this
analytic of power can only be conceptualized on condition of the primacy of resistance.
What is therefore at stake in Foucault’s analytic of power is to articulate the basis of a
new political rationality that presupposes the permanent dynamic between power and
resistance as the principle of intelligibility of the political.
The five theses composing Foucault’s analytic of power in The History of
Sexuality can be summarized as follows: 1.) Within the dynamic field of force relations,
power is attested to and exercised as a non-sovereign, “nonegalitarian” multiplicity of
“mobile relations”731—that is, power is not a substance that can be acquired or
overturned, but is instead what is exercised from a multiplicity of points corresponding
with other social relations; 2.) Relations of power exist in a position of non-exteriority
with other relations; in their position of non-exteriority, power relations are immanent
within other relations such as “economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual
relations,” and are therefore productive—that is, mutually reinforcing—rather than
prohibitive; 3.) Power does not presuppose an essential duality or binary division
between the “rule and the ruled,” but instead comes from and is exercised from below; 4.)
Power is “intentional” and implies a strategic relation exercised with certain aims and
tactics;732 5.) “Where there is power, there is resistance.”733 In this final thesis, Foucault
maintains that points of resistance are primary and absolutely coextensive with relations
of power. In other words, the appearance of power necessarily implies the potentiality of
resistance, and is therefore attested to by the permanence of this potential revolt.
Traditionally readers of Foucault often point to the way in which these theses mark a
critical turning point in his collective thought, and there have been numerous texts,
articles and collections exploring Foucault’s analytic of power. Nevertheless, the
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majority of these studies tend to focus on the first four propositions, while excluding, or
discounting the importance of the fifth. Thus, while Kelly maintains that this
“reconceptualization of power is generally recognized as one of Foucault’s most
important intellectual contributions,” the critical exploration of the Foucauldian analytic
of power traditionally tends to over-emphasize the first four propositions at the expense
of the question of resistance.734 To be sure, inasmuch as the publication of The History of
Sexuality is understood to correspond with a significant and vital renewal of the question
of power, it is my contention that the fifth thesis attests to a critical renewal of the
question of resistance as well.
As found in the above theses, a critical inquiry into the possible redefinition of
power need not analyze, according to Foucault, what power is in terms of a sovereign
substance, but instead examines the existence of power in terms of its strategic exercise
within the domain in which it operates. Analyzing the specific techniques of power
within the domain in which they operate constitutes the basic analytic framework for a
critical inquiry into the problematic of power for Foucault. In order to account for the
quotidian operations of power, this new preliminary analytics of power “must be
understood in the first instance,” according to Foucault, “as the multiplicity of force
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own
organization.”735 Here, Foucault importantly redefines power in terms of a relation
between forces, whereby the “domain” to which power consists designates the strategic
field in which these force relations operate. In this way, Foucault’s analytic of power in
The History of Sexuality radically dislocates power from its traditional locus within the
archic foundation of sovereignty. Rather than arising from the foundation of sovereignty,
“[p]ower relations” as Foucault maintains, “are rooted in the whole network of the
social.”736 Indeed, this is the first vital difference Foucault’s analytic notes in regard to
the traditional question of power. Instead of locating the source of power with a
sovereign entity or the logic of the state, Foucault maintains that the domain in which
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power both consists and operates takes the form of a network co-extensive with the
social.
Furthermore, what is at stake for Foucault is to redefine the exercise of power in
such a way that it cannot be simply reduced to the conception of a “juridico-discursive”
exercise of law as the constitutive essence of power.737 As Foucault writes, inasmuch as
“one schematizes power in a juridical form,” then “one defines its effects as
obedience.”738 Such an analytic is reductive for Foucault, since it presupposes a binary
representation of a sovereign “legislative power on one side, and an obedient subject on
the other.”739 Distinguishable from relations of “obedience,” the general problem of
power for Foucault is neither located within an “institution.” nor an elemental
“structure;” instead power is redefined by Foucault in The History of Sexuality as “the
name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.”740
With its emphasis on redefining power as a “complex strategical situation,” Deleuze
writes that “Foucault’s definition seems a very simple one: power is a relation between
forces, or rather every relation between forces is a power relation.”741 As Foucault
further insists in “The Subject and Power,” inasmuch as power is understood as a
multiplicity of force relations spread throughout the network of the social, the “exercise
of power is not simply a relationship between ‘partners,’ individual or collective; it is a
way in which some act on others”—that is power is redefined by Foucault as a “set of
actions upon actions,” or “conduct of conducts.”742 Thus, as an action of conduction, in
1979 Foucault further clarifies that “power is only a certain type of relation between
individuals.”743 The redefinition of power as a relation between forces, or “conduct of
conducts”—that is as the “complex strategical situation” in which power operates— has
immense consequences for political theory and forms, as Foucault writes in The History
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of Sexuality, the basic possibility to “escape from the system of the Law-and-Sovereign
which has captivated political thought for such a long time.”744
While the first four theses on power are set to dislocate the general schematic of
power from its sovereign, archic center by redefining power in terms of the force
relations immanent within the domain in which the operate, this analytic requires further
attention given to the fifth thesis in order to fully comprehend the possibility and stakes
of a non-sovereign conception of power. Although Foucault’s analytic of power is
established as a fundamental critique of sovereignty, what is at stake in the fifth thesis is
that this study of power turns upon and reveals a fundamental logic of struggle—indeed
of permanent conflict—inherent within, and constituent of, power relation as such. If
power, as opposed to “obedience” can be redefined as a relation between forces, then
what Foucault’s fifth attempts to account for is the very possibility of revolt amongst this
relation. Indeed, throughout his work, Foucault invokes and utilizes the term,
“resistance,” to denote the vital manner in which power relations cannot never be fully
stabilized into relations of obedience, but instead assume the form of an agonistic
struggle between forces. To be sure, this is why specific importance should be attached
to the question of resistance in Foucault. While the analytic of power from The History
of Sexuality is situated within the context of a critique of sovereignty, it is my contention
that Foucault’s fifth thesis highlights a critical caesura between the rationale of an archē
which has always ground the question of politics within the paradigms of sovereignty or
government and the logic of agonism, in which the concept of struggle not only
designates the sphere in which relations of power operate but, more fundamentally, the
nexus between the exercise of power and the permanent potentiality of resistance. In this
way, with reference to the fifth thesis what is at stake for Foucault is to account for a
political rationality that describes the logic of power in terms of permanent, “ceaseless
struggles and confrontations” between techniques of power and strategies of resistance.745
Rethinking the question of power in its irreducibility to the logic of sovereignty and
economic reductionism, Foucault’s point of departure from both orthodox political
philosophy and Marxist thought is therefore to demonstrate the ways in which these

744
745

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 97.
Ibid, 92.

260

previous theories of power cannot adequately “account for the intrinsic intelligibility of
conflicts” that is made possible by, and lies at the heart of, power relations.746 In other
words, what the problem of power reveals for Foucault is a logic of historical struggle in
which the concept of resistance is radically inscribed into the field of power relations
reconceived as agōn.
Thus, while Foucault’s work is to be distinguished from the rationale of
sovereignty and Marxist theories in terms of his analytic of power, this same analytic also
attempts to emphasize and rethink the place and subsequent theory of struggle—indeed,
of resistance—amongst the dynamic to which power refers. In this way, insofar as power
is taken to refer to a strategic relation of forces “one has a much better chance,” Foucault
argues, “than in other theoretical procedures of grasping the relation that exists between
power and struggles.”747 What is therefore at stake in Foucault’s analytic is not simply an
alternative grid from which power might be conceptualized, but a theory that pinpoints
and renders discernable the conflict between power and what he continuously refers to
throughout his work as “resistance.” It is precisely this conflict between power and
resistance that Foucault maintains is traditionally overlooked in previous theories,
including revolutionary traditions such as Marxism. As Foucault clarifies in an
interview, “[w]hat I find striking in the majority—if not of Marx’s texts then those of the
Marxists…is the way in they pass over in silence what is understood by struggle when
one talks of class struggle” (original emphasis).748 If as Foucault claims that “neither the
dialectic, as a logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication,
can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts” then his analytic of power and
resistance ought to read as a critique of the notion of “class struggle.”749 Indeed, the text
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itself should be understood as an attempt to account for a non-dialectic logic of conflict
within relations of power, as well as the principle of intelligibility from which the
concepts of struggle and conflict can be highlighted as the constitutive component
specific to power. It is within the context of an agonistic theory of power, that Foucault’s
theses can be fully understood, and by which the question of resistance becomes more
acute.
Although it is widely recognized that Foucault’s strategic model of power
relations and the corresponding theory of resistance is one of the key objectives in The
History of Sexuality, the full stakes of this analytic have yet to be realized. While one of
Foucault’s primary objectives is indeed to trace the “regime of power-knowledgepleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality in our world,” much of the
critical literature on this text neglects to notice that Foucault’s focus is not simply to
outline the way in which sexuality is co-extensive with relations of power/knowledge, but
instead to complicate and rethink the possibility of a critical emancipation from this very
nexus.750 As Foucault maintains in 1979, part of his project was to describe a new
rationale of power in order to contribute to a rethinking of the possibility of a critical
theory of resistance to the forms of power outlined throughout several of his works.
“Consequently,” Foucault insists,
those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to
denounce violence or criticize an institution…What has to be questioned is the
form of rationality at stake…Its inevitable effects are both individualization and
totalization. Liberation can only come from attacking not just one of these two
effects but political rationality’s very roots.751
To be sure, it is within this context of “attacking” the specific political rationality of
power, as well as a corresponding politics of resistance that Foucault’s analytic of power
most forcibly intervenes in the history of political theory.
It is in this regard that The History of Sexuality ought to be read as developing an
extended critical commentary regarding an alternative way to understand the place of
resistance amongst this changing analytic of power. Indeed, Foucault’s text is itself
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framed by the very question of resistance, and one of the principle objectives of the text
is to offer an analysis of the ways in which this alternative analytic of power more
fundamentally corresponds with a theory of resistance. From the opening section to the
final sentence of The History of Sexuality, Foucault frames his argument both within the
larger context of previous theories of liberation, as well as a corresponding theory of
resistance consequent upon his new analytic of power. In the opening section of the text
Foucault extensively questions theories of liberation that assume a “repressive
hypothesis” of power, and argues that what “sustains our eagerness to speak of sex in
terms of repression is doubtless this opportunity to speak out against the powers that be,
to utter truths and promise bliss, to link together enlightenment, liberation and manifold
pleasures.”752 Presupposing the “repressive hypothesis” of power, the accompanying
theory of liberation can only be accounted for, according to Foucault, in a simple gesture
that binds liberation to the same logic of power it attempts to overcome. Thus, in the
final pages of the work, after posing the possibility of a “different economy of bodies and
pleasures” that might one day sever its nexus the forms of power sustaining this economy
of bodies through the deployment of sexuality, Foucault closes the text with the following
critique: “[t]he irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our “liberation” is in
the balance.”753
It is because Foucault frames his text in terms of the question of possible
emancipation, that a specific subtext referring to and regarding the question of resistance
can be revealed as one of the central goals of this work. Yet, while Foucault’s text is
framed in the context of emancipatory theories of liberation, he nevertheless clarifies that
the term, liberation is itself inadequate to account for the logic of struggle inherent
amongst power relations. “I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of
liberation,” Foucault maintains, “because if it is not treated with precautions…one runs
the risk of falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature or base…concealed,
alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression.”754 For Foucault, then,
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“the practice of liberation is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom”
required in a theory of resistance.755 Yet, Foucault is also suspicious of the term
revolution in a similar manner. For Foucault, one of the problems with the concept of
“revolution” is that it constitutes a “gigantic effort to domesticate revolts within a rational
and controllable history.”756 With this critical framework in mind, the subtext that runs
parallel to and stretches the entire trajectory of The History of Sexuality, is set to pose the
critical question pertaining to the ways in which one might rethink the possibility of a
critical emancipation from relations of power neither in terms of “liberation,” nor
“revolution,” but as the permanent possibility of resistance amongst the dynamic field of
power.
It is in this way that we might read Foucault’s analytic of power as making a key
contribution not simply to political theory in terms of an alternative analytic of power,
but to radical political theory as well in terms of rethinking through the possibility of a
critical theory of resistance to power. By analyzing the question of emancipation in
terms of resistance instead of the traditional Marxist theories of contradiction and
dialectical class struggle, Foucault attempts to provide an alternative way to understand
the concept of struggle without reducing it to either “class struggle,” or “revolution.” As
Foucault writes elsewhere, his own question of resistance ought to be distinguished from
the ways in which “in order to think struggle, the ‘revolutionary’ thought of the
nineteenth century adopted the logical form of contradiction” (original emphasis).757 It is
in the context of 19th and 20th century revolutionary thought—both Marxist (and some
anarchist thought to a lesser extent)—that Foucault asks “[a]re there no great radical
ruptures, massive binary divisions, then?”758 While Foucault acknowledges the
historicity of revolution, he nevertheless concludes that his focus is to be directed towards
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that “transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in society that shift about.”759
In other words, while Foucault’s fifth thesis is not set to deny the possibility of
revolution, his thought does however point toward the ways in which the concept of
resistance, and not the traditional notions of revolution or class struggle, might constitute
the locus from which to rethink the project of radical politics. Yet, although Foucault
emphasizes that the project of radical politics ought to rethink its connection to the
domain of the political and its consequent forms of political struggle in terms of
resistance rather than revolution, this thesis is not set to radically deny the possibility of a
total revolution. Instead, in the passage immediately following his fifth thesis on power
Foucault writes that “it is doubtless the strategic codification of the points of resistance
that makes a revolution possible.”760 Nevertheless, while Foucault acknowledges that
varying points of resistance might be coordinated to form a revolution, it is precisely in
regard to this codification of revolt that he suggests begins to connect revolutionary
theory to the logic of the state. Indeed, inasmuch as points of resistance can be
coordinated into a revolution, the revolutionary process, Foucault laments, is “somewhat
similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power
relations.”761
While Foucault’s critique of revolutionary logic and its similarities to the logic of
the state will be dealt with more extensively in chapter 6, what is key for Foucault is that
what traditional forms of radical politics tend to ignore in favor of revolutionary theory,
are the “transitory points of resistance” effectively producing ruptures and substantial
changes within the field of power. This is to say that what is at stake for Foucault is that
revolutionary theory cannot in itself account for the wide variety of forms of struggle
dispersed amongst the dynamic field of power relations. Indeed, rather than attempting
to understand the question of struggle and conflict in terms of revolution, Foucault
suggests both that the question of historical struggle can be more clearly understood in
terms of a politics of resistance rather than revolution. In other words, while Foucault
does not deny the possibility of a revolutionary politics he does point toward the way in
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which resistance, more often than revolution, is what produces radical ruptures and
transformations within society.
It is within the context of significantly renewing a critical theory of historical
struggle that Foucault’s critical inquiry into the question of power in The History of
Sexuality must be read as revitalizing the question of resistance with particular force. To
be sure, the subtext running the length of the text is set to demonstrate that when power is
no longer conceived in its traditional sovereign form, then any theory of liberation from,
or resistance to, power is found to require a corresponding reevaluation. Indeed, it is the
very possibility of a theory of resistance that forms the basis of what Foucault refers to as
the “historico-political question” against the “repressive hypothesis.”762 In other words,
the stakes of the “repressive hypothesis” Foucault uses as a critical foil for his inquiry
into the problematic of power, is ultimately theorized in order to rethink the question of
resistance against the traditional totalizing logic of revolutionary theory. For Foucault,
then, the critical question that needs to be posed in relation to this analytic of power is
directly situated within the context of resistance:
Did the critical discourse [read revolutionary theory] that addresses itself to
repression come to act as a roadblock to a power mechanism that had operated
unchallenged up to that point, or is it not in fact part of the same historical
network as the thing it denounces (and doubtless misrepresents) by calling it
repression?763
Here, Foucault poses two interrelated problems pertaining to the question of resistance in
regard to the “repressive hypothesis” of power. First, Foucault questions the possibility
and efficacy of a theory of liberation posed under the assumption of power acting in
accordance with the exercise of legal prohibition. When power is taken as that which
represses, this gives rise to the idea that liberation can only be obtained through a struggle
with the external forces of oppression. Liberation from power as such remains caught
within the representation of power it attempts to escape in as much as it does not take into
account or criticize the archic principle that conforms power to the form of law. Indeed,
if as Foucault maintains that in its non-sovereign form, power is not exercised solely in
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terms of legal rights, then resistance to power cannot invoke the same logic of legal rights
as a platform for transformation. Without taking into account the very principle that
reduces relations of power to its juridical foundation, previous theories of liberation,
according to Foucault, have historically failed to form an adequate “roadblock” to power
itself.
Foucault’s second point of criticism is, however, even more insidious and is set to
strike at the heart of the most radical theories of liberation throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries. On the one hand, Foucault has in mind the problem of revolutionary
vanguardism, in which a revolution can only be achieved by conquering or overthrowing
state power. Revolutionary vanguardism and the classical Marxist project therefore
remain bound, according to Foucault, to the “same historical network as the thing it
denounces.” A revolutionary project that presupposes the repressive hypothesis of power
tends to view power as a substance that can be captured and manipulated in accordance
with the process of revolution. In other words, if power is understood in terms of a
central source such as the state, then as May observes it is possible for some to form a
vanguard or party from which to “lead the resistance against the power relationships of
that site.”764 Yet, as May further observes, if Foucault understands power as a creative
and not solely oppressive force, then relations of power give “rise not only to that which
must be resisted,” but also to the “forms resistance itself often takes.”765 For May,
insofar as “power creates its own resistance,” then one of Foucault’s central claims is that
the “liberation from specific forms of power must take account of the kind of resistance
that is being engaged in, on pain of repeating that which one is trying to escape.”766 As
May points toward, here, Foucault wants to rethink the problem of resistance in such a
way that the very possibility of “liberation” cannot ultimately turn upon the eternal return
of the logic of the state. Consequently, what Foucault ultimately reveals with equal and
particular significance is a fundamental reevaluation not only of the question and theory
of resistance, but its very possibility amongst a dynamic of forces. In this way, while
Foucault’s analytic of power is to be clearly distinguished from both Marxist and liberal
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theories, this same analytic contributes to an alternative theory of resistance clearly
distinguishable from previous revolutionary theories of liberation. As we will see,
against traditional conceptions of power Foucault’s analytic of power takes as its key
component, the question of resistance, while further renewing its significance in a
radically different manner than previous theories and discourses of revolution.
If the question of resistance is glossed over by the study of power, this is often
due to, as May suggests, a critical failure to acknowledge that power as found in the fifth
thesis “is only one half of a two pole relationship, power/resistance, in which force is
always pitted against force.”767 To be sure, insofar as the possibility of resistance
amongst relations of power is what Foucault maintains allows for power to be
distinguished from relations of obedience and domination, then the fifth thesis appears as
the conceptual hinge upon which the analytic of power fundamentally depends. For
Kelly, then, “Foucault’s reconception of power,” simultaneously coincides with and
“requires a reexamination of resistance.”768 In other words, insofar as Foucault uncovers
a new analytic of power in The History of Sexuality, the very study of power renders the
problem of resistance more acute. A closer investigation of this two-pole relationship
between power and resistance and the subsequent challenges this poses to both traditional
political theory as well as theories of liberation is therefore required. It is my contention
that Foucault’s fifth thesis on power ought to attain a valorized position in regard to the
other theses insofar as it is found to be required for the possibility of relations of power.
Furthermore, Foucault’s fifth thesis is his most decisive statement regarding the problem
of resistance and one that he never abandons, continuously modifying throughout the
final periods of his work. Foucault’s thesis regarding the primacy of resistance therefore
reveals the limit of traditional theories of the political, and uncovers a new way to read
the problem of politics in such a way that transcends the paradigms of Aristotle and
Schmitt. This unique relation between power and resistance has the effect of revising the
traditional conceptions of both power and resistance, and thus offers key insight into
formulating the basic tenets of an anarchist hypothesis of the political.
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4.3

On the Primacy of Resistance

Where there is power, there is resistance…these points of resistance are present
everywhere in the power network.769
--Michel Foucault
In the above discussion regarding the critical context surrounding the analytic of power in
The History of Sexuality, we have seen how Foucault frames the general argument not
simply in terms of a non-sovereign theory of power, but in terms of retheorizing the
possibility of a theory of resistance amongst this dynamic. Instead of bracketing the
concept of resistance to the study of power, we must now turn to a more detailed critical
examination of Foucault’s fifth thesis in order to reveal the way in which it posits the
logic of the primacy of resistance. Of the five theses outlined in the second chapter of
The History of Sexuality the final is the most copious, and Foucault dedicates a
significant amount of space to exploring the general question of resistance, as well as its
consequent implications. If Foucault’s fifth thesis requires more space than the previous
four, this is because it has the effect of rethinking the traditional concepts of both power
and resistance in such a way that challenges the basic political rationality that lies at the
heart of Western political theory. Although the concept of power is commonly given a
valorized status in political thought, Foucault’s work suggests an uncommon, opposing
viewpoint that asserts a uniquely co-extensive dynamic relation between power and
resistance. A critical recognition of the primacy of resistance within the dynamic to
which power refers and consists, allows for a new perception of the political and clarifies
its possibility as the basis for an anarchist hypothesis of the political.
Given the way in which this thesis and the subsequent passage that follows
designate Foucault’s most definitive statement regarding a critical inquiry into the
question of resistance, as well as the amount of time Foucault spends here on exploring
several subsequent consequences in regard to the general problematic of resistance, a full
citation of this key passage is required in order to understand the full scope and
complexities of the argument. In what appears as a one of the more essential, critical
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commentaries within the history of political philosophy, Foucault’s fifth thesis on power
reads as follows:
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. Should it be
said that one is always “inside” power, there is no “escaping” it, there is no
absolute outside where it is concerned, because one is subject to the law in any
case? This would be to misunderstand the strictly relational character of power
relationships. Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance:
these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations.
These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence
there is no single locus of great Refusal (sic), no soul of revolt, source of all
rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there are a plurality of
resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary,
improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or
violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by
definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations. But this
does not mean that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to
the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to
perpetual defeat. Resistances do not derive from a few heterogeneous principles;
but neither are they the lure or a promise that is necessarily betrayed. They are
the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible
opposite. Hence they too are distributed in irregular fashion: the points, knots, or
focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times
mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of
the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behavior. Are there no great
radical ruptures, massive binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But more
often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing
cleavages in society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings,
furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remolding them,
marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds. Just as the
network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through
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apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so too the
swarm points of resistance traverses social stratifications and individual unities.
And it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that
make a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies
upon the institutional integration of power relationships.770
As attested to in density and length there are many significant claims, factors, and
consequences Foucault wants to point his audience toward that might act as a preliminary
outline for an analytic of power that can account for the place of resistance amongst its
dynamic. It is my contention that this thesis and the subsequent passage ought to read as
making a vital statement and critique not only of the traditional paradigms of political
theory, but also on the condition of radical political theory. The central claim here, of
which the rest of this passage explores in greater depth, is “[w]here there is power, there
is resistance,” and consequently that this resistance is therefore “never in a position of
exteriority in relation to power.” While the first part of this thesis posits that resistance is
primary with power, the latter affirms that this position of primacy is itself attested to by
a principle of non-exteriority in relation to the dynamic field of power. Taken together,
these two components form the general logic of what I refer to as the primacy of
resistance, a specific rationale in which the question of politics can be understood in its
anarchic and agonistic specificity.
In its most preliminary form, Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of strategically
reworking the traditional concepts of both power and resistance in such a way that the
field of the political can neither be reduced to the paradigms of government and
sovereignty outlined in chapter one. In regard to the question of power, the fact that
resistance is primary with power radically disrupts the theory regarding the sovereignty
of power as an absolute unto itself, and thus reveals an alternative paradigm opposed to
the theories based in the political thought of Hobbes and Schmitt. It is in this way that
the fifth thesis can first be understood as making a vital statement on the radical
dislocation of the place of power from its position of sovereignty in regard to the logic of
the state—that is, the fact that resistance is primary amongst power relations radically
modifies the way in which power has traditionally been conceptualized according to
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Foucault. Without the logic of an archē acting as the basis from which a critical theory of
power can be conceptualized, Foucault’s thesis first demonstrates that relations of power
are made possible and can only be understood on condition of resistance. What is
therefore first at stake within this dynamic is that resistance is situated in a position of
primacy with respect to power—that is, “[w]here there is power, there is resistance”
means that the domain to which power consists radically coincides with the permanence
of resistance. Rather than presupposing the sovereignty of the state as the archic
foundation of power, Foucault’s thesis demonstrates that the site of power is both
theoretically and materially coupled with the site of resistance. Resistance is therefore
primary with power, according to Foucault, since it designates a permanent component
and condition of possibility for relations of power as such. In its position of primacy,
however, resistance is a permanent feature of relations of power, and yet is never exterior
to this dynamic. Foucault’s thesis thus asserts a principle of non-exteriority with regard
to resistance.
Although the two parts composing this thesis are directly interrelated, each needs
to be investigated on its own terms in order to fully understand the complexities
regarding how the primacy of resistance forms the nexus from which the analytic of
power and the domain of the political can be fundamentally rethought. In this way,
Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of fundamentally challenging the traditional
conceptions of power and resistance, while corresponding with a new framework for
political theory from which to rethink the problem of politics as a coinciding field of
struggle between the two. In order to rethink the very question of politics against the
paradigm of government and the sovereign logic of the state, it is therefore crucial to
understand the ways in which power as posed by Foucault in The History of Sexuality
ought to be understood on condition of resistance. Foucault’s thesis “[w]here there is
power, there is resistance,” is not an isolated claim, and different variations with slight
altercations appear at several different points throughout his thought and work. It is by
demonstrating the ways in which Foucault’s fifth thesis modifies traditional conceptions
of power via resistance, that the logic of the primacy of resistance forms the pivotal point
from which an anarchist hypothesis of the political can be found.
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Rather than presupposing the problematic of sovereignty as the foundational
source of power, Foucault’s fifth thesis maintains that the very possibility of power
implies that resistance is topologically coextensive within the dynamic field to which
power functions and arises: hence “[w]here there is power, there is resistance” (my
emphasis). In this way, Foucault conceives of the dynamic between power and resistance
spatially—that is, the dynamic field to which power refers does not emerge with the
problem of sovereignty, but is instead coupled with and necessarily includes the plane of
resistance as a constituent element of power as such; the site of power for Foucault is
simultaneously the site of resistance. Indeed, this is the first way in which Foucault
begins to reveal the vital manner in which resistance is to be situated in a fundamental
position of primacy amongst the dynamic to which power refers. Insofar as Foucault
understands power as a network, coextensive with the social body, this means that the
place for resistance is found to take on a similar structure, and is therefore simultaneously
spread throughout this same dynamic. This is why in the passage immediately following
the fifth thesis Foucault writes: “[j]ust as the network of power relations ends by forming
a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly
localized within them, so too the swarm points of resistance traverses social
stratifications and individual unities.”771 Rather than failing to account for the possibility
of resistance, Foucault instead reminds us that “these points of resistance are present
everywhere in the power network.”772 Inasmuch as points of resistances are “present
everywhere” within the dynamic field to which power refers, then the very “domain” of
power coincides with and cannot be separated from the field of resistance. Consequent
upon the permanent presence of “swarm points of resistance” amongst relations of power,
this, then, is the first central claim set to rethink the problem of power parallel with the
question of resistance as posed in Foucault’s fifth thesis. The power/resistance dynamic is
attested to by a spatial topology; the historical presence of power directly corresponds
with and reveals the appearance of counter-historical movements of resistance. The field
of power is coextensive with, and can never be divorced from, the “swarm points of
resistance.”
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While Foucault asserts the primacy of resistance in terms of a spatial topology, his
thesis also points toward the ways in which resistance designates the condition of
possibility required for the emergence of power as such. Although the advent of politics
in the tradition from Hobbes to Schmitt can be conceived on condition of the eradication
of resistance, Foucault radically inverts this idea and demonstrates that the manifestation
of power relations can only be conceived on condition of resistance. This is why in
certain key moments in his work, Foucault’s reiterates this idea in order to capture this
crucial distinction. Thus, in 1982 Foucault maintains that “if there was no resistance,
there would be no power relations. Because it would simply be a matter of
obedience,”773 while elsewhere he maintains quite firmly that “there are no relations of
power without resistances.”774 In these modifications of the fifth thesis, the concept of
resistance is neither taken as a supplement to nor considered secondary in relation to
power, but that which is profoundly required in terms of its condition of possibility;
resistance is what prevents relations of power from solidifying into states of domination.
Foucault’s claim that resistance is primary with respect to power thus demonstrates both
the permanent dependence of power on resistance, as well as its permanence amongst the
dynamic to which power refers. It is in this way that Foucault’s fifth thesis can be
understood as formulating the conceptual hinge required for both the theory and
appearance of power. Distinct from relations of obedience and domination, the condition
of possibility of power is the permanence of resistance amongst the dynamic to which it
refers and operates, without which the former could not come into being; power as such
can only be understood on condition of the permanence of resistance.
While Foucault’s thesis inscribes resistance into power relations as both its
condition of possibility and constituent component, the same proposition additionally
points toward another way that we might understand the primacy of resistance. As
resistance marks out a terrain that cannot be separated from the possibility of relations of
power, the claim “[w]here there is resistance, there is power” is further set to elaborate
the question of resistance in terms of a radical potentiality of revolt. Thus, in a lecture
where Foucault critiques the forms of political rationality sustaining Western political
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thought, we find another significant variation of his fifth thesis. Foucault writes: “[t]here
is no power without potential refusal or revolt.”775 Here, the question of resistance is not
posed in terms of the dynamic between power and resistance, but rather as the radical
potentiality for revolt inherent within all relations of power. Insofar as power cannot,
according to Foucault, exist without the potentiality for revolt, Foucault’s point is to
demonstrate the ways in which “[e]very power relationship implies, at least in potentia, a
strategy of struggle.”776 In terms of this potentiality, Foucault’s fifth thesis can be
understood as developing an agonistic understanding of power, in which the condition of
possibility of power is not simply the permanent presence of resistance, but the
potentiality of resistance to transform a relation of power into a relation of struggle. In
other words, Foucault not only demonstrates how resistance is required as a condition of
power, but also how this condition is attested to in the way that power necessarily refers
to the potentiality of resistance. Resistance is primary with power insofar as the capacity
of power necessarily implies a radical potentiality of revolt—that is, the potential to
transform a power relation into a relation of struggle. Because the permanence of
resistance means that a relation of power can always be transformed into a relation of
struggle, the primacy of resistance locates a specific dimension of agonism at the center
of power relations.
Finally, critical theories seeking to locate the problem of power in “the primary
existence of a central point,” either “embodied in the state apparatus,” or in the “unique
source of sovereignty,” all fail to recognize what Foucault refers under his fifth thesis as
the “strictly relational character of power relationships.”777 Whereas, the relational
character of power as outlined in the second thesis from The History of Sexuality first
nominates the ways in which power relations do not exist in a “position of exteriority
with respect to other types of relations (economic processes, knowledge relationships,
sexual relations),” but are instead “immanent” within these relations, the fifth thesis
further complicates and extends this claim to the problem of resistance.778 Inasmuch as
Foucault speaks of a certain “knowledge/power,” the term power/resistance can be added
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to Foucault’s lexicon in order to nominate the inherent relation between power and
resistance. As Foucault further clarifies, the field of power relations might be redefined
as power/resistance since the very “existence” of relations of power “depends on a
multiplicity of points of resistance.”779 As a critical modification of the traditional
conception of power, what is at stake in the claim “where there is power, there is
resistance,” is to demonstrate an inherent and corresponding relation between power and
resistance, whereby the existence of power does not assume the principle of an archē as
its foundational basis, but instead the permanent potentiality of resistance. While the
fifth thesis can be read as the conceptual hinge required for Foucault’s analytic of power,
there is therefore a final way in which the concept of resistance is found to radically
modify the traditional conceptualization of power. A relation of power and the dynamic
field to which it refers and consists is never in a position of exteriority with respect to the
permanent potentiality of resistance; resistance is primary since it is co-extensively
relational with power relations. Consequently, the analytic of power and the dynamic
field to which it refers must be discursively and materially rewritten as power/resistance.
Yet, as a consequence to this dynamic, power relations are genuinely an-archic for
Foucault since a relation of power always implies, “in potentia,” the permanence of its
own impossibility.
There are thus four preliminary ways in which Foucault’s non-sovereign and noneconomic analysis of power relations not only vitally turns upon the question of
resistance, but also upon the unique assertion that resistance as such is situated in a
relation of primacy with power. Indeed, in addition to the non-sovereign economic
analysis of power relations, Foucault’s fifth thesis invokes the concept of resistance as the
pivotal turning point from which his analytic both begins and depends. First and
foremost, the proposition “[w]here there is power, there is resistance,” posits that the
domain in which power exists and is manifest coincides with the immanent potentiality of
resistance; resistance, in its most preliminary form, is therefore situated in a position of
primacy with respect to power. Secondly, insofar as resistance is taken as primary with
power, then the permanent presence of resistance amongst this dynamic dislocates the
sovereign, archic place of power; power does not emanate from the logic of a central
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archē, but is instead coextensive with the permanent possibility of resistance within the
domain in which power operates. In the Foucauldian sense, power as such is genuinely
an-archic since the permanent potentiality of resistance refuses the sovereign foundation
of power and therefore designates the principle whereby power relations cannot solidify
into pure relations of domination. Third, insofar as it is to be differentiated from relations
of obedience and domination, power’s condition of possibility is itself found within the
potential for resistance that marks the terrain of power as such. Strictly speaking, this
means that power cannot exist or become manifest for Foucault without the potential
condition of resistance. Finally, relations of power and the domain in which they operate
are never in a position of exteriority with respect to the possibility of resistance.
In the above analysis pertaining to the way in which Foucault’s fifth thesis
modifies the traditional conceptions of power and dislocates its place within a sovereign
center, resistance is found to exist and is theoretically situated in a position of primacy
with respect to the domain of power. By referring to a much more complex dynamic in
which resistance marks a constituent component, Foucault’s analytic of power itself
resists the transcendental and material logic of the archē as the radical foundation for
power, and therefore offers key insight into the formation of an alternative political
rationality consequent of the problematic of resistance. If resistance can be understood as
attaining a position of primacy with power to the point where the latter cannot be
conceived without regard to the potentiality of the former, what is at stake in Foucault’s
fifth thesis is that the dynamic field of power relations is necessarily coupled with the
potential field of resistance. By placing resistance in a primary relation with power
Foucault’s intention is to speak of a certain theoretical and material dependency of power
on resistance; the appearance of power can only be conceived and become manifest on
condition of the potentiality of resistance. In other words, what is ultimately at stake in
fifth thesis is that insofar as a relation of power can only exist at the points where there is
the potential possibility of resistance, then what Foucault uncovers is a radically new
basis from which to read the question of politics and the political from the perspective of
resistance.
By formulating a rupture in the logic of the archē, which has hitherto shaped the
traditional discourse for political theory, Foucault’s fifth thesis redefines power on
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condition of resistance in such a way that its position of primacy designates resistance as
both a permanent invariant of power, as well as an alternative principle of intelligibility
from which the dynamic field of power can be made discernible. By designating the
space of resistance amongst the power/resistance dynamic as a permanent invariant
inherent to power, Foucault’s fifth thesis indicates a radical rupture in the political
rationality that traditionally reduces the question of power to the logic of an archē. In
relation to the way in which the permanence of resistance radically modifies the
traditional concept of power, Foucauldian resistance as such might be better be referred
to as an anarchist invariant of power since the potentiality for revolt, which marks the
condition of possibility of power, signifies the very limit of power, of archē.
Furthermore, the question of resistance in Foucault’s thought can be understood as an
anarchist invariant of power since the permanent potentiality of resistance amongst power
relations is what, according to Foucault, prevents the field of power from becoming
reduced to the effects of both domination and obedience. By redefining the concept of
resistance as an anarchist invariant of power, what I refer to as the primacy of resistance
is set to elucidate the ways in which the potential for revolt that marks the condition of
possibility of power dislocates the place of power from its sovereign center and redefines
its domain as the agonistic field of force relations oscillating between the exercise of
power and the counter-movements of resistance.
While Foucault’s fifth thesis can be read as a critical modification of the more
traditional concepts of power in terms of the way in which he radically inscribes
resistance into its domain, this same thesis equally emphasizes a new way to rethink the
traditional question of resistance amongst this dynamic. That is, the way in which
Foucault’s fifth thesis asserts the primacy of resistance radically reveals an alternative
way to reconceive the logic of historical struggle. With the central task of redefining a
critical conception of resistance, it is now important to address how this thesis modifies
the concept of resistance by ascribing a position of primacy to it. First, despite my use of
the term “primacy” as a critical modifier for the concept of Foucauldian resistance, this
amendment is not set, however, to suggest that resistance predates, or is prior to, relations
of power. As Foucault clearly maintains, resistance “does not predate the power it
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opposes,” but is instead “coextensive with it [power] and absolutely its contemporary.”780
Similar to the way in which resistance is a condition of possibility for power, the coextensive relation Foucault draws between power and resistance means that the latter
fundamentally relies upon the form of power it opposes in order to be characterized as
such. To speak of the primacy of resistance is therefore not to suggest a space for
resistance either transcendent or prior to the existence of a relation of power, but in terms
of a contemporaneously mutual and coextensive relation between resistance and the
forms of power it opposes. Commenting of this coextensive relation between power and
resistance, Kelly suggests how the fact that resistance is primary with power “does not
mean that resistance actually is to be found wherever there is power, but rather only
implies that the potential for resistance is ever-present” (original emphasis).781 In other
words, Foucault’s claim that “where there is power, there is resistance” does not mean
that each relation of power is always and necessarily confronted by a form of resistance,
but that the prospect for such resistance must remain an inherent and permanent
possibility within the dynamic of power. At the same time as the co-extensive relation
between power and resistance designates resistance as a permanent component of power
relations, this same relation is set to demonstrate how the manifestation of forms of
resistance are directly tied to the forms of power with which it struggles. Since
resistance, as Foucault maintains, is absolutely contemporaneous with specific forms of
power, there can be no claim for a transcendental source outside of power from which
resistance becomes possible. In its position of primacy, then, Foucauldian resistance is
not to be understood as a mere reactive response to the deployment of power, but can
instead be redefined as a vital component, co-extensive with field of power as such,
whereby the term primacy denotes the permanent possibility and relational specificity of
resistance amongst power relations.
To claim that resistance is primary with power is first set designate the condition
by which a relation of power cannot be conceived or practiced without the permanent
possibility of resistance. It is by designating resistance as a permanent, and therefore
primary, component of the dynamic field of power relations, that Foucault’s fifth thesis
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begins to reveal an alternative critical conception of what is meant by the term
“resistance” in the power/resistance dynamic. Similar to the way in which the materiality
of power within Foucault’s analytic is not conceived as a “substance,” what is at stake in
the fifth thesis on power is not to posit a “substance of resistance versus a substance of
power.”782 Thus, while Foucault finds resistance to be situated in a relation of primacy,
there is “no soul of revolt” or essential substance from which this claim to primacy can be
made, but instead a “plurality of resistances” marking the permanent potential for revolt
coextensive with the domain of power.783 In this regard, while resistance is not to be
understood as an essence or “substance,” May has shown that the permanent potential for
resistance means that Foucault importantly “finds resistance to be immanent to the power
relationship.”784 Despite the fact resistance is situated in a position of primacy in terms
of its permanent and co-extensive relation with the field of power, this condition of
primacy is itself attested to by virtue of the immanence of resistance to power. To be
sure, resistance is immanent to power, according to Foucault, since the latter’s
“existence…depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance”—that is, resistance is
immanent to the field of power since its permanent potentiality marks the condition of
possibility of power as such.785 Resistance—indeed, the “plurality” of resistances—are
immanent amongst relations of power; the multiplicity of force relations composing the
domain of power coincides with the networks of resistance immanent within the field of
power.
Yet, the question of immanency amongst the power/resistance dynamic is also
found to modify the concept of resistance since its condition of possibility fundamentally
relies upon its struggle with power. In other words, the materiality of resistance relies
upon the forms of power it opposes; resistance cannot therefore be posited as a substance
transcendent or external to power, but only that which is intimately bound to the form of
power with which it struggles. Foucault’s fifth thesis thus demonstrates how the capacity
for power coincides with the immanent capacity of a counter-force realized in forms of
resistance. While it is possible to designate the primacy of resistance in terms of its
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permanent and coextensive relation with the dynamic of power relations, it is also
possible to understand the primacy of resistance in terms of its immanency. Insofar as
Foucault is understood as making a vital claim for the immanency of resistance amongst
the dynamic field of power, his fifth thesis fundamentally reveals that the historical
possibility of power is simultaneously the potential counter-history of its own
impossibility. Yet, it is precisely because Foucault finds resistance to be immanent to
power relations that the very domain in which power operates can be redefined as a
“relationship of confrontation,” or “strategy of struggle.”786 The immanency of resistance
to power reveals, for Foucault, that the domain of power—now written
power/resistance—is itself a field of agonism, of confrontations, and of forms of struggle
with the exercise of power.
Insofar as power can only exist on condition of resistance, the fact that resistance
is immanent to power means for Foucault that the domain in which power refers can
always become transformed into a strategy of struggle in which power relations might
become reversed. What Foucault refers to as “power” thus designates an agonistic field
of struggle, and his fifth thesis is set to capture this important distinction. If resistance is
immanent to the dynamic field of power relations this is due, as Foucault claims, to the
way in which the permanent potential of resistance implies how at “every moment, the
relationship of power may become a confrontation between two adversaries.”787
Foucault’s point here is to account for the ways in which a power relation can always be
transformed into a relation of “confrontation” or “struggle” consequent upon the primacy
of resistance amongst this dynamic. In other words, what makes the logic of the primacy
of resistance so crucial for Foucault is how the permanent potentiality of resistance
reveals as agonistic basis at the center of his analytic of power. In its condition of
primacy, resistance according to Foucault, is to be defined neither as a mere reactive
counter-force deployed in response to power, nor a transcendent essence external to
power; instead resistance defines the condition from which a relation of power comes up
against its own limit and can be transformed into an agonistic strategy of struggle. Since
the permanent potential of resistance marks the condition that intensifies relations of
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power to their limit points by transforming the field of power into a site of confrontation
and struggle, the very dynamic of power/resistance attested to in the fifth thesis
redesignates the field of power in its anarchic specificity—that is, as agōn.
While Foucault’s claim regarding how a relation of power can always be
transformed into a struggle seems to invoke a return to the adversarial model as found in
Schmitt’s theory of the political, Foucault’s agonistic model is to be critically
distinguished by its fundamental reference to the place of resistance amongst this
conception. While Schmitt’s theory rests on the presupposition of sovereign power—in
which the distinction between adversaries is made only in reference to the state—
Foucault, however, fundamentally reverses this claim, and maintains that the permanent
potential for revolt or primacy of resistance is what makes possible an agonistic struggle
between adversaries. Thus, unlike Schmitt who posits an adversarial model in terms of a
struggle between two nation-states, Foucault’s analytic of power instead posits that a
relation of power can only become transformed into a relation of agonism on condition of
resistance. Thus, when Foucault speaks of a “confrontation between two adversaries” he
means to designate the struggle between the art of governing on one side, and “a
confrontation with those whom one governs” on the other.788 In the previous chapter, we
saw how the history of power exercised as government historically coincides for Foucault
with the “art of not being governed.” With the primacy of resistance marking the
condition by which a relation of power can be transformed into a “confrontation with
those whom one governs,” it is clear that the power/resistance dynamic represents the
conceptual basis from which this “art of not being governed” becomes visible. In other
words, inasmuch as both power and resistance are not to be understood in terms of an
essence or substance this means, however, for Foucault that the power/resistance
dynamic ought to be analyzed in terms of an agonistic struggle between power exercised
as government and the art of not being governed.
Insofar as resistance, according to Foucault, is the agent that reveals the agonistic
dimension specific to the field of power, his fifth thesis can be read not only as a vital
attempt to account for the permanence of resistance amongst the network of power, but
also the dimension of struggle inherent to power relations as such. It is in this way that
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Foucault begins to rethink how the domain of power refers to the dynamic field in which
“between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a
perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal.”789 To be sure, Foucault’s fifth thesis is set to
highlight this “perpetual linking” or nexus between power and resistance in such a way
that highlights how the primacy of resistance marks the principle of intelligibility from
which power can be analyzed as an agonistic struggle between power exercised as
government and the art of not being governed. Against the criticism that Foucault’s
analytic of power cannot account for the possibility of resistance, the fifth thesis clarifies
how resistance is permanently inscribed as an immanent and vital component to the
domain in which power operates. Yet, Foucault takes this a step further and argues that it
is because resistance is primary with power that the field to which power refers is
radically reopened as an agonistic field of struggle situated at the horizon of the state and
governmentality. In this regard, it is my contention that Foucault’s fifth thesis and the
subsequent logic of the primacy of resistance contained therein must be read as reopening
the field of power in its anarchic specificity—that is as agōn. This is to say that while
Foucault understands power within the field of government, a specific form of power
exercised as a “management of possibilities,” the fact that resistance marks the principle
from which the field of power can be transformed into a relation of struggle, radically
dislocates the field of power from its monopolization within the exercise of
governmentality.790 Thus, insofar as the exercise of power is defined as the “government
of men by other men—in the broadest sense of the term,” Foucault writes that one
necessarily “includes an important element: freedom.”791 On condition of the primacy of
resistance, the field of power exercised as government is reopened as a radical space of
freedom in which the existence of power is parallel to its own impossibility animated in
movements of resistance. For Foucault, then, the site of resistance is also the site of a
radical form of freedom.
If the exercise of power as governmentality requires and turns upon the concept of
“freedom,” this theory of freedom is only made possible due to the logic of the primacy
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of resistance. Thus, in 1984 Foucault affirms the relation between this radical condition
of freedom and the primacy of resistance:
In order for power relations to come into play, there must be a certain degree of
freedom on both sides…This means that in power relations there is necessarily the
possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance (of
violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation),
there would be no power relations at all.792
Here, Foucault retrospectively highlights the way in which the primacy of resistance
redesignates the field of power as a site of potential freedom—that is, on condition of the
“possibility of resistance,” the field of power requires a conception of freedom in order to
account for the capability of “reversing the situation.” As Foucault reiterates, then, “as
soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance. We can never be
ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and
according to a precise strategy.”793 More fundamentally, then, the radical inscription of
the permanent potential of revolt into the field of power relations means that resistance
designates the point by which one is never fully “ensnared by power.” The primacy of
resistance is not attested to by a position, either anterior or exterior to power, but as a
permanent and immanent possibility of freedom amongst the dynamic to which power
consists; power is therefore not itself absolute, but coextensive with the permanent
potential of resistance and freedom. Consequently, however, this means that in its
position of primacy, resistance is redefined by Foucault as that which designates a radical
condition of freedom made possible by its permanence within the dynamic field of power
relations. The fact that resistance is primary with power reveals an alternative principle
from which the exercise of governmentality can never solidify as a relations of pure
domination, but only that which, on condition of resistance, is reopened as a potential site
of freedom.
Fundamentally, then, while the fifth thesis posits that resistance is necessarily coextensive and immanent to the field of power with which it struggles, the fact that
question of resistance turns upon a radical condition of freedom further elucidates the
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ways in which the place of resistance amongst this dynamic cannot ultimately be reduced
to a reactive force truncated by power from the beginning. Although resistance, as
Foucault suggests, is intimately bound to the forms of power it opposes, it is a mistake to
conceive of resistance as “only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to the basic
domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual
defeat.”794 Rather than simply forming the reactive, passive counter-part of power,
Foucault maintains instead that points of resistance form “the odd term in relations of
power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite.”795 Foucault clarifies
here that resistance is permanently inscribed within a relation of power, and yet maintains
that this resistance can be seen as belonging to power in such a way that it cannot be
reduced to the techniques of power—that is, resistance is defined as an “irreducible
opposite,” co-extensive with power relations. Deleuze affirms this idea and argues that
points of resistances “are not simply the ‘repercussion’ or ‘passive’ side of the former but
are rather the ‘irreducible encounter’ between the two, especially if we understand that
the force affected has a certain capacity for resistance.”796 Here, Deleuze affirms that
resistance is irreducible to power, because the latter contains the capacity for the counterforce of resistance. This is to say that while resistance depends upon relations of power
in a similar manner to the way in which power relies upon the potentiality for resistance,
the capacity for resistance is nevertheless irreducible in this relation because the counterforce of its realization marks both the condition of possibility and limit of power.
This means, however, that what is at stake in the fifth thesis is not simply that
power ought to be redefined in a way attested to by the permanence of resistance but,
more fundamentally, to describe the ways in which the capacity of power directly
corresponds and coincides with the immanent potential of its own counter-force, from
which Foucault invokes the concept of resistance to describe this possibility. Resistance
as such is redefined by Foucault as the counter-force of revolt immanent within the
deployment of power relations that wards off power as such. Although resistance can
never be severed from the relations of power with which it struggles, the former is
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irreducible amongst this dynamic since it is through the immanent capacity of revolt that
a relation of power reaches its limit and becomes intensified in terms of a confrontation
between those who are governed and those who govern. “Hence,” Foucault writes, “they
too are distributed in irregular fashion: the points, knots, or focuses of resistance are
spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals
in definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain
types of behavior.”797 In other words, while resistance is immanent to power and cannot
be conceived outside of this relation, its permanent potential amongst relations of power
designates a parallel, yet heterogeneous, networked field of resistance “spread over time
and space.”
It is because Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of reversing the traditional
perception of power, that the place of resistance within the domain of power/resistance is
reformulated as the paradigm that makes power visible as such. Resistance, then, is
irreducible to power since in order to view the operability of power in its quotidian form
one has to begin, according to Foucault, by invoking points of resistance as the principle
of intelligibility of power; points of resistance are therefore indispensable for the analysis
of relations of power as such. Consequently, then, as Foucault maintains, inherent within
the power/resistance dynamic is “the ability to decipher the same events and the same
transformations either from inside the history of struggle or from the standpoint of the
power relationships.”798 It is important to note here the way Foucault stresses how an
analytic of power can be interpreted either from “inside” the history of resistance or from
the perspective of power. In other words, the fifth thesis is not simply a commentary
regarding how the field of power necessarily coincides with the field of resistance, but
that the very dynamic power/resistance reveals a new perspective from which to read the
field of power in terms of its agonistic dimension. Yet, while Foucault maintains that the
field of power can either be read from the perspective of power or from within the
perspective of resistance, his own work is firmly situated within the critical perspective of
the later. Thus “in order to understand what power relations are about” Foucault writes,
“perhaps we should investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate
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these relations.”799 In other words, given that the history of political thought and practice
is traditionally reduced to the paradigms of sovereign power and governmentality,
Foucault instead maintains that the operability of power can instead be determined from
“inside the history of struggle”—that is, from history of resistance.
Yet, the question of resistance is additionally found to be the motor of power in
Foucault’s thought because it marks the condition of potential transformation by which
relations of power can become reversed as a strategy of struggle; resistance therefore
designates the point in which relation of power can be retranslated into a radical space of
freedom made possible in its struggle with the forms of power it opposes. We might
therefore consider the primacy of resistance as the motor of power relations in two
manners: as its condition of possibility, and as that which precipitates a possible
transformation of power. In an interview, Foucault directly situates his fifth thesis in
relation to these two points and further clarifies that resistance ought to be understood as
the primary component of the dynamic between power and resistance. Foucault writes:
You see, if there was no resistance, there would be no power relations. Because it
would simply be a matter of obedience. You have to use power relations to refer
to the situation where you’re not doing what you want. So resistance comes first,
and resistance remains superior to the forces of the process; power relations are
obliged to change with resistance. So I think that resistance is the main word, the
key word, in this dynamic (original emphasis).800
Again, alluding to the primacy of resistance, Foucault maintains that what is at stake in
this analytic is not simply a redefinition of power, but rather that resistance marks the
“key word” amongst the dynamic to which power refers. On one side of the question,
resistance is to be understood as the “key word” in relations of power, because
“resistance comes first,” and is therefore in a position of primacy with respect to the
power dynamic. As a consequence to the power/resistance dynamic, Foucault begins to
indicate how points of resistance are what make possible an alternative critical
framework from which to read the dynamic of power—that is, “resistance comes first”
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for Foucault because it is what marks the principle of intelligibility that renders the
concrete operability of power relations discernible as such.
At the same time, however, resistance is also key to the dynamic of power,
because it is what precipitates the possibility of transformation in the exercise of power as
government, and therefore “remains superior to the process.” In this way, while the
primacy of resistance marks a new grid of intelligibility for relations of power, this same
idea is what Foucault maintains allows for a possible transformation amongst the
deployment of power. As Deleuze notes, Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of
demonstrating how relations of “force display potentiality [that] presents itself as the
possibility of resistance…in such a way as to make change possible.”801 Thus, the
potentiality for resistance within relations of power is irreducible amongst this relation
since resistance is the condition from which the exercise of government can become
transformed into a fundamental struggle with the ones whom one governs. In its position
of primacy, resistance is irreducible in that it pinpoints the limit of power and acts as the
principle of intelligibility from which to read power relations, while at the same time
forming the locus that reopens the field of power as a field of potential freedom.
With the above outline regarding the vital manner in which Foucault’s fifth thesis
radically modifies the way in which the question of resistance can be situated in a relation
of primacy within the power/resistance dynamic, it is now possible to demonstrate what I
hold to be one of the penultimate claims in The History of Sexuality. Foucault’s fifth
thesis not only acts as the conceptual nexus from which the analytic of power as found in
The History of Sexuality depends, but also and more fundamentally that the primacy of
resistance designates the historical motor of power as such. By claiming that resistance
designates the historical motor of power relations, I mean to point toward the way in
which Foucault’s fifth thesis critically amends Marx and Engels’s famous thesis that the
“history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle,” in which the
substance of this struggle is defined as the “antagonism of oppressing and oppressed
classes.”802 In Foucault’s thought, it is not simply “class struggle” that acts as the radical
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agent that gives human history its historicity as such, but more specifically the primacy of
resistance which, as we have seen, is the condition upon which the exercise of
government is transformed into a fundamental confrontation with those whom one
governs. Thus, for Foucault:
revolts belong to history…People do revolt; that is a fact. And that is how
subjectivity (not that of great men, but that of anyone) is brought into history,
breathing life into it…All the disenchantments of history won’t alter the fact of
the matter: it is because there are such voices that the time of human beings does
not have the form of evolution but that of “history,” precisely.803
It is in this way that rather than invoking the concept of “class struggle” as the agent of
history, Foucault instead maintains that the “enigma of revolt” is the motivating force of
history. Thus, while Foucault affirms that history can indeed be read as a history of
struggle, he maintains that the varying forms of revolt cannot, however, be reduced to the
totalizing notion of class struggle. In other words, Foucault’s fifth thesis not only forms
the basis from which a non-sovereign analysis of power relations can be based, but also a
non-Marxist approach to the history of struggle. In light of the power/resistance
dynamic, the fifth thesis can be read in the following manner: “[w]here there is power,
there is resistance” posits that it is resistance, and neither the paradigm of government
nor the theory of sovereignty, that acts as the basic motor of power relations as such.
Instead, resistance is the fundamental motor of power relations since it is on condition of
its position of primacy that the exercise of power as government can be transformed into
a relation of struggle between the art of governing and the art of not being governed,
without which the field of power could only be rendered discernible as a binary relation
of domination and pure obedience.
We have seen how Foucault’s fifth thesis posits a coextensive relation between
power and resistance in such a way that resistance attains a position of primacy in regard
to power and is therefore to be taken as a permanent component of the dynamic to which
power refers. The primacy of resistance not only radically modifies the traditional
concept of power, but also the traditional conceptualizations of emancipatory struggle in
such a way that offers an alternative manner from which to read the field of power in
803

Michel Foucault, “Useless to Revolt?”, 447-452.

289

terms of an agōn. To be sure, Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of both redefining
power on condition of resistance, as well as offering a critical redefinition of what is
meant by the term resistance amongst this relation. Because resistance is what is
presupposed by power, Foucault valorizes resistance as the irreducible “key word” in the
dynamic between the two concepts. “[A]nd yet,” as Foucault writes in a way that
critically modifies the first component of the fifth thesis, “or rather consequently, this
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”804 While the primacy
of resistance both disrupts the place of power and remains a permanent possibility within
power itself, the consequence of this additionally demonstrates that the materiality of
resistance derives its specificity from a relation of power and is therefore not to be
conceived as “outside” or external to its place within this dynamic. As Kelly notes,
“while resistance in general ‘comes first,’ specific resistance does not come into
existence until power appears.”805 In this way, although resistance is primary with
power, this relation of primacy is attested to by what can be referred to through
Foucault’s fifth thesis as the principle of non-exteriority, or the way in which resistance is
realized in its relation to the form of power it opposes. It is in this consequent second
part of his fifth thesis that Foucault begins to pinpoint and elaborate a preliminary
rationale to describe the space of the political in terms of a permanent sphere of agonism
attested to by the power/resistance dynamic. In its principle of non-exteriority, the
question of resistance—indeed, its primacy—must neither be conceived in terms of a
central source transcendent to power, nor as a material essence anterior to power, but as a
constituent component actively bound to the power it opposes and resists.
Without a transcendent point from which to ground a theory or praxis of
resistance, what is ultimately at stake for Foucault is to demonstrate how the principle of
non-exteriority reveals an alternative manner from which the materiality of resistance can
in fact be considered without reducing the question of revolt to the Hegelian notion of
dialectic negation, or subsuming all forms of resistance under the alleged universality of
class struggle. “Hence,” Foucault writes in the passage following the fifth thesis, if
resistance is always in a position of non-exteriority with relations of power then “there is
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no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of
the revolutionary.”806 While, Foucault’s critics tend to take this principle as a theoretical
impasse in which he cannot account for the possibility of resistance, I instead affirm this
notion as a way to think through how Foucault’s fifth thesis marks out a terrain from
which a critical caesura between the paradigm of an archē that grounds power in the
problem of sovereignty and a fundamental agonistic dynamic that takes into account the
primacy of resistance can be found. In its position of non-exteriority, Foucault’s fifth
thesis reveals the power/resistance dynamic as a permanent domain of agonism between
forces, and thus a new way to understand the question of politics consequent upon this
dynamic. In its position of non-exteriority, resistance arises within, and cannot be
separated from, the space of struggle made possible by its realization amongst power
relations. This space of struggle is not prior to the deployment of power relations, but
that which is realized and animated by resistance.
In its most preliminary form, Foucault’s assertion that the primacy of resistance is
attested to by a position of non-exteriority, radically denies any claim for a transcendental
source or pure law of resistance, while highlighting its agonistic specificity. Without a
transcendental or theoretical “source of all rebellions,” Foucault’s point is to
problematize the place of resistance, and to subsequently reveal a new rationale that can
account for the materiality of revolt within a permanent sphere of agonism. In an
interview given shortly after the publication of The History of Sexuality, Foucault
emphasizes that while “power is co-extensive with the social body,” the consequence to
this dynamic means that “there are no spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of its
network.”807 Foucault’s reference to the space of “primal liberty” invokes Hobbes’s
conception of “nature” as a space of “absolute liberty” pre-existent to and outside of the
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advent of sovereignty.808 In other words, by “spaces of primal liberty” Foucault wants to
designate a foundation prior to the space of power from which might act as the essential
foundation from which resistance might arise. If there are no primal spaces of liberty
outside of power, Foucault’s consequent claim regarding the non-exteriority of resistance
to power demonstrates that the logic of resistance cannot invoke a place outside of
power—either theoretically or materially—in order to justify its existence. Rather than a
single source, or essence prior to and outside of power, that acts as the foundation for the
possibility of resistance, Foucault maintains:
there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are
possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary,
concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise,
interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of
power relations.809
Here, in regard to the principle of non-exteriority, Foucault maintains that resistance is
itself enmeshed within the “strategic field of power relations”—that is, resistance finds its
material basis directly within the form power with which it struggles. Yet, at the same
time, rather than presupposing a “pure law” of revolt in which the materiality of
resistance could become reduced to the Marxist notion of class struggle, a critical
conceptualization of its existence can only be posed in terms of a “plurality of
resistances.” Although resistance exists in a relation of primacy with power, the material
realization of resistance can only be determined and become known in relation to the
form of power with which it struggles. According to Foucault, then, there can be no
universal, all-encompassing theory from which to codify revolt, instead the plurality of
resistances reveals the dynamic of power as a domain of agonism discernable within the
power/resistance dynamic. This, means, however, that while Foucault denies the
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absolute exteriority of resistance, he simultaneously relocates its materiality within the
dynamic of struggle from which it arises and is manifest.
Without any “primal spaces of liberty” acting as the source of resistance, the
consequent component of the fifth thesis ought to be read as making a critical
commentary on traditional conceptualizations of resistance. In its position of nonexteriority, there is not a point of departure outside of power from which resistance
emanates or can be justified; one does not begin to engage with the question of resistance
by looking outside of the relation of power with which it struggles, nor by attempting to
universally subsume all forms of resistance under a single revolutionary logic. For
Newman, then, instead of presupposing the “revolutionary transcendence of law, perhaps
radical politics can be more productively thought today in terms of localized forms of
resistance at the interstices of law and power.”810 Indeed, it is on this point that we must
attempt to understand Foucault’s key contribution to anarchist theory. Rather than
searching for a transcendental ground outside and prior to power from which to premise a
theory of resistance, Foucault maintains that the place of resistance “is not anterior to the
power it opposes.”811 As Foucault confirms in an interview from 1982 resistance is not
prior, but intimately bound to relations of power: “resistance is part of this strategic
relationship of which power consists.”812 Thus “resistance,” as Foucault continues,
therefore “really always relies upon the situation against which it struggles.”813 Just as
Foucault demonstrates that there is a certain dependence of power on resistance, the
question of resistance is analogously shown to rely upon the relation of power “against
which it struggles.” In this sense, the consequent component of the fifth thesis modifies
the original claim in a significant way, while revealing a preliminary rationale to account
for the material manifestation of resistance. While resistance, in its coextensive and
contemporaneous relation to power, this claim to primacy neither invokes nor is derived
from a position transcendent to power, but is instead found to be located at the precise
points in which power is exercised. Conditioned by its principle of non-exteriority, the
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primacy of resistance is not attested to by a pre-existent space either prior or outside of
power; instead the space of resistance is to be found precisely at the points of power’s
operability against which it struggles.
That there are no primal spaces of liberty outside of relations of power does not,
however, foreclose the possibility of resistance, but instead renders its presence and
existence more acute for Foucault. To be sure, it is precisely because the space of
resistance is located within its struggle with power, that Foucault testifies to the existence
and effectivity of resistance as such. In this way, when Foucault further contextualizes
the primacy of resistance, he additionally affirms that this principle of non-exteriority is
what allows for a new way to engage with the question of historical struggle. Far from
negating the possibility of resistance, Foucault maintains:
there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real
and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power
are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be
real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power. It
exists all the more by being in the same place as power; hence, like power,
resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global strategies.814
Rather than the foreclosing the possibility of resistance, we see that the principle of nonexteriority is what characterizes the very possibility of its existence. Instead of invoking
a universal theory that attests to the reality of resistance, as is often the case in radical
political theories, resistance is according to Foucault found to be all the “more real” not
because it comes from “elsewhere,” but because its very realization arises from, and
corresponds with, its material struggle with power. Hence, “it does not have to come
from elsewhere to be real”—that is, the actuality of resistance is attested to and made
more “effective” by its realization of a struggle with power, and neither by an exterior
position prior to a relation of power, nor a revolutionary transcendence of power. In this
way, the principle of non-exteriority holds that a theory of resistance cannot be based off
of the logic of a pure outside, but instead finds its logic in the elaboration of its struggle
with a relation of power. It is within the space of struggle, and not a position of
exteriority, that resistance is animated as such; this means, however, that a theory of
814
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resistance ought not to presuppose a topological or theoretical position of exteriority
prior to its manifestation within a relation of power, but instead an internal dimension of
agonism.
Although Foucault’s fifth thesis reveals an alternative point of entry from which
to account for the permanence of resistance amongst power relations, his critics tend to
point toward how his fifth thesis and the corresponding claim regarding non-exteriority of
resistance appears as a conceptual impasse that precludes the possibility of a critical
emancipation though the notion of resistance. Yet, in several key moments spread
throughout his work, Foucault consistently refuses to acknowledge that this principle of
non-exteriority means that one is always trapped by a relation of power. Indeed, instead
of presupposing a dynamic in which one is always trapped within relations of power,
what is at stake for Foucault is to demonstrate how the power/resistance dynamic
indicates a condition of radical freedom. Indeed, Foucault tackles this problem in tandem
alongside his fifth thesis. “Should it be said” Foucault asks “that one is always ‘inside’
power, there is no ‘escaping’ it, there is no absolute outside where it is concerned,
because one is subject to the law in any case? Or that…power is the ruse of history,
always emerging the winner?”815 To be sure, while Foucault denies the possibility of a
transcendent position outside of power which might act as critical foundation for a theory
of resistance, this same logic radically renews, rather than revokes, the possibility of
emancipation. Thus, while Foucault maintains that “power is ‘always already there,’ that
one is never ‘outside’ it, that there are no ‘margins’ for those who break with the system
to gambol in,” he further concludes that “this does not entail the necessity of accepting an
inescapable form of domination or an absolute privilege on the side of the law. To say
that one can never be ‘outside’ power does not mean that one is trapped and condemned
to defeat no matter what.”816
The interdependence Foucault locates between power and the non-exteriority of
resistance does not reduce the question of resistance to a mere reaction to power, nor does
its position of non-exteriority disclose the possibility of reversing, escaping or moving
outside of power. The principle of non-exteriority according to Foucault instead reveals a

815
816

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 95.
Michel Foucault, “Power and Strategies,” 142.

295

radical condition of freedom located in the space of struggle made possible through
resistance. In a manner that seems to anticipate the criticism that would later he would
later come to face, Foucault maintains:
I don’t think the word trapped is a correct one. It is a struggle, but what I mean
by power relations is the fact that we are in a strategic situation toward each
other…we are in this struggle, and the continuation of this situation can influence
the behavior and nonbehavior of the other. So we are not trapped. We are always
in this kind of situation. It means that we always have possibilities, there are
always possibilities of changing the situation. We cannot jump outside the
situation, and there is no point where you are free from all power relations. But
you can always change it. So what I’ve said does not mean that we are trapped,
but that we are always free—well, anyway, that there is always the possibility of
changing (original emphasis).817
Rather than emphasizing the term “trapped” to describe a conceptual impasse inherent in
the power/resistance dynamic, Foucault instead understands this dynamic as a “strategic
situation,” and thus invokes a preference for the term “struggle” to describe this dynamic.
Yet Foucault also makes an important distinction here regarding the concept of
“freedom” within this dynamic. Since there is no position prior or outside the form of
power resisted, the radical freedom Foucault locates in the power/resistance dynamic is
not set to describe the point where one is, or can ultimately become “free from all power
relations;” Foucauldian freedom is not freedom from. Instead, the Foucauldian notion of
freedom is what is found in the space of struggle made possible by resistance, and refers
to the “possibility” of changing the situation to which power consists. It is in regard to
the inherent interrelation between resistance and freedom—indeed the freedom arising
from resistance—that Foucault attempts to rethink the power/resistance dynamic in a way
that presupposes, rather than forecloses, the possibility of lines of flight from relations of
power. This means, however, that the agonistic space of struggle attested to and made
possible by resistance is also the condition of radical freedom; yet, the freedom revealed
by the power/resistance dynamic does not posit the possibility of an “outside” where one
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is freed from power, but instead conceives of freedom as a space of struggle made
possible in the realization of resistance.
Insofar as the domain of power relations can be rethought as the permanent
struggle between the power/resistance dynamic, the above analysis has been set to
demonstrate how Foucault maintains that this very domain must therefore be analyzed in
the form of an agōn rather than in the problem of governmentality, sovereign power and
the state. Indeed, what is at stake in Foucault’s fifth thesis is that the power/resistance
dynamic means that the field of power can be analyzed in terms of permanent struggle, in
which the notion of resistance at once designates the condition by which power relations
can be transformed into strategies of struggle as well as a point of possible reversal, of
potential freedom brought about through the struggle with power. Thus, as Foucault
writes:
If it is true that at the heart of power relations and as a permanent condition of
their existence there is an insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the
part of the principles of freedom, then there is no relationship of power without
the means of escape or possible flight.818
By way of summary, Foucault here maintains that relations of power exist as such only
on the “permanent condition” of resistance which, in its position of primacy, is both the
motor that transforms power relations into a field of struggle as well as the principle from
which the “means of escape” become possible. Yet, while power designates a
“relationship of confrontation” on condition of the primacy of resistance, Foucault
cautions that this field can become a relation of domination “when stable mechanisms
replace the free play of antagonistic reactions” (original emphasis).819 Consequently,
then, what is ultimately at stake in Foucault’s fifth thesis is that the very field of force
relations which compose the power/resistance dynamic ought to be redefined as the “free
play of antagonistic reactions”—that is, as agōn. Herein lies the key to Foucault’s
analytic; it is only when the primacy of resistance is replaced with “stable mechanisms”
that the field of power can designate a relation of domination. Yet, if resistance is taken
as a permanent component of the field of power, then as Foucault maintains the very
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dynamic of power/resistance must be understood as the domain of the “free play” of
agonistic forces.

4.4

From Power to Politics

But what makes the domination of a group, a caste, or a class, together with the
resistance and revolts that domination comes up against, a central phenomenon in the
history of societies is that they manifest in a massive and global form, at the level of the
whole social body, the locking together of power relations with relations of strategy and
the results proceeding from their interaction.820
This point of view of the plebs, the point of view of the underside and limit of power, is
thus indispensable for an analysis of its apparatuses (dispositifs); this is the starting
point for understanding its functioning and development.821
--Michel Foucault

In one of the more commonly cited passages from The History of Sexuality, Foucault
writes that “[i]n thought and political analysis we have still not cut off the head of the
king.”822 By studying and outlining a non-sovereign analytic of power, Foucault
fundamentally attempts to demonstrate one way to critically detach political theory from
the juridical foundation of sovereignty that has, in its paradigmatic form, continued to
shape the course of Western Political philosophy. Yet, as I have argued throughout this
chapter, Foucault’s analytic of power as developed in The History of Sexuality itself turns
upon, and cannot be separated from, the vital (albeit historically ignored) question of
resistance. While Foucault’s analytic of power radically dislocates power from its
sovereign foundation, what is at stake in this analytic is that the characteristic feature of
power is not that is omnipotent or absolute, but that the domain of power is itself coextensive with the permanent potential of resistance amongst this dynamic. Indeed, the
key claim from Foucault’s analytic is to suggest that power is neither omnipotent nor
absolute, but that its condition of existence depends on the multiplicity of points of
resistance; the key characteristic of Foucault’s analytic is therefore that resistance is
primary with power. Thus, while Foucault’s work in The History of Sexuality is often
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noted for his critical attempt to account for a non-sovereign analytic of power, this
regicide of political theory is made possible in terms of the primacy of resistance. In
other words, the power/resistance dynamic is what constitutes the pivotal point from
which his regicide of political theory takes place. Indeed, with the primacy of resistance
marking the critical terrain from which the traditional paradigms of political theory can
be thought, the regicide of political theory is marked by a critical caesura between the
political as archē and the political as agōn—that is, the “free play” between power as the
exercise of government and the counter-historical movements of resistance. What is at
stake, then, in Foucault’s fifth thesis is not simply a redefinition of power indicative of
the permanent presence of resistance, but that the permanent presence of resistance
within the dynamic field of power offers key insight into rethinking the basic paradigms
of both traditional and radical political theory.
In this chapter, I have argued that Foucault’s fifth thesis from The History of
Sexuality, which radically inscribes resistance into the dynamic to which power refers,
reveals and turns upon a new political logic that can be referred to as the primacy of
resistance in which the exercise of power as government radically coincides with the
immanent and permanent potential for revolt. In this regard, the overall goal has first
been to demonstrate how Foucault’s fifth thesis radically modifies the traditional
conceptions of both power and resistance in such a way that the power/resistance
dynamic might come to act as the basic principle of intelligibility for an anarchist
hypothesis of the political in which the primacy of resistance redesignates the field of
power as the exercise of government as itself a field of struggle. In its most preliminary
form, we have seen how Foucault’s thesis that resistance is primary with power forms the
critical nexus upon which both his analytic of power depends, as well as the conceptual
hinge required in order to understand the full complexities of this very analytic. Rather
than presupposing the sovereignty of power, Foucault’s fifth thesis radically inscribes
resistance into the domain to which power refers, and maintains that the permanent
potentiality of resistance is a condition of possibility for relations of power as such. As
attested to by the power/resistance dynamic, relations of power, Foucault argues, must be
theoretically and materially understood on condition of I have referred to as the anarchist
invariant of resistance. In this regard it has been my contention in this chapter that
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Foucault’s thesis “[w]here there is power, there is resistance,” redefines the field of
power anarchically.
At the same time, however, as the fifth thesis radically modifies the traditional
conception of power, I have argued that the corresponding nexus between power and
resistance reveals the agonistic dimension proper to the field of power as such. In its
position of non-exteriority, the permanent potentiality of resistance disrupts the sovereign
place of power and reopens the field of power as a dynamic domain of struggle. Yet, as
that which finds its consistency within a field of struggle, resistance at once designates
the motor by the exercise of government can be transformed into an agonistic
confrontation with those whom one governs, as well as the condition of freedom made
possible in the struggle with power. Taken together, then, the primacy of resistance as
broached in Foucault’s thought is at once the principle from which the domain in which
power operates is retheorized as permanent sphere of agonistic struggle, as well as that
which acts as the pivotal possibility for a critical politics of resistance. Resistance can
thus be seen as belonging to power in such a way that cannot be reduced to the
techniques of power itself; the potentiality for resistance is the anarchic spacing that
provides the irreducible condition to both confront and escape the history of
governmentality. Conversely, power, according to Foucault, can only be understood on
condition of resistance; consequently, however, this means that resistance forms the
pivotal point upon which the analytic of power depends in The History of Sexuality.
Resulting from Foucault’s power/resistance dynamic, the fact that resistance is
found to exist in a position of primacy radically denies the latter’s traditional place as an
absolute substance born in the advent of the sovereign, and forms the first axiom of the
anarchic terms of the political. Indeed, it is by invoking the logic of the primacy of
resistance that forms the basic point of departure of a radically new way to read the
question of both power and politics in such a way that the political is shown in its
irreducibility to the paradigm of government and the logic of the state. While Foucault’s
fifth thesis is established as a way to fundamentally situate and designate the primacy of
resistance as a permanent component of the field of power, it is my contention that this
same thesis forms the basis from which an alternative economy of power relations and
politics can be developed from inside the history of struggle and not with the
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presupposition of the paradigm of government and the logic of sovereignty. As such, the
importance of Foucault’s work lies in the way in which he reveals an alternative principle
of intelligibility for a new economy of power relations from which to understand the
domain of the political consequent upon the permanence of resistance. Thus, in the
“Subject and Power” when Foucault proclaims that “what we need is a new economy of
power relations,” we find that the advent of this “new economy of power relations”
requires and is made possible by a critical investigation into the question of resistance, as
well as the agonistic struggle between the exercise of government and the counter-force
of resistance.823 For Foucault, then, a new economy of power relations:
Consists in taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a
starting point. To use another metaphor, it consists in using this resistance as a
chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find
out their point of application and the methods used. Rather than analyzing power
from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists in analyzing power
relations through the antagonism of strategies.824
Here, Foucault importantly confirms that the critical development of an alternative
economy of power relations both depends on the critical question of resistance, as well as
an analytic of power in terms of the “antagonism of strategies.” Within the
power/resistance dynamic, the question of politics for Foucault means that the very field
of the political can be read in terms of an agonistic struggle: “the struggle is
everywhere….at every moment, we move from rebellion to domination, from domination
to rebellion, and it is all this perpetual agitation that I would like to bring out.”825 It is in
regard to this “perpetual agitation” that Foucault’s analytic of power/resistance and its
correspondence with the field of politics can be understood as marking a critical caesura
between the logic of an archē and the domain of an agōn as a principle of intelligibility of
power.
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Indeed, it is my contention that insofar as Foucault’s fifth thesis posits that
resistance is primary with power, then the theme of agonism arising from the dynamic
power/resistance can be invoked as alternative basis from which to understand the
historical domain of the political in a way that transcends the paradigms of the political as
outlined in chapter one. Foucault writes, “[r]ather than speaking of an essential
antagonism,” as Schmitt does to describe the substance of the political based in the
sovereign power of the state, “it would be better to speak of an agonism of a relationship
that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less a face to face confrontation
that paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.”826 Here, Foucault directly
reveals a new dynamic from which to read the structure of the political in terms of a
permanent field of “agonism” made possible by the permanent inscription of resistance
amongst this dynamic. By invoking the term “agonism” instead of “antagonism,”
Foucault means to point toward the way in which power/resistance dynamic attested to in
his fifth thesis is redefined as the space of an agōn, and thus that the domain of the
political can be marked as the dynamic field of a continuous and “permanent
provocation” between relations of power and forms of resistance.
In other words, rather than inquiring into the questions pertaining to power,
politics and the political in terms of the historical archē, as is the case in both Aristotle
and Schmitt, Foucault’s fifth thesis instead determines that the very question of the
political ought to be understood in terms of a permanent sphere of an agōn in which
resistance is permanently inscribed into the dynamic to which relations of power consist
and operate. To be sure, the theme of agonism as developed in regard to Foucault’s fifth
thesis reveals a fundamental point in his work in which the simultaneity between the art
of governing and the art of not being governed can be substantiated. Thus, when
Foucault invokes the term “agonism” as opposed to antagonism to critically distinguish
his thought from his predecessors, this term is set to nominate how the very field of
power as government is necessarily counter-posed with the dynamic of field of resistance
as both the condition of possibility of power relations as such and the material
manifestation of the domain of agonism inherent within power relations as such.
Crucially, however, insofar as resistance is taken to be primary with power, the question
826
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of politics—indeed of the political—cannot simply be reduced to the paradigm of
government since it is the permanent potentiality of resistance that distinguishes the field
of power from its traditional basis in the notion of sovereignty. The primacy of resistance
means that the political emerges in the struggles created by movements of resistance—
that is resistance, according to Foucault, designates the topology proper to the field of the
political, since without the permanent potential of resistance, the question of politics
could only be posed and conceptualized in terms of domination, obedience, and the
repressive hypothesis of juridical, sovereign law.
Lest political theory wishes to remain within the conceptual terrain that can only
conceive of the question of politics in terms of the state, sovereign power, and the history
of governmentality, Foucault’s fifth thesis maintains that such a task can only be
accomplished in regard to the question of resistance—indeed, the primacy of resistance.
It is because Foucault maintains that a critical analysis of power relations and the domain
of the political must be understood on condition of resistance that he valorizes the place
of resistance in his thought and maintains that the analysis of the “agonism between
power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is an increasingly political task—even,
the political task inherent in all social existence.”827 Insofar as Foucault elevates the
“agonism” between relations of power and points of resistance as the “political task
inherent in all social existence,” then the fifth thesis from The History of Sexuality can be
understood as marking the very basis from which such a task can be accomplished. To
be sure, Foucault’s radical inscription of the permanent potential of resistance amongst
power relations demonstrates how it is with the concept of resistance and not simply the
paradigm of government that marks the principle of intelligibility from which power
relations are exposed as a permanent field of agonism.
With the outline of the primacy of resistance acting as an analytic framework
from which to rethink the paradigm of the political as a permanent co-extensive relation
between power and resistance, the following chapter demonstrates a critical
correspondence between the fifth thesis of The History of Sexuality and his strategic
inversion of Clausewitz’s proposition on politics and war from Society Must Be
Defended. To be sure, Foucault’s fifth thesis informs the very basis of this strategic
827
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reversal to the point where the structure of the political becomes indicative of a
permanent struggle between power and resistance coded as a relation of civil war.
Whereas this chapter was set to broach the ways in which Foucault’s analytic of power
reveals and turns upon the rationale of the primacy of resistance, the following chapter
traces how this thesis formulates a critical caesura in the logic that ground the question of
politics within the first principle of an archē to the domain of a permanent agōn. More
specifically, in the following chapter I contend that Foucault’s preliminary problematic of
resistance as sketched in the History of Sexuality is significantly reinvigorated and
revised in Society Must Be Defended in such a way that the history of the political can be
reread neither as a politics of an oikonomia nor as sovereignty, but rather as an agonistic
politics of resistance as civil war.
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Chapter 5
5

From Archē to Agōn

If power is indeed the implementation and deployment of a relationship of force, rather
than analyzing it in terms of surrender, contract, and alienation, or rather than analyzing
it in functional terms as the reproduction of the relations of production, shouldn’t we be
analyzing it first and foremost in terms of conflict, confrontation, war? That would give
us an alternative to the first hypothesis—which is that the mechanism of power is
basically or essentially repression—or a second hypothesis: Power is war, the
continuation of war by other means. At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition
and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means.828
--Michel Foucault
The Modern State, which purports to put an end to civil war, is instead its continuation
by other means.829
--Tiqqun

In the previous chapter, I introduced and examined the primacy of resistance—via
Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality—not only in order to
demonstrate the ways in which the notion of resistance is the key concept required for
Foucault’s analytics of power and governmentality, but also how the primacy of
resistance offers a radically new perspective from which to read the structure and history
of the political anarchically. A critical economy of power relations according to
Foucault’s fifth thesis can only be understood on condition of the permanent potentiality
for resistance; hence, the field in which power consists is reformulated in terms of the
power/resistance dynamic. At the same time, however, the concept of resistance within
this dynamic can be seen as belonging to power in such a way that it cannot be reduced to
the techniques of power itself. The permanent potentiality of resistance amongst the
dynamic field in which relations of power operate designates resistance as the anarchist
invariant in which power relations can become transformed into a fundamental struggle
between the exercise of government and a struggle with those whom one governs.
Consequently, however, this means that resistance—indeed the primacy of resistance—
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forms the pivotal point in which power, politics, and the history of the political can
neither be reduced to the advent of sovereignty nor the exercise of government; the
political only assumes the form of an archē for Foucault “when stable mechanisms
replace the free play of antagonistic reactions” (original emphasis).830 While we have
seen how Foucault prefers the term “agonism” over that of “antagonism,” what is referred
to as “free play of antagonistic reactions,” ultimately reveals an alternative paradigm for
political thought and praxis, one that takes the form of an agonistic struggle between the
exercise of power as government and the counter-historical movements of resistance.831
What is at stake, then, in Foucault’s fifth thesis is not simply a redefinition of an
economy of power relations indicative of the permanent presence of resistance, but that
the permanent presence of resistance within the dynamic field of power offers key insight
into rethinking the foundational tenets of orthodox political philosophy, as well as basic
project of radical political theory. If we refuse, as Foucault suggests, the nexus that binds
the question of politics to its foundation in sovereign power, and take the primacy of
resistance as the critical grid from which to read the history of the political, it is my
contention that the history of politics can no longer be understood in terms of a project in
pursuit of a state, sovereignty or the exercise of government, but rather as a form of
agonistic struggle, a certain sphere of praxis in which we can glimpse the basis of what I
hold to be an anarchist hypothesis of the political.
In this regard, this chapter seeks to establish a theoretical continuity between the
primacy of resistance broached in The History of Sexuality and the lecture series given
under the provocative title Society Must Be Defended in which the power/resistance
dynamic is directly reinvigorated by Foucault as the basic framework from which to read
politics and the history of the political. More specifically, while the previous chapter was
set to reveal and explicate how Foucault’s fifth thesis posits the primacy of resistance as
the condition of possibility and principle of intelligibility for a new economy of power
relations, this chapter traces how Foucault invokes this same thesis as the basis from
which to rethink the history of the political as agōn in which the power/resistance
dynamic is recast and coded in terms of interpreting politics as a continuation of war.
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Provided that the lectures comprising the series Society Must Be Defended were given in
the years between the publications of Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality,
the former not only coincides chronologically with the later text, but thematically as well,
often expanding upon and further developing several of the key concepts made possible
in his new analytic of power. Since the lectures composing Society Must Be Defended
were given during the final stages of writing The History of Sexuality, the former, as
Mark Kelly concludes, “constitutes something of a supplement to” the latter.832 Yet,
while it has been acknowledged that certain central themes explored in The History of
Sexuality are furthered developed in Society Must Be Defended, the continuity between
the two texts is most commonly reduced to the question of power while bracketing the
coinciding question of resistance. 833 In this regard, Stuart Elden has traced how the
concept of “biopower” is the key concept developed in Society Must Be Defended.834
Elden’s reading of the importance of the study of “biopower” in Society Must Be
Defended is further shared by Paolo Palladino835 and Michael Dillon,836 both of whom
analyze these lectures as extended commentaries on the term as it he develops in The
History of Sexuality. While these studies have helped outlined a specific continuity
between these two texts in terms of power, it is my contention that Society Must Be
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Defended more directly extends the discussion of the question of resistance proposed in
The History of Sexuality to the study of politics and political theory.
With this in mind, I argue that insofar as a vital connection between the analytic
of power posed in The History of Sexuality and the analytic of the political as extensively
theorized in Society Must Be Defended can be made in terms of the primacy of resistance
rather than biopower, that this theoretical nexus is itself made possible in Foucault’s
strategic inversion of Carl Von Clausewitz’s proposition regarding the ways in which war
designates the continuation of politics by other means.837 Thus, within the same chapter
from The History of Sexuality containing the theses on power, Foucault infamously
inverts Clausewitz’s proposition in order to begin to retheorize the political consequent
upon the agonistic dynamic of power/resistance. Insofar as the field of power relations
designates the strategic struggle between power and resistance, it is in this regard that
Foucault asks the following critical question: “[s]hould we turn the expression around,
then, and say that politics is war pursued by other means?”838 Although Foucault’s
strategic inversion of Clausewitz marks a significant turning point in The History of
Sexuality, especially in terms of the relation between power/resistance dynamic and the
domain of the political, the question pertaining to whether or not politics can be thought
in terms of struggle, war, and resistance is what informs the eleven lectures composing
Society Must Be Defended, and it is necessary to turn to the this text in order to
demonstrate how Foucault’s analytic of power/resistance directly informs his theory of
politics.
By tracing the ways in which Foucault’s fifth thesis is recast in Society Must Be
Defended, it is my contention in this chapter that his assertion regarding how resistance is
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primary and absolutely co-extensive with the field of power is indicative of an alternative
hypothesis from which to interpret the political as agōn rather than archē. At the same
time, however, while it is my claim that Foucault’s thought fundamentally turns upon
carving out a critical transition from the political as archē to the political as agōn, I
further argue that the agonistic theory of struggle which underpins his political work
additionally transcends the recent neo-Schmittian attempts to understand the political in
terms of what political theorist Chantel Mouffe refers to as “agonistics.”839 Although in a
series of texts organized in an attempt to reinvigorate the basic tenets of Schmitt’s theory
of the political within the context of a “liberal, pluralist, democracy,” Mouffe maintains
an agonistic conception of the political, her thought fundamentally relies upon the
Aristotelian and Schmittian models of political as outlined in chapter one.840 Thus, while
Mouffe retains a fundamental dimension of agonism as the substance and principle of
intelligibility of the political, her model of the political simply reframes Schmitt’s
argument that the state designates the conceptual horizon proper to the antagonistic
dimension of the political, while simultaneously reducing the question of “agonistic
politics” to the Aristotelian paradigm of government in which politics is that which seeks
“to establish order and organize human co-existence.”841 To be sure, despite her
839
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intentions at theorizing a contemporary form of “radical politics,” Mouffe’s work is set to
“institutionalize” the agonistic dimension of the political within the framework of both
government and sovereignty—that is, Mouffe eradicates the field of struggle from the
theory of agonism in order to arrive at an “agonism without antagonism,” or an agōn
without the permanence of resistance.842 As we will see, an agonistic conception of the
political according to Foucault, can only be maintained on the permanent possibility of
resistance and not its exclusion; to expel or eradicate resistance from the field of the
political is to remove the condition by which power relations can be transformed into an
agonistic struggle. Against Mouffe’s theory of agonism, this chapter is therefore devoted
to a critical exploration of an alternative agonistic conception of insurrectionary politics
central to both Foucault’s project in Society Must Be Defended and anarchist politics. My
central claim is that an agonistic conception of the political is characterized neither by the
antagonism inherent in the sovereign friend/enemy antithesis (Schmitt) nor by a
hegemonic struggle over power (Mouffe), but rather by the struggle with, or resistance to,
power exercised as government.
Contrary, then, to the ways in which Mouffe’s theory of agonistic politics reduces
the political as agōn to the exercise of government within a sovereign state, it is my
contention in this chapter that a return to an agonistic theory of the political is better
elaborated through a Foucauldian framework, in which the political as agōn retains the
logic of a permanent struggle internal to the power/resistance dynamic outlined in the
previous chapter. The challenge central to this chapter is to develop an agonistic
conception of the political which allows us to more critically reflect on the questions
pertaining to resistance and anarchist thought today. In this regard, this chapter traces
how Foucault’s fifth thesis acts as the basis from which the history of the political is
recast in Society Must Be Defended as the history of agonistic struggle in order to
ultimately explore the implications of an anarchist hypothesis of the political as agōn in
three interrelated ways that carve out a distinct intervention in the history of political
theory. After addressing some of the critical commentary and challenges surrounding
Society Must Be Defended, the first section explicates how Foucault’s genealogical
method ultimately reveals that the history of politics and the political can in be
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reinterpreted in terms of a history of struggle. At stake here is to demonstrate how
genealogy posits an alternative basis and approach to the question of politics in such a
way that the political cannot be simply reduced to the history of the state. Rather than
beginning with the question of sovereignty as the precondition of modern politics,
Foucault proposes to replace the “contract-oppression” paradigm of juridico-sovereignty
with the war model of the political, “in which the pertinent opposition is not, as in the
previous schema, that between the legitimate and the illegitimate, but that between
submission and struggle.”843 As we will see, it is on condition of historical discourses of
struggle and resistance, and not that of the state, that gives politics its distinctive
character as a continuation of war for Foucault.
Utilizing Foucault’s strategic reversal of Clausewitz as the pivotal turning point
from which the fifth thesis is recast as the basis of the political, in the following section, I
outline how Foucault’s war model of the political reveals an agonistic conception of
politics historically expressed in movements of resistance. Here, I trace the ways in
which the interpretation of politics as a continuation of war reveals an alternative
hypothesis from which politics and the history of the political emerge in the permanent
struggle, or agonistic conflict between power and resistance. Yet, as we will see, insofar
as the domain proper to the history of the political is agōn, what is ultimately at stake for
Foucault is that resistance is therefore primary with the history of politics as such. My
claim here is that just as resistance is primary with power for Foucault, the agonistic
model of the political asserts that resistance is also primary with the history of politics.
In the final section, I explore the ways in which Foucault’s thesis that politics can be
interpreted as a continuation of war is invoked as a theoretical and historical counternarrative to the origin of sovereign power and the birth of the state as extensively
outlined by Hobbes in his seminal political treatise the Leviathan. While in Hobbes the
condition of possibility of sovereign power and the modern state coincides with the
eradication of the condition of war from the field of the political, in Foucault’s reading of
the history of politics it is the permanence of civil war that allows for the emergence of
politics. As the expression that captures the field of struggle between forces within an
agonistic conception of the political, civil war at once designates, for Foucault, the
843
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condition of possibility and principle of intelligibility in which the history of politics and
the political can be understood as a paradigm of resistance. Taking the outline of the
primacy of resistance developed throughout the previous chapter as a way to demonstrate
how Foucault’s analytic of power itself turns upon a permanent and continuous struggle
between relations of power and forms of resistances, what is required here is to further
elaborate how the fifth thesis on power is reinvigorated in Society Must Be Defended in a
way that reveals an agonistic theory of the political in terms of a unique paradigm of
resistance that Foucault refers to as “social warfare.”844 My claim here is that civil war
designates the key paradigm from which the history of the political can be interpreted
agonistically on condition of the primacy of resistance. More specifically, my argument
is that if we refuse the dual paradigms of government and sovereignty as the a priori
foundation of both politics and the political, and take civil war as the alternative
expression in which the history of politics is expressed in terms of a politics as resistance,
then Society Must Be Defended reveals an agonistic model of the political that can only
be described as anarchistic.

5.1 Critical Reception of Society Must Be Defended and the War
Model of the Political
Society Must Be Defended designates one of Foucault’s most detailed inquiry into the
questions pertaining to the history of political theory, and his analysis regarding the ways
in which the history of the political can be reread in terms of the strategic model of force
relations, struggle, and war has at once been considered “one of the major achievements
of Foucault’s thought,”845 as well as a critical “turning point”846 in his research at this
time. As Julien Reid suggests, “the problem of war” in Foucault “is the problem of
political modernity par excellance.”847 To be sure, the various themes and problematics
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tackled by Foucault in Society Must Be Defended have inspired volumes of work
dedicated to elaborating the importance of the concept of war in the whole of his work
and thought.848 Because the lectures were given only a few months before The History of
Sexuality, the two texts are often read together as support for Foucault’s attempt at a nonsovereign analytic of power and politics. Thus, in his commentary on Society Must Be
Defended, Arnold Davidson argues that “Foucault shows us one way to detach ourselves
from the philosophico-juridical discourses of sovereignty and the law that has so
dominated our thought and political analysis.”849 At the same time, however, Society
Must Be Defended is often misunderstood as a model of power and politics that Foucault
ultimately abandons in favor of the study of governmentality in the years to follow.
Thus, in Foucault, Governmentality, Critique Thomas Lemke views Society Must Be
Defended as the beginning point from which Foucault begins to revise his genealogy of
power in regard to the question of government rather than a politics of war.850 Similarly,
while Kelly does not maintain, as does Lemke, that the concept of governmentality
designates a distinct break with the war model of power and politics, he nevertheless
suggests that Foucault disavows the “metaphor of war.”851 While it is true that around
1978 Foucault ceases (although not completely) to use the language of war, he never
abandons this agonistic conception of power and politics, and it is my contention that this
model allows us to see how Foucault centralizes the question of resistance to his theory
of politics and the political.
Although the lectures comprising this text have been recognized as a crucial
turning point in Foucault’s political thought, rereading the history of the political through
the paradigm of war and struggle, like the concept of resistance, has been met with much
negative critical reception. On one side of the critical spectrum, philosopher Jürgen
Habermas criticizes Foucault’s understanding of power relations in Society Must Be
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Defended for reducing the field of power to the “interaction of warring parties,”852 thus
neglecting other possible models. Similarly, Charles Taylor criticizes Foucault’s
strategic reversal of Clausewitz’s proposition on war and politics in order to claim that
the theory of the political posited in Society Must Be Defended undermines all the
political achievements that rest on the foundations Foucault ultimately hopes to
overturn.853 More seriously, however, is the way in which both Habermas854 and
Taylor855 claim that Foucault’s thought in Society Must Be Defended fundamentally relies
upon an unacknowledged Schmittian framework, and thus that there is a sort of
theoretical alliance between Foucault and Schmitt’s respective theories of the political.
This position is again shared by Axel Honneth, who argues that Foucault’s refusal to
presuppose a normative base for his theory of the political ultimately leads to an
“unacknowledged political decisionism” in the sense of Schmitt.856 In her text Critique
of Violence Beatrice Hansen has extensively outlined the ostensive connections between
Foucault and Schmitt. Hansen takes Society Must Be Defended as the critical turning
point from which Foucault’s theory of politics can be assessed, and maintains that
“Foucault’s theory of the warring subject risk[s] coming remarkably close to Schmitt’s
The Concept of the Political or even his later, postwar Theory of the Partisan.”857
Indeed, although Hansen acknowledges Foucault’s attempt to rethink politics in terms of
an agonistic struggle, she concludes that Foucault fails in the end to theorize a certain
reciprocity between power and resistance, instead “favoring more often than not a one-
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sided sedimentation of force, inflicted upon subjects from the top down.”858 It is in this
regard that Hansen maintains that the “very status of the homology power/war lack[s]
clarity.”859
At stake in these critiques of Society Must Be Defended is that while Foucault
attempts to rethink the history of the political in terms of struggle, this very form of
political historicism simply recasts the fundamental antagonism inherent in Schmitt’s
model. Yet, while Foucault does indeed invoke the concept of struggle as the principle
from which to read the history of the political, the form agonism assumes within the
history of politics for Foucault can be fundamentally differentiated from Schmitt’s
antagonistic model of the political. Whereas Schmitt’s thought turns upon, as we have
seen in chapter one, reducing the dimension of antagonism proper to the political as a
paradigm of sovereignty, in Foucault the dimension of antagonism that gives the history
of the political its defining character as such arises and is historically manifest in a
struggle, or war against the state and the exercise of government. In other words, while
both Schmitt and Foucault theorize the political as agōn, it is my contention in this
chapter that the latter’s thought is to be critically distinguished from the former in that the
antagonistic dimension of the political is theorized by Foucault as a paradigm of
resistance and not that of state sovereign power.860
Although Foucault has been criticized for the alleged similarities between his
work in Society Must Be Defended and Schmitt’s theory of the political, others have
sought to offer more critical readings of Foucault’s theory of politics, while further
outlining the ways in which these lectures designate an extended discussion of the
general problematic of resistance as set forth in The History of Sexuality. Neil Levy
praises Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended for outlining an alternative theory
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of the political “in which history became the site and stake of political struggle.”861
Indeed, Levy further maintains that “it is one of the virtues of [Society Must Be
Defended] that its detailed descriptions of strategies employed…in the struggle over
history provide an extended illustration of one of the ways in which Foucault envisages
resistance as functioning.”862 It is in this regard that Society Must Be Defended can be
read in terms of offering a distinct account of how the power/resistance dynamic is
exemplified historically. Furthermore, other theorists such as Andrew Neal have traced
the ways in which Foucault’s lectures are concerned with a series of historical discourses
of resistance linked together through the general theme of “politics as war.”863
Accordingly, Neal maintains that what is at stake for Foucault in Society Must Be
Defended is to demonstrate how the historical discourses of politics as war provide a
“resistant understanding of the principles of modern politics and the modern sovereign
state.”864 While Foucault’s critical inquiry into the how the resistant discourses of
politics as war itself resists the orthodox, standard narratives of political theory, others
have suggested how in Society Must Be Defended Foucault attempts to rethink the
political as agōn in which the discourses of politics as war reveal an alternative theory of
historical struggle that cannot be reduced to the paradigm of “class struggle.” Thus,
while Hansen maintains a close approximation between Schmitt and Foucault, she
nevertheless suggests that the latter rejects an “antagonistic conception of social struggle,
including Marx’s forceful class struggle, to unlock another agonistic playing field, one no
longer tethered exclusively to the historical category of economic redistribution” (original
emphasis).865 Tracing the question of war through both Foucault and Deleuze, Reid
claims that what is ultimately at stake in their respective theories is the shared “insistence
upon war as the condition of possibility for the expression of resistance against the state
and its allied regimes of power.”866 Although it is widely recognized that Foucault’s
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theory of politics—with its emphasis on the questions of war and struggle—designates a
key turning point for Foucault, the significance of this unique model of the political and a
corresponding form of politics as resistance has yet to be fully explored or appreciated in
its anarchic and agonistic specificity.
While each of these theorists have highlighted the relation between the concept of
war and the question of politics, while further exploring the implications of this war
model of the political to the question of resistance in Foucault, it is my contention that the
specific correspondence Foucault develops between the power/resistance dynamic and
the war model of the political signifies a distinct way in which the political can be
interpreted anarchically—that is, as agōn, a unique theory in which politics emerges not
as a paradigm of sovereign power, but instead as resistance. To be sure, it is my
contention that Foucault’s strategic inversion of Clausewitz, wherein the term “politics”
comes to be coded as a paradigm of war, designates an alternative principle in which the
history of the political can be read from the perspective and logic of the primacy of
resistance. As we will see, Foucault’s agonistic model of the political in Society Must Be
Defended at once designates an alternative theory of politics that transcends the
Schmittian and neo-Schmittian models, as well as an alternative paradigm of historical
resistance that transcends the Marxist model of class struggle. While the following
chapter will outline how a specific continuity between Foucault’s historical model of
political struggle as posed in Society Must Be Defended and his later work on ethics
through the concept of resistance, what is first required in this chapter is to demonstrate
how the primacy of resistance is recast by Foucault as a key paradigm of politics, and
further how this paradigm ultimately reveals an agonistic theory of the political that turns
upon the primacy of resistance. This is why in The History of Sexuality, Foucault
describes his work as informing a critical transition from “the model based on law” to the
“strategic model” of war, in which the question of politics is reopened through the
power/resistance dynamic.867 While the power/resistance dynamic marks the cusp from
which an alternative analytic of power can be based, this same co-extensive relation
between power and resistance demonstrates for Foucault that the domain of the political
can be analogously analyzed in terms of a permanent struggle—that is on the basis that
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resistance is primary with power. In other words, by inverting Clausewitz’s proposition,
Foucault reveals how the dynamic field of force relations constituting the
power/resistance nexus directly corresponds with the domain of the political, and thus
that the question of politics is marked by a similar dynamic. Crucially then, whereas the
primacy of resistance marks the conceptual nexus from which Foucault’s analytic of
power is made possible, it is my contention that this thesis reappears in Society Must Be
Defended in such a way that carves out a critical caesu6ra between the political as archē
and the political as agōn, a caesura in which the domain of the political and the history of
politics coincides with the agonism inherent within the power/resistance dynamic.

5.2 Genealogy as an Analytic of Historical Struggle and
Discourses of Resistance
And so we have the outline of what might be called a genealogy…We have both a
meticulous rediscovery of struggles and the raw memory of fights…we can give the name
“genealogy” to this coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories which
allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggle and to make use of that
knowledge in contemporary tactics.868
--Michel Foucault

In the opening lecture of Society Must Be Defended Foucault begins by tracing the ways
in which the general thematics, points of focus, and methodologies in both philosophy
and critical theory have, over the past two decades prior to his own work, changed in
regard to what he refers to as the “efficacy of dispersed and discontinuous offensives.”869
To be sure, Foucault views his own work in Society Must Be Defended as continuing
within this critical tradition, and the inaugural lecture in this series is set to reveal a
specific continuity between these critical movements and his own unique methodology.
Consistent with his other texts and lectures, the question of method is crucial for
Foucault, and the first lecture is set to situate his work within the methodological
framework of these “discontinuous offensives” in terms of what he refers to—via
868
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Nietzsche—as “genealogy.”870 As outlined here, Foucault’s genealogical method is itself
characterized by three distinct features that form the basic theoretical framework from
which the critical inquiry into the history of the political comprising the remaining
lectures is made possible. It is important to briefly trace what Foucault employs in this
text as his genealogical method in order to point toward the ways in which the
power/resistance dynamic is recast as the implicit conceptual framework that makes
possible an alternative reading of the political as a history of agonistic struggle between
power and resistance. While it has been noted that Foucault views his work in Society
Must Be Defended as taking part in an ongoing struggle over a critical interpretation of
history,871 and further that this alternative interpretation of history ultimately turns upon a
historical critique of sovereignty,872 it is my contention that the outline of genealogy in
the opening lecture is set to both frame the interpretation of history and critique of
sovereignty as an extended discussion of primacy of resistance. Indeed, genealogy is the
methodology proper to understanding history as a history of struggle—that is, genealogy
is the method of analysis that renders the history of politics as resistance discernible for
Foucault.
First at stake in Foucault’s genealogical method is a return to the concept of
“critique” as extensively outlined in chapter three. Indeed, in relation to the critical turns
in philosophy contemporaneous to his own time, Foucault maintains that this return to the
general ethos of critique is characterized by the “immense and proliferating criticizability

870

Foucault first begins to use the term “genealogy” in his 1971 essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in
The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 76-100. Here, Foucault writes
that the key characteristic of genealogy “is that it opposes itself to the search for origins” (77). In contrast
to the search for “origins” as the principle task of historical analysis, Foucault maintains that history is not
produced in a unitary or linear fashion, but is instead “always produced through a particular stage of
forces” (83). In order to account for an analysis of “forces” as the substance of history, Foucault proposes
an alternative analytic of that takes “insurmountable conflict” as its basic point of inquiry (83). As a
critical methodology “genealogy,” Foucault writes, on the one hand “seeks to re-establish the various
systems of subjection” in which the analysis of history “must delineate this interaction, the struggle these
forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances” (83-84). What is ultimately at stake for
Foucault is that genealogy designates the methodology by which history can be reinterpreted as a history
of struggle, and as early as 1971 we can begin to glimpse the beginnings of Foucault’s agonistic theory of
the political in which an “insurmountable conflict” between power and resistance, between power
exercised as government and the art of not being governed, designates the substance of politics.
871
Neil Levy, “History as Struggle: Foucault’s Genealogy of Genealogy,” 166.
872
Andrew W. Neal, “Goodbye War on Terror? Foucault and Butler on Discourses of Law, War and
Exceptionalism,” 375.

319

of things, institutions, practices, and discourses.”873 This “immense and proliferating”
return of the critical attitude is what Foucault poses in terms of the “local character of
critique,” and is to be distinguished from the “tyranny of overall discourses, with their
hierarchies and all the privileges enjoyed by theoretical vanguards.”874 At stake here is
how the “local character of critique” distinct to genealogy reveals the “inhibiting effect
specific” to the “all-encompassing,” or “totalizing approaches” exemplified in the
dominant disciplines of Marxism and psychoanalysis.875 Indeed, Foucault’s own critical
approach is set as a way to contest and replace the theoretical and political vanguardism
of psychoanalytic and Marxist thought with an “autonomous and noncentralized” realm
of genealogical critique.876 It is in the critical transition from the universal and totalizing
theories to the local forms of critique, that Foucault begins to present an alternative way
to interpret the history of the political from a critical perspective that begins in the
analysis of local forms of resistance opposed to a universal theory of class struggle.
Indeed, while we have seen how with the concept of critique Foucault begins to broach
an anarchist hypothesis of the political in terms of an ongoing struggle between the
exercise of power as government and the “art of not being governed,” Foucault reaffirms
this connection here and maintains that the local character of critique by which the
genealogical method is to be distinguished, develops (albeit “distantly”) in relation to the
“anarchist thematic” of struggle.877 Distinct from an all-encompassing, universal theory,
what Foucault posits here as the “anarchist thematic” of critique is itself made possible in
the analysis of discourses of resistance—that is, the “anarchist thematic” of critique is
that which begins with and is elaborated through an analysis of historical struggle
manifest in what Foucault refers to in terms of “insurrections of subjugated
knowledges.”878 Crucially, it is by analyzing these forms of resistance and “insurrections
of subjugated knowledges” that Foucault begins to rethink politics and the history of the
political agonistically.
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With these “insurrections of subjugated knowledges” Foucault further outlines
two interrelated ideas through which the question of resistance emerges as the basis from
which genealogy proceeds. First, by “subjugated knowledges,” Foucault makes reference
to the “historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or
formal systematizations.”879 At stake here for Foucault is how the formal systems of
universal theories such as Marxism effectively homogenize the interpretation of history
in a way that fundamentally excludes the “historical contents” animated in varying forms
of struggle and resistant knowledge. In this way, the “historical contents” revealed
through genealogical analysis are what “allow us to see,” according to Foucault, “the
dividing lines in the confrontations and struggles that functional arrangements or
systematic organizations are designed to mask.”880 In other words, the genealogical
method is established by Foucault as a way to both reveal and account for the various
forms of historical struggle, as well as a critique of how certain forms of struggle and
conflict are effectively hidden in other critical approaches. Understood in this way,
“genealogy,” according to Foucault, is “a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical
knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle
against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse.”881
Furthermore, by “subjugated knowledges” Foucault refers to a “whole series of
knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently
elaborated knowledges.”882 With reference to Deleuze, Foucault refers to these
“disqualified” forms of knowledge as “minor,” and further maintains that the project of
genealogy is to “reactivate” these minoritorian forms of knowledge “against the scientific
hierarchicalization of knowledge and its intrinsic power-effects.”883 It is in this way,
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Foucault concludes, that these “returns of knowledge” are what make “critique
possible.”884
What Foucault refers to in this lecture as “insurrections of subjugated
knowledges” offers a unique way to from which to reread history on condition of the
question of resistance; rather than presupposing sovereign power and the state as the site
of political and philosophical problems, Foucault instead suggests that if a critical
interpretation of history is possible then one must begin with an analysis pertaining to the
forms of resistance to the exercise of power. In other words, genealogy constitutes an
alternative critical framework from which to consider to the question of politics on
condition of resistance. Indeed, as Foucault suggests, “we can give the name genealogy
to this coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories, which allows us to
constitute a historical knowledge of struggles, and to make use of that knowledge in
contemporary tactics.”885 Here, Foucault posits a certain continuity between genealogy
and the history of struggle as revealed in the analysis of “subjugated knowledges,” as
well as how this type of analysis encourages and is paired with a certain type of praxis.
Indeed, as Levy comments, Foucault views his work in Society Must Be Defended as a
way to “engage in political struggle by way of an interpretation of history as struggle.”886
At stake, then, in what Foucault refers to as the “insurrection of subjugated knowledges”
is at once how these discourses reappear as discourses of resistance, as well as how these
insurrectionary subjugated knowledges are what make possible the critical analysis of
history as struggle in such a way that philosophy itself begins to intervene and partake in
this very struggle.
While the reappearance of these insurrectionary discourses of resistance, paired
with the local, minoritorian character of critique, are what form the theoretical framework
of the genealogical method, what is ultimately at stake for Foucault is how these
discourses of resistance reveal the history of politics in radically novel ways that the
genealogical method must be able to take into account. To be sure, it is in relation to the
historical inquiry into forms of struggle and discourses of resistance in which the
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genealogical method is invoked by Foucault in Society Must Be Defended in order to
reinterpret the history of the political and politics on condition of both the “anarchist
thematic” of critique, as well as the insurrectionary discourses of resistance. Thus, “what
is at stake in both cases,” Foucault maintains, is a “historical knowledge of struggle.”887
This is to say that “genealogy” according to Foucault, at once takes a critical inquiry into
a “historical knowledge of struggle” as the basic locus from which its form of critique
becomes possible. To be sure, Foucault draws a specific continuity between the
insurrectionary discourses of resistance and what he refers to in terms of a critical
“memory of combats” in which genealogy comes to designate the “meticulous
rediscovery of struggles and the raw memory of fights.”888 Indeed, with the anarchist
thematic of critique paired with insurrectionary discourses of resistance—indeed, a
historical “memory of combats,” the genealogical method finds its locution and is
elaborated within a reinterpretation of history as paradigm of struggle. As we will see,
what Foucault refers to as “genealogy” not only turns upon an agonistic conception of the
history of the political in which politics emerges as a paradigm of resistance, but also a
critical theory of these movements and discourses of resistance as such. Indeed, it is
because Foucault rereads the history of the political agonistically that Society Must Be
Defended carves out a distinctly vital intervention within the history of political theory.
While all of Foucault’s works have severe implications for the tradition of
political theory, Society Must Be Defended designates Foucault’s most concentrated and
sustained effort to explore his genealogical analytic of power and resistance in relation to
the questions of politics and traditional political theory. Similar to one of the main goals
of The History of Sexuality, Foucault’s primary concern in Society Must Be Defended is
to juxtapose the ways in which power is traditionally represented in political theory with
an alternative reading of how relations of power function historically—which is to say,
agonistically, for Foucault.889 While the genealogical method turns upon an analysis of
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the discourses of resistance in order to reinterpret history as a history of struggle, it is my
contention that there is a specific continuity between the analysis of these discourses of
resistance and Foucault’s attempt to rethink the possibility of power and politics “outside
the model of the Leviathan, outside the field delineated by juridical sovereignty and the
institution of the State.”890 Indeed, it is within the context of the “insurrections of
subjugated knowledges,” or discourses of resistance that Foucault proposes a reversal of
Clausewitz in order to suggest that, rather than being expelled from the field of the
political, the continuation of war is what gives the political its agonistic form of
permanent struggle as such. In this regard, Foucault’s primary focus throughout these
lectures is to elaborate a critical analytic of power and politics in terms of the model of
war, a model that at once designates the historical operability of power relations, as well
as the principle of intelligibility from which to reread the history of the political in terms
of an agonistic model of war. In order to rethink the history of the political against the
model of the Leviathan, Foucault maintains that it is by analyzing the history of
insurrectionary discourses of resistance, or “subjugated knowledges,” that allows for an
inversion of Clausewitz, and ultimately that politics can be interpreted in terms of a
continuation of war. Similar, then, to the way in which The History of Sexuality is
framed in terms of rethinking power relations on condition of the primacy of resistance,
in Society Must Be Defended Foucault frames his critical inquiry into the war analytic of
power and politics in terms of unmasking an alternative theory of historical resistance,
and thus an anarchic theory of the political as agōn.

5.3

Politics as the Continuation of War

War is waged throughout history, and through the history that tells the history of war.
And history, for its part, can never do anything more than interpret the war it is waging
or that is being waged through it.891
--Michel Foucault

distinguished from his other works in that its question is directly situated in opposition to Hobbes’s
treatise the Leviathan. Thus, Foucault maintains that his work has been set to accomplish the “opposite
of what Hobbes was trying to so in Leviathan” (28).
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In the epigraph above, Foucault posits a specific nexus between war and the
interpretation of history; war, as Foucault suggests here, at once designates the substance
that gives history its form as such, as well as the principle of intelligibility from which
history can be interpreted as itself a continuation of war. While Foucault’s genealogical
analytic of history as the history of struggle is what makes possible his critical inquiry
into the history of the political as such, the remaining lectures ought to be understood as
an attempt to employ this analytic in the study of politics. To be sure, Foucault’s
inversion of Clausewitz designates the guiding theme by which the lectures in Society
Must Be Defended are organized as an alternative account of how the history of politics
and the political can be posed in reference to a historical knowledge of struggles manifest
within the paradigm of war. Insofar as the “insurrections of subjugated knowledges”
fundamentally turn upon and reveal a “historical knowledge of struggle,” it is in this way
that the general theme of Society Must Be Defended recasts the power/resistance dynamic
as the basis of the political. Indeed, as Neal observes the central theme established by
Foucault in Society Must Be Defended is his concern “with a series of marginal historical
discourses that are linked through the theme of politics as the continuation of war.”892 In
this regard, there is a specific continuity between an analysis of insurrections of
subjugated knowledges and the interpretation of politics as a continuation of war; that is,
although the discourses of resistance Foucault traces throughout this text are irreducible
to one another, what unifies these otherwise heterogeneous movements is a model of the
political that takes war as the very basis of politics. In its most preliminary form, then,
we might take the interpretation of politics as a continuation of war as at once being
informed by an analysis of discourse and movements of resistance, as well as how this
type of analysis itself resists the standard narrative of orthodox political theory.
It is my contention that the continuity Foucault’s establishes between history, war,
and politics designates a critical caesura between the political as archē and the political as
agōn. Rather than analyzing power and politics “in terms of surrender, contract, and
alienation,” as in Hobbes, Foucault therefore asks “shouldn’t we be analyzing it first and
foremost in terms of conflict, confrontation and war?”893 To do so, Foucault concludes,
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“would give us an alternative to the first hypothesis—which is that the mechanism of
power is basically or essentially repression,” or that politics can be reduced to the genesis
and exercise of sovereignty.894 In opposition to the repressive hypothesis of power
(referred to in this text as “Reich’s hypothesis”), Foucault proposes “Nietzsche’s
hypothesis,” and maintains that politics and the political can be analyzed in terms of “a
warlike clash between forces.”895 It is in regard to this second hypothesis that Foucault
takes as the basic model, or conceptual framework, from which Clausewitz’s initial
proposition can be inverted as the basic principle from which to reread the history of the
political as a genealogical history of struggle between forces—that is as agōn. In relation
to this agonistic conception of politics and the political, what is ultimately at stake in
Society Must Be Defended is how Foucault’s analysis of “subjugated knowledges” and
insurrectionary discourses are what make possible a counter-historical theory of the
political in which the question of politics is reframed by Foucault on condition of the
discourses and politics of resistance manifest in the continuation of war.
Although Foucault has been criticized for conflating the condition of war with the
exercise of politics, Foucault’s goal in Society Must Be Defended is, more fundamentally,
to provide a critical inquiry into whether the paradigm of war can be understood as at
once constituting the principle of intelligibility of politics, as well as how the history of
the political as such can be interpreted agonistically—that is, in terms of an ongoing and
permanent struggle between force and counter-force, between power and resistance. 896
With this problematic in mind, in the third lecture Foucault suggests a preliminary set of
three propositions derived from the thesis “politics is the continuation of war by other
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means.” First, Foucault maintains that what can be referred to in terms of “politics”
derives its specific political character as such from the inegalitarian and asymmetric
relations of force manifest in the paradigm of war. “Politics,” Foucault therefore writes,
designates the field which “sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces
manifested in war.”897 Here, Foucault draws an explicit continuity between power,
politics, and war in such a way that the latter designates the key paradigm in which both
power relations and politics are traditionally represented and historically manifest; hence,
politics according to Foucault is historically expressed and coded as the continuation of
war. While the characteristic specific to “politics” is itself derived and manifest in the
paradigm of war, this additionally means for Foucault that the history of the political as
written “within this civil peace, these political struggles, these clashes over or with
power, these modifications of relations of force” can all be interpreted as a continuation
of the political paradigm of war.898
Indeed, in Society Must Be Defended Foucault discards the orthodox narrative of
modern political theory that begins with the state and the advent of sovereign power as
the substance of politics in favor of an agonistic conception of history and politics that
locates war as the key paradigm of the political. While modern political theory since
Hobbes899 and Locke900 relies upon the eradication of war from the field of the political,
Foucault instead replies that interpreting politics as the continuation of war means “we
are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of
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peace and its institutions.”901 Despite, then, the orthodox narratives of politics in which
the condition of war (agōn) is replaced with the political as archē, Foucault maintains that
the very history which purports to put an end to the condition of war is instead its
continuation. While Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz is set in order to rethink the
question of politics on condition of the struggle/war paradigm, this means that the history
of the political is not to be found in the advent of state sovereignty; instead what defines
the history of the political and gives it its historicity as such is the continuation of politics
as war. Finally, Foucault claims that interpreting the history of the political in terms of
the paradigm of war “means that the last battle would put an end to politics,” and
effectively “suspend the exercise of power as continuous warfare.”902 In other words, the
permanence of the political for Foucault is attested to by the permanence of war, without
which the question of politics would lose its specificity.
In each of these propositions, what is ultimately at stake in interpreting politics as
a continuation of war is how the political is manifest and historically expressed as an
agonistic domain of continuous struggle, conflict, confrontation, and ultimately
resistance. The history of the political and the emergence of politics does not begin with
the advent of sovereignty according to Foucault, but in the paradigmatic condition of
war—that is, war designates the domain proper to the history of the political; in other
words, politics as a continuation of war turns upon an agonistic, rather than archic,
conception of the political. Thus, according to Foucault “[i]f we make history, the
history of the wars that go on throughout history,” then it is the “history/war
relationship,” and not the political as archē that forms the “precondition for the
emergence of politics.”903 As the condition required for the emergence of “politics,” war,
like resistance for Foucault, designates a position of primacy with respect to the questions
of politics and the political—that is, “politics” is made possible and is historically
elaborated in what Foucault refers to as “the primacy afforded to war.”904 While in The
History of Sexuality Foucault asserts that resistance is primary with power, in Society
Must Be Defended he reveals that what underlies the question of politics and gives it its
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character as such is a “sort of primitive and permanent war.”905 By “primitive” war
Foucault’s choice in terminology is not set to allude to the condition of war that defines
the “state of nature” in the writings of Hobbes and Locke; instead, by “primitive”
Foucault on the one hand refers to the way in which the paradigm of war is, more
fundamentally, what underlies the orthodox narrative of the history of the political as told
from the perspective of the state and the advent of sovereignty. Thus, while Honneth
suggests that it is on this point that Foucault’s thought is “reminiscent of Hobbes,”906 the
term “primitive” in Foucault’s thought more fundamentally means that “beneath peace,
order, wealth, and authority, beneath the calm order of subordinations, beneath the State
and State apparatuses, beneath the laws”—that is, beneath the history of political power
as archē—is the permanence of war.907 It is in this way, and not of invoking a “state of
nature” prior to the state, that Foucault asks the critical question pertaining to whether or
not the “phenomenon of war” can be “regarded as primary with respect to other
relations.”908 Furthermore, in its reproduction of the permanent struggle between forces,
politics as war can be understood as exemplifying and continuing the power/resistance
dynamic outlined in The History of Sexuality. Indeed, by reading the historical
expression of politics as a continuation of war, Foucault not only reveals the problematic
of sovereignty and political power in a radically new way that turns upon the paradigm of
war, but also how the paradigm of war—as a history of agonistic struggle—itself turns
upon and is made possible in posing the question of politics alongside the permanent
possibility of resistance.
By refusing to subordinate the condition of war to the birth of modern politics,
Foucault reveals an alternative hypothesis of the political that takes as its basis the
continuation of war, and it is in this way politics can be understood as assuming the form
of an agōn. Insofar as war is a “permanent,” and therefore primary, component of
politics this means that for Foucault war—as the historical expression of politics—at
once designates the general principle of intelligibility from which to interpret both the
history of the state and sovereign power, as well as the counter-history of resistance.
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Politics as the continuation of war is therefore established, on the one hand, by Foucault
in order to demonstrate how the standard interpretation of the political as found in the
advent of sovereignty, in the history of the state, and the exercise of power as government
can in fact be reread as a continuation of the political paradigm of war. At the same time,
however, because war designates the historical expression of the political, “politics as the
continuation of war by other means” is also, and more fundamentally, invoked by
Foucault not only to account for the place of resistance amongst the dynamic of politics
as war, but also in terms of how resistance designates the vital component from which the
question of politics can be understood agonistically. Similar to Foucault’s assertion
regarding how the question of power is to be necessarily paired with the question of
resistance, interpreting politics as the continuation of war means that the history of the
state and of sovereignty are to be posed alongside the correlative problematic of
“rebellion.”909 This affirmation that the substance of politics arises between the state and
the counter-history of rebellion echoes Foucault’s insistence that “where there is power,
there is resistance.” Whereas the dynamic field of force relations that characterize power
relations is, according to Foucault, to be understood as a permanent struggle between
power and resistance, this idea is again recast in terms of what he first refers to as the
“invasion-rebellion system.”910
With the power/resistance dynamic designating the basis from which politics can
be interpreted as a continuation of war, what Foucault refers to in this text as the
“invasion-rebellion system” reveals an alternative basis from which to think through the
question of politics agonistically. “[I]nvasion and rebellion” Foucault therefore writes
“were the two main elements that were introduced to rediscover the war that goes on
within societies.”911 As we will see, although Foucault prefers the term “government”
above that of “invasion” in order to distinguish historical conquest from its continuation
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as an exercise of government, what is crucial is that resistance and the history of
“rebellion” designate a permanent component of the interpretation of politics as a
continuation of war. While resistance, as a condition of possibility of power, in
Foucault’s thought is at once primary with respect to field of force relations, as well as
that which designates the permanent potential to transform a power relation into an
agonistic struggle between forces, by reading the political as a historical continuation of
war, Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended is set to invoke this same dynamic as
the constituent component of politics. Indeed, the term “politics”—as both political
paradigm and historical continuation—does not simply refer to the history of the state,
but more fundamentally toward the struggle between the state and the history of
rebellion. As Neal observes, insofar as politics can be interpreted as a continuation of
war, this means that politics as war can either be “deployed in the nationalist myths of
historical defeat of victory” (invasion)—that is, in terms of the politics of the state, “or
inverted into discourses of class war, race war, religious war” (rebellion).912 Interpreting
politics as a continuation of war, thus subverts the sovereign/political nexus, and reframes
the very question of politics in terms of an agonistic struggle between the history of the
state and the counter-history of resistance.
Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz ultimately turns upon the elaboration of
politics within the historical discourses of war and resistance in which the political as
such assumes the agonistic form of power/resistance. By invoking the paradigm of war
as both the principle of intelligibility of the political, as well as the defining characteristic
of politics as such, Foucault reveals how an agonistic theory of the political turns upon a
struggle between the exercise of sovereign government and movements of resistance. In
other words, the war paradigm of politics is an agonistic model of the political in which
resistance nominates the key component through which the politics assumes the form of
permanent sphere of struggle between adversarial forces. Consequently, however,
insofar as politics is to be understood as the continuation of war, this reveals what
Foucault refers to in terms of a “historical paradox” in which politics as the continuous
exercise of warfare is at once the object of the state, as well as the movements of
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resistance against the state.913 As an object of the state, Foucault first traces how,
alongside the development of the state from the Middle Ages to the modern era, the
discourses and practices of war underwent a distinct change characterized by the ways in
which “only State powers could wage wars and manipulate the instruments of war.”914
Indeed, Foucault argues that the historical expression of politics as war predates its
colonization by the state, and thus traces how “the State acquired a monopoly on war.”915
By outlining how the state gradually obtained a monopolization on the discourses of war,
Foucault’s point is to first demonstrate how what he refers to as the practice of “day-today warfare” was increasingly “eradicated from the social body.”916 Rather than defining
the state as Max Weber does in terms of the monopolization of legitimate violence,
Foucault shifts the focus toward the question of politics as war, and demonstrates that
what defines the state and makes possible its existence as such is, contra Hobbes, its
colonization and eventual monopolization of the political paradigm of war. 917 By
locating the existence of a condition of war prior to the advent of sovereignty, Foucault
appears to affirm the condition of war that characterizes the “state of nature” as described
by Hobbes and Locke. Yet, while Foucault does indeed retain the notion of a social
condition of “day-to-day warfare” prior to the state, what is at stake for Foucault is not to
suggest a condition or essence of war that must necessarily be overcome in contractual
sovereignty, but rather that another form of “politics”—indeed, a politics as resistance
expressed in the continuation of war—predates the politics of the state. In other words,
the history of politics neither begins with the eradication of war from the field of the
political nor the advent of sovereign power; instead, rather, the advent and continuation
of sovereign power is only an episode in the continuation of politics as war.
At the same time, however, while the state increasingly acquired a
monopolization on the discourses and practices of war, Foucault’s penultimate claim in
Society Must Be Defended is to suggest that alongside and parallel to the state’s
monopolization of war is the appearance of heterogeneous, critical discourse of resistance
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that radically denied and opposed the state’s eradication of war as a permanent social
relation. This oppositional discourse of resistance is what Foucault refers to as the “first
historico-political discourse on society.”918 Distinct from the philosophico-juridical
discourses” of sovereignty, Foucault is clear that these “historico-political” discourses of
resistance are exemplary of what he refers to as “subjugated knowledges.”919 It is in
regard to these “historico-political” discourses of resistance that Foucault begins to posit
an agonistic theory of the political in a novel form. In tracing the advent of these
resistant discourses, what is first at stake for Foucault is how the discourse opposed to the
state is “also a discourse on war,” wherein the reappearance of the general paradigm of
war was “understood to be a permanent social relationship, the ineradicable basis of all
relations and institutions of power.”920 In “historico-political” discourse, then, the
concept of politics as war takes on an entirely different meaning than in that of the state.
As Reid suggests, insofar as the examples Foucault invokes in Society Must Be Defended
refer to the “increasingly autonomous, decentralized, and anarchistic character” of
political struggles, then what is at stake in the “historico-political” discourses on society
is “not so much the wars of the state as wars against the state.”921 Here, the critical
question of war, as revealed in these “historico-political” discourses, at once designates a
permanent social condition, as well as that which is inscribed into and makes possible
political power—that is, the concept of warfare within historico-political discourse
describes both the exercise of sovereignty and a position a position of resistance, a praxis
against the state. Indeed, Foucault’s thesis that politics designates the continuation of
war is set to capture the struggle between these opposing critical positions.
Consequently, however, this means that Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended
reveals a vital way in which the question of politics and the history of the political can be
understood not as archē, but as agōn, as a field in which the permanence of resistance
represents the condition by which politics assumes the war/struggle model.
Further at stake for Foucault is how these discourses of resistance fundamentally
disrupt the standard, orthodox narrative of political theory. Against Hobbes’s theory that
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posits the advent of sovereign power through the eradication of the condition of war from
the field of the political, Foucault maintains that the key characteristic common amongst
these “historico-political” discourses of resistance begins with the claim that “political
power does not begin when the war ends”—that is, political power is none other than the
continuation of politics as war.922 While the politics of war is revealed by these
“historico-political” discourses of resistance as basic motor behind political power and its
exercise, Foucault additionally demonstrates how these critical discourses fundamentally
give rise to, and turn upon, a distinct form of politics as resistance. “Historico-political
discourse is not, and cannot be,” Foucault argues “that of the Prince’s politics or,
obviously, that of absolute power.”923 Instead “historico-political discourse,” as Foucault
maintains, is a “discourse that cuts off the king’s head, or which at least does without a
sovereign and denounces him.”924 As a critical discourse that decapitates the theory and
practice of sovereignty, Foucault’s inquiry into the “historico-political” discourses should
be understood as exemplary of his oft cited attempt to behead the sovereign in political
theory. Taking the Levellers as an early historical example of the appearance of this
critical discourse of resistance, Foucault maintains that the historico-political discourse
on war is therefore a “discourse of a struggle against the king.”925 As a distinct form of
politics irreducible to the sovereign politics of the state, these “historico-political”
discourses of politics as war and resistance are genuinely anarchic in both its struggle
against and without a king—which is to say without archē. Finally, insofar the
“historico-political” discourses on war posits and turns upon the elaboration of a distinct
understanding of the political in which politics cannot be reduced to the exercise of state
sovereignty, these discourses reveal what Foucault refers to as a “counter-historical
function” made possible in the concept and practice of politics as resistance.926 As that
which designates the appearance of an alternative history parallel, yet counter to the
history of the state, the “historico-political” discourses of resistance are what reveal for
Foucault the very possibility of an alternative history of the political as agōn.
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Interpreting politics as the continuation of war unmasks a counter-narrative that
resists the standard, orthodox history of political theory. Rather than presupposing the
eradication of the condition of war from the domain of the political, Foucault takes the
paradigm of war as the constituent component of both politics and the political. The war
analytic of politics as such is irreducible to the political as archē—that is, politics as the
continuation of war is therefore an agonistic model of the political. As agōn, the history
of the political for Foucault is manifest and defined by a permanent struggle between
forces. More specifically, the term “politics”—as the historical continuation of war
manifest in the “invasion-rebellion system”—designates for Foucault a permanent
struggle between the politics of the state and the politics of resistance. “The State,”
Foucault therefore maintains “is nothing more than the way that the war between the two
groups in question continues to be waged in apparently peaceful forms.”927 While the
state according to Foucault exists only as the continuation of war waged through peace,
rethinking the political in terms of an agōn ultimately turns upon conceptualizing the
political on condition of the permanent possibility of resistance and rebellion. In this
way, having established an alternative reading of the political, Foucault importantly
maintains “how an analysis of this type is obviously articulated with revolutionary hopes,
an urgent call for rebellion, and also a politics of rebellion or revolution.”928 Here,
Foucault reveals that what is at stake in the elaboration of an agonistic conception of the
political is the question of resistance—indeed a form of politics as resistance. To be sure,
the thesis “politics is the continuation of war by other means” is made possible according
to Foucault not simply by the permanent possibility of resistance within the field of the
political, but the elaboration of a certain praxis, a certain notion of politics as resistance.
It is with these two ideas—that is, that the permanent presence of resistance
within the field of the political reveals a counter-historical narrative to orthodox history
of the state and sovereign power, and further that this counter-history is elaborated in
terms of conceiving politics as resistance—that Society Must Be Defended reinvigorates
the power/resistance dynamic through interpreting politics as a continuation of war.
While resistance is primary amongst the dynamic field of power relations both in terms of
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the condition of possibility of power relations as such, as well as the permanent
potentiality to transform a power relation into a relation of struggle, Foucault reworks this
dynamic into his understanding of politics in order to demonstrate how parallel to the
history of the state, of sovereign power, of the exercise of government, is the counterhistory of the state’s own impossibility manifest in the politics of resistance. Foucault’s
rereading of the history of the political as the continuation of war, has been affirmed by
the French collective, Tiqqun, whose text Introduction to Civil War attempts to rethink
the history of the political from the perspective of resistance expressed in the paradigm of
what they refer to as “civil war.” In a manner akin to Foucault’s writing, Tiqqun writes
that interpreting politics from the perspective of civil war means on the one hand that
“the modern State, which purports to put an end to civil war, is instead its continuation by
other means.”929 Yet, because of this, Tiqqun further maintains that the “history of the
modern State is the history of the struggle against its own impossibility…We have, then,
the official history of the modern State…And also there is a counter-history, which is the
history of its impossibility.”930 It is this “counter-history,” in which politics emerges in
the war against the possibility of the state, that directs Foucault’s general focus in Society
Must Be Defended. As a consequence, however, what is ultimately at stake for Foucault
is that the history of politics as such can no longer be reduced to the history of the state.
As a continuation of war, politics according to Foucault takes place within an agonistic
dynamic, a fundamental struggle or relation of war between the history of the state and
the counter-history of resistance.
Interpreting politics agonistically—as a continuation of war—therefore means
that the historical possibility of the state, of sovereignty, and of government is
simultaneously the counter-history of resistance, or that which makes the state
impossible. At the same time, however, the war model of the political not only posits the
historical necessity of interpreting the politics as the continuation of struggle between
forces, but also an alternative way from which to understand the historical question of
politics on condition of resistance. In relation to the interpretation of war as a paradigm
of resistance, both Pierre Clastres’ ethnographic research into stateless societies, as well
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as Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “war-machine” add further leverage to
Foucault’s argument.931 In Clastres’ text Societies Against the State (a text Foucault
surprisingly neglects to reference) the concept of “war” is understood historically as a
mechanism of resistance to the formation of the state.932 Indeed, in Clastres’ work, the
concept and practice of war designates an alternative perspective from which history can
be reinterpreted as an agonistic struggle between the state and the non-state. For Clastres,
then, insofar as it is said that the “history of peoples who have a history is the history of
class struggle,” one could equally posit “with at least as much truthfulness, that the
history of peoples without history is the history of their struggle against the state.”933
Yet, this alternative interpretation of history as the ongoing struggle with the state
additionally turns upon the elaboration of an alternative form of politics as resistance.
With explicit reference Societies Against the State, Deleuze and Guattari affirm Clastres’
understanding of war as a form of resistance with their concept of the “war-machine.”
Insofar as the paradigm of war can be understood as a political form of resistance,
Deleuze and Guattari reverse the logic of Hobbes and maintain that since “the state was
against war, so war is against the state and is what makes it impossible.”934 As a form of
resistance, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the “war-machine” cannot be defined, as is
the case for Hobbes and Locke, in terms of a “state of nature,” but instead as a “mode of
a social state that wards off and prevents the state.”935 Thus while the orthodox tradition
of political theory takes the concept, condition, and practice of war as the inverse of the
modern politics, in Foucault, Tiqqun, Clastres, and Deleuze and Guattari, the concept of
war not only designates an alternative grid or principle of intelligibility from which to
understand the history of politics agonistically, but also an alternative paradigm of
politics found in the movements of resistance and rebellion.
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Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz ultimately turns upon the elaboration of
politics within the historical discourses of war in which the political as such assumes the
form of an agōn as opposed to archē. More specifically, Foucault’s primary focus
throughout Society Must Be Defended is at once a detailed account of how the history of
the political refers not simply to the history of the state, but instead to the permanent
struggle between the state and the counter-history of its own impossibility, and
furthermore that this interpretation of politics ultimately turns upon the analysis and
elaboration of a politics of resistance as the key component that gives the political its
form as such. Society Must Be Defended therefore turns upon an agonistic conception of
the political. Crucially, however, while Schmitt’s agonistic conception of the political, as
well as Mouffe’s more recent attempt to recast Schmitt’s theory within a contemporary
framework, effectively reduces the condition of agōn to that of archic sovereignty, in
Foucault’s thought the notion of an agōn attested to in the paradigm of war is retained in
an altogether different manner. With the paradigm of war designating the materiality and
principle of intelligibility of politics, the political as agōn cannot simply be reduced,
according to Foucault, to the politics of the state; instead, rather, an agonistic theory of
politics coded in the form of a permanent war ultimately turns upon a struggle between
the state and the movements of resistance against the state. To be sure, although in
Agonistics Mouffe maintains that a permanent “dimension of antagonism” is what defines
the nature of the political, her agonistic model of politics fundamentally turns upon the
eradication of resistance from the field of agonism as such. 936 This eradication of
resistance from the field of the political is what Mouffe refers to as an “agonism without
antagonism”937 whereby a “radical disobedience that puts the state at bay” is to be
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replaced or overcome by an “engagement with institutions.”938 In contrast to Mouffe’s
theory of the political, Foucault’s conceptualization of politics as the continuation of war
offers an alternative theory through which the agonistic dimension of the political is
retained on condition of the primacy of resistance and the paradigm of war. Similar,
then, to the way in which resistance, as we saw in the previous chapter, designates the
condition of possibility in which a power relation can be transformed into a relation of
struggle, resistance as manifest in the paradigm of war is what transforms the political as
archē into the political as agōn.

5.4 Against Leviathan: Civil War as a Paradigm of Resistance
The people have in a sense never ceased to denounce property as pillage, laws as
extractions, and governments as domination. The proof is that they have never stopped
rebelling…rebellion is nothing but the obverse of war. Laws, power, government, are the
obverse of the war they are waging against us. Rebellion is therefore not the destruction
of a peaceful system of laws for some reason. Rebellion is a response to a war that the
government never stops waging. Government means their war against us, rebellion is
our war against them.939
--Michel Foucault
By interpreting politics as the continuation of war by other means, Foucault reveals how
an agonistic conception of the political is made possible by the permanent presence of
resistance within the field of politics as such. As a domain of agōn, the historical
expression of politics as war cannot be reduced, according to Foucault, to the histories of
government, sovereignty, and the state; instead, “politics” designates the domain of a

“adversaries” and “enemies.” In her earlier text On the Political, Mouffe discusses this distinction with
reference to the friend/enemy antithesis established in Schmitt’s theory of the political, and maintains
that “[w]hile antagonism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share any
common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging
that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their
opponents” (20). Yet, while Mouffe reserves the term “agōn” to describe the struggle between
adversaries rather than enemies, her agonistic model of the political turns upon a struggle between those
who share a common political ideology. According to Mouffe, then, this means that although adversaries
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permanent dynamic of struggle between the history of the state and the counter-history of
resistance, a permanent war between government and movements of rebellion. In chapter
three, we have seen how with the concept of “critique” Foucault maintains that the
political questions pertaining to the exercise of government and its history is to be
simultaneously posed alongside the counter-history of the “art of not being governed.”
Furthermore, in chapter four, we have seen how the primacy of resistance as found in the
fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality means, as Foucault writes that “[o]ne
cannot, therefore, write either the history of kings or the history of peoples.”940 On
condition of the permanence of resistance, Foucault therefore maintains that “one can
write the history of what constitutes those opposing terms”—that is, the history of the
permanent struggle “between the people and those who govern.”941 In Society Must Be
Defended, Foucault reaffirms these critical positions and subsequently posits that the
political designates the historical struggle between the paradigm of government on the
one hand, and the paradigm of resistance on the other. As Levy confirms, the
“affirmation that in the relation between king and people, power is never fully
concentrated on one side, echoes Foucault’s insistence that where there is power there is
resistance.”942 Crucially, it is in this way that Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz can be
understood as recasting the primacy of resistance as the basic principle from which to
read the history of politics and the political. This is to say that the war model of the
political, in which politics is historically manifest in terms of a continuation of war, not
only finds its consistency within the power/resistance dynamic, but also on condition of
the primacy of resistance.
With the history of struggle between the exercise of power as government and the
counter-movements of resistance designating the field proper to the domain of the
political, it is my contention that Society Must Be Defended at once invokes the
power/resistance dynamic as the principle intelligibility of the political, as well as the
historical manifestation of politics as such. In other words, there is a specific continuity
between Foucault’s conception of power and politics, whereby the power/resistance
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dynamic is reframed in terms of the politics/war model of the history of political struggle.
Indeed, Foucault’s fifth thesis, “where there is power, there is resistance”—means that
politics and the history of the political can be interpreted in terms of the continuation of
warfare. Yet, as a consequence to the war analytic of politics and the political, Foucault
not only reveals how resistance is primary with respect to the history of the political—its
historical manifestation continuously transforming the field of politics into an agonistic
struggle between those who govern and those who resist—but, more fundamentally, how
resistance is the key term that reveals the political in its agonistic form as such. Foucault
therefore posits that resistance designates the principle of intelligibility from which the
historical emergence of “politics” can be observed in its specificity—that is, the
permanence of resistance designates the political in its most paradigmatic form. “The
proof,” that resistance designates a constituent component of the political as agōn arises,
according to Foucault in the epigraph above with the fact that the “people have in a sense
never ceased to denounce property as pillage, laws as extractions, and governments as
domination…they have never stopped rebelling”—that is, rebellion must be understood
as a permanent component of the field of the political.943 Thus, while we have seen how
the war model of politics and the political ultimately finds its basis in the
power/resistance dynamic, Foucault more directly recasts basis the political in terms of
what can be referred to in terms of a government/rebellion dynamic. In other words,
insofar as politics can be interpreted as a continuation of war, the field of the political is
historically expressed for Foucault as the history of struggle; in such a system, the term
“politics” in the Foucauldian sense comes to designates the free play of agonistic struggle
between the exercise of power as government and the counter-historical movements of
resistance.
Although, as we have seen, Foucault’s war analytic of politics ultimately turns
upon the struggle between the exercise of government and the counter-historical
movements of resistance, what is at stake for Foucault in the government/rebellion war
model of the political is how resistance, and neither sovereign power nor the history of
the state acts as the historical motor of politics interpreted as a continuation of war. Thus,
in Society Must Be Defended Foucault redefines the paradigm of rebellion in a way that
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captures this motive. “Rebellion,” Foucault writes, “is therefore not the destruction of a
peaceful system of laws for some reason;” instead, rather, “rebellion is nothing but the
obverse of war.944 As the “obverse” of politics as war, rebellion is the constituent
counter-part to the history of politics interpreted as a continuation of war, without which
the political could only assume the form of an archē. According to Foucault, however,
this means that the war model of the political necessarily includes resistance as a
permanent feature of politics—that is, rebellion is a permanent “response to the war the
government never stops waging.”945 As Foucault writes, then, while the history of the
political as “government means their war against us,” the permanent possibility of
“rebellion is our war against them.”946 While Foucault’s agonistic conception of the
political, in which politics is expressed in the interplay between the war of government
waged against its own impossibility, and the movements of resistance launched against
the continuation of government appears to reproduce the we/they antithesis in Schmitt’s
theory of the political, Foucault’s agonistic theory of politics refuses the basic
presuppositions required by Schmitt. Although the political as agōn is indeed inherently
partisan according to Foucault, the agonistic dimension of politics that assumes the form
of a struggle between adversaries cannot be reduced, as is the case in Schmitt’s work, to
the sovereign state. Whereas in Schmitt, the primacy of the state is presupposed in such a
way so that the we/they antithesis which designates the criteria proper to the domain of
the political is bound to the permanence of sovereign power, in Foucault’s model it is the
permanence of resistance that makes possible not simply the distinction, but the struggle
between adversaries that gives the political its constituent logic.947
While in Foucault’s work the history of the state, of sovereignty, and of the
exercise of power as government all still hold an elemental place in his theory of politics,
the agonistic conception of politics as explored in Society Must Be Defended reveals
resistance as the vital (albeit historically neglected) concept in the history of political
theory. In contrast to Mouffe’s neo-Schmittian model which expels resistance from the
field of the political in order to arrive at an liberal democratic politics without
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antagonism, it is my contention that the narrative arc of Society Must Be Defended, in
which politics is interpreted as a continuation of war, must be understood as an attempt to
reintroduce the general problematic of resistance into the field of the political as agōn,
and furthermore that this strategic inclusion of resistance within the field to which
politics refers invokes a theory of anarchism as its very basis. In order to substantiate the
claim that the history of the political can be read from the perspective of war instead of
the advent of sovereignty, Foucault offers an alternative reading of the Leviathan in order
to both account for the question of resistance within the history of political theory, as well
as to rethink the history of politics of resistance as itself of a paradigm of what Foucault
will refer to as “civil war” or “social war.”948 As we will see, while both Schmitt and
Mouffe presuppose a specific continuity between the state and politics, in Foucault’s
reading of Hobbes the concept of “civil war” designates the key concept by which the
political can be understood as agōn. Thus although, Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz is
established as an agonistic conception of the political in which politics designates the
struggle between the history of government and the counter-history of resistance, his
rereading of Hobbes asserts a unique understanding of the political from the perspective
of resistance, in which the concept and practice of civil war reflects a conscious decision
to reframe the political agonistically.
Within the history of political theory, Foucault turns to Hobbes as the political
philosopher whose understanding of politics begins by positing a distinct relationship
between war and political power.949 In this way, it is necessary to read Hobbes,
according to Foucault, in order to understand how war first emerges as the principle of
intelligibility of power relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. More
specifically, however, despite more orthodox readings of the question of politics in the
Leviathan, Foucault reads Hobbes’s text as a critical exploration into the possibility of
interpreting politics as a continuation of war. It is well known amongst political theorists
that Hobbes takes the condition of war as the inverse of the sovereign state; the
eradication of the condition of war prior to the existence of the state is the ontological
foundation that makes possible the birth of sovereign power and the state. In this regard,
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Foucault reads Hobbes’s text as being centered around two seminal questions in which
the war/politics relation is at once understood as the very basis of the political, as well as
that which allows for the advent of sovereignty and the birth of the state. Foucault first
maintains that the initial question that drives Hobbes’s theory of politics and the political
asks “what is this war that exists before the State, and which the State is, in theory,
destined to end?”950 Second, Foucault claims that while the first question forms the
critical background from which Hobbes’s theory of politics begins, what is ultimately at
stake in the Leviathan is to theorize how this condition of war, prior to the existence of
the state, is invoked in order to ask how this “war give[s] birth to the state.”951 Here, the
concept of “war” in Foucault’s reading of the Leviathan at once designates a social
condition prior to the state, as well as that which is to be eradicated from the field of the
political in order to make the sovereign state possible. Importantly, in each of these
questions, Foucault suggests that it is the concept of war and not that of the state that is
invoked by Hobbes as the vital concept from which his theory regarding the emergence
of modern politics is based. As we will see, because the condition of war is that which is
presupposed by Hobbes, it is with the concepts of civil war and anarchy, and not that of
sovereignty, that designate the key paradigm for an agonistic conception of the
political.952
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Because Foucault takes the paradigm of war, and not its elimination, as the
constituent component of the political, what is at stake in Society Must Be Defended is
not only a strategic reversal of Clausewitz’s thesis on politics and war, but also an
inversion of the general narrative arc of Hobbes’s political treatise. Thus, while Hobbes
traces the ways in which the condition of war that characterizes the state of nature is
overcome in the advent of sovereignty, Foucault inverts this thesis and suggests that the
condition of war is irreducible to the advent of sovereignty. Against traditional readings
regarding the relation between the state of war and the advent of political power,
Foucault importantly maintains to the contrary:
Hobbes turns war, the fact of war and the relationship of force that is actually
manifested in the battle, into something that has nothing to do with constitution of
sovereignty. The establishment of sovereignty has nothing to do with war.
Basically, Hobbes’s discourse is a certain “no” to war.953
While in Hobbes’s theory of the political, the eradication of the state of war is both what
is required and that which makes possible the emergence of modern politics in the form
of sovereignty, in Foucault’s reading of Hobbes, the condition of war is irreducible to the
constitution of sovereignty. This is to say that sovereignty—indeed the emergence of
sovereign power—has a history, according to Foucault, distinct from the political
paradigm of war. Rather than a linear history of the political in which the condition of
war prior to the state is fully eliminated by sovereign power, Foucault reads the
Leviathan as a treatise on two conflicting understandings of political history, one from
the perspective of the state and sovereign power, and the other told from the counterhistorical condition of war. What is unique about Foucault’s reading of Leviathan in the
above passage lies in his claim that “Hobbes turns war…into something that has nothing
to do with the constitution of sovereignty.” In other words, while the Leviathan is
primarily read as a historical theory pertaining to the constitution of sovereign power,
Foucault maintains that the text ought to be understood as making a fundamental
statement on the political paradigm of war. “Hence the problem,” Foucault asks, “to
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whom, to what, is the elimination of war addressed, given that no previous theory of
power had given war the role that Hobbes so stubbornly denies it?”954
By asking to whom Hobbes’s text attempts to address by eliminating the
condition of war from the field of the political, Foucault strategically shifts the focus of
Leviathan from the question of sovereignty to the politics of resistance. Indeed, insofar
as the question of war in Hobbes is irreducible to the state and the advent of sovereign
power, Foucault reads the general problematic of war in the Leviathan as pointing toward
a completely separate history of politics and the political in which resistance is its key
component. In this way, rather than reading the elimination of war in Hobbes as being
posed against a “specific or determinate theory, or something that could be defined as his
adversary,” Foucault maintains that “[a]t the time Hobbes was writing, there was in fact
something that could be described not as his partner in polemic, but as his strategic
opposite number.”955 The “strategic opposite” Foucault refers to here reveals an
alternative principle of intelligibility from which to read the political not simply in terms
of the history of sovereignty, but rather as a form of politics expressed as war in the
struggle between the exercise of government and counter-historical movement of
resistance. Indeed, in Foucault’s unorthodox reading of the Leviathan what Hobbes
attempts to eliminate through the advent of sovereignty are the discourses and politics of
struggle, conflict and resistance. More specifically, by “strategic opposite” Foucault
clarifies that it is a “certain theoretical and political strategy that Hobbes specifically
wanted to eliminate and render impossible.”956 Two ideas are of key importance here.
First, Foucault reads Leviathan as a strategic discourse that attempts to expel the forms of
the insurrectionary historico-political discourse of politics as war from the field of the
political. Additionally, Foucault maintains that Hobbes attempts to eliminate not only the
historical knowledge of struggle, but the “political strategy” of resistance as well. With
Foucault, then, we have an alternative reading of Hobbes in which what is at stake in is a
political history of resistance rather than the advent of sovereignty. What is to be
eradicated from the field of the political in the advent of sovereignty is thus both a
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knowledge of history of struggle and the use of this knowledge as a political strategy of
resistance. In other words, what the politics of sovereignty attempts to mask and
overcome is the politics of resistance manifest as a socio-political condition of war.
By reading Leviathan from the perspective of war and resistance instead of
sovereignty, Foucault reveals that what motivates Hobbes’s text, and makes his argument
possible, is to be found in his attempt to expel the historical knowledge of the history of
politics as war. This is to say that in Foucault’s reading of the question of politics posed
in the Leviathan, what Hobbes attempts to render obsolete is the historical knowledge of
the political as agōn; the advent of sovereignty theorized by Hobbes in the Leviathan is
established to disrupt and discount the continuation of politics as war. In a manner that
fundamentally reverses the general trajectory of the history of the political as told in the
Leviathan, Foucault therefore maintains:
What Hobbes is trying, then, not to refute, but to eliminate and render
impossible—his strategic opposite number—is a certain way of making historical
knowledge work within the political struggle. To be more specific, Leviathan’s
strategic opposite number is, I think, the political use that was being made in
political struggles of a certain historical knowledge pertaining to…all these acts
of war, all these feats of battle, and the real struggles that go on in the laws and
institutions that apparently regulate power.957
Understood in this way, the question of sovereignty—indeed its institution—in the
thought of Hobbes is established in order to “render impossible” the discourses and
politics of resistance. Despite Hobbes’s intentions, the history of the political does not
therefore trace a linear progression from the state of nature and condition of war to the
institution of sovereign power, but instead the fundamental struggle between the
historical conception of politics as agōn and politics as archē. Thus, the “enemy”
Foucault writes, “or rather the enemy discourse Hobbes is addressing—is the discourse
that could be heard in the civil struggles that were tearing the state apart.958 What
Hobbes attempts to ward off with the turn toward sovereignty are the discourses of
struggles against the state. Yet, in this way what is ultimately at stake in Foucault’s
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reading of Leviathan is how the problem of war—indeed its continuation—renders both
the discourses of and politics as resistance more acute.
In order to rethink the history of the political in a way that is irreducible to the
standard history of the state, of sovereignty, and of government Foucault reads Hobbes’s
text as itself fundamentally turning upon an agonistic, rather than archic conception of
politics. Yet, the interpretation of politics as the continuation of an agonistic struggle
manifest in the politics of war necessarily turns upon a theory of resistance as the vital
and central component of an agonistic conception of politics as such. Indeed, although
Hobbes attempts to expel the condition of warfare from the history of the political, in
Foucault’s strategic reading of the Leviathan the political question of resistance is
reintroduced into the field of politics as both a continuation of war as well as a paradigm
of politics as war. It is with this interpretation of politics as the continuation of war, that
Foucault is able to begin to both rethink the political in terms in terms of an agonistic
history of struggle, as well as how resistance designates the key paradigm of the political
as such. In order to both explore an agonistic history of the political, and further how this
theory of the political ultimately turns upon the politics of resistance, Foucault invokes
the concept of civil war as unique paradigm of the political. Thus, in a letter written four
years prior to the lectures comprising Society Must Be Defended Foucault affirms this
position and writes that the question of power, politics, and the political ought to be
analyzed in the form of the “most disparaged of all wars: neither Hobbes, nor Clausewitz,
nor the class struggle: civil war.”959 It is with the concept of civil war that the specific
continuity between Foucault’s theory of resistance and his theory politics can be fully
understood; indeed, with the paradigm of civil war, Foucault not only seeks to rethink
politics outside of the model of the Leviathan, but also against the Marxist reduction of
resistance to the struggle between classes.
Throughout Society Must Be Defended, Foucault importantly invokes the term
“civil war” to designate the topology of the political in its most paradigmatic form, as
well as alternate paradigm for the politics of resistance. As a paradigm of the political,
Foucault suggests that politics as the continuation of war refuses the logic of the history

959

Qtd. in Alessandro Fontana and Mauro Bertani, “Situating the Lectures,” 282. The letter cited here is
originally pulled from Daniel Defert, “Chronologie,” Dits et écrits, vol. 1, 30-32.

348

of politics as told by Hobbes, whereby it is with the term “civil war” instead of the state
or the advent of sovereignty can be understood as the key term within the history of
political thought. In Foucault’s interpretation of Hobbes, the historical continuity
between the state and politics is disrupted to the point where the basic thesis of Leviathan
is fundamentally reversed; rather than assuming the advent of sovereignty as the
precondition of politics, Foucault suggests that the question of politics finds its
consistency and is historically elaborated within the paradigm of civil war. At the same
time, however, it is not just the standard narrative of Hobbes that Foucault’s concept of
“civil war” resists, but also that of Marx’s theory of “class struggle.” Indeed, while
others have noted that Society Must Be Defended criticizes Marxism for reducing power
relations to the state and class, the concept of civil war is established, in part, by Foucault
as a critique of the Marxist notion of class struggle.960 The question of “civil war” as set
forth in Society Must Be Defended is therefore not simply an alternative paradigm of the
political and politics but, more importantly, a paradigm of the general form resistance
takes within this alternative conception of politics. Because the concept and praxis of
civil war is that which is to be expelled from the field of the political, Foucault reads
Hobbes as revealing a way in which the political concept of civil war can be redefined as
a paradigm of resistance. In Foucault, then, the concept of civil war at once designates an
alternative political paradigm in which the history of the political can be understood
agonistically—that is as a history of permanent struggle and conflict—as well as how this
conception of the political necessarily turns upon the politics of resistance as its defining
characteristic.
In his unorthodox reading of the history of politics in the Leviathan, Foucault
first reveals that what Hobbes attempts to ward off with the advent of sovereignty is not a
mythical condition of a fundamental war of all against all, but an entirely different
conception of the political in which politics as the continuation of war is conditioned by
the permanence of resistance. It is not a state of nature that is overcome by the birth of
the sovereign Leviathan; instead, rather, Foucault asserts that it is the “discourse of
struggle and permanent civil war that Hobbes wards off by making all wars and
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conquests depend upon a contract, and by thus rescuing the theory of the state.”961 As
both concept and practice, “civil war” for Foucault is first and foremost a counterhistorical discourse of struggle and resistance, or what is referred to throughout Society
Must Be Defended as the historico-political discourses on society. As an example of
these types of political historicism, Foucault turns to the discourses of resistance as found
in the writings and practices of the Diggers, a seventeenth century group of Protestant
radicals and historical forerunner of modern anarchism. By turning to the Diggers as an
example of the forms of political historicism excluded by Hobbes, what is at stake for
Foucault is how the writings of the Diggers invoke the discourse of “civil war” to
describe the field of the political as a fundamental struggle between the exercise of
government and the counter-historical necessity of rebellion. “Civil war” in this context
“functions,” according to Foucault, “in both a political and historical mode, both as
program for political action and search for historical knowledge.”962 It is therefore not a
mythical war of all against all that Hobbes invokes as his opponent in the Leviathan, but
the politics of resistance, of resistance as civil war. For Foucault, then, “Hobbes’s
philosophical-juridical discourse was a way of blocking this political historicism, which
was the discourse and the knowledge that was actually active in the political struggles of
the seventeenth century.”963
While the concept of civil war at one designates a discourse and praxis of struggle
and resistance, this same term for Foucault is makes possible the inversion of Clausewitz
in which the history of politics can be interpreted as a continuation of war. Indeed, what
Foucault refers to in terms of “permanent warfare” designates the domain proper to
history of the political; as a paradigm of the political civil war means for Foucault that the
political more correctly assumes the form of agōn instead of archē.964 As agōn, the
permanence of civil war is what gives the political its defining characteristic as such, and
it is the permanent possibility of civil war amongst the history of the political in which
politics can ultimately be interpreted as a history of struggle. With the concept of civil
war constituting the nexus between history and politics, Foucault remarks that “[h]istory
961

Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 99.
Ibid, 109.
963
Ibid, 111.
964
Ibid, 88.
962

350

thus becomes a knowledge of struggles that is deployed and that functions within a field
of struggles; there is now a link between the political fight and historical knowledge.”965
Here, civil war is the concept that designates, for Foucault, the way in which the history
of the political can be interpreted as a history of agonistic struggle. Yet, because civil
war implies that the history of the political can be interpreted as a history of struggle, this
means that politics is retheorized by Foucault as a mode of praxis defined by the
permanent possibility of resistance: “[r]ebellion is therefore inscribed within a whole
historical analysis that reveals war to be a permanent feature of social relations.”966 In
Foucault’s unorthodox reading of the Leviathan, “civil war” is revealed as the key term
by which the political can be shown in its paradigmatic form as agōn.
With the concept of “civil war” designating the key paradigm from which to read
the history of the political, Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended reveals a
radically alternative hypothesis or theory of the political that cannot be reduced to the
dual paradigms of the exercise of government and the sovereign state. Although
unorthodox within the history of political theory, Foucault’s reading of the question of
politics and the history of the political from the view point of civil war has been affirmed
by other theorists. Inspired in part by Foucault’s rereading of Hobbes in Society Must Be
Defended, Tiqqun’s Introduction to Civil War has been seminal in this regard, and is
importantly established as a critical attempt to rewrite the political from the perspective
of civil war. To be sure, there is a specific continuity between Foucault and Tiqqun in
regard to the way in which the term “civil war,” and not that of the state, designates the
principle of intelligibility of the political. Thus, while in Society Must Be Defended
Foucault maintains that “war is the historical principle behind the working of power,” and
hence that it is “possible to analyze political power as war,”967 Tiqqun radicalizes this
thesis and claims that “the point of view of civil war is the point of view of the
political.”968 Insofar as the domain of the political can be understood as a history of civil
war, Tiqqun furthermore affirms, as does Foucault, that civil war is primary with respect
to the political. For Tiqqun, then, insofar as the “modern State came into being in order
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to put an end to civil war,” this means that “both historically and by its own admission, it
is secondary vis-à-vis civil war” (original emphasis).969 It is in this way that civil war
can be understood as key term within the history of political theory. In Foucault we find
that civil war forms the basic principle from which to read the history of the political
situated at the horizon of the state—that is, civil war is not only that which designates the
principle of intelligibility of the political, but that which in its position of primacy allows
for the history of the political to assume the form of an agonistic history of struggle, a
uniquely anarchic paradigm of resistance that designates the characteristic specific to
politics.
While the standard history of political theory from Aristotle, Hobbes, and Schmitt
presupposes the state and the exercise of government as the permanent component that
distinguishes the domain of the political from other domains, Society Must Be Defended
reverses the orthodox narrative of Western political theory and suggests that the history
of politics and the political is a history of agonistic struggle—that is, a history through
which resistance marks the permanent component in which politics assumes the
paradigmatic form of civil war. Indeed, the key intervention made by Foucault in Society
Must Be Defended is that the history of the political can be understood on condition of
what Hobbes attempts to eradicate with the advent of sovereign power; rather than being
overcome by sovereignty, civil war reveals the field of the political in its most
paradigmatic form. As an agonistic domain of struggle, what is therefore at stake in
Foucault’s rereading of Hobbes is that the permanence of the political is attested to by the
permanence of “civil war.” It is in this way that Tiqqun—via Foucault’s reading of
Hobbes—writes that “it is civil war—stasis in Greek—that is permanence, and the
modern state will have been a mere reaction process to this permanence” (original
emphasis).970 As agōn, it is resistance and the paradigm of civil war—what Tiqqun refers
to as “stasis”—rather than the state, that gives the political its historicity and form. To be
sure, Society Must Be Defended ought to read not only as a fundamental statement on the
historical politics of resistance, but also an alternative hypothesis of the political that
finds its basis in the permanence of civil war, a certain theory of stasiology. The
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permanence of stasis, of civil war within the field of the political designates a specific
rupture with the logic of the archē that has hitherto shaped the narrative of Western
political theory; stasis, as an agonistic paradigm of the political, means that the history
of politics is made possible and emerges as civil war, a permanent struggle between the
history of the state and the exercise of government and the counter-history of resistance.
In a recently published text that continues his ongoing project to rethink the basic
tenets of Western political theory titled, Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm,
Agamben like Tiqqun traces how the concept of “stasis” designates the key paradigm by
which the history of politics and the political can be rethought in terms of civil war.
According to Agamben, stasis translated from the Greek oikeios polemos can be defined
as a “war within the household,” and is (albeit historically neglected) “an integral part of
the political life of the Greeks.”971 Because stasis is an inherent and coextensive
component to the Greek’s notion of politics, Agamben writes that “stasis acts as its
revealer; it attests to its irreducible presence in the polis”—that is, in its permanent and
“irreducible presence” within the field of the political, civil war according to Agamben
reveals the specificity of the political as such (original emphasis).972 Indeed, because
stasis acts as the revealer of the political, what is at stake in Agamben’s text is that
politics must be redefined on condition of this paradigm of civil war. In Foucauldian
language, Agamben therefore writes that “[w]e must therefore conceive of politics as a
field of forces…between them, civil war.”973 Consistent, then, with Foucault’s theory
regarding how the dynamic field of forces manifest in the relationship between power
and resistance ought to be analyzed as a relation of struggle instead of a theory of
sovereignty, Agamben suggests that politics, which reproduces the force relations
between power and resistance, must therefore be analyzed in terms of civil war. Stasis,
or civil war, not only reframes the political agonistically, but in doing so further redefines
politics as a movement of resistance. Indeed, insofar as Agamben defines stasis as a “war
within the home (oikos),” civil war redefines the politics of resistance as a permanent and
ongoing struggle with what was outlined in chapter one as the Aristotelian notion of
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“oikonomia” (government of men). Indeed, the stasis that acts as the revealer of the
political simultaneously reveals politics as a paradigm of resistance; within its
irreducibility to the field of the political, stasis means that politics is that which becomes
manifest in the struggle against the exercise of government as a form of power—that is,
stasis designates the way in which the primacy of resistance is expressed politically as
civil war.

5.5 An Anarchist Hypothesis of the Political Emerges as a
Theory of Stasiology
The lectures comprising Society Must Be Defended represent Foucault’s most detailed
analysis and historical examination into the question of politics and the history of the
political. By analyzing the paradigmatic condition of war in terms of the principle of
intelligibility from which to understand the history of politics, as well as the correlative
historico-political discourses of civil war and resistance, Foucault’s work throughout
these lectures exemplifies the critical attempt to detach political theory from the
discourses of sovereignty that have hitherto conditioned the narrative history of the
political. In other words, Society Must Be Defended represents Foucault’s most
concentrated effort to cut off the head of the king in political theory. Although some
commentators have suggested that Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended simply
pluralizes history, and as such fails in his attempted regicide of political theory, it is my
contention that the agonistic war model of the political is an effective way to rethink the
history of the political against its history as a continuation of the political as archē. 974
While many of Foucault’s writings and lectures throughout the 1970’s are established in
order to think through this conceptual impasse in relation to the question of power, the
general focus of Society Must Be Defended is not simply to analyze relations of power in
terms of the historical continuation of war but, more specifically, to draw a
correspondence between his theory of power and the war model of politics; it is in this
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critical equivalence between the analytic of power and the war analytic of politics that
Foucault effectively cuts off the king’s head in political theory.
While the previous chapter addressed—via the fifth thesis on power from The
History of Sexuality—the way in which resistance is primary with power relations, and
hence that the very nexus between power and resistance ought to be analyzed in terms of
a permanent struggle, this chapter outlined the ways in which the question of resistance
reappears as the very basis from which Foucault begins to interpret politics as a
continuation of war—that is as a history of struggle, and thus as a domain of agōn.
Insofar as resistance is primary with power, its permanent presence continuously
transforming relations of power into relations of struggle, Foucault recasts this thesis as
the criteria that gives the political its historicity as such; resistance according to Foucault
is what gives the history of the political its form as a continuation of war. Indeed, this is
what I hold to be the penultimate claim made by Foucault in Society Must Be Defended:
in its irreducibility to state sovereignty and the exercise of power as government, the war
model of politics ultimately reveals an agonistic conception of the political made possible
by the permanent possibility of resistance. Politics therefore reproduces the relationship
between power and resistance and takes the paradigmatic form of “civil war” in which
stasis designates the principle through which the history of the political can be
retheorized as a history of struggle, as well as how this theory of the political ultimately
reveals an alternative theory of politics that begins with the question of resistance.
In Foucault’s reading of the history of the political, it is the continuation of the
condition of war, of stasis that marks the condition of possibility of politics, and it is this
history of politics that Foucault views Hobbes as attempting to eradicate from the field of
the political. Nevertheless, Foucault’s theory of the political has been criticized for
celebrating a return to the condition of war prior the advent of the state. In this regard
Hansen writes that “[b]y reducing power to strategic action, by rejecting contract theory,
and by neglecting the politics of democratic consent, Foucault is said to fall back behind
the insights of contractarianism, serving up an unpalpable spectacle of the struggle of all
against all.”975 While it might appear that Foucault advocates for a return to a state of
existence prior to the advent of the modern sovereign state, what is at stake in Foucault’s
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theory of the political is not a return to condition of war prior to the state as described by
Hobbes, Locke and others. Instead Foucault’s goal is more adequately to trace the
continuation of an alternative history of the political in terms of a counter-history of
agonistic struggle manifest in the political paradigm of war. By warding off the political
as agōn, what is ultimately at stake in Foucault’s reading of the Leviathan is that Hobbes
attempts to eradicate the politics of resistance from the field of the political.
Consequently, however, this means for Foucault that Hobbes’s text ultimately reveals the
very possibility of an alternative theory of the political in which the condition of
possibility of politics is made possible when civil war designates a permanent component
through which the political is expressed historically. As agōn, civil war forms the
paradigm in which the political is historically elaborated, and the permanence of the
political is itself attested to by the permanence of civil war amongst the dynamic field to
which politics refers. Yet, because civil war designates the way in which politics
assumes the form of an agōn rather than archē, the political paradigm of civil war
simultaneously designates for Foucault a political paradigm of resistance as the
constituent criteria of politics. With Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended, it is
my contention that it is possible to think of the political no longer as a project in pursuit
of, and determined by, the state, sovereignty and the exercise of government, but rather as
a form of agonistic struggle, a domain conditioned by the permanence of civil war and
the primacy of resistance.
Taking the primacy of resistance as the basic foundation from which Foucault
begins to rethink the history of politics as a continuation of war, the overall goal of this
chapter has been to demonstrate how Foucault’s interpretation of politics and the history
of the political in Society Must Be Defended not only reveals an agonistic model of the
political, but an anarchist hypothesis of the political in which resistance designates the
key criteria through which politics assume the form of an agōn as such. In chapter two
we saw how for anarchist philosopher Benjamin Tucker an anarchist theory of the
political relies upon a fundamental distinction between government and resistance in
order to account for an alternative history for interpreting politics on the basis of a history
of struggle.976 Insofar as the distinctions between government and resistance designates
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that which is proper to the domain of the political, I further outlined how Kropotkin
invokes this distinction as the basis from which to interpret the history of politics as an
ongoing and permanent civil war between the principle of government and the principle
of anarchy. 977 It is my contention in this regard that Foucault’s work in Society Must Be
Defended both mirrors the distinction between government and resistance as the central
criteria for a critical theory of the political, as well as how this distinction is that which
gives the political its form as an agonistic continuation of war. Rather than beginning
with the advent of sovereignty as the precondition of modern politics, we have seen how
Foucault’s genealogical methodology first begins with an analysis of “subjugated
knowledges,” or discourses of resistance in order to interpret history as the history of
struggle. For Foucault, it is these discourses of resistance, and not the history of the
archē, that reveal the nature of the political as a continuation of war. Furthermore, we
have seen how the hallmark statement of Society Must Be Defended—that is, that politics
is the continuation of war by other means—redefines the term politics on condition of
resistance. As a continuation of war, the agonistic conception of politics necessarily
refers to and is made possible by the permanent potentiality of resistance amongst the
domain to which politics refers; the political as a continuation of war is thus irreducible
to the history of the state according to Foucault. Finally, in his rereading of Hobbes,
Foucault reverses the orthodox narrative of Western political theory and suggests that
rather than reading the history of the political through the eradication of the condition of
war as is the case in the Leviathan, it is instead the permanence of civil war (stasis) that
defines the key paradigm of the political as such. By tracing the history of politics and
the political not simply as a continuation of war, but in terms of the paradigm of civil
war, Foucault reveals how the political is historically manifest as a permanent domain of
struggle between the history of the state and the counter-historical movements of
resistance, revolt, and rebellion.
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With the paradigm of civil war designating an agonistic theory of the political that
turns upon the primacy of resistance, it is my claim that Foucault war model of the
political transcends Schmitt and Mouffe’s theories of the political, and better finds its
consistency in the framework of anarchism. In a manner akin to Kropotkin, Foucault’s
agonistic model of the political can be vitally distinguished from Mouffe’s recent
attempts to reframe Schmitt’s model of the political in the context of what she refers to as
“radical politics today.”978 While Mouffe maintains that the field of the political is to be
defined as the “antagonistic dimension which is inherent to all human societies,” what
she refers to as agonistic dimension of politics is set to effectively eradicate resistance
from the domain of the political as such.979 In doing so, however, what Mouffe refers to
as politics effectively reduces the permanent dimension of agonism inherent to the
political to a politics of archē, insofar as politics is defined as an engagement with the
exercise of governmental institutions.980 Indeed, what is ultimately at stake for Mouffe is
to eradicate an agonistic conception of politics that “refuses to become government.”981
Similar to the position of Hobbes, in eradicating from the field of the political the
dissident forms of politics as resistance—a form of politics that refuses government—
Mouffe’s work can be understood as a polemic against an anarchist theory of the
political. While Mouffe’s agonistic theory of the political posits a liberal, democratic
pluralism as the ultimate horizon for agonistic politics, it is my contention that Foucault
affirms an alternative and dissenting theory of the political that finds its basis in
anarchism and not that of liberal democratic state. In other words, what is at stake in
Foucault’s conception (contra Mouffe) is precisely a form of politics of resistance that
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refuses to become government—that is, in Foucault’s agonistic conception of the
political, politics is what is animated as an art of not being governed. What is therefore
required by Foucault is not the eradication of anarchy from the field of the political, but
rather its return in the political movements of resistance, a specific movement in politics
that could never assume the form of an oikonomia. Indeed, through Foucault we might
take this further and suggest that an anarchist hypothesis of the political emerges as a
theory of stasiology. While the power/resistance dynamic directly informs Foucault’s
theory of politics, civil war—itself a paradigm of resistance—is what reveals the field of
the political in its anarchic specificity—that is, civil war designates the point in which the
field of the political can never be fully solidified as archē.
Yet while the interpretation of politics as a continuation of war ultimately turns
upon, as we have seen, an agonistic theory of politics and resistance, Foucault warns his
audience that such discourses of politics as war are always in danger of either being coopted by the state or, even more insidiously, as tending toward the totalitarian logic of
“social racism.”982 Thus in the final lecture of Society Must Be Defended, Foucault
claims that “no matter whether it is Fourier at the beginning of the century or the
anarchists at the end of it, you will always find a racist component of socialism.”983
Given that anarchism traditionally maintains a commitment to the eradication of all forms
oppression, Foucault’s critique in the final pages of Society Must Be Defended strikes at
the heart of the tradition fundamentally premised upon anti-racism. Indeed, since
Foucault defines “social racism” in terms of a “socialist state which must exercise the
right to kill or the right to eliminate, or the right to disqualify,” his critique of anarchism
initially appears unfounded insofar as anarchists traditionally argue that the state
(socialist or otherwise) is inherently inconsistent with anarchist principles.984 More
seriously, however, what is at stake in Foucault’s critique of anarchism is certain
biopolitical rationale that connects the politics of revolutionary socialisms to the logic of
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state sovereignty. Indeed, while the final lecture of Society Must Be Defended is often
taken by Foucault’s readers as introducing the concept of “biopower” into his wider
critical lexicon, the term itself is introduced not only to designate a specific form of state
power directed at the management of populations, but rather as the nexus that connects
revolutionary discourse and practice to the logic of state sovereignty. Revolutionary
discourse and the logic of state sovereignty first collide according to Foucault with the
“idea that the essential function of society [that which replaces the state in revolutionary
discourse] or the state [sovereignty], or whatever it is that must replace the state, is to
control life, to manage it.”985 Understood as such, revolutionary discourses ultimately
collide with the logic of sovereignty and tend toward a rationale of “social racism”
inasmuch as they both seek to manage life in the constitution of political order. In other
words, both revolutionary discourse and sovereign theory reproduce what Foucault refers
to as biopower—that is, with or without the state, they both attempt to manage—which is
to say govern—the life of a population in regard to specific ends. Insofar as
revolutionary discourse reproduces the logic of the state, Foucault seems to be suggesting
that this is because 20th century forms of socialism never solved the problem of
government; in seeking to overthrow the power of the state, the idea of revolution
produces and constitutes the founding of another political order.
If anarchism and other socialist discourses from the nineteenth century contain a
racist component according to Foucault, this is because these discourses often tend
toward a form of totalitarianism by presupposing a certain universality of how life ought
to managed. Thus, rather than eradicating the problem of power through the destruction
of the state, revolutionary theory and praxis reproduce power as “social racism,” which is
to say biopolitically in the management, or government of life. Even more insidiously,
Foucault additionally locates a racist component to traditional forms of struggle
employed in revolutionary praxis. “Whenever,” Foucault laments:
socialism has been forced to stress the problem of struggle, the struggle against
the enemy, of the elimination of the enemy in capitalist society, racism does raise
its head, because it is the only way in which socialist thought, which is after all
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very much bound up with the themes of biopower, can rationalize the murder of
its enemies.986
While Foucault admits that not all forms of revolutionary praxis turn upon the
“elimination of the enemy” in the sense suggested above, revolutionary praxis is
biopolitical insofar as the concept of struggle can only be conceived in terms of the
elimination of one’s enemy. 987 While Foucault’s examples of “social racism” are taken
from the movements that sought to control state power as a means towards achieving
revolution, his critique nevertheless points to certain continuity between revolutionary
theory and what he refers to as the sovereign “power to foster life or disallow it to the
point of death the sovereign right let live” (original emphasis).988 Thus, although social
racism appears in the failure to adequately deal with the question of government, it also
appears in the failure to rethink the possibility of a form of politics distinct from the logic
of sovereignty. In attempting to overcome the violence of the state with revolutionary
violence, revolutionary praxis as such is simply a politics of sovereignty without a state.
The forms of “social racism” Foucault describes are not endemic to anarchism
necessarily, but rather to revolutionary socialism, and perhaps even the concept of
revolution itself. Nevertheless, anarchist theory ought to take seriously the nexus that
connects revolutionary praxis to the logic of both government and sovereignty. Although
Foucault’s critique is quite damning to the tradition of radical politics, especially
anarchism, his point is not to discount the possibility of a radical political theory, but
instead to call form a non-universalizing form of politics as resistance that refuses the
logics of government and sovereign power. If the logic of revolution coincides with and
reproduces biopower, we might read the final pages of Society Must Be Defended as
Foucault asserting a new basis for radical politics in the transition from revolution to a
politics as resistance. Indeed, if as Foucault suggests that the war model of the political
and the revolutionary project that sustains it, have the potentiality to develop into “social
racism,” what is at stake for Foucault is that the question of revolution might have to be
significantly modified or even abandoned as the key focal point of radical politics. In this
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regard, it is my contention that the very possibility of an anarchist politics of resistance
can no longer be elaborated in terms of the revolutionary overthrow of power leading to a
future classless and stateless society, but instead as an art of not being governed. In this
regard, the following and final chapter seeks to establish a specific continuity between
Foucault’s agonistic conception of the political and his turn toward the study of ethics in
order to outline a unique way to conceive of an anarchic, insurrectionary politics of
resistance that could never assume the form of an archē. My claim will be that what
Foucault refers to in the lectures series that follows the 1975-1976 courses titled Security,
Territory, Population as “revolts of conduct” and “resistances of conduct” offers a unique
way to think about resistance neither as struggle for or over power, nor as a revolutionary
overthrow of existing power relations, but in terms of a permanent ethos of revolt, an
insurrectionary struggle towards ungovernable forms-of-life.989 Reconceiving an
anarchist politics of resistance as such, also necessitates a fundamental reconsideration of
anarchy as well.
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Chapter 6
6
The First Revolt: Politics as an Ethics of Resistance to
Government
Recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on
which to base the elaboration of a new ethics. They need an ethics, but they cannot find
any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific knowledge of what the self
is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on.990
Ethics is a practice; ethos a manner of being…we have to raise the problem of…a
nonacceptance of the passivity of our own governments…this attitude is an ethical one,
but it is also political.991
--Michel Foucault

The previous three chapters have sought to advance a specific continuity within
Foucault’s works around the concept of resistance, while simultaneously highlighting the
ways in which the emphasis on a critical conceptualization of resistance reveals a vitally
new way to understand Foucault’s critical inquiries into power, governmentality, and the
history of politics. In chapter three I outlined how what Foucault refers to throughout
various periods in his work as “critique,” or the “critical attitude” that underlies the basis
of philosophy since Kant, allows for a new way to interpret Foucault’s larger project and
draw connections between the differing periods of his thought with respect to the general
question of resistance. With reference to the unique methodological approach to the
study of power and politics invoked by in On the Government of the Living under the
portmanteau “anarchaeology”— a critical methodology that begins anarchically, or on
condition of what Foucault refers to as the “non-necessity of all power of whatever
kind”—I maintained that such approach to the field of power ultimately reveals for
Foucault a new way to read the history of the political.992 Rather than beginning with the
first principle of the archē, and thus that politics can be reducible to the techniques of
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government exercised within the domain of a state, Foucault instead maintains that the
history of the “art of being governed” is simultaneously the counter-historical movement
of resistance manifest in terms of the “art of not being governed.” In the following
chapter, which should be taken as the center piece around which this study is based, I
took Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality as the critical locus
that reveals what I refer to as the primacy of resistance, and maintained that the logic of
the primacy of resistance forms the conceptual nexus through which Foucault’s study of
power, politics, and the history of the political can be understood in their specificity.
With the primacy of resistance designating the conceptual key required for a full
understanding of Foucault’s work, I argued that the condition of possibility of power
relations and the field of the political turn upon the permanent potentiality of resistance,
and further that this permanent potentiality of resistance is what allows for a relation of
power to be transformed into a form of agonistic struggle. In chapter five I further
maintained that a specific continuity between Foucault’s analytic of power and his theory
of politics and the political as explored in Society Must Be Defended can be drawn
through the primacy of resistance. Herein I argued that Foucault’s unorthodox reading of
Hobbes, as well as the “historical-political” discourses of resistance that sustain this
reading, offer a radically new principle of intelligibility from which to read the history of
the political.993 By taking the condition of war instead of the advent of sovereign power
as the historical motor of politics, Foucault reveals a fundamental caesura between the
political as archē and the political as agōn, in which politics comes to designate an
agonistic struggle or permanent war between the history of power exercised as techniques
of government within a state, and the parallel yet heterogeneous counter-historical
movements of resistance.
While Foucault’s works are traditionally read as contributing to an innovative and
often controversial critical theory of how power relations function in society, as well as
the distinct rationalities of government that sustain them, it has been my general
contention throughout this project not only that Foucault’s respective studies of power,
governmentality and politics all fundamentally turn upon a unique theory of resistance
that forms the conceptual key from which his larger project is based, but also that
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Foucault must be read in terms of a philosopher of resistance as such. More specifically,
I have not only sought to demonstrate how Foucault’s studies of power, governmentality
and politics all turn upon revealing the permanent potentiality of resistance amongst these
relations, but also how the primary goal of Foucault’s general project can be read as a
critical attempt to unmask the primacy of resistance as such. In this regard, the overall
goal of the previous chapters has been two-fold. By highlighting the importance Foucault
attaches to the concept of resistance throughout his work, my intention has at once been
to demonstrate how the primacy of resistance forms the critical locus from which
Foucault bases his inquiries into power, politics, and governmentality, while
simultaneously exploring how each of these inquiries ultimately turn upon elaborating a
critical theory of resistance as the central component to Foucault’s philosophy.
Additionally, however, my intention has been to demonstrate how the primacy of
resistance as broached by Foucault reveals an alternative basis from which the history of
politics and the political can be interpreted anarchically—that is, without the first
principle and logic of the archē. In this way, the logic of the primacy of resistance forms
the basis of what I refer to as an anarchist hypothesis of the political in which the political
as archē is unfounded by taking the primacy of resistance as the constituent component of
politics, and from which the political can be redefined as a domain of permanent
agonistic struggle.
While the previous chapters have sought to situate Foucault’s work in relation to
the history of political philosophy and anarchist thought, it is my contention in this final
chapter that this anarchist hypothesis of the political which takes the primacy of
resistance as its constituent component, also turns upon an ethics of revolt that animates
and makes possible Foucault’s analytics of power and politics. It is therefore necessary
to turn toward some of his later works, thematics and key concepts not only in order to
understand the full implications of how Foucault’s theory of resistance corresponds and
coincides with a particular theory of ethics, but more specifically how this inquiry into
the question of ethics additionally reveals a vital dimension of his theory of resistance
that cannot be ignored. It is widely recognized that Foucault’s final works, particularly
The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, as well as the final series of lectures given
at the Collège De France in the period from 1979 to 1984, signify a direct change in focus
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from questions pertaining to power and politics to those posed in relation to the field of
ethics.994 The ways in which Foucault’s later thought can be fundamentally distinguished
from the themes and points of focus of his earlier works has led some to refer to this
period as “Foucault’s ethical turn.”995 To be sure, scholars996 and biographers997 alike
consistently argue that following the publication of The History of Sexuality in 1976,
Foucault begins to rethink his work in terms of a shift from the general question of power
to the ethical problematization of subjectivity and how human beings are constituted as
subjects as such. As Simons acknowledges, during the final period of his work,
“Foucault discerns ways in which people participate in their own subjectification by
exercising power over themselves, tying themselves to scientific or moral definitions of
who they are.”998 Thus, as Simons concludes, Foucault “refers to this relationship to the
self as ethics.”999 Indeed, in the 1982 essay “The Subject and Power” Foucault
retrospectively maintains that the problem of the subject has always been at the forefront
of his works since the beginning. As Foucault recognizes in hindsight, the general
objective of his collected works “has been to create a history of the different modes by
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects,” and furthermore that his works
therefore correspond with “three modes of objectification that transform human beings
into subjects.”1000 As we will see, similar to the ways in which Foucault maintains that
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power relations correspond with the primacy of resistance, the forms of power that take
as their object the transformation of human beings into subjects directly correspond with
a movement of desubjectification, a movement of resistance against the individualizing
techniques of government. It is this movement of resistance as desubjectification that
Foucault understands as the ethical component corresponding with a form of politics
conceived as resistance.
For Foucault’s readers and critics there has been some serious contention
pertaining to how Foucault’s ethical turn can be read not only in light of the three
volumes of The History of Sexuality, but also more broadly in terms of his larger
project.1001 While some critics and scholars argue that Foucault’s turn toward the study
of governmentality and eventually of the question of ethics employs an entirely new set
of concepts, problems, and themes, and therefore that his ethical period constitutes a
decisive break with his earlier thought,1002 others argue that Foucault maintains a specific
continuity between the political and ethical axes of his thought,1003 and further that each
axis can be read as critically complementing the other. For some, the decisive break
between the analytic of power and the turn toward the study of ethics is often attributed to
Foucault’s transition to the study of governmentality in the years following the
publication of The History of Sexuality, wherein critics claim that Foucault ultimately
Foucault maintains that his inquiry into the question of power as posed in Discipline and Punish and The
History of Sexuality “studied the objectivizing of the subject” in terms of “dividing practices;” finally,
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(327).
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abandons his previous analytics of power, war, and politics.1004 With note of Foucault’s
claim in the first lecture from Society Must Be Defended regarding how the “twin notions
of “repression” and “war” have to be considerably modified and ultimately, perhaps,
abandoned,”1005 readers of Foucault maintain that he ultimately “managed to abandon the
burdensome ballast of the war matrix.”1006 In his text, Foucault, Governmentality and
Critique, Thomas Lemke designates Society Must Be Defended as a key turning point in
which Foucault begins to radically change the trajectory of his work. Thus according to
Lemke while “Foucault replaces the focus on legitimacy and consent in political theory
by accentuating war and struggle” this model is itself replaced by the way in which
“power relations for Foucault, have become governmentalized.”1007 Similarly, in the
introduction to the English translation of Society Must Be Defended Arnold Davidson
suggests that “by 1976, just after this course, Foucault had subtly but significantly
modified his own attitude” not only regarding his analytic of power, but also his
conception of war and politics.1008 More critically, others have suggested that the turn
toward the study of governmentality can be understood in terms of how Foucault
ultimately fails to succeed in attempting a non-sovereign theory of power and politics. In
this regard, Andrew Neal maintains that in the wake of his lectures on the questions of
politics, war, and historical struggle Foucault “quickly subsumed into a different path,”
and consequently that he “does not succeed in cutting off the King’s head.”1009
While it is true that Foucault began to focus on the general problematic of
governmentality in the years following the 1976-1977 lectures, the theoretical break or
disjuncture Lemke and others posit between the study of governmentality and his earlier
analytics of power and politics is not entirely accurate. Hence, the claim that the turn to
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the study of governmentality ought to be understood as turning point in which Foucault
abandons his previous studies in favor of completely new project has been equally
discounted by several theorists. While Kelly acknowledges that “Foucault drops his talk
of war by around 1978,” he further concludes “that there is no break” in the form of a
total abandonment of previous ideas, concepts, and points of focus.1010 Along this
trajectory, other critics have sought to establish a continuity between Foucault’s work on
power and politics through the 1970’s and his study of ethics in the early 1980’s, and
have more correctly explored how the two periods are not exclusive, but rather mutually
complementary of one another. Rather than asserting a fundamental distinction between
the analytic of politics and the study of ethics, Milchman and Rosenburg have therefore
suggested that we might read the later works in view of how “Foucault came to see
politics as an ethics.”1011 Against the claim that Foucault’s inquiry into the question of
ethics turns him away from the study of politics, the ethical turn can therefore be read “in
the direction of a reconceptualization of politics as an ethical politics.”1012 Expanding
upon the idea that Foucault’s turn toward ethics itself turns upon the elaboration of a
form of politics conceived as ethics, Kelly reads the ethical turn as a vital attempt to
understand what types of ethical practices might coincide with Foucault’s theory of
power, politics, and the political, and argues that “ethics is for Foucault a logical outcome
of his political thought.1013 As a form of ethics that corresponds with his theory of
politics, Colin Koopman suggests that Foucault’s late writings ought to be understood as
a distinctly unique way to think through the actual “possibility of the future
transformation of the subject” instead of how the subject is formed through relations of
power.1014 Indeed if, as I have argued in the three previous chapters, that Foucault’s
analytics of power and politics are inseparable from the primacy and permanent presence
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of resistance as the constituent component that redefines the political as a field of
agonistic struggle, then following Kelly and Koopman’s readings we can suggest that the
turn toward ethics can be understood as both a “logical outcome” to his political theory as
well as a critical attempt to theorize what types of ethical praxis might coincide with his
theory of politics as resistance.
Although it has been noted that readers of Foucault ought to be careful when he
retrospectively reads his early texts and problematics in view of his current projects,1015 if
we follow the claim made in “The Subject and Power” wherein Foucault maintains that
the goal of his general project has been to trace the ways in which humans are made into
subjects, it is my contention, then, that the ethical turn can be read as a critical attempt to
expand upon his theory of resistance and propose an ethics of resistance and possible
transformation against the forms of subjectification traced in the works leading to his
final projects. Rather than taking the turn toward the study of governmentality as found
in Security, Territory, Population in terms of a conceptual bridge through which Foucault
abandons his analytics of power and politics in favor of the study of governmentality and
ethics, this why Arnold Davidson in his introduction to the English translation of these
same lectures argues that the key concept “that allows us to link together the political and
ethical axes of Foucault’s thought” is not found in the problematic of governmentality,
but rather arises in the practices of revolt, or forms of “counter-conduct” directed against
the exercise of government.1016 Affirming that Foucault’s theory of ethics ultimately
turns upon a radical transformation of the subject, others have more directly outlined how
a specific continuity between his political and ethical periods can be maintained in terms
of an expanded discussion of the question of resistance Foucault poses throughout his
work. In this regard, Johanna Oksala argues that “Foucault’s later work on ethics is an
inquiry into resistance.”1017 Furthermore, while Bernauer and Mahon maintain that what
is ultimately at stake in his turn toward the study of ethics is how “Foucault called for a
clear attitude of protest, of ethical rejection that could itself become a political force,”1018
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Simons argues that Foucault’s search for a form of ethics that can be transformed into a
political force led him to develop “an ethic of permanent resistance.”1019 Thus while
Foucault understands the history of the political as a history made visible by the primacy
of resistance, and further that a conception of politics as resistance is what allows
relations of power to be both confronted and transformed, a continuity can be drawn
between Foucault’s conceptions of politics and ethics in that the latter is an expanded
historical inquiry into which types of ethical practices might be invoked in order resist the
techniques of governmentality outlined in his later works.
In light of the way in which a continuity between the political and ethical axes of
Foucault’s thought can be drawn through the concept of resistance, it is at once my
contention in this chapter that there is an explicitly political dimension of Foucault’s
theory of ethics that itself turns upon the question of resistance, as well as how this turn
toward the study of ethics reveals an important way through which the relation between
politics and resistance can be rethought in terms of a critically resistant ethos, not as a
prescriptive set of moral codes and normative rules, but ethos defined as a mode of
resistance to the exercise of power as government. More specifically, it is my claim that
Foucault’s ethical turn ought to be understood as an attempt to locate a continuity
between a form of ethics that animates his theory of resistance, and a form of politics as
resistance that coincides with a radical, permanent ethics of revolt, a distinct way of being
in the world through resistance—that is, specific art of not being governed. To do so, I
first turn to the lecture series titled Security, Territory, Population, particularly the eighth
lecture, in order to demonstrate how a unique bridge between the study of politics and the
turn toward ethics can be maintained through what Foucault designates as movements of
“counter-conduct,” “revolts of conduct,” or insurrections of conduct.”1020 While the
importance of Security, Territory, Population is often attributed to the introduction of the
concept and study of governmentality, it is my contention here that the majority of
Foucault’s critics have neglected to notice how Foucault’s outline pertaining to the ways
in which power is exercised as a technique of government is fundamentally paired with a
historical outline of movements of resistance against these same practices. Although
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Davidson has pointed toward a certain correspondence between the concept of resistance
and what Foucault refers to as “counter-conduct,” it is my contention here that what is at
stake in this relation lies in the way in which Foucault begins to redefine politics as a
specific ethics of resistance to the exercise if governmentality.1021 As we will see,
however, while several critics have asserted a specific continuity between the turn toward
governmentality and the study of ethics, it is my argument that the turn toward ethics can
more correctly be understood in relation to Foucault’s theory of resistance to
governmentality, and thus a continuation of his study of power and politics. Indeed, with
the notion of “counter-conduct” Foucault enhances his theory of politics by adding a
distinct ethical component to the concept and practice of resistance in which these
movements of revolt are at once characterized by a form of resistance directed against the
exercise of government as well as a movement whose objective is not simply to counter
the techniques of governmentality, but also to carve out a radical space of freedom in
which one is able to form one’s own subjectivity autonomously as an art of not being
governed.
After outlining the ways in which Foucault’s analysis of the “revolts of conduct”
against governmentality ultimately reveals a fundamental redefinition of politics from the
perspective of resistance, I then trace how the concept of “counter-conduct” also reveals
an ethical dimension of the politics of resistance. Herein I invoke the notion of “counterconduct” as a key referent from which Foucault begins to problematize the question of
politics as ethics, as well as the conceptual basis that animates other concepts vital to his
study of ethics such as “the care of the self” and “askēsis.” Ultimately at stake here is to
demonstrate how Foucault begins to rethink ethics in terms of a practice of resistance, a
permanent ethos of revolt against the logic of governmentality. Expanding upon the idea
that the politics of resistance appears in Foucault’s work as the conceptual basis required
1021
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for a critical inquiry into the problematic of ethics, in the final section, I situate
Foucault’s work on the ethical politics of resistance in relation to anarchist thought in
order to explore how the anarchist hypothesis of the political I have been tracing
simultaneously corresponds with an ethics of revolt that animates this conception of the
political. Staging an intersection between two of Foucault’s later works—“The Subject
and Power” and an interview titled “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of
Freedom”—I not only argue that anarchism forms a key referent from which Foucault
begins to rethink ethics as a practice of resistance, but also how these two texts develop a
unique definition of resistance in which the radical ethos of struggle against the
techniques of government is simultaneously paired with the affirmation of autonomous,
ungovernable forms of subjectivity. By placing Foucault’s ethics of revolt in dialogue
with anarchist thought, it is my contention that it is possible to rethink an anarchist
politics of struggle not simply in terms of a revolutionary project determined by the
teleological goal of a future classless and stateless society. Rather than taking the project
of social revolution as the paradigmatic form of anarchist struggle, I suggest that an
anarchist theory of resistance might be rethought as a distinct form of agonistic ethos, an
insurrectionary politics of revolt in which what is at stake in resistance is neither a
struggle with or over state power, but instead a struggle at once directed against the forms
of governable subjectivities that connect individuals to the state, as well as a struggle for
the invention of autonomous forms-of-life, a struggle that begins with anarchy instead of
ending with it.

6.1

Counter-Conduct: Politics as Resistance to Governmentality

To be GOVERNED is to be kept in sight, inspected, spied upon, directed, law-driven,
numbered, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, estimated, valued, censured,
commanded, by creatures who have neither the right, nor the wisdom, nor the virtue to do
so…To be GOVERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted,
registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed,
authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished…then, at the slightest
resistance…to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed,
disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold,
betrayed…That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality.1022
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--Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
Politics is no more or less than that which is born with resistance to governmentality, the
first uprising, the first revolt.1023
--Michel Foucault
Following the publication of The History of Sexuality in 1976, Foucault abandoned what
he initially proposed as a six volume set of texts connected through the theme of
sexuality, and quickly set about rethinking the general focus and trajectory of his
project.1024 Although Foucault produced no new texts aside from several essays,
interviews and lectures for the following eight years, the fundamentally revision of his
initial project ultimately resulted in the second and third volumes of The History of
Sexuality, respectively titled The Use of Pleasures and The Care of the Self, both
published in 1984. While a fourth volume titled The Confessions of the Flesh was nearly
finished before Foucault’s death, it has never been published.1025 For many of
Foucault’s critics it is not necessarily the eight-year gap separating the publication of
volume one from volumes two and three that is difficult to explain, but rather the change
in theme from the analysis of the ways in which relations of power intersect with modern
discourses of sexuality to an analytic of the “practices of the self” through which one
constitutes oneself as a subject of sexual conduct.1026 Indeed, although in the
introduction to The Use of Pleasure Foucault reintroduces the aim of his project and
further establishes a new set of concepts and themes from which the later volumes can be
distinguished from the first, critics have often pointed out how the transition from the
analytic of power to the ethical dimension of sexuality and the formation of the subject
seemed “sudden and inexplicable.”1027 Furthermore, as Davidson notes, Foucault’s
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passage from the political to the ethical is even more complex given how “this
displacement of focus had consequences far beyond the specific domain of the history of
sexuality.”1028 Indeed, Foucault’s turn toward the study of ethics is by no means limited
to the final two volumes of The History of Sexuality, and several essays, interviews, and
lectures between 1977 and 1984 situate the question of ethics in relation to other concepts
of interest to Foucault such as resistance, power, politics, governmentality, and the
relation between the subject and truth.
After the wide-spread publication of Foucault’s lecture’s given at the Collège De
France, scholars typically pinpoint Security, Territory, Population as a key turning point
from which Foucault begins to transition from the analytics of power and politics to the
general problematic of governmentality.1029 Thus, according to Oksala “government
becomes Foucault’s preferred term for power, while governmentality functions as his
main theoretical tool for analyzing its rationality, techniques, and procedures in
modernity.”1030 While acknowledging that Foucault does indeed valorize the term
“government” over the term “power,” Lemke, however, understands the turn toward
governmentality as representing a distinct break and disqualification of Foucault’s model
of power, politics, and war as outlined in Society Must Be Defended.1031 For Lemke, by
abandoning the analytic of power and the theory of politics as war, the term
“governmentality” comes to represent the hidden link between the political and ethical
axes of Foucault’s thought insofar as it mediates between the “genealogy of the state”
outlined in the fourth lecture of Security, Territory, Population and the genealogy of the
subject occupying Foucault’s thought in the following years.1032 While Lemke is correct
that with the turn toward government Foucault indeed navigates between the study of
politics and the question of ethics, the way in which he posits a distinct break between the
analytic of power and study of governmentality rationality fundamentally neglects, as we
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will see, how the analysis of governmentality significantly continues and expands upon
the models of power and politics, found in the first volume of The History of Sexuality
and Society Must Be Defended.1033 More specifically, Lemke fails to consider the ways
in which Foucault’s theory of resistance, which is inherently tied to his theory of power,
directly reappears and coincides with the notion of governmentality, and further that it is
this reappearance of the question of resistance that allows for a specific continuity to be
established between the political and ethical periods of Foucault’s work. In this respect,
Davidson has more correctly outlined how the turn toward the study of governmentality
is fundamentally paired with the corresponding movements of resistance as “counterconduct,” and further that it is with these movements of “counter-conduct” and not
simply that of governmentality from which a “conceptual hinge” that links together the
political and ethical periods of Foucault’s thought can be found.1034
To fully understand how the political and ethical axes of Foucault’s thought can
be connected, it is first necessary to briefly outline what Foucault refers to as
“governmentality” in order to demonstrate how the study of government corresponds,
according to Foucault, with both a politics and ethics of revolt. Foucault’s concept and
study of governmentality first emerges in the fourth lecture of Security, Territory,
Population, and is progressively developed throughout the remaining lectures of this
series, and again in the following 1978 to 1979 lectures collected as The Birth of
Biopolitics. On Foucault’s study of the problem of governmentality in these lectures,
Gordon has maintained that “Foucault understood the term ‘government’ in both a wide
and narrow sense.”1035 Similarly, Senellart argues that Foucault’s use of the term
governmentality “progressively shifts from a precise, historically determinate sense, to a
more general and abstract meaning.”1036 In the narrow and precise sense, Foucault first
1033
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maintains that the term governmentality at once designates the forms of rationality and
techniques of government that correspond with the emergence of the modern state. In
this sense, governmentality refers to the “actual definition of the state, of what we would
call…the political form of government.”1037 More generally, however, Foucault
additionally invokes the term governmentality to describe a specific form of power
distinct from the government of the modern administrative state, in which the techniques
of government come to refer to “the way in which one conducts the conduct of men.”1038
As a technique of government that conducts, or manages, the conduct of others, Foucault
traces the history of governmentality to what he refers to as “pastoral power,” or the
techniques of individualizing power specifically oriented at managing the conduct of
others.1039 Yet, in Security, Territory, Population, Foucault adds a third way in which
the term governmentality can be defined. “Finally, by governmentality,” Foucault further
clarifies that “we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by
which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually governmentalized.”1040 As Foucault
reiterates elsewhere, the inquiry into the problem of government not only designates the
intersection between “the state” as the “political form of a centralized and centralizing
power” and the “pastorate…individualizing power,” but more importantly “how this
pastorate happened to combine with it opposite, the state.”1041 Although these alternate
definitions might initially appear disparate, Foucault is clear that they together form a
single unique rationality— what is referred to elsewhere in Latin as “omnes et
singulatim” (all and each)—in which what is at stake in the term governmentality is not
only how “the state has been…one of the most redoubtable, forms of human
government,” but also how the state combines with pastoral power in such a way that its
logic can be defined as “both individualizing and totalitarian.”1042 As we will see, this
political rationality specific to governmentality is not only key for understanding how
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politics is traditionally manifest as a logic of the archē, but also the question of
governmentality as such significantly modifies the stakes and practices of resistance
exercised as an ethics of revolt.
In chapter one, I extensively outlined two key paradigms of Western politics—the
Aristotelian notion of oikonomia in which politics assumes the form of a government of
men and Schmitt’s theory of the political in which the domain of the political is reduced
the sovereign power of a state—and maintained that with these two paradigms the term
politics tends to designate the techniques of government as exercised with the domain of
the state. It is now clear that what Foucault outlines as the historical logic, rationality,
and practices of governmentality, a unique term that describes the ways in which the
history of government comes to coincide with the modern state and assumes the form of
an oikonomia, can be understood within this context. At once an individualizing and
totalizing form of power, what is ultimately at stake in the term governmentality for
Foucault “is not then the state’s takeover of society, so much as…the
governmentalization of the state.”1043 When the individualizing techniques of pastoral
power combine with the centralizing techniques of the state, the paradigmatic form
politics assumes in West is therefore, according to Foucault, “the political government of
men.”1044 Yet, the importance of Foucault’s work in Security, Territory, Population lies
not simply in the genealogy of this “political government of men,” but rather in the direct
correlation he establishes between the governmentalization of the state and the counterhistorical movements of resistance parallel to the phenomenon of governmentality. Thus,
the “governmentalization of the state is a particularly contorted phenomenon” according
to Foucault, since “the techniques of government have really become the only political
stake and the only real space of political struggle and contestation.”1045 In other words,
when pastoral power becomes governmentalized within the domain of the state and
assumes the political government of others, what is at stake and contested in political
struggle is not what Foucault refers to here as the “privileged position” of the state, “the
absolutely essential…target to be attacked,” but rather the specific techniques, tactics,
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and exercises of government.1046 Indeed, herein lies the key for Foucault: it is not that the
state either disappears from or is irrelevant to the forms of struggle and resistance to
governmentality, but rather that “the survival and limits of the state should be understood
on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality.”1047 Ultimately at stake for
Foucault is that the governmentalization of the state historically coincides with new
forms of struggle and resistance specifically directed at the techniques of government,
and furthermore that these forms of resistance directed at the exercise of governmentality
are, in fact, what allow for the state to be contested and possibly overturned. It is this
reinvention of the logic and tactics of political struggle and resistance that designates the
most significant and compelling parts of Security, Territory, Population. As is often the
case in several of his other works, Foucault here frames his inquiry into the study of
governmentality in terms of a critical theory of resistance. “Consequently,” Foucault
therefore concludes in “Omnes et Singulatim:”
those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to
denounce violence or criticize an institution…What has to be questioned is the
form of rationality at stake…Its inevitable effects are both individualization and
totalization. Liberation can come from attacking not just one of these two effects
but political rationality’s very roots.1048
It is at the intersection between the individualizing techniques of government and the
totalizing aspects of the state that Foucault ultimately begins to rethink, as we will see,
the praxis of resistance as an ethic of revolt. To be sure, rather than a revolutionary
overthrow of state power, it is clear in the passage above that Foucault’s critically
couples the study of governmentality with a fundamental retheorization of the stakes of
resistance.
While the term governmentality is used by Foucault in the wider sense to refer to
the governmentalization of the state, he also invokes the concept in reference to a specific
form of power that takes the management and government of human conduct as its
principal domain. It is necessary to quickly outline the form of power specific to the
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logic of government in order to full understand how Security, Territory, Population
fundamentally turns upon a unique theory of resistance exercised against the logic and
practices of government, as oikonomia. Although in this text Foucault acknowledges that
the term “oikonomia” has a history that harkens back to Aristotle, his notion of
governmentality is to be critically distinguished from the former insofar as the concept
and practice of oikonomia “takes on a completely different dimension and a completely
different field of references with the pastorate.”1049 While Foucault primarily focuses on
how the notion of pastoral power develops throughout the sixteenth century, he further
traces the history of the pastorate to the Greek expression “oikonomia psuchōn”
translated as “the economy of souls,” and later from the Latin phrase “regimen
animarum,” or the “government or regimen of souls” (original emphasis).1050 While
Aristotle’s use of the term oikonomia is often translated as an administration or
management of a household, at stake for Foucault is how the notion of an “oikonomia
psuchōn” adds a crucial dimension to the Aristotelian notion of politics as government.
According to Foucault, the notion of an “oikonomia psuchōn” adds to Aristotle’s
definition inasmuch as it directly refers the how this “political government of men” is
understood as a form of power that at once takes the conduct of human beings as the
object in which the techniques of government are directed. Indeed, Foucault proposes the
term “conduct” as the most adequate translation of “oikonomia psuchōn” since it
indicates two ideas essential to the notion of governmentality. “Conduct,” Foucault
writes:
is the activity of conducting (conduire), of conduction (la conduction) if you like,
but it is equally the way in which one conducts oneself (se conduit), lets oneself
be conducted (se laisse conduire), is conducted (est conduit), and finally, in which
one behaves (se comporter) as an effect of conduct (une conduit) as the action of
conducting or of conduction.1051
Foucault’s choice in translating “oikonomia psuchōn” as an activity of conducting is set
in order to pinpoint how government is exercised at once as the technique of conducting
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the conduct of others, as well as a relation to the self in which one is conducted by others
or by oneself, and finally the correlative form of behavior to conducting oneself or being
conducted by others. When Foucault speaks of the individualizing techniques of
governmentality, he is referring to the form of power that takes as its object the conduct
of others—that is, the task of government is the direction and management of conduct.
After distinguishing the form of power exercised as government in terms of the
activity of conducting and of conduction, Foucault nevertheless quickly turns to the
question of resistance. Indeed, it is around the question of resistance that Foucault frames
his critical inquiry into the question of governmentality. This “[t]ransition from the
pastoral of souls to the political government of men,” Foucault therefore argues, “should
be situated in [the] context of resistances, revolts and insurrections of conduct.”1052
Insofar as the “political government of men” designates the forms of power that take the
conduct of others as its focal point, then what is first at stake for Foucault in the eight
lecture of Security, Territory, Population is to outline the specificity of the correlative
forms of resistance manifest against and in response to the exercise of government as
such. As Foucault importantly maintains, then, we can read the history of
governmentality in the following way:
from the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century,
generally speaking I think that inasmuch as many pastoral functions were taken
up in the exercise of governmentality, and inasmuch as government also begins to
want to take responsibility for people’s conduct, to conduct people, then from
then on we see revolts of conduct arising less from the religious institution and
much more from political institutions. Conflicts of conduct will occur on the
borders and edge of the political institution.1053
In its most basic form, what is at stake here is how the history of governmentality is
inseparable from the corresponding movements of resistance, or “revolts of conduct.”
Furthermore, in a manner analogous to Foucault’s notion of “critique” which, as we saw
in chapter three, begins with the premise that the art of governing is always parallel to the
“art of not being governed,” the analysis of the fundamental struggle between conduct
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and counter-conduct historically specifies a key example from which this logic again
appears. The history of government for Foucault is parallel to its own counter-history
manifest in the movements of resistance against the exercise of government—that is,
governmentality is itself the history of “conflicts of conduct,” or the struggle between the
art of governing and the art of not being governed. In this regard, despite the ways in
which the significance of these counter-historical “revolts of conduct” are traditionally
overshadowed by the study of governmentality, the importance of Foucault’s work in
Security, Territory, Population arises not only in his analysis of the fundamental struggle
between the government of conduct and the movements of resistance outlined in terms of
“revolts of conduct,” but also how these movements of counter-conduct open up a vital
understanding of the how politics of resistance can be conceived and practiced.
Taking this analysis of the forms of resistance against the techniques of
governmentality as the basic framework and critical context from which Foucault situates
his study of the governmentalization of the state, it is my contention that the analysis of
the revolts of conduct corresponding to the governmentalization of the state and the
coinciding techniques of government ought to be understood as an extended critical
discussion of what I have referred to as the primacy of resistance, not only in terms of the
analytic of power from The History of Sexuality, but also the analytic of politics from
Society Must Be Defended in which the political is redefined as a field of agonistic
struggle between those who govern and those who are governed. Thus, after briefly
outlining the passive and active forms of resistance, or “great external blockages,”
directed against pastoral power, Foucault claims that his goal in the March 1 lecture of
Security, Territory, Population is more correctly to “identify some of the points of
resistance, some of the forms of attack and counter-attack that appeared within the field
of the pastorate” (original emphasis).1054 Indeed, it is in reference to these counterattacks against pastoral power that Foucault’s work in Security, Territory, Population is
set to explore how the “specificity of refusal, revolts, and forms of resistance of conduct
corresponded with the historical specificity of the pastorate.1055 Foucault’s emphasis here
regarding how these points of resistance directly appear within the field of pastoral
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power, makes reference to the latter component of the fifth thesis from the History of
Sexuality wherein resistance is shown to exist in a position of non-exteriority with respect
to power. Indeed, it is the logic of the primacy of resistance that Foucault takes as a key
referent from which the notion of “counter-conduct” can be conceived. Furthermore,
there are some striking similarities in both form and content between Foucault’s thesis—
“where there is power, there is resistance”—and the following passage from Security,
Territory, Population:
Just as there have been forms of resistance to power as the exercise of political
sovereignty, and just as there have been other, equally intentional forms of
resistance or refusal that were directed at power in the form of economic
exploitation, have there not been forms of resistance to conducting?1056
Consistent with the logic of his fifth thesis, Foucault maintains a distinct correlation
between power/resistance, and insists that resistance as “counter-conduct” is primary
with power exercised as government. Here, Foucault again insists that resistance is not
only coextensive with, yet irreducible to, the exercises of power as sovereignty, as
economic exploitation, and as government, but also that these forms of power necessarily
exist in relation to the permanence of resistance within the domain in which they operate.
This permanent and inseparable relation between power and resistance is what Foucault
refers to as the “relational character of power” in which the existence of power relations
depends upon the “multiplicity of points of resistance.”1057 Just as Foucault’s analytic of
power fundamentally turns upon the primacy of resistance, Security, Territory,
Population importantly extends this analytic into the study of governmentality in such a
way that “there is an immediate and founding correlation between conduct and counterconduct.”1058 In other words, there is an “immediate and founding correlation” according
to Foucault, between the history of government and the counter-history of resistance.
As outlined above, Foucault’s fifth thesis reappears in the context of the study of
governmentality. Power exercised as government reveals a correlative form of resistance
which Foucault designates in Security, Territory, Population as “revolts of conduct.”
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Insofar as “the pastorate is a highly specific form of power with the object of conducting
men,” then the history of power as government is, according to Foucault, simultaneously
the counter-history pertaining to how “specific movements of resistance and
insubordination appeared in correlation with this that could be called specific revolts of
conduct.”1059 In other words, Foucault’s point is to demonstrate how these “revolts of
conduct” are primary with respect to power exercised as government. Because the
power/resistance dynamic reappears in Security, Territory, Population as a key
component corresponding to the study of governmentality, what Foucault refers to as
“revolts of conduct” can be understood as adding a historical example in which the logic
of the primacy of resistance and the corresponding agonistic conception of politics is, in
fact, manifest as such. In this regard, while the previous chapter established a certain
continuity between Foucault’s analytic of power/resistance and Society Must Be
Defended in terms of a critical caesura between the political as archē and the political as
agōn, a further continuity can be established with Security, Territory, Population in terms
of how the inseparable nexus between power exercised as government and the countermovements of resistances of conduct exemplifies a key way through which the political
as agōn develops. Indeed, as Foucault suggests there is a certain use-value in invoking
the term “counter-conduct” to describe the forms of resistance against governmentality.
“Using the word counter-conduct,” Foucault argues, reveals a unique principle of
intelligibility from which to analyze “the way in which someone actually acts in the very
general field of politics”—that is, the term counter-conduct unmasks the existence of an
agonistic form of politics of resistance.1060
Perhaps even more important, however, than the inseparable relation Foucault
establishes between the analysis of governmentality and the corresponding forms of
resistance as counter-conduct is how this founding correlation ultimately hinges upon a
redefinition of politics conceived from the perspective of resistance to the forms of power
exercised as government. In this regard, it is necessary to turn to the untitled manuscripts
on governmentality cited by Michel Senellart in the “Course Context” following the
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English translation of Security, Territory, Population.1061 In the manuscripts on
governmentality cited by Senellart, Foucault juxtaposes two critical positions pertaining
to how the domain of the political has been traditionally conceived in the context of
governmentality and the governmentalization of the state. First, Foucault claims that the
“analysis of governmentality…generally implies that everything is political,” and further
suggests that this “expression is traditionally given two meanings” through which the
political as governmentality is reduced to a theory of the state.1062 Foucault summarizes
these two positions as follows:
[1.] Politics is defined by the whole sphere of state intervention, (…). To say that
everything is political amounts to saying that, directly or indirectly, the state is
everywhere. [2.] Politics is defined by the omnipresence of a struggle between
two adversaries (…). This other definition is that of K. (sic) Schmitt.1063
In the first tradition, Foucault suggests that the analysis of governmentality is often
reduced to the domain of the state whereby the term politics is rendered synonymous with
the exercise of state power. In the second, however, Foucault makes a rare reference to
Schmitt’s theory of the political,1064 wherein the terms of the political are defined “by the
existence of adversaries” determined within the sovereign authority of the state.1065
Refusing these two traditional paradigms on the ground that both theories
presuppose an originary nexus between the primacy of the state and the domain of the
political, Foucault reveals a third way from which to read the history of governmentality
and the corresponding field of the political neither simply in terms of the state, nor the
exercise of government, but rather from the perspective of resistance to power. Since the
expression “everything is political” traditionally locates the question of politics within the
domain of the state, Foucault fundamentally reverses this claim and suggests that:
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it is a question of saying rather nothing is political, everything can be politicized,
everything may become political. Politics is no more or less than that which is
born with resistance to governmentality. The first uprising, the first
confrontation.1066
Against the orthodox understanding of the political as archē, Foucault argues that politics
can be redefined neither in terms of the state nor state power, but as “that which is born
with resistance to governmentality.” In other words, politics emerges as a practice of
resistance. Yet, without the comparison draws between his own model of the political
and the previous two traditional theories, the precise meaning of Foucault’s claim might
be difficult to ascertain. First, Foucault’s claim that “nothing is political” denies the
state’s claim of primacy—that is, if the domain of the political is traditionally reduced to
the state as the decisive entity of politics, Foucault’s counter-claim, “nothing is political”
fundamentally refuses this artifice. However, Foucault’s second claim pertaining to the
ways in which “everything may become political” is more complex than initially appears,
and is directed towards the heart of Schmitt’s theory. At stake, then, in Foucault’s
statement “everything can be politicized” is not that everything might become the politics
of the state, but rather that politics more correctly refers to the ways in which a particular
relation of power can be transformed into a relation of struggle. Although Foucault
prefers the term “agonism” over “antagonism,” he nevertheless retains the fundamental
notion of antagonism inherent in Schmitt’s model of the political, while simultaneously
revoking the basic premise that sustains this same theory.1067 To claim, as does Schmitt,
that the antagonistic dimension of the political only takes place within the domain of the
state, would contradict Foucault’s counter-claim that “nothing is political,” or rather that
politics is not inherently reducible to the state’s domain. Indeed, herein lies the key to
rethinking the political anarchically: in Foucault’s model it is neither the state nor the
exercise of governmentality that is the domain proper to the political, but rather what I
have called the primacy of resistance; resistance to the exercise of governmentality is
what transforms relations of power into relations of struggle, and it is through these
relations of struggle that the condition of “politics” is able to emerge as such for
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Foucault. Against the sovereign tradition of political philosophy, which presupposes the
advent of the state as the condition from which the political historically emerges, it is in
this way that Foucault importantly maintains to the contrary that “politics” is “that which
is born with resistance to governmentality, the first uprising, the first confrontation.”
Furthermore, while in the trajectory that stretches from Aristotle to Hobbes and
later culminates in Schmitt, we have seen how the domain of the political and the history
of politics has been traditionally characterized in terms of the logic of the archē, the first
principle from which politics comes to designate the techniques of government exercised
within the domain of the state, Foucault instead denies the principle of the archē. Indeed,
rather than presupposing the principle of the archē as the condition of possibility for the
emergence of the political, Foucault begins with what can be referred to as the anarchic
principle of the political, whereby politics emerges with the “first uprising, the first
confrontation,” or the first act of resistance that transforms the exercise of government
into an agonistic relation of struggle. Indeed, rather than taking the governmentalization
of the state as the decisive criteria that allows the political to emerge as a distinct domain,
Foucault’s repeated emphasis regarding how politics emerges with the “first uprising, the
first confrontation,” is at once set to demonstrate how resistance is primary with the
domain of the political and further that the primacy of resistance is what allows for the
political to emerge as such. Thus, while the concept of counter-conduct designates the
point in which Foucault redefines politics from the perspective of resistance, its practice
is what animates an agonistic conception of the political. At the same time, however,
Foucault’s claim that politics emerges with resistance to governmentality not only reveals
an anarchist hypothesis of the political at the core of his thought, but also the beginning
point from which to conceive an anarchist politics of resistance.

6.2 The Ethics of Revolt: Resistance as an Ethos of CounterConduct
For centuries we have been convinced that between our ethics, our personal ethics, our
everyday life, and the great political and social and economic structures, there were
analytical relations, and that we couldn’t change anything…I think we have to get rid of
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this idea of an analytical or necessary link between ethics and other social or economic
or political structures.1068
[T]hat ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the
juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure. All that is
very interesting.1069
--Michel Foucault

In addition to all of these points of equivalences drawn in Security, Territory Population
between resistance and counter-conduct, Foucault’s work on counter-conduct is not
limited to the question of politics, and is further set to inform a conceptual and historical
correlation with his turn to the study of ethics. Thus, as Davidson notes, the notion of
counter-conduct “allows one to move easily between the ethical and political, letting us
see their many points of contact and intersection.”1070 In an interview from 1983,
Foucault not only draws an explicit connection between his theory of politics and his turn
toward ethics, but also that this connection is set to rethink “politics as an ethics.”1071 If
as Foucault suggests here, that a continuity between his theories of politics and ethics can
be maintained in terms of a critical theory of “politics as an ethics,” it is therefore my
contention that Security, Territory, Population can be read not only as a conceptual
bridge between the political and the ethical but, more specifically, between the
conceptions of politics as resistance and the ethics of revolt. While Foucault’s theory of
power/resistance from the History of Sexuality, as well as his agonistic theory of the
political in Society Must Be Defended ultimately culminates in redefining politics as
“resistance to governmentality,” this form of politics as resistance is itself animated by a
distinct form of ethics as revolt. In this regard, Davidson has drawn an extensive
connection between counter-conduct and resistance, while further outlining how this
connection turns upon a unique theory of ethics. At stake in Davidson’s work is to
demonstrate how “politically and ethically, counter-conduct is the invention of a new
philosophical concept” (original emphasis).1072 Focusing more directly on the
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implications of Foucault’s turn to ethics in relation to political theory, Kelly maintains
that what Foucault comes to refer to as ethics is defined as a specific type of praxis
against the pervasiveness of governmentality. Thus, for Kelly “this ethics is the
generalized practice in response to pervasive government by which all those who are
governed…hold government to account.”1073 In light of these readings, it is my
contention that what Foucault refers to as counter-conduct not only adds an explicitly
ethical component to his notion of politics as resistance, but also that this notion of ethics
fundamentally changes the way in which the politics of resistance is both conceived and
practiced.
In the Western tradition, ethics is most commonly understood as a branch of
moral philosophy concerned with systematizing and defending certain concepts of right
and wrong, or the moral principles that might govern one’s individual or collective
behavior. Yet rather than defining ethics as a set of normative or prescriptive rules that
might come to govern the conduct of others, Foucault suggests in an interview from 1983
the following definition of ethics: “ethics is a practice; ethos is a manner of being.”1074
As a “practice” or “manner of being” what Foucault refers to as ethics seems to exclude
any sort of normative frameworks or regulatory principles that might come to act as the
common basis from which such ethical practices and ways of being could be formally
known. Indeed, in her oft-cited critique of Foucault, Nancy Fraser argues that both
Foucault’s theory of resistance as well as his notion of ethics ultimately suffers from a
clear lack of norms, and thus that “Foucault’s work is normatively confused.”1075 Despite
her intentions, however, Fraser nevertheless points toward a real possibility pertaining to
how Foucault’s theory of resistance might inform the basis of his concept of ethics. After
pondering what sort of alternative normative framework Foucault might be presupposing,
Fraser asks “[c]ould the language of domination, subjugation, struggle and resistance be
interpreted as the skeleton of some alternative framework?”1076 Fraser’s immediate
answer is a resolute no.1077 Indeed, Foucault refuses the idea of a “regulatory principle”
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that might act as the basis for either politics or ethics on the ground that all political and
ethical actions would therefore be placed under the “governance” of such a limiting
principle.1078 Yet, while Foucault does indeed refuse any sort of regulatory principles
that might act as the basis of his conception of resistance, he does not exclude what is
referred to in the same interview from 1983 as “a critical principle” in which one takes
the non-necessity of relations of power and domination as a starting point.1079 However,
insofar as Foucault understands the domination/struggle and power/resistance as existing
in a fundamental relationship of agonism, then as Newman more correctly suggests, the
ethics of “resistance is not necessarily sanctioned by moral or rational standards, or by
the promise of a better world.”1080 Against Fraser, Newman instead concludes that
“resistance is an absolute refusal of domination—a desperate struggle, sometimes to the
death, with a particular relation of power.”1081 Although Fraser discounts the idea that
resistance might come to serve as the basis of Foucault’s notions of both power and
ethics it is my contention that what Newman takes as the basis of resistance—that is, the
“absolute refusal” or struggle with a “particular relation of power”—can be further be
extended as the fundamental basis of Foucauldian ethics. In this way, while we have
seen how Foucault takes the “non-necessity of power” as the methodological approach to
the studies of power, politics, and governmentality, this same notation forms the basis of
what Foucault refers to as ethics—that is, ethics for Foucault takes the non-acceptance of
power as the beginning point from which a critical ethos—or way of being-in-the-world,
can be elaborated in life as a politics of resistance to governmentality.
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As a practice, or way of being, ethics for Foucault at once designates a critical
principle directed against the pervasiveness of governance, as well as a position of praxis,
an ongoing struggle with power as government. Similar to his notion of “critique,” ethics
as Foucault suggests begins with a critical principle, or critical attitude, that takes the
“nonacceptance…of our own governments” as a starting point.1082 Indeed, this
elaboration of a critical position beginning with the nonacceptance of government is,
Foucault maintains:
an ethical one, but it is also political; it does not consist in saying merely, “I
protest,” but in making of that attitude a political phenomenon that is as
substantial as possible, and one which those who govern, here or there, will
sooner or later be obliged to take into account.1083
Foucault draws a clear connection here between politics and ethics not through an
attitude of “protest,” but in the strategic conversion of this critical attitude into a
“political phenomenon” that contests “those who govern.” At the same time, however,
this type of ethico-political and critical attitude directed against the logic of
governmentality, ultimately turns upon a praxis of resistance—an ongoing struggle with
power as government—which Foucault refers to in Security, Territory, Population as
“counter conduct.” While we have already seen how Foucault’s use of the term “counterconduct” is set to redefine politics in terms of resistance to governmentality, it is now
necessary to see how Foucault distinguishes revolts of conduct as a specific form of
resistance, as well as how these forms of counter conduct hinge upon an ethics of revolt
in which resistance to governmentality is not simply a fundamental struggle with the
exercise of power as government, but also a movement towards another possible form-oflife. In this regard, Foucault maintains that these movements of resistance as counterconduct are:
movements whose objective is a different form of conduct, that is to say: wanting
to be conducted differently…towards other objectives…through other procedures
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and objectives. They are movements that also seek, possibly at any rate, to escape
the direction of others and to define the way for each to conduct himself.1084
Here, Foucault clarifies that what he refers to as counter-conduct consists of a double
dimension of resistance, in which the struggle against the exercise of government is
paired with the affirmation of new forms of conduct, and ultimately as we will later see
new forms of autonomous, ungovernable subjectivity. One of the key characteristics of
counter-conduct is how these revolts of conduct are distinguished as movements seeking
to be conducted differently—that is, movements of resistance who struggle against the
logic and practice of governmentality in order to achieve a different way of being in the
world. At stake here for Foucault is how the counter-movements of resistance arising
within the field of governmentality are directed not simply at the state, but rather against
the government of conduct. This struggle against the logic and practice of
governmentality designates what can be referred to as the political pole of counter
conduct.
At the same time, however, these revolts of conduct are also movements that seek
to “escape the direction of others” in order to autonomously define the domain of one’s
own conduct. This second aspect of counter conduct in which one attempts to ultimately
escape the direction of others designates the ethical counterpart to the politics of
resistance against governmentality; at stake here is not simply a struggle against a form of
power, but an affirmative struggle toward increasing one’s autonomy. With the addition
of this ethical component of resistance, Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct means that
politics as resistance to governmentality is neither to be considered a mere reaction to the
exercise of power, nor its total negation; instead resistance as counter-conduct is itself
productive—indeed life-affirming—and has as its aim the autonomous selftransformation of the subject. Foucault thus confirms that these revolts of conduct are
movements that “definitely have a productivity, forms of existence, organization, and a
consistency and solidity that the purely negative word disobedience does not capture.”1085
Indeed, what is produced in revolts of conduct against the exercise of power as
government is the self-formation and production of new forms of subjectivity and forms-
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of-life. If politics conceived as resistance necessitates a corresponding critical ethos,
herein lies the key for Foucault: at stake in the ethical component of counter-conduct is
not only that these forms of resistance take as their adversary a form of power exercised
as a “political government of men,” but also how the focus of these movements of
resistance is not directed at a revolutionary overthrow of power, but rather toward the
transformation of one’s way of being, a movement of withdrawal from power and
government. This relation to the self, in which one struggles against relations of power in
order to produce new forms of life is what Foucault refers to in The Use of Pleasure and
The Care of the Self amongst other places as “ascesis” (askēsis) 1086 or “the care of the
self” (epimeleia heautou).1087
Although Foucault acknowledges that it might appear a “bit paradoxical to
present ascesis as counter-conduct,” the idea that ascesis exemplifies a form of counterconduct highlights two vital characteristics that help refine the ethical component
required in the theory of resistance to governmentality.1088 First, as Foucault maintains in
Security, Territory, Population, askēsis, which is defined in Security, Territory,
Population in terms of “an exercise of self on self,” designates a “sort of close combat of
the individual…in which the authority, presence, and gaze of someone else is, if not
impossible, at least unnecessary.”1089 Here, Foucault underlines the ways in which
counter-conduct turns upon a practice of askēsis that attempts to render the authority of
others “impossible”—that is, counter-conduct actively “denies access to an external
power,” so as to transform the practices of government into an “unnecessary” relation of
power.1090 In this way, counter-conduct designates a form of voluntary refusal to submit
to power exercised as government. Yet, this practice of askēsis as counter-conduct is,
according to Foucault, coextensive with a struggle toward new forms of subjectivity.
This struggle towards a transformation in one’s conditions is what Foucault understands
as ethics. Thus, as Foucault maintains in an often cited interview from 1984, an “ascetic
practice” also designates “an exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to
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develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being.”1091 In this
regard, insofar as the term “ethics” for Foucault at once refers to a “practice” and a “way
of being,” then resistance as a form of counter-conduct—a praxis of askēsis—can be
defined as a practice against the exercise of power as government coupled with a struggle
toward the invention of new forms-of-life. Ethics as such arises, according to Foucault,
as a movement of resistance—that is a permanent ethic of revolt—that assumes the form
of new practices of subjectivity.
Foucault’s writings on the relation between ethics, askēsis, and the care of the self
are numerous and develop over a wide variety of themes and historical contexts. While
Foucault draws several interesting connections between askēsis and resistance, I need not
go into extensive detail into Foucault’s writings on the care of the self. Instead my goal
has been to demonstrate how the political and ethical periods of Foucault’s thought can
be connected through the concept of resistance, and furthermore that these forms of
counter-conduct, which turn upon the elaboration of a permanent ethic of revolt, add a
vital dimension to Foucault’s theory of resistance in a way that still needs to be explored.
In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault explains precisely how the turn toward the
study of governmentality bridges the gap between the political and ethical periods of his
thought. As Foucault concludes:
the theory of political power as an institution usually refers to a juridical
conception of the subject of right, it seems to me that the analysis of
governmentality—that is to say, of power as a set of reversible relationships—
must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the relationship of self to
self…and I think it is around these notions that we should be able to connect
together the question of politics and the question of ethics.1092
Perhaps even more important, however, is how Foucault begins to rethink resistance not
simply as a struggle against power, but in terms of an ethic of resistance located in the
care of the self. In this regard, Edward McGushin has argued that what is surprising
about the turn toward ethics is how “Foucault discovered, through his research in ancient

1091

Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 282.
Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982, trans.
Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2006), 252.
1092

394

philosophy, an unexpected site of resistance to power in the relationship we take up with
ourselves.”1093 Moreover, Johanna Oksala claims that the care of the self is the ethical
domain in which Foucault situates his theory of resistance. Thus, Oksala maintains that
the “focus of the government of the self by one’s self is crucial in Foucault’s elaboration
of resistance,” and furthermore that “[e]thics is the domain in which he situates it.”1094
Yet, while Foucault indeed understands the movements of counter-conduct and practices
of askēsis as specific sites of resistance, he also maintains that this type of ethics, this
ethics of revolt of insurrections of counter-conduct reveals a real political possibility from
which relations of power might effectively be resisted. While in The Hermeneutics of the
Subject Foucault acknowledges that “we might have to suspect that we find it impossible
today to constitute an ethic of the self, even though it may be an urgent, fundamental, and
politically indispensable task,” he concludes that “after all…there is no first or final point
of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself.”1095
While Foucault’s claim regarding how an ethic of the self can come to constitute
the first and final point of resistance to power might initially appear somewhat
inexplicable, what is at stake is not that an ethic of the self designates the sole point from
which one might actively engage in resistance, but rather that this ethic of revolt reveals
an alternative paradigm from which resistance is historically manifest as a struggle
against the logic of governmentality, and further how this allows us to rethink the
question of politics of resistance in new ways. In an interview from 1984 when Foucault
is asked if the statement cited above from The Hermeneutics of the Subject designates the
only “useful” practice from which power can be resisted, Foucault maintains that he does
not “believe that the only possible point of resistance to political power…lies in the
relationship of the self to itself;” instead, Foucault suggests that the ethic of revolt
practiced as counter-conduct “makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject
and its relationship to others—which constitutes the very substance of ethics.”1096 At the
same time, however, it is this understanding of ethics that Foucault nevertheless suggests
can be elaborated politically. Indeed, while governmentality develops for Foucault
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according to a specific rationality that is both individualizing and totalizing, the
corresponding ethic of revolt directly targets this logic, and is set not simply as a
movement that resists the state, but rather a struggle against the forms of power that
connect individuals to the state. Recalling that what needs to be attacked through
resistance is the specific rationality of governmentality—that is the simultaneity between
the individualizing techniques of government and the totalizing power of the state,
Foucault clarifies this idea in “The Subject and Power,” and maintains:
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we
are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind
of political “double bind,” which is the simultaneous individualization and
totalization of modern power structures. The conclusion would be that the
political, ethical, social, philosophical problems of our days is not to try to liberate
the individual from the state, and from the state’s institutions, but to liberate us
from the state and the type of individualization linked to the state. We have to
promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality
that has been imposed on us for centuries.1097
Against more traditional notions of historical struggle that take the state as the adversary
at which resistance is directed, Foucault specifies here that an ethic of revolt begins with
a refusal of who we are—that is a refusal of the individualizing techniques of government
and the forms of subjectivity that connect us to the state. Indeed, it is in this way that
Foucault maintains that the care of the self might designate the first point of resistance to
power. Importantly, then, this refusal of who we are targets the specificity of power
exercised as government—the “political double bind” of individualizing and totalizing
power structures—and seeks a fundamental rupture in the nexus that links individuals to
the state and makes them governable. At stake, then, in this ethic of revolt is not that
resistance is exhaustively directed against the totality of the state, but instead at the “type
of individualization linked to the state.” At the same time, however, what is crucial for
Foucault is that this type of resistance ultimately turns upon the affirmation of and
promotion of “new forms of subjectivity.” Indeed, this is the crucial point for Foucault:
politics as resistance, as an ethics of revolt is not manifest in a struggle with the state, but
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rather in the invention of new forms-of-life against and autonomous from the
governmentalization of the state.
We have seen how Foucault’s notion of “counter-conduct” forms an interesting
connection that bridges the political and ethical periods of his thought. In this way,
counter-conduct is at once the concept through which Foucault redefines politics as
resistance to governmentality, as well as how this form of politics as resistance turns
upon an ethics of revolt struggling toward the formation of new forms of subjectivity.
Thus according to McGushin, the convergence between the political and ethical “allows
Foucault to conceive of an alternative model of political ethics, or of an ethics of
resistance to the proliferation of power.”1098 If as Foucault maintains that modern forms
of governmentality operate by producing individualities and governable forms of
subjectivity, “then the practices of the self would represent an experience of ethical life
which resists those forces.”1099 Simons takes on a similar position and maintains that
Foucault’s turn toward ethics led “his politics to…an ethic of permanent resistance.”1100
Yet, Simons also suggests that this ethic of permanent resistance extends Foucault’s
agonistic conception of politics. Foucault’s “affirmation of agonism” sustains, Simons
writes, “the active, participatory capacities of subjects required for…resisting
domination.”1101 It is this ethical component to the politics of resistance that Foucault
maintains is missing from traditional liberation and revolutionary movements: “[r]ecent
liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on which to
base the elaboration of a new ethics.”1102 For Foucault, then, the problem with
contemporary liberation movements is that they tend to seek to provide a scientific basis
for ethics while uncritically neglecting the necessity of constructing new forms of
subjectivity that might effectively resist power.

6.3
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Government, the dominion of human conduct represent[s] the stronghold of man’s
enslavement and all the horrors it entails…Anarchism rouses man to rebellion against
this…monster.
--Emma Goldman1103
The need for a new life becomes apparent…The machinery of government, entrusted with
the maintenance of the existing order, continues to function, but at every turn of its
deteriorated gears it slips and stops…there [is] no other way out than by the road of
insurrection.
--Peter Kropotkin1104
There is the possibility of that moment when life can no longer be bought, when the
authorities can no longer do anything, and when, facing the gallows and machine guns,
people revolt.1105
--Michel Foucault
Although Foucault remains skeptical of certain recent liberations movements and theories
of revolution insofar as they lack an ethical principle from which to base the elaboration
of a politics of resistance, in The Hermeneutics of the Subject he lists a few key historical
examples and philosophies of counter-conduct that have attempted to find a politics based
on a permanent ethic of revolt. Just before Foucault claims that an ethics of the self
designates the first point of resistance to power, he maintains that a “whole section of
nineteenth-century thought can be read as a difficult attempt to, a series of difficult
attempts to, to reconstitute an ethics and an aesthetics of the self.”1106 Amongst these
attempts at constituting an ethic of the self Foucault concludes that if we look at the
examples of
Stirner, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, dandyism, Baudelaire, anarchy, anarchist
thought, etcetera, then you have a series of attempts that are, of course, very
different from each other, but which are all more or less obsessed by the question:
is it possible to constitute, or reconstitute, an aesthetics of the self.1107
Foucault’s mention of the German philosopher Max Stirner, as well as “anarchy” and
“anarchist thought” as key referents of the attempt to constitute an ethic of the self should
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not go unnoticed. Indeed, while I have maintained throughout this project that Foucault’s
theory of power, politics, governmentality, and ultimately resistance all develop and turn
upon what I have referred to as anarchist hypothesis of the political, we see here that a
further connection can be made between anarchism and Foucault’s theory of ethics.
While Kelly has observed the connection Foucault draws between anarchist thought,
resistance, and an ethics of the self, he just as quickly dismisses this idea as a mere after
thought and claims that these “movements lack the asceticism necessary to the
constitution of an ethics.”1108 Yet, rather than dismissing this correlation, it is my
contention that the connection Foucault draws between anarchist thought and an ethic of
the self in revolt not only adds a vital dimension to the anarchist hypothesis of the
political that underpins his work, but also opens up a real political possibility for an
anarchist politics of resistance in which the state and the exercise of power as government
can be contested. Like Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct, anarchism can be
understood as a movement of resistance against power exercised as government coupled
with an ethic of revolt that actively struggles toward the formation of new types of
subjectivities.
The way in which Foucault takes anarchism as a key referent for his
understanding of the ethics of revolt is not an isolated instance. Thus, in order to see how
Foucault invokes anarchism as a possible basis from which to advance an ethical politics
of resistance, it is necessary to turn to “The Subject and Power” wherein Foucault
outlines several propositions on resistance so as to account for an ethical conception of
struggle against governmentality. While the turn toward the study of governmentality
and the corresponding movements of counter-conduct in Security, Territory, Population
bridge the gap between the political and the ethical in terms of elaborating a permanent
ethic of resistance, in “The Subject and Power” Foucault reaffirms this continuity and
outlines several propositions on resistance which help further explore how this form of
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politics as resistance develops as an ethic of revolt toward the affirmation of new forms
of subjectivity, while additionally drawing a key connection between this ethics of revolt
and an anarchist politics. Although we have seen that in The History of Sexuality
Foucault enumerates several theses on power that form the basic methodological
framework for an alternative economy of power relations that begins with the primacy of
resistance, in “The Subject and Power” returns to this notion and maintains that “in order
to understand what power relations are about, perhaps we should investigate the forms of
resistance and attempts made to dislocate these relations.”1109 It is in this way that “The
Subject and Power” can be read as a critical and fundamental companion to the power
resistance dynamic attested to in the fifth thesis. Further at stake in this essay, however,
is to account for the ethical specificity of these forms of resistance realized in the struggle
against the logic and practice of government. Herein, Foucault maintains that what is
important to the elaboration of politics as resistance to governmentality is that these
revolts are animated by a “struggle for a new subjectivity.”1110 By returning to this
ethical component of the politics of resistance, “The Subject and Power” ought to be
understood as a critical extension of Foucault’s notions of counter-conduct, askēsis, and
the ethic of the self.
While “The Subject and Power,” is often recognized as an important text in the
context of Foucault’s larger body of work, a text in which the theory of power is recast
within the context of governmentality, his critics tend to overlook not only how the
question of resistance reappears in this text as an ethic of revolt, but also how anarchism
forms a key referent for this ethical conception of the politics of struggle. Thus, while
Foucault has been criticized for failing to offer historical examples of his notion of
politics, the importance of “The Subject and Power” directly lies in the way that Foucault
accounts for the question of struggle in terms of resistance to power as government. At
the same time, however, the importance is further exemplified in the way Foucault
explores the ethical component of this theory of resistance. It is this ethics of resistance
that forms the basic connection between anarchism and Foucault. After briefly
explaining how it is in regard to the question of the subject that relations of power can be
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explored, while also outlining a “series of oppositions” developed in response to the
“administration over the ways people live,” in “The Subject and Power” Foucault turns to
an extended discussion pertaining to the common characteristics through which the
movements of resistance against governmentality might be distinguished from other types
of struggle.1111 In searching for a way to describe how these revolts against the exercise
of governmentality might be distinguished from other forms of struggle, Foucault claims
that it is “not enough to say that these are anti-authority struggles,” and thus that “we
must try to define more precisely what they have in common.”1112 The common
characteristics that can come to account for the forms of struggle against the exercise of
power as government are organized by Foucault in “The Subject and Power” into six
propositions. At stake for Foucault in these propositions is to specify exactly what he
means by defining politics as resistance to governmentality, as well as how these forms
of resistance can be distinguished from more traditional forms of liberation such as class
struggle or revolution. While the first three propositions are set to outline the general
framework that specifies certain key characteristics of the politics of resistance, the latter
three are set to address not only what these forms of resistance are against, but also what
they struggle toward. First, Foucault maintains that the forms of resistance directed at the
exercise of power as government are characterized as “transversal struggles,” in which
the question of revolt can neither be “limited to one country,” or “confined to a particular
political or economic form of government.”1113 By “transversal struggles,” then,
Foucault means to suggest two ideas that help to overcome some of the ambiguity
regarding how he conceives of an ethical politics as resistance to government. Here,
Foucault demonstrates the global, yet non-universal, extent of revolts of conduct—that is,
since resistance is co-extensive and primary with power, resistance to governmentality
necessarily takes on a global form corresponding with the field of power relations as
government. In other words, the global network of power relations exercised in terms of
government correspond to and are co-extensive with the transversal character of
resistance to governmentality. Furthermore, Foucault clarifies that the very specificity of

1111

Ibid, 329.
Ibid, 329.
1113
Ibid, 329.
1112

401

these struggles is not confined to a single form of government; hence, although resistance
to government takes on a global form, there is no universal law of revolt, but the
transversality of forms of revolt against the varying exercises of governmentality. In
addition to the transversal characteristic of revolt, in the second proposition Foucault
maintains that the “target of these struggles is power effects as such.”1114 What these
forms of resistance to governmentality are directed at is not, according to Foucault, the
abstract monolithic notions of state and capitalism, but instead the specific ways in which
power is exercised as government. In this way, Foucault’s point is to demonstrate how
the primary objective of resistance to government “is to attack not so much such-or-such
institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but, rather, a technique, a form of
power.”1115 What is at stake here is not simply a change in the objective target of
resistance—that is a change from the macro notions of state and capital to the micro
conception of power relations—but the way in which resistance to governmentality is
directly enmeshed within the forms of power against which it struggles.
Foucault’s third proposition on resistance to governmentality continues the logic
of the first two, while highlighting an important possible connection between this
understanding of resistance and anarchism. Foucault points toward the way in which
these forms of resistance against the exercise of power as government are therefore
“immediate struggles.”1116 Practices of resistance to governmentality are “immediate”
forms of struggle according to Foucault, because in such struggles “people criticize
instances of power that are the closest to them”—that is, the forms of power “which
exercise their action on individuals.”1117 Thus, while Foucault maintains that the “target”
of resistance to governmentality is directed at the effect of power relations as such, this is
because power as government is exercised as an “action on individuals.” Yet, at the same
time as these “immediate” forms of struggle are directed at power as government instead
of the “chief enemy,” of state or capital, this means for Foucault that these “immediate”
forms of struggle against governmentality are to be fundamentally distinguished from the
traditional concept of liberation through either class struggle or revolution. In this way,
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forms of resistance to governmentality are “immediate” for Foucault because they do not
“expect to find a solution to their problems at a future date (that is, liberations,
revolutions, end of class struggle).”1118 Rather than understanding the question of
struggle in terms of a future classless and stateless society realized and made manifest in
the form of a divine, or messianic revolution, Foucault emphasizes that the immediacy of
resistance to governmentality is itself a form of what anarchists traditionally refer to in
terms of direct action.1119 Thus, Foucault argues that “[i]n comparison with a theoretical
scale of explanations or a revolutionary order that polarizes the historian,” forms of
resistance to governmentality can neither be reduced to the notion of class struggle nor a
revolution-to-come. Instead Foucault clarifies that “they are anarchistic struggles.”1120
Foucault’s choice to identify the forms of resistance against governmentality as
“anarchistic struggles” is vital to his understanding of an ethical politics of resistance to
governmentality. These forms of struggle are “anarchistic” since they seek an immediate
rupture in the logic of the archē, not in terms of a future revolution that might ultimately
end class struggle, but in terms of a permanent insurrection against the immediate effects
of power relations. Yet, at the same time, however, Foucault characterizes these forms of
resistance as “anarchistic struggles” since they exemplify an immediate and permanent
struggle toward autonomy, rather than a revolutionary struggle over power. In other
words, such struggles are “anarchistic,” according to Foucault, not because the seek to
overturn state power, but because these movements of resistance struggle towards new
forms of subjectivity.
While the first three propositions in “The Subject and Power” are set to outline
how the forms of resistance to governmentality designate what Foucault refers to as
“anarchistic struggles,” the final three are set to explore more specifically what is at stake
in these forms of resistance, as well as how these struggles can therefore be differentiated
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from more traditional notions of struggle. By way of summary, Foucault reminds his
reader exactly what the object of resistance to governmentality is directed against:
The main objective of these struggles is to attack…this form of power that applies
itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own
individuality, attaches him to his identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he
must recognize and have others recognize in him. It is a form of power that
makes individuals subjects.1121
As Foucault maintains here, the primary target of the forms of resistance to
governmentality are the techniques of power as subjection—that is, the techniques which
turn an individual into a subject of government. As revolts of conduct organized against
the techniques of subjection, Foucault’s fourth proposition argues that forms of resistance
to the exercise of government “are struggles against the government of
individualization.1122” As resistance to the “government of individualization,” what is at
stake for Foucault is not that these forms of struggle are “for or against the
individual.”1123 Instead what is at stake is that that these forms of resistance are aimed at
the techniques of power exercised as subjection or subjectivation (assujettissement). In
this sense, resistance to the exercise of power as government is directed against the “form
of power that makes individuals subjects.”1124 In regard to this form of power, Judith
Butler has argued that Foucault’s term “subjectivation” carries a fundamental paradox
within itself. “Assujetissement,” Butler writes, “denotes both the becoming of the subject
and the process of subjection…a subjection which implies a radical dependency”
(original italics).1125 As Butler suggests here, power exercised as government at once
signifies a process of becoming subjected to power as well as a process of becoming a
subject of power as such. Because the techniques of government refer to a dual process
of subjection, the way in which Foucault designates the struggles against these forms of
power as “anarchistic” highlights a vital characteristic essential to his theory of
resistance. At stake in the politics of resistance against governmentality is not simply a
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revolt against the exercise of power as such but, more specifically, a movement against
the dual process of subjection—a fundamental revolt against the becoming subject to
government—that is, a revolt against becoming-governable.
In the fifth proposition on resistance Foucault maintains that these forms of
resistance are “struggles against the privilege of knowledge,” or the ways in which
relations of power are inherently linked with relations of knowledge.1126 According to
Foucault, then, what is additionally at stake in these “anarchistic struggles” is the way in
which relations of power function, circulate, and are “linked with the privileges of
knowledge.”1127 In other words, these struggles are forms of resistance against the
relations of power-knowledge—that is a revolt against the imposition of forms of
knowledge bound to forms of power. Finally, Foucault further clarifies that “all these
present struggles revolve around the question: Who are we?”1128 Here, the notion of
resistance designates, according to Foucault, a “refusal of these abstractions, of economic
and ideological state violence, which ignore who we are individually, and also a refusal
of a scientific or administrative inquisition that determines who one is.”1129 As a refusal
of who we are—that is, a refusal of the process of becoming governable—at stake is how
these “anarchistic struggles” attempt to carve out a terrain of life that is itself
ungovernable. With these components form the basis for a preliminary outline regarding
the objective targets of the forms of resistance to government, what is ultimately at stake
in these “anarchistic” forms of resistance to the exercise of government is, as Foucault
importantly maintains, “a struggle for a new subjectivity.”1130 In this way, while
Foucault designates the specificity of revolt in terms of the forms of resistance to the
exercise of power as a form of government, he also maintains that the overall goal of
these forms of struggle is to promote and develop new forms of radical subjectivity made
possible in and through resistance to the individualizing techniques of governmentality—
that is, what is at stake in these struggles is the development of new forms of life against
the techniques of government. At the same time, however, insofar as these struggles are,
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as Foucault suggests, struggles against the government of individuation, it is my
contention that what is produced in these forms of resistance is what can be termed,
following Agamben, the ungovernable.1131 As an attempt to constitute an ethic of the self
in the ungovernable, the politics of resistance not only designates an ongoing struggle
with power exercised as government, but a struggle toward a new ethos, or form-of-life
that at once coincides with and is bought about through the praxis of resistance. Through
Foucault the ungovernable can be understood as a form-of-life obtained in a condition of
revolt. As Foucault suggests in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, a form of “life obtained
thanks to a technē, does not obey a regula (a rule): its submits to a form. It is a style of
life, a sort of form one gives to one’s life.”1132 Here, Foucault clarifies how an ethic of
revolt proceeds from a position of autonomy; rather than a set of prescribed rules, it is an
ethic “one gives to one’s life.” At the same time, the form or style of life produced in an
ethic of revolt is the ungovernable insofar as the transformation in subjectivity is what is
brought about through the struggle against power exercised as government. Indeed, if
Foucault is correct that it is through our forms of subjectivity that our behavior is
conducted or governed, then what is ultimately at stake in these forms of resistance is the
production of ungovernable forms of subjectivity; an ethic of revolt elaborated as a
permanent process of becoming-ungovernable.
While Foucault emphasizes the significance of these “anarchistic” forms of
resistance to the exercise of governmentality in contrast to more traditional forms of
struggle his point is not, however, to suggest that other forms of resistance and revolt
either do not exist or are of little importance. Instead Foucault clarifies that there have
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been three general forms in which forms of resistance and revolt have been historically
elaborated: struggles against forms of ethnic, religious and social domination; struggles
against economic forms of exploitation; and finally struggles against subjection—that is
“against forms of subjectivity and submission.”1133 While, Foucault maintains that
resistance against the submission of subjectivity is “becoming more and more important,”
he also argues that the “struggles against forms of domination and exploitation have not
disappeared.”1134 Thus, rather than directly excluding other forms of revolt, Foucault
instead maintains that “in history you can find a lot of examples of these three kinds of
social struggles, either isolated from each other, or mixed together.”1135 Despite, then,
the ways in which Foucault is criticized for remaining ambiguous in regard to the
question of resistance, in “The Subject and Power” he does indeed directly outline how
these revolts of conduct are to be critically and practically distinguished from more
traditional theories of liberation, while Security, Territory, Population offers a historical
example of these forms of revolt in the notion of counter-conduct. Furthermore, it is in
“The Subject and Power” that Foucault again importantly locates anarchism as a key
referent for his inquiry in the question of resistance and the ethics of revolt. To be sure,
the connection Foucault draws between his theory of resistance, the corresponding ethic
of revolt, and anarchism not only opens a real possibility for a critical praxis of
resistance, but also a vital way from which to rethink the stakes and praxis of an anarchist
politics of resistance.
Although Foucault maintains that forms of revolt against domination and
exploitation have not been eradicated from the field of revolt, his inquiry into the forms
of resistance against government nevertheless suggests an alternative framework from
which the revolts against government as “anarchistic struggles” can be distinguished
from traditional theories of liberation and revolution. Forms of resistance to the exercise
of power as government can be distinguished from a theory and praxis of revolution
because they are firstly immediate struggles against the specific techniques of
“subjection,” against the process of becoming governable. To be sure, what is attacked in
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these forms of resistance is not the state or capital, but the techniques of power that both
subjugate and make one subject to the exercise of power as government. This means,
however, that the forms of resistance Foucault describes should not be understood in
terms of a revolutionary struggle with state power; at stake in the struggle against
government is therefore not a future end to revolutionary class struggle in which relations
of power might be fully eradicated from the political. Instead of invoking the term
‘revolution’ to describe the ultimate goal and terminal point of all forms of struggle, what
is at stake in “anarchistic struggles” is instead insurrection, the immediate elaboration of
new forms of life made possible in the realization of resistance against governmentality.
It is in this way we can fully understand Foucault’s claim regarding how the
“philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state,
and from the state’s institutions, but to liberate us from both the state and from the type of
individualization linked to the state.”1136 Indeed, herein lies the political possibility of
Foucault’s theory of resistance, as well as the ethic of permanent revolt that animates this
form of struggle. If one is to resist the state, one must first revolt against the government
of individualization; it is an insurrectionary struggle against becoming-governable that
breaks the nexus that binds us to the state, and allows for its continuation. Indeed, if it is
true as Foucault suggests that the governmentalization of the state is what has allowed the
state to survive, then it through an insurrectionary struggle with governmentality through
which the state might in fact be abolished. While anarchism is commonly understood,
although by no means exclusively, as a form of politics premised on a theory and praxis
of revolution—an ongoing struggle with the state and capital that will eventually lead to
future classless and stateless society, it is my contention that Foucault’s notion of the
“anarchistic struggles” against governmentality tend toward emphasizing the importance
of insurrection rather than revolution as the paradigmatic form revolt assumes in the
struggle against government.
With the critical exploration of the question of resistance and its relation to ethical
struggle toward new forms of subjectivity designating the principal problematic of “The
Subject and Power,” it is clear that anarchism designates a possible basis from which
Foucault’s ethical politics of resistance might arise. At the same time, however,
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Foucault’s theory of a permanent ethic of resistance allows us rethink an anarchist
politics of resistance in radically new ways. First, politics as resistance to
governmentality is not itself premised, yet does not exclude, the telos of revolution as the
end-point of an ethic of revolt. Rather than a revolutionary politics, through Foucault we
can begin to conceive of the politics of resistance in terms of insurrection—indeed, as
insurrections of conduct, and insurrection of the self—which, in struggling for an
autonomous, ungovernable form-of-life, effectively creates a fundamental rupture with
the logic and practice of the state. In order to understand this vital differentiation
between insurrection and revolution it is necessary to turn to an often cited passage from
Max Stirner’s 1844 text The Ego and His Own: The Case of the Individual Against
Authority. Keeping in mind that Foucault mentions Stirner in The Hermeneutics of the
Subject as an example of a philosopher who attempted to reconstitute and ethic of the
self, or practice of askēsis, then a connection can easily be made between the former’s
ethic of revolt and the latter’s notion of insurrection. Indeed, Foucault’s understanding of
the forms of resistance directed at the government of individualization appears to echo
Stirner in the distinction maintained between revolution and insurrection. According to
Stirner, “[r]evolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous:”
The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition
or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter
has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet
does not start from it but from men’s discontent with themselves, is not an armed
rising, but a rising of individuals, a getting up, without regard to the arrangements
that spring from it (original italics).1137
Similar to Foucault’s notion of an ethic of permanent resistance, Stirner’s notion of
insurrection begins not with a revolt against the state, but rather in individual’s
“discontent with themselves,” a “rising up of individuals” out of the government of
individuation. At the same time, however, Stirner takes this a step further and maintains
an additional distinction between revolution and insurrection that highlights what is
ultimately at stake in Foucault’s ethics of resistance. “The revolution,” Stirner writes,

1137

Max Stirner, The Ego and His Own: The Case of the Individual Against Authority, trans. Steven T.
Byington (New York: Dover Publications, 2005), 316.

409

aims “at new arrangements”—that is a rupture with the previous arrangement in order to
arrive at a new set of arrangements—whereas “insurrection leads us to no longer let
ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and set no glittering hopes on
institutions” (original italics).1138 What Stirner refers to as “insurrection” begins not only
with a refusal of the self, but a refusal to be “arranged” or governed; in other words it has
the same form as Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct. At the same time, however, this
refusal to be governed is radically paired with, according to Stirner, a general aim not
toward the forms of arrangements instituted after a revolution, but instead toward a
radical position of autonomy, a position from which we might “arrange ourselves.”
Taken together we can, following both Foucault and Stirner, begin to understand an
ethical politics of resistance to governmentality in terms of an insurrection of the self.
This insurrection of the self is itself a form of what anarchists refer to as direct action
which, in refusing to be governed, prefigures anarchy in the ungovernable, a radical
position of autonomy in which one is able to arrange oneself. While anarchism is most
typically understood as a revolutionary theory that seeks the dissolution of the state, it is
my contention that through Foucault we might amend this basic paradigm of anarchist
theory and suggest that this ethical politics of resistance better characterizes anarchism as
a fundamental withdrawal from the logic, practice, and domain of oikonomia.
The thematic of an ethical politics of resistance I have been developing through
Foucault not only demands a reconsideration of the basis of an anarchist politics of
resistance, but also how we resist the forms of governable subjectivities that link us to the
state. In this way, we have seen how a Foucauldian theory of resistance refers not to a
struggle with the state over power but, more specifically, to a struggle with the exercise
of government; the politics of resistance as such is not characterized in terms of
revolution, but as insurrection—an insurrection of conduct that attempts a fundamental
rupture in the practices of government that connect us to the state. At the same time,
however, this politics of resistance is itself paired with an ethics of revolt, a way of being
through resistance that ultimately seeks a withdrawal from power in order to affirm an
ungovernable position of autonomy. While Foucault claims that the politics of resistance
to governmentality is itself ethical in its struggle toward new forms of subjectivity, this
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ethical component of resistance is therefore ontological as well. Indeed, this
insurrectionary ethical politics of resistance is what Newman refers to “ontological
anarchism.”1139 By “ontological anarchism,” a term developed with regard to Foucault,
Newman argues that an insurrectionary theory of politics of resistance is “primarily a
form of ethical and political self-transformation…which seek[s] to foster autonomous
relations and practices of outside power.”1140 Indeed, what is fostered or produced in the
politics of resistance directed against the logic and practices of government is not
necessarily the dissolution of the state, but radical positions of autonomy outside of
power. This position of autonomy produced outside of power exercise as government is
what Newman refers to, via Agamben, as the “ungovernable,” or the “anarchic dimension
to life that exceeds and resists” the governable forms of subjectivity that connect
individuals to the state.1141 Yet, these ungovernable positions of autonomy formed in
practices of resistance, and which form the basis of anarchist politics, also reveal a radical
condition of freedom that forms the basis of what I have outlined as a permanent ethics of
resistance. According to Newman, then, since “insurrection allows people to constitute
their own freedom,” then it can further be maintained that a politics conceived as
resistance “is the political articulation of ontological anarchy: a form of praxis which is
not overdetermined by a project or telos, but which simply assumes and puts into practice
the freedom we already have.”1142 It is this form of freedom obtained through the
practice of resistance that Foucault locates as the basic principle that grounds the notion
of the permanent ethics of revolt.
While we have seen that a specific continuity can be drawn between the political
and ethical through the concept of resistance, and furthermore that ethics is defined by
Foucault as both a practice and way of being in the world, he also argues that this ethics
of permanent resistance is itself to be conceived in terms of a radical practice of freedom.
It is the concept of freedom, the condition proper to the domain of ethics, that Foucault
argues has been missing from revolutionary movements. Thus, in a crucial interview
from 1984 titled “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” wherein
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the question of politics is directly tied to the questions of ethics in terms of a theory of
resistance, Foucault further argues that this ethical theory of resistance reveals the
problematic of freedom in new ways. It is in this way Foucault asks “for what is ethics, if
not the practice of freedom, the conscious practice of freedom.”1143 In this way, the
politics of resistance is, according to Foucault, an ethical practice of freedom.
“Freedom,” Foucault therefore writes, “is the ontological condition of ethics.”1144 In
Foucault’s thought, then, the practice of ethics requires a concept of freedom through
which a critical ethos of revolt can be expressed—that is, ethics according to Foucault
finds its basis and is expressed in the forms and practices of freedom manifest in the
praxis of resistance. At the same time, it is this relation between ethics and the condition
of freedom that Foucault conceives of as an inherently political problem. Thus “insofar
as freedom…signifies non-slavery,” which Foucault acknowledges “is quite a different
definition of freedom” from traditional notions, then the problem of ethics “is already
entirely political.”1145 As a critical position of “non-slavery,” Foucauldian freedom is not
to be conceived as freedom from but rather in terms of a condition of being-in-autonomy.
Thus, while we have seen that politics exercised as resistance to governmentality
at once refers to an ethical and political practice of resistance toward autonomous selftransformation, the way in which Foucault defines freedom as a condition “non-slavery”
adds a vital dimension to the intersection between politics, ethics, and resistance. Politics
as resistance to governmentality is a perpetual striving toward a condition of non-slavery,
and it is in this way that the question of freedom is problematized by Foucault as an
ethos—indeed, an ethics of permanent resistance. While Foucault redefines politics as
resistance to governmentality, with the practice of freedom as “non-slavery” forming the
ontological precondition of ethics, he also redefines ethics in a unique manner consistent
with his theory of the political. Resistance is, according to Foucault, an ethical practice
of freedom—that is, a permanent ethic of revolt perpetually striving toward a condition in
life of non-slavery and autonomous freedom. There is a real political possibility in this
politics of resistance and ethics of revolt that not extends what I have referred to as
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anarchist hypothesis of the political that underpins Foucault’s thought, but also the
elaboration of an anarchist ethics of revolt, a permanent exercise in freedom through the
practice of resistance, a specific art of not being governed that ruptures the logic of the
archē.

6.4 An Anarchist Politics of Resistance Emerges as an Art of Not
Being Governed
Facing them head on and as compensation, or rather, as both partner and adversary to
the arts of governing, as an act of defiance, as a challenge, as a way of limiting these arts
of governing and sizing them up, transforming them, or finding a way to escape
them…there would have been something born…a kind of general cultural form, both a
political and moral attitude, a way of thinking…which I would simply call the art of not
being governed.1146
--Michel Foucault

The central challenge of this chapter has been to explore the ethical contours of
Foucault’s theory of resistance, and to further demonstrate how this permanent ethic of
revolt at once reveals the political as a space of agonistic contestation and a position of
autonomy outside of the logic and practices of governmentality. In this regard, the first
goal of this chapter has been to trace how Foucault’s turn toward the study of
governmentality directly corresponds with a critical inquiry into the counter-historical
movements of “counter-conduct,” a unique form of resistance, and furthermore that it is
through this notion of counter-conduct that Foucault redefines politics from the
perspective of resistance. If, as I have argued throughout this project that resistance is
primary with power and the political, it has been my contention in this chapter that
Foucault clarifies this position in Security, Territory, Population, ultimately arguing not
only that politics can be redefined as resistance, but also how politics is that which
emerges in the condition of resistance to governmentality. By redefining politics as a
movement of resistance against the logic and practice of governmentality, Foucault takes
these movements of counter-conduct as a historical referent in which the political as agōn
emerges in the form of an active resistance and open contestation with the exercise of
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power as government. Taking Foucault’s theory of politics as resistance as a critical
extension of his agonistic conception of the political, the second goal of this chapter was
to outline the ways in which the politics of resistance as such forms the conceptual and
practical nexus that connects the political and ethical periods of Foucault’s thought.
Indeed, as Foucault maintains in 1984, the connection between the political and ethical
axes of his thought can be made in the following way: “the hinge point of ethical
concerns and the political struggle” at once arises as a movement “against abusive
techniques of government and research in ethics that seeks to ground individual
freedom.”1147 It is at the intersection between the movements of revolt against the
practice of government and the struggle toward an ethos of freedom that Foucault reveals
an alternative manner from which to rethink the question of resistance in terms of an
ethic of revolt.
Furthermore, it has been my contention in this chapter that Foucault’s redefinition
of politics as a movement of resistance to governmentality corresponding with an ethics
of revolt allows for a unique intersection to be staged between Foucault’s turn toward
ethics and anarchism. While I have maintained that Foucault’s critical inquiries into
power, politics, and governmentality all reveal the specificity of the primacy of resistance
as the basis of what can be termed an anarchist hypothesis of the political, in this chapter
we have seen how Foucault identifies anarchism as a key referent from which an ethical
politics of resistance might be based. It has therefore been my contention that Foucault’s
conceptions of the politics of resistance and corresponding ethic of revolt revitalize the
question of an anarchist politics of resistance in vital ways. Through Foucault we might
suggest that anarchism—indeed anarchy—is elaborated not in terms of a revolution to
come, but as a permanent ethos of resistance, a specific art of not being governed. This
critical intersection between Foucault and anarchist thought reveals a real political
possibility, a hidden locus that not only designates an active position of praxis in which
power exercised as government can be confronted and possibly reversed, but also the
elaboration of an ethos of revolt inseparable from a critical affirmation toward
autonomous, ungovernable forms-of-life. Rather than a revolutionary struggle with or
over state power, an insurrectionary ethos or art of not being governed is directed at what
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Foucault refers to as the “political double bind” of power exercised as government, a
form of revolt at once directed against the state and the government of individualization
that connects us to the state. While we have seen that a certain consistency can be drawn
between Foucault and anarchism in terms of rethinking politics as resistance to
governmentality, there is also a specific continuity between his notion of an ethics of
revolt and anarchist thought that has yet to be fully explored. In this regard, it has been
my contention not only that Foucault begins to conceive politics—indeed, the politics of
resistance—as a form of ethics, but that this ethical component to the politics of
resistance helps to rethink an anarchist politics as a vital attempt to constitute an ethic of
the self as an art of not being governed.
Although the notion of an anarchist ethics of resistance is often eclipsed by the
discourses on politics, there have been several attempts at elaborating an anarchist ethics
in which the question of the politics of resistance is explored and elaborated as an art of
not being governed. In the final years of his life, Kropotkin attempted to complete a twovolume text that sought to provide a historical account of the emergence of ethics and
forms of morality within the tradition of Western philosophy, while simultaneously
outlining a specific correlation between an alternative ethics and anarchism. Although
the Ethics was never completed, in an earlier work titled “Anarchist Morality,” Kropotkin
sketched a preliminary outline of an ethics devoid of any normative or moral
prescriptions imposed by authority, while further tracing a specific continuity between
this notion of ethics and an anarchist praxis of resistance. According to Kropotkin, an
anarchist ethics is to be elaborated not in terms of a Kantian “categorical imperative”—
that is, a universal code that guides all action, but rather upon two mutually reinforcing
principles: the principle of equality and the principle of non-governance. Indeed,
“equality,” Kropotkin writes, is “the fundamental principle of anarchism,” while further
concluding that “equity in all things…is anarchism in very deed.”1148 Yet, while the
principle of equality is what forms the ethical basis of anarchism, the very condition of
equality toward which anarchism strives can only become manifest in a meaningful way,
according to Kropotkin, as a perpetual movement toward a principle of non-governance,
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a movement toward anarchy. For Kropotkin, then, the principle of equality directly
corresponds with a principle of non-governance, a refusal to govern others that
simultaneously turns upon a refusal to be governed in turn: “we do not wish to be ruled,”
Kropotkin writes, and “by this very fact do we not declare that we ourselves wish to rule
nobody?”1149 It is this principle of non-governance that forms the essence of an anarchist
ethics. At the same time, however, the principle of non-governance leading to a condition
of equality additionally corresponds with and forms the basic foundation of an agonistic
praxis of resistance according to Kropotkin. Yet, instead of being premised on a theory
of revolution, Kropotkin describes the politics of resistance as a process of becoming, a
development of a critical ethos in which the refusal to govern and to be governed itself
prefigures a radical condition of equality and anarchy. An anarchist ethics can be
elaborated by developing an inextricable nexus between the principle of non-governance
and that of equality; thus in Kropotkin’s words: “By becoming anarchists…we declare
war against their way of acting, against their way of thinking…It is in the name of
equality that we are determined to have no more…exploited, deceived, and governed men
and women.”1150 Like Foucault, Kropotkin understands the politics of resistance as a
struggle in life against the government of conduct, an insurrectionary revolt of conduct
struggling against “their way of acting;” yet, in Kropotkin’s understanding this struggle is
both premised upon and leads to a condition of equality. Crucially, however, what
Kropotkin outlines here as the two principles that animate an anarchist politics of
resistance is to be elaborated as an ethos, a specific process of becoming-ungovernable in
a condition of equality. In other words, what Kropotkin understands as ethics describes a
form of praxis in which the principles of non-governance and equality are elaborated as
an art of not being governed, or a process of becoming-anarchy.
Similar to Kropotkin, Emma Goldman also recognized the importance of
elaborating an ethical basis to the politics of resistance: “to divest one’s methods of
ethical concepts” Goldman laments will ultimately lead to the failure of anarchist
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thought.1151 Indeed, anarchism according to Goldman ought to be understood as a
specific process of becoming, an ethic of revolt in which one transforms one’s self and
one’s conditions by developing an ethos of counter-conduct. It is in this way that
Goldman argues strongly that an anarchist politics of resistance cannot be a “violent
change of social conditions through which one social class, the working class, becomes
dominant over another class,” as is the case in traditional Marxist and some anarchist
discourses on revolution.1152 Because it is directed at the state as a physical object that
can be overturned, traditional theories of revolution according to Goldman are only the
“conception of a purely physical change,” and as such “involves only political scene
shifting and institutional reaarangements.”1153 While Goldman acknowledges that
“[r]evolution is indeed violent,” she further contends that the essential task of an
anarchist politics of resistance is not a struggle over power, but the elaboration of an
insurrectionary ethos of revolt, or a “fundamental transvaluation of values” (original
italics).1154 By a “transvaluation of values,” a concept that has its origins in Nietzsche’s
philosophy,1155 Goldman means to suggest something akin to Foucault’s notion of
counter-conduct, in which revolt seeks a fundamental change in one’s subjectivity. For
Goldman, then, a “transvaluation of values” ushers in a “transformation of the basic
relations of man to man, and of man to society”—that is, the basis of an “NEW ETHICS,
[sic] inspiring…a new concept of life and its manifestation in social relationships.”1156
By conceiving an anarchist politics of resistance in terms of ethical change in one’s self
and one’s relations to others, Goldman adopts a position similar to Foucault in which the
refusal of the self is paired with the affirmation of becoming ungovernable. As a
“transvaluation of values” instead of a revolutionary struggle over power, the politics of
resistance according to Goldman is an exercise in what Foucault refers to as counterconduct—that is, anarchism is a movement in life that seeks to escape the logic of
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governmentality, a revolt against the ways in which one is governed paired with a radical
transformation in life through resistance.
Through Kropotkin and Goldman there is a position nearly analogous to
Foucault’s claim in “The Subject and Power” in which the politics of resistance pertains
less to the state, but a struggle against the government of individualization linked to the
state. It is this art of not being governed elaborated in both Foucault and anarchism that
opens new possibilities from which to resist the logic and practices of the
governmentalization of the state. Indeed, in reconceiving politics as a movement of
resistance to governmentality paired with an ethic of revolt in which the struggle towards
new forms of subjectivity within a space of autonomous freedom, that is, towards
conditions of non-slavery and ungovernability, Foucault ultimately adopts a position
quite similar to that of the German anarchist Gustav Landauer. Like Foucault, Landauer
criticized Marxist and anarchists alike for regarding the state as a physical object or
“thing…that one can smash in order to destroy.”1157 Rather than conceiving the state as a
physical object that can be overturned or destroyed, Landauer instead argues that the
“state is a relationship between human beings, a way in which people relate to one
another.”1158 In other words, the state according Landauer is a social relation akin to
Foucault’s notion of the government of conduct. It is this conception of the state as
“relationship between human beings” that Landauer locates an alternative way from
which to rethink the basis of an anarchist politics. Anarchism will not destroy the state,
as Landauer suggests, by overturning its power; instead just as Foucault maintains that
the object of resistance is directed toward the production of new forms of subjectivity,
Landauer argues that “one destroys the state by entering into other relationships, by
behaving differently to one another.”1159 In this way, the object of resistance according to
Landauer is not, in essence, manifest in a revolutionary struggle against the state, but
rather in the attempt to “separate themselves from the state” by creating new ways of
conduct and relations between others.1160 Herein lies the key for an anarchist politics of
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resistance according to Landauer: “weaker and weaker will be the state power, the
governing principle…if only the people begin to constitute themselves outside the
state.”1161 This is to say that for Landauer, the object of an anarchist politics of resistance
is a radical withdrawal of oneself from the state by entering into different relations with
others, an ethic of counter-conduct that at once involves a position of voluntary
inservitude and a perpetual striving toward a condition of autonomy, freedom, and
equality in life. An ethics of revolt based in the practices of freedom, autonomy,
equality, and non-governance, is not a new set of moral values, but an ethos, a way of
being in the world through resistance, a strategy of withdrawal and desertion oriented
toward overcoming the constituent power of the state by constituting ungovernable forms
of life outside of the state; it is an art of not being governed, an ethic of becomingungovernable, a certain continuity between existence and resistance that allows the
conditions of anarchy to emerge.
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Conclusion
From Revolution to Resistance: Destituent Politics as an Art of Not
Being Governed
Resistance is the motor of history. Again and again we revolt against everything that
exploits, oppresses, outrages, and depresses us; again and again our revolts are
reabsorbed, becoming new conventions, new confines, new systems of control. Buried in
the sedimentary layers of our ancestor’s defeat it’s easy to forget what produced these
structures and can tear them down again: our great unruliness.1162
--Crimethinc Ex-Workers Collective
Politics is about the movement between no power and state power, and it takes place
through the creation of…a space of resistance and opposition to government.1163
--Simon Critchley
In a manner that echoes the core logic of Foucault’s fifth thesis from the History of
Sexuality, “anarchy,” writes Peter Gelderloos, “thrives in the struggle against domination,
and wherever oppression exists, resistance exists also.”1164 In this sense, anarchy is not
understood as a post-revolutionary condition following a total eradication of the state,
government, and capitalism, but rather as that which emerges as agōn, a condition
brought about in the forms of struggle against power in all its manifestations. Anarchy as
such is neither prior nor anterior to the forms of power against which it struggles.
Instead, rather, anarchism in the sense I have been elaborating throughout this study takes
as its basis and emerges from the logic that “wherever oppression exists, resistance
exists.” As a correlative to this logic, “anarchy”—that is, a condition of being-withoutgovernment—is what is historically expressed in the forms of resistance to power. In
other words, Foucault’s thesis “where there is power, there is resistance” designates the
principal logic central to anarchism. Beginning with a critical inquiry into the reasons
why the field of the political is traditionally elaborated in the archic nexus between
government and state sovereignty, the purpose of this study has examined the
possibilities of elaborating an alternative theory of the political in the intersections
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between Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchism. In doing so, the aim of this study
was to shift the site of politics away from the traditional archic paradigms of government
and sovereignty toward the logic of the primacy of resistance. Taking the primacy of
resistance as the concept that reveals the history of the political in its agonistic
specificity, it has been my contention that Foucault rethinks the political anarchically—
that is, rather than reducing the question of politics to the archic expressions of
government and sovereign power, Foucault maintains that the field of the political is
historically expressed as agōn, a permanent dynamic of struggle between power and
resistance. Consequently, however, because resistance designates a permanent
component that can never be eradicated from the field of the political, it is the primacy of
resistance and not the continuation of power that gives the political its form and
historicity as such. In this regard, it has been my contention that the critical attempts to
reopen a space for political praxis situated at the horizon of the state and government
hinge on a unique relationship between Foucault’s philosophy of resistance and
anarchism.
In establishing a vital intersection between Foucault and anarchism through the
logic of the primacy of resistance, the central challenge of this study has been to rethink
the question of politics in a way that transcends the Aristotelian and Schmittian
paradigms, and thus to gesture toward an alternative set of principles for a theory of the
political opposed to, and autonomous from, the models of politics expressed in the forms
of power exercised as sovereignty and government. This alternative, agonistic theory of
politics is what I have referred to throughout this project as an anarchist hypothesis of the
political, in which the primacy of resistance ruptures the logic of the archē and
redesignates the field of the political as an insurgent topology of struggle and
contestation. Following a discussion, via Aristotle and Schmitt, pertaining to the ways in
which the question of politics has traditionally been reduced to the first principle of an
archē, I then outlined how certain critical turns in political theory and philosophy such as
metapolitics and postanarchism have set the tone for beginning to rethink the political
and the question of politics in a way that gestures toward a fundamental return to the
study of anarchism, while highlighting how this alternative understanding of politics
ultimately turns upon the question of resistance. In this regard, chapter two sought to
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reintroduce anarchism in a manner that prefigures the postanarchist and metapolitical
attempts to locate a theory of the political irreducible to the state, as well as a
corresponding form of politics as resistance that could never assume the form of an
oikonomia. The goal here was at once to consider anarchism as a distinct form of
political philosophy that relocates the question of politics in the fundamental distinction
between government and resistance, as well as to demonstrate how the concept of
resistance is not only what animates an agonistic conception of the political as such, but
the condition of anarchy as well. Tracing the concept of anarchy as a philosophical
principle that affirms an alternative starting point for a critical theory of the political, as a
historico-political principle in which the history of the political is retheorized as a
permanent domain of agonistic struggle, and as a paradigm of politics as resistance it has
been my contention that anarchism asserts a theory of the political through the unique
question of resistance. Taken together, the first two chapters were set inform the
historical, philosophical, and political context in which Foucault’s thought can best be
situated, and from which my own study of the radical political possibilities brought to
light in the intersection between Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchism proceeds.
By situating the question of politics and the political at the horizon of the state
and the exercise of government, it has been my contention that anarchist political theory
fundamentally turns upon an alternative theory of the political, in which what is
ultimately presupposed is not the primacy of the first principle of government, but a
critical caesura between the political as archē and an insurgent, agonistic conception of
the political. It is in the context of the anarchist tradition, or rather in the critical tradition
that attempts to rethink the terms of the political and the question of politics from the
perspective of resistance in which the full potential of Foucault’s studies of power,
politics, and governmentality can be realized. In this regard, chapter three sought to
introduce and highlight the importance of the concept of resistance to Foucault’s thought
through the corresponding notion of “critique,” while further emphasizing how this
notion of critique designates an inimitable approach to the study of the political.
Beginning with what Foucault refers to as “anarchaeology,” a unique approach to the
study of politics that begins anarchically—that is, a critical methodology that takes as its
starting point the “non-necessity of all power of whatever kind”—I maintained that such
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approach ultimately reveals the agonistic dimension specific to the history of the
political.1165 Rather than beginning with the first principle of the archē, and thus that
politics can be reducible to the techniques of government exercised within the domain of
a state, Foucault instead reveals how politics is historically expressed agonistically in the
permanent struggle between power exercised as government and the counter-historical
movements of resistance manifest in terms of an “art of not being governed.” Taking a
critical elaboration of this “art of not being governed” as the conceptual key central to
Foucault’s project, the following chapter introduced what I refer to as the primacy of
resistance—via the fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality—as the
conceptual nexus through which Foucault’s study of power, politics, and the history of
the political can be understood in their anarchic and agonistic specificity. With the
primacy of resistance designating the conceptual key required in Foucault’s analytic of
power, I argued that the condition of possibility of power relations and the field of the
political turn upon the permanent potentiality of resistance, and further that this potential
for revolt is what allows for power relations to be transformed into a form of agonistic
struggle.
Focusing more directly on the question of politics, chapter five outlined a specific
nexus between the power/resistance dynamic and Foucault’s war analytic of politics and
the political. While in Hobbes the condition of possibility of politics coincides with the
eradication of the condition of war from the field of the political, I argued here that in
Foucault’s reading of the Leviathan it is the permanence of “civil war,” or stasis, that
gives the field of the political its agonistic specificity and allows for politics to emerge as
a paradigm of resistance. My central claim here is that just as resistance is primary with
power for Foucault, the war model of the political asserts that resistance is also primary
with the history of politics. In the final chapter, I argued that rather than constituting a
distinct break with his earlier studies in power and politics, Foucault’s turn towards the
study of ethics in his final works reveals how his agonistic conception of politics as
resistance is itself animated by a critical ethos of revolt. Taking the ethical concept of
“counter-conduct” as the key term by which Foucault redefines politics as resistance to
power exercised as government, my claim here was that Foucault’s ethical turn ought to
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be understood as an attempt to locate a continuity between a form of ethics that animates
his theory of resistance, and a form of politics as resistance that coincides with a radical,
permanent ethics of revolt, a distinct way of being in the world through resistance—that
is, a specific art of not being governed. While the primacy of resistance reveals an
anarchist hypothesis of the political in terms of a permanent struggle between the
exercise of power and the counter-movements of resistance—the corresponding ethos of
revolt through which politics emerges as resistance is elaborated in terms of an art of not
being governed.

Social Revolution or Resistance?
While Foucault’s theory of resistance forms an indispensable reference through which the
question of politics and the history of the political can be rethought agonistically, it has
been my contention that this conception of politics reopens up the space for an anarchist
theory of politics as resistance. Indeed, while Foucault’s project shifts the question of
politics from power to resistance, a critical theory of anarchism emerges in this space
between the primacy of resistance and the art of not being governed. In this regard, the
aim of this concluding chapter is to explore the emergence of a new ethical terrain and
political logic from which the question of resistance in anarchist political theory might be
rethought neither as a revolutionary overthrow of power, nor in terms of an anarchy-tocome, but rather as an art of not being governed, a certain continuity between life and
resistance, in which the condition of anarchy arises not in the revolutionary overthrow of
the state, but in the process of becoming-ungovernable. In this regard, it is my contention
that Foucault’s theory of resistance helps renew and revitalize the specific contours of an
anarchist politics emerging as resistance.
Nevertheless, in articulating an anarchist politics of resistance in terms of an art of
not being governed, rather than the traditional concept of social revolution, my approach
to the question of resistance within the anarchist tradition appears at odds with certain
anarchist theorists such as Murray Bookchin who argues that the “polymorphous
concepts of resistance are eroding the socialist character of the libertarian tradition.”1166
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Indeed, the intersection staged throughout this study between anarchism and Foucault in
terms of the primacy of resistance invites a return to the polemic debate initiated in
Bookchin’s 1995 text, Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable
Chasm. While Bookchin’s argument is premised on what he views as the irreconcilable
difference between politics conceived as resistance and politics conceived as
revolution—that is, between “lifestyle anarchism” and “social anarchism”—his critique is
important in the context of my study since the eradication of social anarchism traced in
this text is attributed, in large, to the spread of Foucault’s ideas and works.1167 In
returning to Bookchin’s debate, my intention is neither to resolve the tension he
establishes between the individualist and communalist forms of anarchism, nor to
advocate for a “lifestyle anarchism” as such. Instead, by way of concluding this study,
my intention is to explore how the dichotomy Bookchin establishes between resistance
and social revolution illustrates the ways in which the latter concept reproduces the logic
of the archē and a form of praxis that tends to conceive of politics in terms of power
rather than a theory of resistance as developed throughout this study. Although I do not
maintain, as does Bookchin, an irreconcilable difference between the so-called
individualist and social traditions of anarchism, instead preferring Goldman’s notion that
there is “no conflict between the individual and the social,”1168 it is necessary to turn to
his critique of Foucault in order to highlight the ways in which the possibility of an
anarchist politics today emerges as an art of not being governed, a form of resistance
which rejects the institutional, universal, and totalizing aspects of social revolutionary
theory and, in doing so, elaborates a form of politics that could never assume the form of
an archē.
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Written in the context of a critique of contemporary anarchist ideas and
movements of resistance, Bookchin begins his polemic by arguing that anarchism’s
failure to achieve any wide-spread revolutionary changes within society can be fully
explained by the “emergence of a phenomenon in Euro-American anarchism that cannot
be ignored: the spread of individualist anarchism.”1169 Following the development
throughout the 1960’s of what Bookchin refers to as the rise of “anarchic counterculture,” his text is written as a polemic against the ways in which these counter-cultural
movements tend to reproduce a new form of anarcho-individualism, or what he
pejoratively refers to as “lifestyle anarchism.” 1170 Although the individualist and
socialist schools of anarchist thought have often coincided, Bookchin’s text argues that
anarchism has traditionally “developed in the tension between two basically contradictory
tendencies: a personalistic commitment to individual autonomy and a collectivist
commitment to social freedom” (original emphasis).1171 It is in this division between
autonomy and freedom, between the individualist and social tendencies, that Bookchin
maintains “there exists a divide that cannot be bridged.”1172 Given that anarchists tend to
emphasize both autonomy and freedom, Bookchin’s distinction should be rejected.
Nevertheless, at stake in Bookchin’s critique is not to seek a fundamental reconciliation
between the individual and social traditions of anarchism, but rather to critically oppose
the difference between the ways in which the question of politics is treated in each of
these traditions. In illustrating a divide between the “anarchic” counter-cultural
movements and traditional anarchism, it is clear that Bookchin privileges a rigid,
universal conceptualization of anarcho-syndicalism, or what he often euphemistically
refers to as “democratic communalism.”1173 This form of “traditional anarchism”—
which is the only real form of anarchism for Bookchin—must adhere to four basic tenets
in order to be considered anarchist as such: “a confederation of decentralized
municipalities; an unwavering opposition to statism; a belief in direct democracy; and a
vision of a libertarian communist society.”1174
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While it is clear that Bookchin’s polemic against lifestyle anarchism attempts to
reinvigorate what he understands as a more traditional anarchism of the past, his critique
of anarchic counter-cultural forms of resistance nevertheless betrays some of his other
works in which he rejects the antiquated model of the proletariat as the locus of struggle,
while analyzing counter-cultural movements toward new forms of community as the key
fulcrum of resistance in contemporary society.1175 Nevertheless, with these basic tenets,
it is clear that Bookchin understands anarchism from a much different perspective than
the one elaborated throughout this project. Since the first premise designates the
alternative form of political praxis that animates Bookchin’s critique of the state-form,
anarchism in this sense can be situated in relation to the key question that animates the
political works of Plato and Aristotle—that is, a future vision of how society ought to
best be organized, and a coinciding programme for implementing the management of
such a society. In other words anarchism, in the sense Bookchin, attributes to it
designates a theory of politics in which an institutional counter-power (albeit in a nonstatist and decentralized form) might be implemented as an alternative to the state. At
stake in Bookchin’s critique is less the question of resistance than of a return to a
classical conception of politics understood as a certain exercise and distribution of power.
In Bookchin, then, the notion of a social revolution refers not to a struggle against, but
toward, power—indeed, a struggle toward the development of an institutionalized
counter-power that counter-acts and displaces the power of the state. To be sure,
Bookchin conceives of power as the very substance of politics. As Bookchin maintains
elsewhere, politics designates a choice between power possessed by the people or power
possessed by the state: “Power that is not retained by the people is power that is given
over to the state.”1176 Insofar as Bookchin’s theory of politics understands power as the
substance of the political in which the development of a series of counter-institutions
might come to countervail the power of the state, such a theory therefore requires, as
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Bookchin suggests, a “recovery of a classical conception of politics.”1177 Such a return to
a classical conception of politics is set by Bookchin to describe what he refers to as the
“democratic dimension of anarchism,” in which politics is exercised in terms of a
“majoritarian administration of the public sphere”—that is, in terms of an oikonomia.1178
While Bookchin attempts to eradicate the state rom the field of the political, the
development of an institutional counter-power nevertheless still turns upon the problem
of government as the locus through which politics is exercised.
I need not go into extensive detail here regarding a discussion of Bookchin’s
commitment to so-called traditional anarchism; instead what is important is the decisive
division he draws between politics conceived as resistance and politics conceived as a
social revolution. Indeed, it is in the context of a form of politics expressed as
resistance—which Bookchin worries is in danger of supplanting the notion of social
revolution—that the critique of Foucault which drives his text is situated. Although
Bookchin is not a particularly strong reader of Foucault, he nevertheless draws an
immediate correspondence between “lifestyle anarchism” and the latter’s theory of
resistance. Bookchin writes:
Consciously or not, many lifestyle anarchists articulate Michel Foucault’s
approach of “personal insurrection” rather than social revolution, premised as it is
on an ambiguous and cosmic critique of power as such rather than on a demand
for the institutionalized empowerment of the oppressed (original emphasis).1179
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While Bookchin’s critique is less a critical assessment of Foucault’s work than a selfreflexive nostalgic affirmation of an ‘authentic’ anarchism of the past, what is at stake in
this passage is the contrast Bookchin posits between Foucault’s conception of politics as
“insurrection” and the traditional notion of “social revolution.” While Foucault never
uses the term “personal insurrection,” Bookchin’s critique is at once directed against this
conception of politics as insurrection, as well as how the question of “resistance” within
this conception of politics “becomes entirely polymorphous.”1180 At stake in Bookchin’s
critique, however, is less the distinction between insurrection and revolution, than the
ways in which Foucault’s theory of resistance refuses to ascribe to a unifying logic from
which a politics of resistance could assume the form of a universal “social revolution.”
Because Foucault neither presupposes a universal character that binds all forms of
resistance to a particular ideology, nor a singular, all-encompassing form of revolt from
which the politics of resistance might assume the form of an institutional counter-power,
Bookchin argues that there can be no possibility of revolution—and thus no possibility of
anarchism—in Foucault. To demonstrate this point, Bookchin cites part of Foucault’s
fifth thesis in order to demonstrate how a “polymorphous” conception of resistance
fundamentally eradicates the chance of a communal form of anarchism. “Foucault,”
Bookchin argues, “fosters a perspective that ‘resistance is never in position to
power…Hence there is no single [read: universal] locus of Great refusal’” (Bookchin’s
brackets).1181
As indicated in the above passage from The History of Sexuality, what Bookchin
takes issue with is how Foucault’s theory of resistance appears to exclude a certain
universality through which individual revolts might be redirected toward a collective
vision of how society could best be arranged. For Bookchin, then, if “anarchism” is to
“resolutely retain its character as a social movement,” then it must be “programmatic”
(original emphasis).1182 In other words, Bookchin’s understanding of social revolution is
prescriptive in regard to both the specific form revolt must assume, as well as a
teleological prescription of how society must be organized in line with a particular
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ideology. In his critique of Foucault’s theory of resistance, Bookchin reveals his own
nostalgia for what he views as a more traditional understanding of politics, in which
anarchism designates the institutional development of a counter-power that rivals the
state. More critically, it is my contention that what is revealed in Bookchin’s polemic
against “lifestyle anarchism” reproduces the logic of the archē anarchism opposes.
While a lot more could be said about Bookchin’s polemic against “lifestyle
anarchism,” it is my contention that if radical political theory is to avoid the logic of the
archē traced throughout this study, that an anarchist theory of resistance ought to both
resist a politics of program, as well as a prescriptive theory of how society ought to be
arranged when one is freed from government. In other words, an anarchist theory of
resistance must be rethought anarchically, and thus against the traditional notion of social
revolution. Because Bookchin works squarely within a classical conception of politics,
his theory of social revolution is less a theory of resistance, than a theory of power—that
is, “municipalist confederal power to countervail the state.”1183 Yet as I have maintained
throughout this study, power is to be resolutely distinguished from politics, wherein the
latter can only be understood on condition of the permanent potential of resistance. In
this regard, it has been my contention that politics is not what takes place in a struggle
toward power or in a revolutionary confrontation for a new order, but that which, in its
agonistic specificity, emerges as a paradigm of resistance, a particular art of not being
governed which, in withdrawing from power, could never assume the form of an archē.
While such a conception does not necessarily exclude the idea of revolution, what is to be
resisted is what Foucault refers to as the “pure law of the revolutionary” which, in
prescribing not only the form revolt ought to take, but also how society ought to be
organized, relocates the paradigm of the archē in the notion of revolution itself.1184
Indeed, in a review of André Glucksmann’s 1977 text The Master Thinkers,
Foucault invokes the example of the Gulag to explain the fundamental logic inherent in
revolutionary discourse. “In the Gulag,” Foucault writes, “one sees not the consequences
of an unhappy mistake, but the effects of the ‘truest’ of theories in the political order.”1185
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The horrors that occurred in relation to Stalin’s revolutionary ideal, call into question, for
Foucault, the very logic of revolution itself and not just Stalin’s alleged
(mis)interpretation of it. Anarchism, of course, has produced no Gulag of its own. Yet,
what is particularly striking in Foucault’s critique, is how the logic of revolution is
intimately bound to the logic of the state, and thus that its very possibility always runs the
risk of collapsing into a form of authoritarian biopolitics. Thus, while Foucault maintains
in The History of Sexuality that it is the “strategic codification of these points of
resistances that makes a revolution possible,” we have seen how he laments in conclusion
that this possibility of turning resistance into revolution is in fact “somewhat similar to
the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power
relationships.”1186 Indeed, herein lies the political aporia traditional thinkers such as
Bookchin have never been able to overcome; a revolutionary politics is a form of politics
that can only be instituted as archē; while the state emerges as a paradigm of the archē,
revolution reintroduces the archē in the institution of a new order. It is this fundamental
nexus that links the politics of the state to the politics of revolution through the paradigm
of the archē that has yet to be fully thought through in the anarchist tradition. In this
regard, rather than an anarchist theory of the political based in a universal logic of class
struggle, in which politics is conceived as revolutionary overthrow of state power, it is
my contention that what is required by anarchist philosophy is not only an alternative
theory of the political in which resistance, rather than power, designates the emergence of
politics, but also an anarchist theory of agonistic resistance in which politics refers to an
insurrectionary withdrawal from power. Such a form of politics can only be elaborated
as an art of not being governed, a movement in life which, in refusing to constitute itself
as power, prefigures the condition of anarchy in the ungovernable.

Destituent Politics and the Art of Not Being Governed
Although anarchism is by no means reducible to a theory of revolution, insofar as the
notion of social revolution is often privileged as the dominant expression of an anarchist
politics, it might be stated that problem of the archē has never been fully eradicated from
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revolutionary discourse and praxis. Indeed, inasmuch as anarchism has sought to
articulate a politics of resistance in terms of revolution, anarchist theory has never been
able to overcome the aporia that lies at the basis of this conception of politics; indeed, in
attempting to realize anarchy through the revolution, the conceptual impasse anarchist
theory has yet to overcome is how to realize anarchism without either reproducing the
archē in the institution of a new order, or in the sovereign biopolitical logic that takes the
elimination of one’s adversaries as the means of creating and maintaining a social
revolution. Although anarchists have attempted to rethink the possibility of revolution by
distinguishing social revolution from the Marxist notion of a political revolution, the
question of how to realize anarchism without reterritorializing on the problem of power
has never been fully solved. Thus when Alexander Berkman attempts to theorize a form
of revolution that “seeks to alter the whole character of society,” he concludes that such a
“social revolution…would have to fight not only government and capitalism, but it would
also meet with opposition of popular ignorance and prejudice, those who believe in
government and capitalism” (original emphasis).1187 If, then, a social revolution requires
not only a struggle against government and capitalism, but also a struggle against “those
who believe in government and capitalism,” Berkman is forced to ask “how is it then to
come about?”1188 To be sure, anarchist theory has yet to figure out how to realize
anarchism without having to eliminate not just the exercise of power, but those whose
beliefs and ways of being differ from the truths held by anarchists themselves.
Indeed, insofar as a certain equivalence can be drawn between the state and
revolution this is because both fundamentally turn upon instituting a specific form of
constituent power. Thus, in order to rethink of a form of politics that could never assume
the form of an archē, it is my contention that an anarchist politics of resistance can no
longer be understood as a process of revolution—that is, of constituent power—but rather
as destitution. While Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have attempted to affirm the
relation between constituent power1189 and a form of revolutionary praxis within the
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universal revolutionary subjectivity they refer to as the “multitude,”1190 it is in
Agamben’s work that the conception of a destituent politics emerges as an anarchic
paradigm of resistance.1191 As we will see, what Agamben and The Invisible Committee
refer to as destituent power invites a unique way to understand how the question of
resistance in Foucault emerges as an art of not being governed rather than social
revolution. At the same time, however, what is at stake in this theory of destitution is not
a return to the question of how to realize an anarchist vision of society, but rather a return
to the relation between the politics of resistance and an ethos of revolt, a movement in
life which contests the state and government not by overturning one form of power with
another, but by withdrawing from its grasp. It rejecting the traditional notion of an
anarchist social revolution, it would be a mistake to affirm a politics of “lifestyle” in the
sense Bookchin understands the term. Nevertheless, in as much as anarchism seeks a
transformation in one’s conditions and life, it seems that a theory of resistance
necessitates a theory of life, not in terms of prescribing how one ought to live, but as an
ethos of revolt, a way of being in the world through resistance.
In a lecture titled “Elements for a Theory of Destituent Power” Agamben outlines
how the question of constituent power designates a specific paradox that connects the
logic of sovereignty to revolutionary praxis, through the paradigm of the archē. Yet, the
general thrust of Agamben’s lecture is that the nexus that links sovereignty to revolution
through constituent power requires a radical rethinking of a form of politics that could
never assume the form of an archē, a form of politics he refers to as “destituent
power.”1192 Here Agamben analyzes Walter Benjamin’s short work “Critique of
Violence,” and maintains that it is with Benjamin that the notion of a destituent politics
emerges as an anarchic paradigm of resistance. Agamben reads Benjamin’s essay as an
1190
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attempt to reserve a space for the possibility of a form of political violence fundamentally
distinct from, and outside of, the constituent power, that links revolutionary violence
together with state sovereignty. This form of violence which does not reproduce the
logic of sovereignty is what Benjamin refers as “pure,” or “divine violence.”1193 In
Benjamin’s essay, the nexus that connects the problem of sovereignty to revolutionary
praxis is laid bare in the distinction he draws between constituted power and constituting
power. While constituted power designates a form of “law-preserving violence” and
refers to a form of power inseparable from a pre-established state power, both
sovereignty and revolution are examples of a form of constituting power, or “law-making
power.”1194 By positing an inherent link between sovereignty and revolution in terms of
“law-making,” or constituting power, Benjamin’s point is to demonstrate how both
notions ultimately turn upon the same modes of political praxis, or violence. For
Benjamin, if an inherent nexus can be made that connects sovereignty to the logic of
revolutionary praxis, this is because:
the function of violence in law-making is twofold, in the sense that lawmaking
pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to be established as law,
but at the moment of instatement does not dismiss violence; rather, at this very
moment of lawmaking, it specifically establishes as law not an unalloyed by
violence, but one necessarily and intimately bound to it, under the title of power.
Lawmaking is power making (original emphasis).1195
Here, Benjamin’s argument is that both sovereignty and revolutionary praxis employ a
type of violence as means toward achieving what is to be established as law; yet, the
thrust of Benjamin’s critique is that lawmaking violence as such is intimately bound to
power. In the context of the anarchist notion of social revolution, Benjamin’s critique
demonstrates how a form of power overthrown by revolutionary violence inevitably leads
to another form of constituting power—that is, rather than eradicating the logic of the
archē, revolutionary praxis is fundamentally bound to the archē it opposes. Yet, it is
against the nexus that links sovereignty to revolution, that Benjamin attempt to rethink
1193
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the possibility of a radical political praxis that could never reproduce the dialectic
between law-making violence and law-preserving violence. Indeed, in searching for
another form of politics that neither turns upon the preservation or making of power,
Benjamin’s penultimate point is to gesture toward another form of politics that could
never assume the form an archē. It is in the context of elaborating an anarchic political
violence that Benjamin makes a further distinction between the “mythical violence” of
constituting power and “divine violence,” a specific type of “law-destroying” or non
violent violence.1196 While revolutionary violence can indeed be law-destroying, the
distinction Benjamin draws between revolutionary praxis and “divine violence” lies in
the way that the latter refuses to reterritorialize as power. “For this reason,” Benjamin
writes, “the first of these undertakings (mythical violence) is law making but the second
is anarchistic.”1197 Indeed, it is in this distinction between the constituting power of
mythical violence and the “law-destroying” non-power of “divine violence” that
Agamben locates the possibility of an anarchic politics of destitution.
To be sure, much of Agamben’s work is set to explore the possibilities of an
“anarchistic” form of political praxis that refuses the traditional logic of a constituting
power. Thus in “Notes on Politics” Agamben argues that the “concepts of sovereignty
and of constituent power, which are at the core of our political tradition, have to be
abandoned” (original emphasis).1198 If these two concepts are to be abandoned this
because sovereignty and constituent power are representations of “the being-hidden of
the historical archē.”1199 In contrast to the attempts to affirm revolutionary political
praxis, a form of praxis that reproduces the logic of the archē in the form of a constituting
power, in a lecture given in 2013 Agamben invokes Benjamin’s concept of “divine
violence” in order to elaborate what he refers to as “destituent power,” a unique form of
praxis which, in its refusal to be reconstituted as revolutionary archic power designates an
alternative paradigm for an anarchic politics of resistance. Indeed, it is the elaboration of
the concept and praxis of “destituent power,” and not that of revolution, that Agamben
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assigns as key task for political theory. For Agamben, then: “if revolutions…correspond
to constituent power, that is, a violence that establishes and constitutes the new law, in
order to think a destituent power we have to imagine completely other strategies, whose
definition is the task of the coming politics.”1200
By “destituent power” Agamben means to suggest a form of political praxis—
indeed of resistance—that deprives power of its archic foundation and, in doing so,
deactivates the possibility of an oikonomia. The fundamental distinction Agamben draws
between constituent and destituent power has been further affirmed by The Invisible
Committee in their text To Our Friends. According to The Invisible Committee, “to
institute or constitute power is to give it a basis, a foundation, a legitimacy;” in contrast,
however, “to destitute power is to deprive it of its foundations,” which as The Invisible
Committee concludes “is precisely what insurrections do.”1201 Indeed, it is because the
traditional paradigm of revolution fundamentally turns upon constituting its own archic
legitimacy, The Invisible Committee encourages us to “reconceive of revolution as pure
destitution instead” (original emphasis).1202 As “pure destitution,” a form of politics
which, in refusing to constitute itself as a form of power ruptures the logic of the archē,
therefore appears not as a revolutionary struggle to overturn power, but instead as an
“insurrectionary destitution” of power exercised as government.1203 For The Invisible
Committee, then, “destituting this epoch’s specific form of power requires, for a start,
that one challenge the notion that men need to be governed, either democratically by
themselves or hierarchically by others.”1204 It is this notion of insurrectionary destitution
that brings to light the fundamental relation Foucault posits between life and resistance in
the concept of the art of not being governed.
In challenging the constituent logic that has guided the traditional logic of
revolution, which is to say depriving radical politics of its archic foundation, Agamben
and Tiqqun both reveal that what is at stake in the politics of resistance is not a
revolutionary overthrow of power, but instead another form-of-life, a fundamental being-
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without government. Indeed, at stake in a theory of destitution is not a decisive
confrontation with power, but rather as Tiqqun suggests “certain coincidence between
living and struggling, a coincidence that is never given without simultaneously requiring
its construction.”1205 Rather than a revolutionary overthrow of power, it is this continuity
between living and resistance—a certain condition of being-without-government—that
best animates the history of anarchism. Indeed, it is this elemental point in which the aim
of resistance is to create another form-of-life and way of living that Bookchin neglects to
notice in his polemic against Foucault and “lifestyle anarchism.” For Agamben, then,
“the destitution of power and its works is an arduous task, because it is first of all and
only in a form-of-life that it can be carried out.” In this way, “only a form-of-life,”
Agamben concludes, “is completely destituent.”1206 To be sure, Agamben defines formof-life in a manner that captures the ways in which another way of life is itself what is
ultimately at stake in destituting power. A form-of-life, according to Agamben, is “a life
that can never be separated from its form,” which is to say a life so closely tied to its form
of living that it cannot be captured by power.1207 Thus, while Bookchin expels the
possibilities of a politics of resistance developed through one’s ethos of revolt, or way of
living in resistance Agamben, like Foucault, suggests that it is only in life that one is able
to resist or destitute power effectively. For Agamben, then, a “life that can never be
separated from its form is a life for which, in its way of living, what is at stake is living
itself, and, in its living, what is at stake above all else is its mode of living.”1208 Here
Agamben emphasizes that what is at stake in the term “form-of-life” refers to a specific
chiastic structure between life and its particular ethos; life is what is at stake in one’s
mode of living; and yet at the same time, what is at stake in this form of living is the
ethos, or way of living that gives life its form as such. Further emphasizing the vital
relation between life and its particular ethos, Tiqqun writes “[m]y form of life does not
relate to what I am, but to how, to the specific way, I am what I am.”1209 Herein lies the
key: insofar as an insurrectionary destitution of power can only take place within a form-
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of-life as the basic unit of revolt, the question of radical politics must be rethought as an
art of not being governed, rather than a revolutionary overturning of power. What is at
stake in a theory of destituent power is the elaboration of a specific ethos of resistance, a
specific nexus between one’s mode of living and resistance. Indeed, a life so closely tied
to its form of resistance, which is to say its specific way of living in the world through
revolt, is what Agamben calls the “ungovernable.”
Crucially, it is in this theory of destituent power that Agamben locates a real
political possibility for rethinking possibility of an anarchist politics of resistance without
collapsing into the constituent logic of revolutionary praxis. “It is this destituent
potentiality,” Agamben writes “that both the anarchist tradition and 20th century thought
sought to define without ever actually succeeding.”1210 If the anarchist tradition
neglected to understand the potentiality of a destituent politics, this failure itself arises in
the failure to rethink the possibility of a politics of resistance outside of the constituent
power of revolution, a form of praxis that could never reproduce the archē it opposes. At
the same time, however, it is within the intersection between Foucault’s theory of
resistance and the anarchist tradition that one can begin to glimpse the beginnings of this
form of destituent politics in the art of not being governed. Destituent power is itself not
a power, but a form of what Foucault would call “non-power.” Yet as non-power,
destituent power is a form of resistance which, in refusing to constitute itself as a form of
power, ruptures the logic of the archē while opening up the possibility for life without
government. This destituent politics as a form of resistance corresponds with a particular
ethos, a form-of-life, in which what is at stake in resistance is becoming-ungovernable. It
is in the context of a politics of destitution that the relation between Foucault and
anarchism I have been elaborating throughout this project can be fully understood.
In shifting the site of politics away from its traditional location in power,
government and sovereignty toward the sites of resistance, it is my contention that the
question of resistance within the anarchist tradition can also be understood as a
movement away from the field of power. Whereas the concept of revolution designates a
form of constituent power similar to the ends and means of sovereignty, an anarchic
politics of resistance necessitates a theory of destitution which, in withdrawing from
1210
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power, deprives it of its archic foundation in the movements toward the ungovernable. In
this understanding, it is no longer necessary for anarchism to propose a universal logic of
social revolution, nor a corresponding detailed prescription of how people ought to
organize and live their lives after they are freed from oppression in the coming
revolution. What is necessary, however, is a retheorization of the fundamental relation
between the politics of resistance and an insurrectionary ethos of revolt, a certain
continuity between movements of resistance and movements in life, in which what is at
stake in resistance is itself a particular form-of-life, an ethos, or way of being in the world
through resistance—that is, a politics conceived in terms of becoming-ungovernable. An
anarchist politics of resistance as such finds its basis and is elaborated as an art of not
being governed.
When the concepts of power and government are understood to emerge on
condition of resistance, the political conceived as archē reveals its own contingency, and
the question of politics is redirected from a constituent theory of an oikonomia to a
destituent theory of anarchy. This condition of anarchy—of being-withoutgovernment—is neither pre-existent nor that which proceeds from a revolutionary
overthrow of power, but that which emerges as resistance to governmentality. Politics as
such is that which destitutes the power of an oikonomia, a movement of resistance that at
once emerges with and prefigures the condition of anarchy. Yet, while Foucault teaches
us that politics emerges as resistance to governmentality, he also reveals that the site of
resistance is not always located at the site of power, but rather in a withdrawal from
power. Although resistance often directly coincides with the sites of power, what is at
stake in the movement of resistance against governmentality is not a fundamental
contestation, or final war that might ultimately bring about an end to all power, but
instead a transformation in life. Such a form of politics as resistance is less a new set of
arrangements than the refusal to be arranged, a withdrawal from power in the affirmation
of becoming-ungovernable. Resistance as a permanent process of becoming
ungovernable is therefore not to be conceived as an end in itself, but as the means of
transformation without end. An anarchist politics of resistance without end does not,
however, foreclose the possibility of realizing anarchism because the condition of
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anarchy animated in the politics of resistance generates the very potentiality of its own
persistence in the art of not being governed.
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